this weekly from london, the ceremony and pageantry of the state opening of parliament. until recently, parliament's

official opening was recently held at the end of the year. with changes of the election rules, it's been changed to the spring. live coverage starts at 5:30 a.m. eastern on c-span2. saturdays this month, c-span radio is airing more of the nixon tapes from the collection of secretly recorded phone conversations from 1971 to 1973. this saturday at 6:00 p.m. eastern, hear conversations with deputy national security adviser alexander haig. >> very significant, this "new york times" expose of the most high lie classified documents of the war. >> oh, that. i see. i didn't read the story but you mean that was leaked out of the pentagon? >> sir, there's a whole study that was done for mcnamara and then carried on after mcnamara

left by clifford and the peacenicks over there. this is a devastating security breach. >> in washington, d.c. listen at 90.1 fm, chant 119 and at c-span radio.org. the marine corps university hosted a discussion looking at the historical origins and future of terrorist organizations, specifically the taliban in afghanistan and the united national peoples movement in nepal. this is part of a conference examining how terrorist organizations have evolved over time on a regional and global scale. we're pleased to have such an interesting and distinguished set of panelists here to discuss first the taliban in afghanistan

and then the nepali maoists in nepal. to be going after such a dynamic speaker, we're going to have to step up our game, i think. first i just -- i would like to introduce dr. amin tarzi, he is truly an expert on afghanistan, pakistan, he's written several books and numerous articles and so forth on the subject. and dr. tom marks has been doing a lot of work on special operations, as well as he's written a number of pieces on vietnam and nepal. you wrote a piece in 2003, i

think, army war college, which i just read last night. so without further adieu, i'd like to introduce dr. amin tarzi to go first. >> good afternoon. welcome to my home because my office is right up above here. i'll make one comment before i say anything. i'll be speaking on my own behalf using my .edu account. so i'm speaking as a scholar and not a member of the united states marine corps. i wish i had one of those extinguished insurgencies because i walked out -- i missed part of the session because the taliban just issued two statements as this conference was going on. so this is very ongoing, i have to tell you, it's very much ongoing. including the taliban under the title of this symposium, war termination, how terrorists and

radical group ends raise as couple of issues. first the taliban of al qaeda have never been designated themselves as a terrorist organization by any entity, although individuals within the organization have been designated of terrorists, the organization of the taliban has not been designated as such. secondly, because their affiliation in playing host to collide yaal qaeda, the talibane largest targest what we used to call the global war against terror. yet after a decade and a half, they have emerged i would even argue as a more stronger and more if not effective, more important political and military organization today. so the taliban currently neither a terrorist group nor coming to an end. however, they're a critical

player in determining war in afghanistan. what part they play ultimately as an adversary or as a partner remains unclear as we speak. let me just give you a little bit of background about what the taliban are. first of all, those of you who are linguists, the term taliban, you cannot have one taliban. it's a plural term, not singular. but we use it -- it's become an english word. it's a persian form of the arabic word talib which simply means a seeker or student. the arab equivalent simply means students. however, since 1994, the -- the islamic movement of afghan taliban or simply the taliban have become internationalally known as part of this group that

emerged seemingly from nowhere in southern afghanistan in october 2000, 1994. they mainly came from the group that was called the mujahadeen. as a political organizations are the taliban came to the scene of politics in kandahar with direct military and support of neighboring pakistan and was initially supported by financial by the the king of asssaudi ara. the original leaders claimed to be members of former student, ie, the taliban and one of the members of the mujahadeen groups mainly called hez-muslimi.

most of them were students -- most of them again, i say they came from different variations and one of pakistan's main support -- one of pakistan's main islamic groups. the taliban became the defact owe governmeo government in 1996 when they seized the de facto control of kabul and ousted the regime. he was assassinated several months ago. he was chosen ironically as the head of the peace council to deal with the taliban. at that time, he proclaimed

himself -- those of you who have studied islamic governance, it has a significance, it literally means the commander of the fateful and thus become the ruler of is began stan, he changed the name to islamic emirates of afghanistan. it transform from a loose pocket of fighters in which they were consolidated under one figure. unlike before, he became inaccessible to his people, a trait which still continues to date. we today in the united states of america and partially the afghan

government deals with an adversary to which we speak with but whose leader has not been seen or heard of in the last ten years. nobody has seen him alive nor has any even videotape, though there's a supposed couple of videotapes out, though he's not seen on them. the taliban government is centralized autocratic system was in part attributed to increasing ties between omar and leadership established in eastern afghanistan in 1996. again, osama bin laden came not through the taliban. he was there before the taliban came in. he was there under what was called eastern shore rarks which are people that are not part of the afghan government. they came in and took jalal bad.

