when he attacked hodgson. because -- attacked the white house and then hodgson, because the democrats had been pounding on nixon to use the authority which they had given him to impose wage and price controls. in the expectation that nixon ideological would never do that because republicans were against wage and price controls, so it was a very convenient whipping forum, whipping post or whatever you would call it. connolly convinced nixon in '71 to invoke the authority which shocked the devil out of all of us, certainly me. i had just given a speech to an ada group saying we would never impose wage and price controls, and a week later we had done it. so, that construction industry stabilization plan growing out of in part the concern about

davis/bacon, but also concern about construction industry wage rates which were so high led to the white house conclusion that wage and price controls might work nationally. of course, they didn't. and shortly after wage and price controls were invoked, i was put on a committee with herb stein and jim lin to plan our exit of wage and price control. in the meantime, jim hodgson and other cabinet members seemed to spend -- and i occasionally replacing jim spent almost every day at the white house in cabinet-level meetings trying to ameliorate wage and price increases or come up with decisions on various wage and prices across the country which was bizarre. >> in --

>> remember, george schultz was -- john connolly and george schultz both had a role in administering that program and arnie weber was the executive director. and then don rumsfeld was, too. >> well, in an interview with secretary schultz said he was against wage and price control. >> i think it's true. it was connolly that convinced nixon. i'm sure schultz was against it. he hated the idea. so that's why it was amusing that he was put in charge with it. >> in an interview with us vice president cheney talked about how he played a role working for rumsfeld and actually assigning some of these targets, you know, deciding how much of this or that could be produced. i think he gave us an example of the wine industry. >> it was truly bizarre. it was a nightmare. but one funny incident. the television networks came in

to see me. i don't know why i was designated as the person to see on this, but the office of the legal counsel assistant attorney general, he had not yet been appointed to the supreme court, came in my office as well because the network ceos and their general counsels were asserting it was unconstitutional to impose price controls on the network. the first amendment protected their right to set prices. bill and i had a short conference in which we agreed that this was ridiculous.

as a legal matter. but i told bill, let me handle it a different way. i said, you know, gentlemen, if we conclude that price controls on the networks are constitutionally dubious, it would follow that we would have to suspend any wage controls on the network. oh, well, we don't want that. that was the end of that. >> but if you would have used that argument, you could have also found the entire program constitutional dubious. >> of course. no, no. it was just the networks or the press. that was their argument. >> the freedom of the first amendment. but you could have found -- >> nobody was making that argument. that had gone by way of the supreme court decision in yakus back in world war ii.

>> oh. but okay. that didn't just apply in times of war, though? >> no. you don't want me to go into a legal analysis but -- >> no. okay. >> it is true that yakus was decided in wartime and that's the reason it was easy for the supreme court to decide it. but the constitutional decision did not limit it to the supreme -- to wartime. >> so at the time -- >> but george was wholly opposed to it, and i -- when i gay that speech to the aba, it was based on my understanding of not just my view but george's view and jim's view and i thought nixon's view. i knew nothing about connelly's persuasion -- sessions with nixon. >> can we focus a bit on the exit strategy. this was a group that -- this must have been a slightly

controversial group. i mean, there were people in the administration who supported wage and price control. >> nobody supported it on its merits. the ones who supported it, supported it only for political reasons. everybody agreed we should get out of it as soon as possible. >> okay. but were you going to get out of it before the '72 election or not? >> no. short answer no. >> so, the exit strategy would be? >> i think we may have implemented something before '72 but we were planning on the post-election. look, it was clear to everybody in the administration this was an election ploy, but the democrats deserved it for having demanded it for so long. >> right about this time i think you have that discussion with volpe and romney -- >> no, this was after. >> when did you have that discussion when they asked --

