unity within the alliance and among the 50 countries that contribute troops. that has persisted. throughout the time i hatch bve there and remains solid and by the time we get to chicago this is indeed a very solid coalition committed to a strategy that was agreed and the last nato summit in lisbon when it was decided that -- a process of transition would take place over four years. that we would -- try, gradually, and over time, build up the afghan national security forces to provide for the security of the country. so that by the end of 2014 it is the responsibility of the forces to -- to ensure security throughout the entire country. tr that strategy i think has been proven to work. we will get together in chicago in a few weeks. where we will reaffirm the -- the centrality of that strategy.

we will announce that we are moving on. it will be possible for all of afghanistan to be in the situation where afghan forces are in the lead for security. and nato and mission will slowly shift from -- from a lead focus on combat to lead focus on, on supporting the afghan security forces. and then 2013 to 2014 be in a position to ensure that afghanistan will be secured by afghanistan forces rather than by international forces. that its a strategy. i think every country is committed. so far, no one has left. we are committed to an in together. out together strategy. some countries have decided to change the focus from combat to chaining. that is their national decision.

we, we accept that. but for now -- i think we will get to chicago -- fully committed to the strategy and united in, in implementing. >> so you would also be optimistic there won't be any -- french troop withdrawals beyond the ones, or different from what, has been forecast before, by sarkozy? >> we'll have to await to see how, how, a new french government will relate to that. i do think french troops will remain in afghanistan. until the end of 2014. >> comb battle troops? >> we'll seep. remember, the dutch don't have combat troops. cat nadians don't make combat troops. they make contribution buys training, training the afghan forces. there are many jobs stew beto b in afghanistan. and individual countries will make their decisions how they want to contribute t they are

committed to strategy we have all agreed to. >> let me turn you to other news today. vladamir putin took office. in moscow. among the things he said was that russia will also seek a predictable relationship with the united states. will adhere to the treaty on nuclear arms. and push for guarantees that the u.s. missile shield in europe will not be directed against russia. its that something that -- that he wants in writing or is that a trust but verify type of thing. or -- how, what does that mean? that statement? >> well we, have had a discussion with russia since -- since lisbon. where the nato allies agreed -- to, for the first time to deploy a -- a nato territorial missile defense system that would provide protection for nato european territories, populations and forces against a

growing ballistic missile threat from outside of europe. that decision was not directed at russia. nor were the systems that were going to be deployed, capable of undermining strategic stability with russia or indeed undermine the nuclear deterrent of russia. we have been saying this for three years. we, we are, more than happy to put it in writing because we have already done so. would be happy to do it in the future. the second thing we did in lisbon was to invite russia to cooperate with us on the deployment of missile defenses. we had to have two separate systems. that could be -- used as separate systems that could cooperate and combine and be a better defense for nato and russia against this growing ballistic missile threat. we have been in discussions for 18 months with the russians.

they continue. thapt are fra they are not moving forward. russian demand. guarantees be legally binding. not only -- the guarantee that it is not, directed against russia. but there are, objective criteria and limits therefore on the nature of the system that we would be deploying. to provide the guarantees. we have made very clear since the system its not designed or directed against russia, it makes very little sense for us to have a legally binding aagreement with russia and, limits on the capabilities of that system. that have nothing to do with russia but have to do with the threat that we are facing. what we make clear is that if we took together and cooperate together they could find over time, that in fact, our system its not designed to deem with the russian threat. and through the confidence

building measures and cooperation we could engage in could make clear that -- that they don't need a guarantee because they can see for themselves that the system is, its not capable of undermining their strategic deter enlt. that discussion is on going. we are willing, continuing that discussion. hopefully one day we will convince them. >> how do you interpret the fact that he repeated it again to day? >> it's the stand are russian line. they have said it before. probably see it again. in the meantime, we are continuing with the deployment of the system. we will announce in chicago that -- that nato will have reached an interim capability. that will have, agreed to the tools off to enable nato to take command and control of -- of the ballistic missile capabilities the united states and other countries would provide. and we will go ahead. because the we think the threat -- warrants that kind of system. anybody who looks at what a threat from the middle east is

