there are a number of people in his administration that say this was a mistake. he understood gorbachev needed to tell advisers that nato would be a different creature. the only way to get them to swallow a reunified germany within nato was to say the nato that was fighting us and was anti-russian was going to change. in a quiet moment with condi rice, at that point in may of 1990, the president explained that he was making a big quote. i don't want people to come back 20 or 30 years from now and say that's when everything went off track. that's where progress stopped. on may 30th, 1990, this all paid off when gorbachev reversed his position on allowing a reunified germany to join nato. this, i would argue, is the most decisive period in the presidency before the gulf war, when the president realized he would have to break his "read my lips" pledge on taxes.

so what was the personal bush style of leadership? george bush, i would argue, was the last of america's world war ii leaders. just as the fact that gorbachev was the first soviet leader of the post world war ii generation in russia, it was extremely fortunate for the united states and the world that george bush had experienced world war i and was president at the end of the cold war. one must avoid psychological portraits, but the end of the cold war was as much the story of men at the top as of the masses. gorbachev experienced world war ii as a victim. kruschev did not wish to be the leader to lose it. in american terms it would be someone like lyndon johnson not wanting to lose vietnam. gorbachev, however, thought of world war ii in terms of the privation he experienced.

he understood the terms of war more than the older of stalin's victims. he understood the toll of war but was also touched by what was later called the wise men. patrishian, careful and revolutionary isolationist. these men believe the 20th century did not just belong to united states, it was more importantly america's responsibility. george bush after all decided to enlist in world war ii after listening to henry stimson, perhaps the greatest representative of that strand of dna in american leadership. he was an inheriter of those values. yes, it took bush eight months to grasp the goreby phenomenon. the reasons for that are complex. frankly, the oral histories give a series of not -- there isn't a consensus view among those

who were interviewed. let me say for the sake of argument. let me propose what george bush's problem was in 199. he found himself struck by another great tradition in u.s. foreign policy and was not sure how to manage it. the nixon-kissinger approach of cold realism made a brief comeback in the twilight of the reagan years. iran contra, especially the president's romantic attachment to freeing the american hostages in beirut coupled with president reagan's romantic attachment to a nuclear free world, raised the hackles of many in the american establishment especially kissinger and a former disgraced president eager for redemption. this tradition fastened on relations with gorbachev is the most dangerous of reagan's illusions. yet by the fall of 1989, george bush would understand that you can be a practical idealist, manage gorbachev without falling into the traps seen by henry

kissinger and the former president nixon. bush reflected henry kissinger's proposal of establishing a permanent yalta. instead, bush helped by scowcroft and baker, opted for what appears to be the only solution, but risky. if bush can be criticized for being too slow in understanding gorbachev's revolution and potential, his actions from 1989 to 1990 can only be described as brilliant and stunning. one need not seek the declassification of intelligence reports to predict that they told the american president that no soviet leader would lose east germany and survive politically. this was not the fault of the cia or our intelligence community. it took great courage to try to run the table at the end of the cold war. here the experience of world war

ii cannot explain his statescraft. his generation matured during the great international crises of the 1950s and 60s, only seven years younger than john f. kennedy, bush understood the conflict over berlin and east germany had been the most important european flash point in the cold war. it reunified germany would eliminate that flash point forever. it would allow the continent to heal like nothing else. the management of the gulf war was the last hurrah of the world war ii generation. in 1944 the british pressured roosevelt through eisenhower to raise the soviets to berlin. the race was for prestige and ensure a greater hand over the division of european spoils. but the u.s. government in 1944 and '45 rejected this political strategy, preferring to maintain commitments to the allies even if one was the murderous joseph stalin. george marshal and dwight eisenhower understood if there was any hope of a more peaceful world, it would involve

establishing the rules of the road for states. the united nations was the embodiment of that. well, isn't that what george bush did by not invading bagdad? the oral histories and president bush's diary entries make clear that he very much wanted saddam hussein's regime to collapse. he hated saddam hussein. he's very open about that in his diary. but you know what? hatred cannot be the motivator for an american leader. bush showed the discipline to end the war in the way most likely to lay the foundation for a better world, where international law might have some force. it was the practical idealism of the world war ii generation, not the cynical realism of the nixon-kissinger era. it ushered in a period during which the united states was never more respected or more powerful. i will leave to another conference the discussion of what happened to that international respected and

