we kind of arranged them like a collage of letters or pictures that referenced all the colleges and pictures that the kids sent in. they are here almost to be an interactive piece. it is a way that kids and adults can come and still leave the same kinds of messages for the community. we really hardly ever see these blank. they are either washed off by the rain or washed off by the people that take care of the memorial. there are always people coming in to leave messages. we feel like that interaction is sort of an important part of this memorial. it is an important way of people letting other people know you are not alone. when we entered the competition to design this place, we had no idea of the weight that that would be. but once we came here, we met

the people. we started interacting with the community. we started to feel the responsibility we had taken on. we were very fortunate to have a big team of people around us and fortunate in that we got to communicate with the community a lot which was due to a process that the memorial foundation had been in place. they wanted to keep the community involved with this project and keep them up to date on everything that was happening. that was really good for us to feel like we were doing this as a partnership with the community. the weight was, it felt very heavy. at the same time, when we were finished, on the day before dedication, we really had to hand it over, we hoped we had done a good job and that we would be delivering to the community something that they could find comfort in, a place where they could come to and really find some sense of peace.

laurence silbeman, excerpts from the oral history recorded for the richard nixon presidential library, he discusses labor policies and politics from that era. the aftermath of president nixon's 1972 re-election. suspicions that the president was involved in watergate. this is the second of two parts. part one can be viewed at cspan.org/history. >> let's move to -- discuss the summer of 1971. tell us about your perspective how the bureau produced employment statistics. and the extent to which the statistics were accurate or not.

>> well, i never had -- i never really had any responsibility to look in to the adequacy or accuracy. i relied very heavily on jeff moore who was an utterly first class economist as to the accuracy. there was -- and jim hodgson used to sit down with jeff and his staff to go over the press releases and it was the press releases that became controversial. there was a feeling in the white house that the press releases were biased, that is to say, if unemployment went up, it was very bad thing. if it went down it was a statistical quirk that was the line. and i was called once by fred

molik who was head of personnel as i recall and expressed the disquiet of the white house of recent press releases. i went over them myself and thought this was some merit the white house concern. it didn't seem fair. this was consternation about two individuals who were senior people in the bls. one of them's name was henley and you reminded me earlier the other was goldstein. and in order to get them out of the line of fire and also perhaps to resolve the problem, i arranged for one of them to go to harvard for a year as a fellow and the other transferred somewhere else. and that's all i knew at that stage.

of course, subsequent events long after i left the department and indeed long after -- i'm not sure, after the nixon administration ended, we learned from the press that there was an anti-semitic tinge to all of this. it was not apparent to me at the time. i had no idea henley was jewish. and i cannot imagine, i cannot figure out why nixon, president nixon and malik would have known that henley was jewish. it was not a jewish name. >> in response to these concerns from the white house about the statistics from omb -- >> not about statistics about the press releases on the statistics. i don't think there was a concern about the statistics. >> but i just wanted to ask because george shultz at the time the omb director undertakes a review of statistics,

government statistics, as could the four departments that produced most of the statistics, hew. you recall this? >> no, i don't. i didn't recall this at all. but it would be census, bls, and who else? >> well, it was agriculture and commerce. >> yes. >> the census being commerce. and so -- but the first part of it was a reorganization of bls. >> oh, i do remember that. >> but what's interesting about this is that after this review, bls gets responsible for even more statistics than it was. >> yes, right. yes, i mean, george, of course, is a first class economist, knew the statistical business quite well and had enormous respect and regard for jeff moore and thought the bls did a professional job.

it was only the press releases that were so controversial as i recall. >> when did you become aware of the pressure from the white house to release -- to fire jeff moore? >> i'm not sure i recall -- yes, i do recall concern that why was -- why was he so passive in the development of press releases. why -- put aside the question of whether the statistics were absolutely accurate and a good job, why was he allowing his senior people to write press releases that were unfair, politically biased on the side of the democratic party. i do remember. but most of those concerns came i think to jim hodgson more than to -- maybe because jim was the one who was working on the press releases.

i was not. that was one part of the department that i hadn't been involved in until i got that call from fred malik. >> i mention this because after -- in early 1973 after jeff moore is fired. >> well, we were all fired. >> well, we'll get to your firing in a moment. but after he's fired he actual i had writes a letter to say that you had been good to him, had protected him. >> i probably did. i probably did. i didn't -- i certainly thought the world of him, and if there's anybody who criticized him, i would have defended him. he just was not -- there was no question he was an utterly first class economist. totally pure and a man of

enormous integrity. just did not understand the political world at all, so he was not sensitive to how a press release would be treated by "the washington post" and "the new york times." >> we skipped over this, but i'd like to return to it -- >> so, you know, come to think of it, there must have been some effort to get rid of him earlier. now i dimly recall. but i can't remember where it would have come from. >> well, it was actually motivated by colston. >> well, of course, yeah, but i don't know how. since i didn't talk -- since i had refused to talk to colston for somered. for some period much time, he would not have communicated that to he. >> let's move to that, then. when did you stop talking to colston? >> can you remind when colston came to the white house? was it about '70? >> it was '70. >> okay.