like that is growing and not getting any less will know that this is, that this is a response that is necessary. as well as, all of the other steps we are frying to take to, reduls that thre reduls -- reduce that threat. when president obama had the open mike situation with m mededev. he talked about having more flex built tee on t -- flexibility after the election. what does that mean? >> you would have to ask him. >> you talked to him i think. >> what heap was reflecting was the reality that the last six months of a presidential campaign, usually aren't the easiest to have serious international negotiations particularly on issues that -- that are politically sensitive. i think that was just a truism. recognized by the russians. recognized by us. we, we have committed to continuing a dialogue. which its, continuing right now,

with the political level. and over time may be focussed on the technical level until such time that the political situation, allows, allows ape more, more thurp rope discussion. >> well, russians are not going to be in chicago. and i wanted to ask you about -- other countries that are not going to be there. but of -- of the whole group as you well know, smaller european states want in under the open door policy. as far as i can tell, enlargement is not on the table. i was wondering where sxt pantipa -- i was wondering where the expansion stands. where does that stand? >> off the list at the moment. four contreats declared they would look to become members of nato, boss knn boz -- bosnia an

others. each will be there. they are contributors to afghanistan. we from the united states perspective. i think i can speak for all other 27 al litz lies remain cod to an open door. we can have invitation to european member states. european states whose, whose membership in nato contributed to the security of the north atlantic area and who meet nato standards. these four countries have declared they would look to be members of nacht tow. we are working actively with them. we as nay tomorrow. tument foster the circumstances and aability for them to become members, sooner rather than later. the time its not yet for various reasons. and each country is unique. echl country will have to be dealt with separately. but the time will not be -- will not be yet -- in chicago.

for them to be -- invited. either because of other member states or in the case of macedonia, we remain committed to inviting them as soon as mutual satisfactory issue of the nape h name has been resolved with greece. we are working hard with montenegro and bosnia in terms of reform of their country. we work with georgia on a daily basis. georgia will be late october. be the largest s contribute to it. remarkable deployment of 1,47 troops. north, west, down south in the province. and georgia faces an important election. parliamentary erect, later this s year. presidential election next year. we will work with them to ensure those are democratic elections.

and, that too then will be another step on the road to membership. which won't happen in chicago. but committed to having happen as soon as possible. >> thank you. one of the themes of the, major theme of the -- french elect, was this -- approach, the austere approach tuco the econoc crisis. i was just wondering whether there is ate sense, that that also could have some effect on defense spending. probably not with the french. but perhaps with others. in terms of loosening some of the restrictions on nato defense budgets. >> well, austerity hasn't been good for defense spending. i think that's true. some say, austerity hasn't been good for a lot of things. certainly hasn't been good for defense spending. i don't see that -- that loosening the, the austerity --

constranlints that exist will ld to massive decrease in defense spending. it is clear we need more defense spending. if you look at, just, just, a two statistics. a decade ago -- europe spent 50% of the amount that nato spends on defense. today even after the cuts that the united states has engaged, 70%, is u.s. spending. 30% is europe. part of it is because the united states, expanded its defense spending in the last decade. but the other part of it is that europe has been cutting. and there will come a time when itch you continue that diverse jen spending between our up and the gap becomes so large, ability to operate together in military operations becomes so constrained, that, that -- that there is a real need to start thinking about how do we meet the ability of the europeans

to -- to be -- good partners, strong partners as we saw in libya. they can be. but continue to be open in the future. that will require not only spending more. but it also will require europeans to spending better. and smarter. one of the issues, that the secretary-general has been pushing is a notion of having, what he calls smart defense. having europeans working together to appropriate cure critical capabilities that, that alone they couldn't afford. but together that they could. we will encourage all europeans to dupe more of that. so that even if they don't spend necessarily more in dollars or euros, or cronin or whatever it is they're spending. the output of that spending will be larger and better. >> you writ any

bany -- written about the campaign in libya, how effective it was and how many lives it saved. "the new york times" last month reported on a lengthy confidential post action nato report. that highlighted just how poorly equipped and staffed are members of the nato allies. and that they would basically have been unable to sustain combat operation for very long even against such a weak oement, as the libyans were. without crucial u.s. assistance in a whole range of basic contemporary warfare and smart weapons. intelligence gathering. aerial refueling. that story really does make one wonder. about the real world, military, capabilities of nato. if -- if, against a weak opponent like that, they were -- really, really all the short comings. were made very obvious to nato.