>> after we were all fired. >> after we were all fired please tell us about that discussion. >> after -- well, let me see now. i'm not positive about that. after the election of '72 in which a number of cabinet officers, undersecretaries or deputies, and assistant secretaries' resignations were accepted to put it euphemistically, i remember a dinner, actually it was cocktails, with jim hodgson, george romney, john volpe, dick van dusan who was the undersecretary of hud, romney's undersecretary, and me. and romney, hodgson, and volpe

were complaining about the fact that they had never, or almost never, had any -- certainly never any small meetings with nixon on domestic policy matters. and i had had that one meeting with nixon on the legislation to deal with emergency disputes. turned out that that was one of the few meetings he ever had with subcabinet officials on a domestic matter. and these three cabinet officers were speculating that nixon never wanted to meet with them because he was afraid that they would press their pet projects and it would bust their budget. they all said they wouldn't have done that, but they just felt frustrated because they didn't

have any meetings with him. i thought about that meeting after the tapes came out and i read more and more of nixon's discussions and got more and more of a perception of his personality, and i also had one meeting with him after i was fired, with my wife, and i concluded that nixon did not have the meetings with his cabinet officers one-on-one not because he was afraid of their efforts to lobby him, but i think nixon was aware of the fact that his personality was not all that pleasant, that he had -- he realized he had real negative aspects, and i don't think he wanted to show them to too many people.

so, he met only with ehrlichman, haldeman, colston and george schultz, connelly and a few others. i think when he met with george he was pretty careful not to exhibit the same kind of behavior or personality that he did in the tapes to haldeman, ehrlichman, colston and connelly. >> when you listened to the tapes, did you -- when you listened to the tapes, did you come to some conclusion about the role of anti-se mettism? >> yes, i was absolutely horrified to read about nixon's statement about jews. if i had ever heard any of those statements, i would have resigned on the spot. there's one rather amusing aspect of this.

in -- before the election of '72, i was called by someone in the white house to ask -- no, to be told that i was to speak to a large congregation of rabbis in chicago. make a political speech. i says, you know, i'm not -- i'm not particularly religious. i'm not a great political speechmaker. i'm not sure i'm the right man for this. and the person at the other end of the phone said, well, you are the highest-ranking jew in the administration. i said wait a minute, what about kissinger? no, no, you actually outrank him as the undersecretary of labor. and he can't make political speeches as national security adviser, you can.

so i reluctantly went out to chicago to speak to these rabbis. rumsfeld who was working in the white house and an ex-congressman from illinois was also the speaker. and this has been a great bit of amusement between the two of us ever since. because after the two speeches the chief rabbi who had put together this meeting of hundreds of rabbis came to me -- first asked what synagogue, what temple i belonged to, i didn't belong to any temple, but i decided that every town has a beth israel, so i said beth israel, and i had no idea where it was in the washington area. he said, i'm not so sure that's such a good temple. and then he said, i've got some advice to you, your speech did not resonate amongst jews.

it didn't give -- it didn't have enough of a jewish feel the way rumsfeld did. i couldn't believe it. when i told don, i said it's not fair, you're a kraut and not a jew. why should you be perceived as a jew? we've been good friends ever since. we laughed about that. but, of course, he was a politician, i wasn't. but in any event, going back to it, there were a lot of jof jews in the administration, particularly in the white house, herb stein, chairman of the counsel of economic advisers -- oh, no, he wasn't chairman yet. he was a member of the council. bill safire, of course, was the speechwriter. len garman was there. when i saw on the tapes or heard

about nixon's remarks about jews and also learned about malik's -- the background of malik, i remember telling all three of them that i was appalled that they would have worked around nixon given his anti-semitism. they said it was all voting blocs. and i said nonsense, it was straight-out anti-semitism. and all three of them were much more identified with the jewish community than i was. i think they were rationalizing. >> before we move from the department of labor period, did you work at all on the u.s. postal service issue there was a postal strike. >> yes. jim hodgson worked on that more than i did. i helped a little bit, but jim