he came from another staff. it was sort of a picture offing a liberal republican and man of enormous integrity and decency. i began to be aware of colston's influence when he or someone on his staff would communicate something to the labor department which led me to believe that in his effort to seek political support from local trade unions around the country, he was promising some relief from department of labor, regulatory and legal proceedings. i have always felt that the most heinous crime any administration can engage this is a political

slant on law enforcement. and, therefore, i instructed people who were involved in law enforcement to ignore colston and his staff. i also received a complaint from an independent agency that was allied with the labor department, national labor relations board, my ex-executive assistant had become deputy counsel, john irving, and he told me with white house pressure on lrb cases and i told john to ignore it. so i came to have a profound distrust and distaste for colston's methodology and generally instructed people in the department to ignore anything that came from him.

as a matter of fact, years later when i was being nominated to deputy attorney general and i was looking through papers in my basement, to find a particular document, my wife and i came across a historical document that was in my files that i never even noticed, and it was a recommendation, a personnel recommendation, from the white house. but attached to it was a little sheet of paper from colston to the individual who had sent the document to my office, and the little piece of paper said for god sake don't tell silberman this came from me or he'll kill it. and nobody ever noticed. so, we continued -- we continued to clash. >> well, let's talk about the most important clash in 1972, please.

>> well, the occupational safety and health bill had been passed, and at my request senator javitz had included in the bill a provision creating a politically appointed post of regional director in all the regions of the labor department. my concern was to have an individual senior enough in each region to be able to ameliorate conflicts between divisions of the department and who would report back to the undersecretary and secretary. in the selection of these individuals, i had asked frank sarr who was assistant secretary for administration, to be sensitive to minorities, look for qualified minorities.

and he came up with the notion of one fellow for the new york region by the name of clay cattrall, who was the head of the manpower administration in that office, was a republican and a harvard business school graduate. very talented, able guy. i told frank to appoint him. and frank came to me and said the civil service won't approve. i said why? anyway, turned out that the civil service was under instructions from the white house not to approve cattrall. to make a long story very short it turned out that peter brennan, the head of the building trades union in new york either in the city or the state, had objected to a black and african-american as head of the labor department because he was concerned about the affirmative action plans and

must have taken a position that merely because he was black he would be objectionable. i found that horrifying. and when i was told that the white house would simply not approve the appointment of cattrall, i sent a letter of resignation to the president through george schultz. i first discussed it, of course, with jim hodgson. jim hodgson was in agreement with me that cattrall should be appointed but didn't think the issue was one he was prepared to resign on. i felt since i had been so much responsible for affirmative action and was now concerned that i made a mistake in going too far, i certainly had a responsibility to object to any discrimination. and the opposition to cattrall was strictly because he was black, so i sent a letter of resignation to schultz.

we spent two or three days, i think it was even three days, in which i had lunch and dinner and breakfast with george several times in which he tried to convince me to be more accommodating. i remember his telling me that nelson rockefeller was involved in support of brennan, such a powerful political figure in the state of new york, john mitchell who was head of the president's re-election committee was involved. and i told george i would resign quietly, but i could not back down on this issue. then i was asked to go down to key biscayne to meet with the president, and i said this was no point in it because i wasn't going to change my view. i would be glad to resign and resign quietly. i think it was three days later george schultz called me over to

the white house again and said, okay, you can appoint clay cattrall, but you caused a lot of difficulty, a lot of trouble, and it is -- you may not travel to the state of new york between now and the election. >> was it -- >> as a government official. >> was it at this time that you had that meeting with john ehrlichman where he talked about colston? >> no, it was later that summer, later that -- i think it was june. i became increasingly concerned about colston's talk with local unions about cases that the labor department had. i was perfectly prepared to do all i could, and i did do a great deal, to gain building

trades and other union support for nixon in '72. george meanie, for instance, was appalled at mcgovern. and so there was a richfield to reach for union support. but i would never under any circumstances touch political discussions with a law enforcement case. and the more colston would do that, the more concerned i got. so i went to ehrlichman, i think it was in june, to ask for his intervention in stopping colston from interviewing with law enforcement cases. and i remember his -- at this point i had not the slightest idea, i had never seen john ehrlichman do anything dishonest and had a high respect for him. of course, i knew nothing about watergate.