a very disturbing report. do you have a react, to it or didn't like it? >> of course -- no, i actually. first, i can't comment on the classified reports. but what i can dupe is people, point people to reading the foreign affairs article that i wrote. with, with, jim, the supreme allied commander europe. which send much the same thing. so, in that sense, it's not surprising. we, we, there is two parts to the, to the european contribution. there is a good news story and not so good news story. the good news story is that europeans led by sarkozy and cameron. decided to take the lead unmuch of the military campaign. including and in particular in the bombing campaign in libya. the statistic that we cite in, in the foreign affairs article that, that really point, makes that clear is in the kosovo war,

90% of all precision-guided missiles dropped on serbia and associate voe we kosovo. 90% was european. 10% was american. that said there were critical capabilities, these gaps, that i mentioned before, that were exposed by the libyan war. most importantly. intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance, between 70%, 80% of the isr effect was provided by the united states. 75% of the aerial of the tankers, were flown by the united states. the capability to do strategic targeting, precision guide targeting to take the information you get and turn that into. >> into precise targets necessary to have a low

casualty. low collateral damage, strategic bombing campaign that we saw in libya was provided by the united states. so it exposed those weaknesses. the good news is -- that as a result of libya, the europeans are now trying to focus on how to close down these gaps. so, in chicago, we will, we will sign. a -- a -- an agreement. and five most advanced kind of drones that will, provide the capability that was so evident in -- in libya. we need it. to have, radar capability. and look at what is going on, on the ground. and procured by 13 nations. owned, operated by nato. aerial refueling. europeans deep sided within the european union they needed to invest in the capabilities bring the capabilities together and do more. there is a lesson learned here.

and reported in "the new york times." a lessons learned report. exposed the problems that existed with nato. and addressing them. making investment in activities. particularly important. and demonstrated. to start to -- overcome the gaps. awe off is that one reason why -- i mean, the current shortcomings, is that a reason why -- nato has not been involved in the syrian operations, in the sense that it would have to be, the united states, much more formidable opponent there, and the united states would have to be more involved? just in terms of capabilities? >> the reality its that ses tha a much different situation than libya, in terms of military capability that its there. and therefore would require a different kind of engagement. that isn't the main reason. the main reason its -- its

that -- there is no legal basis right now for a foreign intervention. which was, did exist in libya and would be important for nato, 28 countries to come to day consensus to act. there is no desire within the region for foreign intervention. quite to the contrary of the arab league made clear this is now the something they seek at this time. again in the libya case, the arab league was the body that, in fact, asked for the u.n. to impose a no flight zone. those are two fundamental reason there is a hesitancy off to engage militarily. on the part knave tow. an alliance of democracies which operates on consensus would find it at the moment difficult, itch not impossible, to have the consensus necessary to intervene. >> okay. we are now going to invite audience members to join in the discussion. let me get the ground rules out

here first. please wait for the microphone. speak directly into it. stand up. state your name. tell us your affiliation. and keep and keep your questions and comments concise so we can get as many as possible. yes, sir? wait for the mike. >> thank you very much, josh rogan, "foreign policy magazi magazine." thank you for taking the time and thank you for your service. i wanted to ask you about your mentioning of an announcement in chicago about interim milestones towards the 2014 full transfer of power over to afghan hands as per the lisbon treaty. is that the same announcement that defense secretary leon panetta made on the plane to brussels in february and then clarified at the munich security council. we were told it was made because

he accidentally read his internal talking points instead of the press points to the reporters on the plane, and i guess i'm wondering since that -- if that announcement was scheduled for chicago before secretary panetta accidentally blurted it out, i'm wondering if that's going to be the same thing or something different or you're going to add meat to the bone or is it going to be something new and if it's new, what's new besides what we already heard? thank you. >> the history of when, how, what i will leave to the historians to dig out of, but as the president said at bagram air base, as he said in this press conference with prime minister cameron when prime minister cameron was here, we are committed to the strategy that we adopted in lisbon which was to have a transition starting in 2011, complete it by the end of