power. thank you. >> let me first of all thank phillip for his very kind introduction, though i should confess that my friends who are historians think i'm a very good political scientist, and my friends in political science think i do a wonderful job at diplomatic history. i'm greatly admired by people who don't know what they're talking about. but in my new job in university administration i've learned to accept any compliments graciously because they're so few and far between. i want to take up a relatively small question. when and why didn't bush decide on an invasion of panama? and hopefully connect it to some of the broader and more important themes that phillip

and tim have already alluded to. in december of 1989 a few days before christmas, american military forces stationed in panama that had recently been augmented left their bases and either defeated or neutralized the panamanian defense forces. in a large-scale operation, at the time it was the largest military operation since vietnam, that was designed to lead to the arrest of manuel noriega and regime change. it was going to change the government of panama and put in place individuals who had won the election the previous may that had been stolen from them. it was a bold step. so when and why did this decision get made. first of all, there's a long-term story about american relations with noriega and the short-term story about what happened specifically in 1989. let me give you a short version

of a long-term story. this is the story of how manuel noriega went from being our man in panama to public enemy number one. both of those are exaggerations. he was never our man in panama. he was on the american payroll for many years, but he was doing what he wanted to do, not what the united states necessarily wanted him to do. and at his worst, he was never that great a threat to the united states. when the bush administration begins, their real problem in central america is nicaragua, not panama. nevertheless, how did that transition take place? it mostly takes place in the second reagan administration. and this is a story i like to tell when i'm teaching american foreign policy because it's so complicated and it has so many actors. it illustrates lots of things that are important in the conduct of foreign affairs. if you back go back to the summer of 1986, seymour hersh

the investigative journalist publishes a front page story in "new york times" that becomes a series of stories and then a life magazine article all about noriega that says he's deeply engaged in the drug trade, he violates human rights. he was probably responsible for killing the principal political opposition leader to his rule in panama. nothing in the story would have surprised experts in the american government, but because it was on the front page of "the new york times," it was suddenly important, and it did get some attention. about the same time congress passed a law listing a number of countries that were engaged in the drug trade, panama among them. the law said none of these countries can receive assistance from the united states unless the president certifies on an annual basis that they are making progress in the war on drugs. in 1989 when ronald reagan

routinely certified that panama was making progress, two members of the u.s. senate decided to sponsor a resolution that would reverse that presidential certification. they were john kerry and jesse helms. talk about your odd bedfellows. they hardly ever agreed, but they worked very hard on this issue, and they, in fact, got a positive vote from the u.s. senate saying that the president is wrong. there isn't any progress being made on the war on drugs in panama. the house also voted on this, but too late to actually reverse the president's decision. but again, a lot more publicity was being given to what's wrong in panama. because of that publicity and because new people were coming

forward in panama, including some former assistants and associates of noriega, verifying all the things that hirsh said, all the things that were testified to on capitol hill, the people of panama began to demonstrate against the regime. there were riots in panama, and noriega brutally put them down. that was a turning point. after that the reagan administration began to impose sanctions against the panamanian regime and early in 1988, two district attorneys, one in tampa and one in miami, indicted noriega, one for drug trafficking, one for money laundering. that public statement that he really was suspected or strong evidence existed that he was engaged in those activities emboldened the president of panama.

the president of panama was the president because noriega had picked him. nevertheless, he was emboldened by that news and he fired noriega. noriega was never elected. he was the head of panamanian defense forces. two days later, three days later, noriega fired the president of panama and that turned out to be the decision that stuck. the panamanian president had to go into hiding and escape from the country. it was clear who was in charge. that, again, triggered sanctions from the united states. the reagan administration said we're going to take all the revenue from the panama canal and put it it in es grow and not give it to a government that nor ya ga evidently controlled. all through this period, there were a number of queue attempts against noriega. there were a number of covert actions sponsored by the reagan

administration. i know about most of them because they were written about in "the washington post." that's where you find out about covert operations. none of them succeeded. and toward the end of the reagan administration there were serious conversations at the highest levels about what should be done. the secretary of state wanted to use military force. let's just go in there and remove this fellow, he is an embarrassment. we can easily get rid of him. the reagan administration rejected that, and instead said let's negotiate, let's send someone down to panama a deal, if you step down, we'll drop the indictments in florida and promise that you won't have to suffer threats from american law. but george bush was then vice president. took the very unusual step of criticizing what the president of the united states had proposed. that became a minor issue in the