and john in response to my concern said, you know, i have just had a meeting with cap weinberger about that very kern everybody concern, well, cap concerned about colston, i don't know if it was law enforcement, it was something he was complaining about colston. and john said to me there's nothing i can do. colston is the second most powerful man in the government. >> do you recall your response to -- >> no. no, i was appalled. but i don't recall what i said. >> tell us, please, before we discuss your firing about the differences between george schultz and jim hodgson. we haven't really talked about jim hodgson as secretary of

labor, what was he like? >> hodgson, the "g" is silent. jim is a wonderful human being and a first class -- was a first class secretary. he suffered badly by comparison to george, and george may have been imcomparable in many respects. he did something that hurt him badly. in loyalty to -- there was a -- excuse me, stop. there was a conflict between meany and the administration. i think it involved wage and price controls, but i can't recall exactly what it was.

but meany, of course, was at that point allied with the democrats before mcgovern was nominated and is still allied with the democrats in the house and senate at least the northern democrats. and he attacked the white house on something. and hodgson, jim, on his own -- i wish -- i didn't have a chance to consult on that -- was called by somebody in the white house, it could have been colston, urging him to respond in defense of the president. and he attacked meany. i don't think george would have ever done that. because the effectiveness of the secretary of labor in a republican administration in those days required at least a diplomatic relationship with the afl-cio. when jim criticized meany, meany's response was devastating. it was, i do not respond to the janitor. and i don't think jim ever

recovered from that. jim and i had a wonderful relationship. he is -- my job was the chief operating officer. his job as secretary of labor was to pick big issues that he was interested in and pursue those big issues. and also he was the outside man and i was more the inside man. >> could you give us a character sketch, please, of george meany. >> george meany was an extraordinarily powerful, brilliant, and ruthless individual. he once said to me something which was very true but chilling, it could have been in his explanation of why he had

attacked jim, and after he attacked jim i was in an awkward position because it was my job to continue to have relationships with the afl-cio, but to be loyal to jim i felt quite bifurcated and tugged in that situation. but i'm having this conversation with meany defending jim. and i think i may have told him that jim was under pressure from the white house or whatever it was. but that wasn't so smart, because meany's reaction was, well, he shouldn't have done it. but i remember what meany said in that conversation, which is if you don't like the governmental policy, you find an individual who can be identified with the policy, either as the creator or the salesman, and

then you destroy him. >> tell us about your reaction to the nixon administration's attempt to develop better relations with the teamsters. >> well, i was pretty sympathetic to it in some respects. because it seemed to me, i was concerned that under the democratic administration the kennedys had made the teamsters too much of a public enemy, continuing on beyond hoffa, and i had a lot of respect for the general counsel, general counsel of teamsters, who subsequently went on to be a professor i think at michigan. and his name -- his last name

begain with st. somebody, i can't recall it offhand. and i dealt with him. and he was a man of scrupulous decency and honor, so i was a little concerned that the teamsters had become needless scapegoats. i think subsequently we found out that fitzsimmons was not as decent as i hoped he was. but i certainly understood the natural inclination of both the teamsters and the republican administration to get together because the teamsters had been so much on the outs both from the afl-cio and the democratic party before then, so it was an obvious marriage of convenience. it was interesting because when the teamsters supported nixon, one of the -- when they agreed

to support him, one of the quid pro quos that nixon would abandon this legislation that i had originally developed, the final offer of selection for national emergency disputes. and i recall that george schultz called me on the phone and said we're going to withdraw our support from that legislation. i said, wait a minute, we developed the legislation. he said, president made a deal with the teamsters, and i recognized that was a policy call the president had every right to make. so, i had to call bob packwood who was leading the charge in the senate for our legislation to tell him we were withdrawing from the field. as i told you earlier, that was not a pleasant conversation. he was as mad as a wet hornet. >> was the policy toward davis bacon influenced at all by the

civil rights consideration? >> yes. george schultz and jim hodgson together were both quite convinced, and i think accurately so, that davis bacon had initially been passed in order to restrict competition from african-american, black employees in the construction industry. so it had an infamous genealogy. and both george and jim regarded it as an unwarranted barrier to entry for minorities and others. also it served to protect the construction industry, construction unions, from general competition.

and jim hodgson was particularly concerned about, as george had before him, about the wage levels in the construction industry which seemed to be way out of proportion to any productivity increases and was leading wage and price control -- wage spiral generally. we spent a lot of time -- jim hodgson worked with jon dunnlap, the dean of harvard, who subsequently became a secretary in the carter administration, to develop a stabilization plan which was sort of an interesting device. it was an ostensible government regulation of the construction union wage rates. i say ostensible because it really was a way in which the

international unions would control the locals. government involvement was more apparent than real. it was a brilliant device that john dunlap and jim hodgson came up with. and it served, unfortunately, to look much more effective as a government regulation scheme than it really was and was the precursor for nixon's invoking of wage and price control authority. which, of course, occupy -- which stunned washington, and that's what infuriated meany because the -- i thinkt'