worked on that more than i did. >> okay. >> it actually turned out that the postal service was -- had as its representative a guy by the name of james blaisdale, who had been the founder of the law firm i had been a partner of in honolulu. and i'd never met him. he had left and come back to the mainland before i came to hawaii. and he was enormously competent and able and he and jim worked a great deal together on that postal strike. >> if i'm not mistaken there is an arena named after blaisdale in honolulu. >> that's a different blaisdale. that's an ex-mayor. that's neil blaisdale. >> did you have any -- i don't know why you would, but just have to ask. did you have any inkling that, "a," your resignation would be requested and, "b," that it

would be accepted -- >> no. >> -- in 1972? >> no. all i knew that i could be in a tenuous position because of my obduratness concerning clay cattrall and colston. but there was speculation in the press that i would succeed jim and there were afl-cio types who advocated that, so i thought i was in pretty good order generally. i think i had a reputation of being a good administrator within the administration and a good reputation with both management, labor and civil rights groups which are our three constituencies, but i knew i was not amazed when i was asked to leave.

i was astonished that all the resignations -- they were all asked to resign and that the number of resignations which were accepted. >> not many. >> plenty. >> of course, the government was -- >> yes, in the labor department everybody's resignation was accepted except for mike moscow who was my deputy went over to an assistant secretary of hud under jim lin who was elevated from undersecretary of commerce to secretary of hud. but the labor department was pretty much wiped out. >> i think alexander haig would explain that the challenge he faced was he found a half-staffed government when he comes in as chief of staff in '73. >> yes. and many of those white house people were put all -- put in as jobs deputy secretary or undersecretaries of departments.

now, my resignation was accepted, but i was offered a job, two jobs. and this is -- i was told by ehrlichman that i was offered the post of a judge on the ninth circuit, now, i'm from hawaii. you understand the courts of appeal, you know, ninth circuit is the west, headquartered in san francisco. i was all of 37. and part of me had always dreamed, one part of me, had always dreamed about the court of appeal. ehrlichman said, president thinks you're a first class lawyer but you're too rigid for politics. and will you take the seat on the ninth circuit. and i said, of course.

and i went to -- a week later i went to a white house dinner or reception -- a dinner i think it was, where i think it was -- it either was a labor-related relations dinner or it was for people who were -- i can't remember why i was there. but nixon, my wife and i were there, and nixon told my wife how delighted he was i was going to be on the ninth circuit and he told me how delighted he was. and a week later the deputy attorney general called me on the phone and said, larry, has the president offered you a seat on the ninth circuit? i said yes. you can't have that. i said, i don't understand. he said it's already been committed to ronald reagan, governor of california, would have the choice.

and shortly thereafter ehrlichman called me and said this is really embarrassing, this is a real mess. would you be willing to take a seat on the district of columbia district court with a promise that you would get the first seat on either the d.c. court of appeals or the ninth circuit? i said, no, john. i think -- i was annoyed at this point, and i said, no, i'll just go out in the law practice. at that point george schultz called me and offered me a post of undersecretary of treasury, not the number two, not the deputy, comparable, but the number three position at treasury. i thought about it for only a moment and i thought, you know, i've had enough. i don't like -- i was truly annoyed. i didn't really want to be part of the administration anymore. >> what changes your mind a year later? >> ah. well, it wasn't quite a year

later when i was first approached. the fellow who had been personnel chief in the labor department, a young man by the name of david weimer, he had done a wonderful job and i recommended to the white house, and he had become the personnel chief in the white house, very competent guy, very able. he called me several times in 1973 as watergate was blowing, asking me whether i would take various positions in the administration. one of them was gsa administrator. but another was a -- i can't recall what it was. i said, no, i don't want anything to do with the administration. because watergate was blowing and i was deeply suspicious that the president himself was involved. >> let's start with why? >> i heard john dean's