1988 presidential campaign. as a result, nothing came of those negotiations, and panama was a real issue when bush became president in 1989. tim has correctly told you that throughout that year, panama is not an important issue on the president's agenda. the changes taking place in europe, the end of the cold war, are far more complicated, far more consequential, and they are occupying most of the president's time. but there are two things that happen in that first year that are worth noting before we come back to december and the president's decision to use military force. one was an election that took place in may of 1989. like most panamanian elections, this one was fraudulent,

corrupt, stolen by noriega and his supporters. unlike previous elections of that character, this one was watched. there were teams from international organizations, there was a team from congress, there was a team led by former president carter, all of whom declared that this election was a fraud. there was also a vivid media image. one of the vice presidential candidates who opposed noriega was beaten in the streets of the capital city, and the picture of him with blood dripping down the side of his face became the emblem of that regime and that election. that was a turning point in terms of world opinion and turning point in terms of american opinion. the president had earlier that month before the election had taken place gone to the council of americas and said the day of the dictator in latin america is over.

it's time for democratic forces to be heard. they weren't heard. in panama, that diminished noriega's status in the region and around the world. and then in october of 1989, a colonel who was part of noriega's personal defense team, one of his body guards essentially, came forward to american officials and said, i'm going to do a coup, and i need your help. you need to protect my family when this coup goes on, and would you please have some of those u.s. troops leave the base and block this bridge and that road so noriega won't get reinforcements when the coup takes place. it was a completely unknown figure. the cia didn't know who he was. lots of people were suspicious, maybe this is a roos, there were

those kinds of rooses from noriega's regime. we didn't have the information to take that coup seriously. the coup failed. the colonel, in fact, turned his gun on noriega and took noriega's gun from him. he should have taken his cell phone. noriega was able to make phone calls and was able to call on loyal troops elsewhere in the country to come and rescue him. that event was widely criticized in the press, widely criticized on capitol hill. the administration was accused of running a keystone cop coup attempt. and it made everything that would happen after that in panama more important. then we come to december.

on december 16th, a group of officers from one of the bases went out into panama city for dinner, got lost driving back to the base, found themselves at a panamanian defense force roadblock where there was a hostile crowd that surrounded the car. it looked like a dangerous place for them. they gunned the engine and drove away. one of the panamanian soldiers shot at the car as it was pulling away. one of the passengers was injured. one was mortally injured. there was a young couple, a naval officer and his wife who were at the roadblock sight and were witnesses to the shooting and killing that took place. they were blindfolded, taken away. the naval officer was beaten, his wife was harassed, groped,

threatened with sexual assault, fainted under the pressure of the interrogation. they were released a few hours later. information about that incident took longer to get to washington. the next day the bush team meets in the white house to decide what to do. it's a sunday. it's not a formal meeting of the national security council, but most of the principle players were there. almost everyone that writes about this meeting reports on what the president was wearing. it is the holiday season, and he has one green sock and one red sock. one says merry and the other says christmas. so it was casual sunday in the white house when they gathered. the military briefing that comes from general kelly describes the

incident in which one american has been killed and the new information that some of the people in the room had not previously heard about how the americans that witnessed the killing had been treated. the recommendation that comes is let's carry out a full-scale invasion, a regime-change invasion. and at the end of that meeting, colin powell, a relatively new as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, expected that nothing would come of it. it's the weekend. it's the day after the event. he had been through the reagan administration. you have a lot of these meetings where nothing happens. but instead the meeting ends with the president saying, let's do it. it's only going to get worse, this needs to be done. the people who were present in the room report different things that the president said.