2014 in which afghan forces would take more and more responsibility for security so that by the end of 2014 they would be fully responsible for security throughout the kcountr. in 2013 there will come a period where the afghans will have lead responsibility throughout the country for security at which point we will shift the main foc focus, the main effort of the nato and isaf contribution from combat to support as the president announced in june of 2011 that we would do. that will be a milestone. a milestone when we shift from one point to the other. what should happen in 2013 depending on, of course, how the situation on the ground evolved, we expected to happen in 2013, and that is where in chicago we will solidify how we get to 2013, what we will do from the ebbed of 2014 and, by the way,

what is the nature of anywnato' role and the international role which the president started to address in his visit to bagram air base a week ago as well as part of the strategic partnership agreement that the united states has now signed with afghanistan and nato which has an agreement signed in lisbon. we'll fill out what that means as well. >> sir? behind you. >> good to see you again. i'd like to get back to nato enlargement both in the north as well as the south. first of all in the north sweden and finland have not asked to join but they have become almost allies in any sense of the word, we took part in the combat missions.

in libya they're doing baltic air policing, swedes and finns are going to as i understand it, cooperating chosely. would you say a few words about that. the most important question has to do with macedonia. mass docedonia's secession to n when the main dispute is solved but the international court of justice ruled that about six months ago that greece had no right, it was almost a unanimous decision, had no right on the 1995 agreement to keep, to block macedonia's membership in international organizations that while the negotiations are going on, it has raised the bar because, you know, if i understood the icj's decision, it shouldn't matter that the negotiations are going on and, in fact, macedonia, as you know, was slated to get in bucharest in 2008 with croatia and

albania. so if you could speak to those two issues. >> thanks for both parts of the question. on sweden and finland, sweden even more than finland, they are extraordinary partners. they participate in every single operation that we are conducting major cooperation and operation unified protect libya, a leading role in the north and afghanistan until recently although that's gone down as contributing significantly in kosovo as has finland in many different ways. they could be allies tomorrow. by the way, i remind them of that, too. it is -- there is something -- the membership does have its privileges. for one you get to sit at the table to make decisions and if you don't, if you're not a member you get to sit at the table but you don't get to make decisions. but it's a national decision. sweden will have to decide,

finland will have to decide, like every country, whether or not they want to become members of nato. you don't have to become a member of nato to be an extraordinary partner. on baltic air policing, they have air covers in the baltics but they're not part of the nato mission as of yet, so that's why i was shaking my head. on macedonia it's very different. in bucharest, it was decided by all 28, at that time 26 members, that macedonia would be invited as soon as the main issue was resolved to mutual satisfaction. you need all members to agree. since greece has insisted that it needs to resolve the main issue prior to being willing to say yes to an invitation. until that is resolved in a

mutually satisfactory way an invitation will not be forthcoming. we are not going to have the icj or anybody else telling nato when and how it should take in new members. that is for nato. that is the recognized way in which every enlargement has happened between 1952 when greece and turkey were the first two countries to join nato until 2008 when the last two, albania and croatia, became members and will continue to adhere to that fundamental decision we all made in bucharest. an invitation will be forthcoming, has been reached. there's no change in position. we've had the same position since 2008.

yes? >> thank you, originally from the center of european reform. we recognize that defense industrial interest do remain an obstacle to defense corporation and i wondered if if you had any suggestions on how the obstacle could be overcome. >> very important question, part of the obstacles for smart defense is if you want to have industrial cooperation, joint procurement of weapons systems you need to do that on the industrial side as well as in the policy side. one reason nations are hesitating internationally is they want to defend their own defense industries. some of the multinational programs are designed to enhance international cooperation. i mentioned ags. the ags program has very

specifics in the contract, very specific benefits for local industries of those participating in the procurement of that system. so all 13 countries, not just the united states, are providing significant industrial input and getting significant benefit from that cooperation. but working out these deals is very complicated, requires good politics as well as good industrial cooperation. that is very difficult. it takes time and it's much easier particularly if you have a large enough defense industry as some europeans still do to just buy local. whether there's french, british, italian or what have you. trying to figure out how we're going to mesh these two pieces, the need for industrial cooperation to help drive procurement cooperation is one of the areas that we're increasingly looking at and recognize as important, not just within europe but