the alliance was not something taliban was seeking initially. it just happened to be there and the title forged from there. in august 1998 the bombings of two u.s. embassies in africa by affiliates of osama bin laden prompted the united states to launch cruise missiles attacks on suspected terrorist camps in afghanistan and spearheaded an effort to isolate the taliban, both through u.s. and international sanctions and other means. thus the fate of thend osama bi were put together at that moment i would say, at 1998. however, i will say that the ideology of the taliban and that of osama bin laden was not the same then, although there was some in the taliban and continued to be in the taliban leadership see such an ideology.

i'm not talking about the terror but the internationalist aspect of the ideology. they view their struckle a beyond borders rather than the majority of at least the southern taliban where more nationalists, by that i mean more concerns about affairs of afghanistan per se and not people outside of them. this trend still continues, and as we speak, there are people within the taliban movement who are trying more what i would call the more nationalist figures who are trying to have a leadership perhaps beyond omar, however, the fact they are in pakistan and the pakistanis are refusing those elements to come to surface as a struggle we see now in the negotiations ongoing. the 2001 operation resulted in the removal of the government

from power. however, the main leadership of both of these organizations simply fled across the border into pakistan. the last major war, if you would, conventional war, was operation anaconda, which ended i would say april 2002. after that you have the have the bulk of these people out. of course now we know a year ago that osama bin laden was busy making new babies while he was there. beginning in 2002 insurgents opposed to the western backed government in afghanistan began a propaganda campaign. these insurgent who refer to themselves as mujahideen, the taliban do not refer to themselves as taliban. they do that as part of going back to their origins and you look at their web site, they call themselves the mujahideen. they are going back to the 90s to the groups we support, the

anti-soviet groups of mujahideen and called to their organization as a government. i call them the neotaliban became increasingly active in the southern parts of afghanistan and fed on the weakness, corruption and often absence of afghan government, lack of coordination of foreign objectives in afghanistan, profits from uncontrolled narcotic trade and foreign emergencies support. there were many reasons why they were being morphed into this power, not just their position to the foreign forces, though that was the main criteria of their message. sometimes it is said that the talibans were not so powerful, it was the afghan government that was so weak and this void was filled by them and i thought i agree with that assessment. by 2005 the taliban managed to become more than a nuisance

morphing into a full fledged insurgency and relying more and more on terror tactics. what i call the neotaliban or you would call the taliban today is not a monolithic group, nor do they share a common vision of afghanistan. it's what we call the qsd mainly concentrate in the southern afghanistan and their headquarters, most of the leadership is east in pakistan or in karachi, which is not even -- they're mostly in the northern province and these are mostly remnants of what we call the old taliban regime that ruled afghanistan between 1996 to 2001. the second group, the hakani

network, these are also former mujahideen, part of another group from mujahideen, they operate mostly in northern wirz stan. he has chunks of territory in the northern province and sorts parts.

this group also includes warlords, criminals and noncriminals and it includes opportunist, those pashtunes who feel they're losing their power. they're simply called enemies of peace and security. okay. since 2009 the marjts of those troops were contributing troops to isaf have decided to end or bring them in the fold of the

afghan government. the negotiations in my view did not only begin now, although officially we are engaged in it, it began in my view in 2001 in kandahar with mr. karzai at the helm. officially in 2003 there were negotiations going on, though the u.s. was not officially in it. today's negotiations is two-track negotiations, one, basically trying to bring in the foot soldiers of the taliban, the reintegration, the number two of that organization, my friend david katz is sitting right there. the second one is reconciliation, which actually tries to bring the leadership into a political agreement. what the united states wants from the pal i ban is to renounce violence, cut all ties with al qaeda, accept the constitution of the republic of afghanistan, including the rights of woman.

this is we have put on the table and to facilitate this earlier this year there was an office open in dohar in the persian gulf to facilitate this. a month and a half ago the negotiations halted because the taliban are not happy about one of the promises in this talk, which was to give them five of their leaders or more but this is basically an ongoing right now, at least the officials talks are halted. now, let me conclude since time is running out right now, we can discuss this more in question and answer what's going to happen. afghanistan is not just a taliban and afghan government. right now through this democratic process that actually united states and our allies ushered there, there is actually a genuine democratic movement.