they all amount to that same message, a really decisive decision. so everything i told you so far has nothing to do with the transcripts that have just been released. let me tell you a little bit about how they help us and what they do for us. following that decision to invade panama, much of the news commentary and many of the scholars who have written about this subject since say exactly the same thing. those events at the roadblock weren't really important. this administration had made its decision well in advance that noriega was going to go. they were just waiting for an excuse. there were secret plans put in place and the events in december were just the trigger. that is a widely reported account of what transpired. now that we're able to see what bob gates, what particularly

brent scowcroft has to say on this subject, and phillip and tim were the people who interviewed brent scowcroft and they didn't let him stop on this, they went into some detail about panama, it's quite clear that that's not correct. there wasn't a prior decision. it's really made in the aftermath of those incidents that occurred. it was important to the president that american soldier had been killed, it was important to the president that the witnesses to that event had been mistreated. and that appears to be the tipping point, which is the title i give to the paper i prepared for this conference. so when the president goes on television the day after the invasion has begun and said this is why i did it, to protect american lives, he also says to

do something about the drug problem, he also says because of the importance of the panama canal. but what he puts up front is to protect american lives. that is the real reason. i think we know more about that subject because we now have more eyes from that meeting. for a long time, all we had was bob woodward, the commanders, and then we had the book that colin powell had written more recently, we have cheney's account. now we have scowcroft. and if scowcroft says this decision was not made in advance, as a matter of fact, scowcroft says in the transcripts, i was surprised that the president made that call at the end of the meeting. i didn't think those events by themselves were going to trigger this decision. i think we now understand what went on. and again, that sounds like a

small story, but it's typical of many events in washington that have really two lives. there's the life created by the early newspaper stories, the books written by people who use those newspaper stories, the presumptions people make about how decisions are actually made. they couldn't have invaded for this reason, it must have been that they had a secret plan. and those ideas take on a life of their own. you can see them repeated in account after account. one of the things we're able to achieve in this oral history project is a very healthy corrective. the people who were there, the people who can be trusted give us a different version. but again, they still give us the version of a decisive president. richard nixon has a quote about george bush that you may know.

it's complimentary because it has a reference to sports. when nixon liked something, he would use that. he says, everybody underestimates george bush. but when it is necessary, he makes the big play. i think there's some truth to that observation and there are a number of big plays we can talk about today and tomorrow. >> i guess i should start by complimenting bob on his presentation as an administrator, as a political scientist and as an historian. it is a friday afternoon. i want you to have compliments from every direction. i enjoyed that. i was very much involved in that and learned from a number of things you had said. i'd like to thank the miller

center for not only this opportunity but the time you spent on this project. i'm not quite as appreciative for being asked to follow three professors in an academic setting. beginning to understand what is meant by the observation that everything has been said, just not by everyone. so i'll see if i can add a little bit at this point and then leave the floor open to some questions. our topic is president bush's statecraft. i would just say statecraft is a craft. i thought he had one that was very informed, very experienced, very personal, that really had an instinctive element to it. but that's sort of the way one goes about or what one brings into the process. i think it is also important for leaders and certainly the president of the united states to set strategic direction. we talked a good bit about german unification. let me read to you from a front

page "new york times" story by johnny apple, who was then the chief correspondent for "the new york times." the headline was possibility of a reunited germany is no cause for alarm, bush says. in the interview that had taken place in the oval office, the president said, i don't share the concern that some european countries have about reunified germany, because i think germany's commitment to and recognition of the importance of the alliance is unshakeable, and i don't see germany in order to get reunification going off on what some are concerned about, and that is neutralist path that puts them at odds or potentially at odds with nato partners. now, that's not surprising substantively, given what brent and others have said. but what may surprise you is that article appeared on the 25th of october, 1989. over two weeks before the wall fell.

this was to have been an interview about the failed noriega coup attempt, apple who spent a lot of time in germany at the end, said mr. president, one quick question. a lot of people are talking about german unification. the president once gave an instinctive response, but secondly, set our strategic direction. and that is if germany reunited within nato, we would have achieved one of ours and the alliance's greatest objectives. another time i think of that instinctest reaction was the cue attempt in august of 1991. the president as he was wanting to say as little as possible but when asked, he uttered the famous line "sometimes coups fail." he didn't want to throw himself