statement, i won't be a scapegoat, i figured huh-uh, that almost surely means that nixon was involved. that was my suspicion. so i turned david down. i also turned down john ehrlichman who asked me to represent him. or represent a committee he was forming for something. i can't recall. but i didn't want anything to do with it. i did agree to represent ed morgan who was, you may recall, ultimately indicted for backdating nixon's deed, papers, for tax purposes. i cross-examined morgan for two days and i was absolutely convinced he was innocent. i largely had gotten him off and i went in to justice and i'll

come back to why i went in to justice and i passed him to dick van dusan who was somebody he also trusted. and after i was deputy attorney general, dick van dusan called me and said after the special prosecuor had determined not to proceed against morgan, he went in and confessed and turns out he was guilty, and i realized afterwards that i should never represent a friend in a situation like that because both van dusan and i were convinced he was absolutely innocent. in any event, so weimer had come after he a couple of types to come back in because during the watergate hearings all of my battles with colston became public. so, for a brief period in my career i was a hero to "the new york times" and "the washington post." halcion days, for a conservative, that's very

unusual. but i wouldn't come back until after the massacre. and the night of the massacre, i remember my wife saying to me, or no, somebody at dinner saying to me, you know, i bet they come after you for deputy attorney general. and bill saxby was picked as attorney general after the massacre. you may recall that after the massacre, and i don't have to explain the massacre here, after the massacre, only two republicans -- first of all, had to be a republican senator to get confirmed, and only two were thought suitable. saxby and cook of kentucky, and the reason is they were both center republican, not moderate republicans, but center republicans. they were far conservative as you could get. a conservative republican would

not be confirmed, but these two senators. and saxby you will recall had said a couple months before when asked whether he thought nixon was aware of what went on in watergate said, reminds me of a fellow who played a piano in a house of ill repute and claimed he didn't know what went on upstairs, so saxby was the love in washington. he was picked. easily confirmed. and i had worked with saxby on the occupational safety and health bill. he initially wanted somebody else as deputy. weimer called me and said, would you be willing to come back as deputy? now at that point the justice department was virtually independent of the white house. i said, you know, i think i would depending on what -- talking with saxby. he said, we need somebody who was, number one, an administrator, good lawyer, an administrator, a reliable republican and with sufficient integrity to get confirmed. we don't have too many people

that fall in that category. as a matter of fact, the only person we can think of is you because you're the only one who is a lawyer who has been a chief operating officer of a department. and bill saxby made clear he was not going to -- he was getting old, he was not going to spend that much time administrating, managing the department, so bill and i had a session and we agreed. and i agreed to come back. now, bill after he was nominated had a session with the president in which he went out and said, i believe the president, weimer called me and said will you have the same meeting with the president? i said, david, of course, i would meet with the president, but i will not say i believe him because i don't. and it's a testament to how -- needless to say i'm sure weimer never told that to the president.

but it was a testament to how desperate they were to get somebody who was confirmable as deputy attorney general. and who they thought was a reliable republican but would still be sufficiently independent to get confirmed. >> you've been watching american history tv on c-span3 where every week we feature eyewitness accounts of the people and events that have shaped our nation. you've just seen an oral history from the collection of the richard nixon presidential library. on c-span radio every saturday this month at 6:00 p.m. eastern you can hear from president nixon himself. listen in on the president's conversations with future president gerald ford, ronald reagan and george h.w. bush and with key white house advisers and the directors of the fbi and cia. for schedule information go to cspan.org/schedule and listen online at c-spanradio.org and

nationwide on xm 119 and 90.1 fm in the washington, d.c., area. all weekend long, american history tv joins our cox communications cable partners in oklahoma city to showcase its history and literary culture. settled in 1889, oklahoma city is the largest city in oklahoma. >> my name is terry jordan. curator at the archive. previously the tapes were on analog tape. it is in this room. it is chilly.

we keep the temperature and humidity down for preservation of the materials. >> how far back does your collection date? back to the 1930s for radio advertisements to the 1950s for television advertisements. some of our earliest material are commercials from the eisenhower campaign. [ no audio ]