i'm not saying afghanistan is a democracy per se but there's a democratic movement. there are democratic force there is. there are people other than the pashtuns. they seem more marginalized yet they are not out of the game. they havele lies, india, iran, uzbekistan, in that order, are active in pursuing all alliances they had pre-2001. when we discussion reconciliation with the taliban, it's not just whether they accept the rules of the constitution but what role they will have, whether they become a dominant role or from within. to eliminate concerns of afghan, not just mr. karzai and the government but beyond that. it's not just the right of woman, which as important as it may be, unfortunately does not have security concerns. the other issue i will leave you with because i'm running out of

time is the concern we just last night president obama and president karzai signed a strategic dialogue -- strategic agreement between afghanistan and the united states. one of those elements basically would allow to us stay and support the afghan government between the 2014 withdraw day. there's a problem in that and what the taliban want. the taliban's number one demand is no the imposition of shariah, it's the withdrawal of foreign forces from that country. how we reconcile those is very much an important aspect of it. as we go forward, the taliban two hours ago issued a new statement, they have announced their operation, they're now using our lingo, somebody, themselves or their handlers no exactly what language to use. they say that both are attending. somebody knows they're doing

their pr pretty well and they have announced their new winter operation called operation far uk. far uk is the title of the second kaleif of islam. there was a bombing inside green village, seven foreigners were killed. they say that was two messages and that one that ushers their new season of fighting and, two, to show president obama that he signed the agreement with somebody who has no authority to sign an agreement. so it's by no means over. how it will end i think depends on manyi issues, not just u.s.-afghan issues and the taliban, whether we like it or not has been more than 18 years now so they have gone beyond that cycle, they a power to be reckoned with. whether they assimilate or not

is all an open question. thank you very much. [ applause ] good afternoon. it's a pleasure to be here and what i'm going to discuss follows naturally on what you saw this morning; that is, both the speakers who led off talking about the ira and the fmln highlighted two groups which could be said to have bargained in good faith. and i would like to use the maoists of nepal, what was once officially called the communist

party of nepal maoist, as an example of a group which chooses as a strategic approach to bargain in bad faith. the literature that deals with the ends of conflicts has focused overwhelmingly on groups which seek to act as spoilers, as you can see in my title, that is those who benefit from conflict and desire to keep it going but much less covered have been groups of which we have any number of examples today that see peace as a way to achieve their strategic ends. we might include in this hamas, hezbollah, farkin, eln and the

maoists. these are not simply spoilers and are not interested in the peace process per se, rather they are interested in the change in strategic context, which can be achieved and therefore can be exploited by participating in a peace process. if we ask ourselves as we did this morning why there is an insurgency in nepal, i think you have the answer right here. that is the land area of florida with more than twice the population and the result economically of a country that is covered with the himalayas and foot hills is that you have one of the poorest countries in the world. socially wealth of course is skewed in its distribution by the caste system which functions

within what once was the world's only official hindu kingdom. politically you have the normal inefficiency and corruption that goes with emerging democracy, nepal having been a parliamentary democracy only se since 1990. historically it has never been a colony, and yet in reality foreign aid consistently provides amounts that total between 50 or this year almost 150% of the official budget and all such foreign aid comes with strings. nepal then in effect is a mandate of the international order. the result, then, is millions of people who if we look at the background of what we're negotiating, who find that the

political opportunity structure has failed them. they want a better deal. always in any society politicians are the ones who articulate the structure of the better deal. leaders are not followers in any organizational setup. in the case of nepal, on the extreme left it was the radical actors of the communist party of nepal maoists who said only by completely overthrowing what is can we deliver a new deal for those who desire. the state, in other words, has lost legitimacy.

the goal then to be achieved is to get a new revolutionary order. violence is used because the existing order is simply not going to turn over the keys to the kingdom so to speak, to have the systems of social stratification turned upside down. this will prove critical for what we're going to discuss in a few moments. violence is necessary because the system will not give you its own denies. if it will, there is no point in continuing violence. if we use the war college formula of ends, ways, means, we know the goal -- a new revolutionary order.

the ways, the strategic approach realized in operational art of this movement was your typical maoist people's war. i'm not going to go into the specifics of it. what is important for us in this entire day to remember is that armed political action designed at the restructuring of the state functions in exactly the opposite manner that regular politics or regular warfare functions. if regular warfare, shaping, as it's called in our manuals, preparing the battle space, overwhelmingly involves non-violent means such as information warfare. and once you've shaped the