but nasa started looking at me, several months, several months, several months went by and finally said, yes, all the tests show that you are no longer affected by this -- by this meniere's disease. so there i was, having made the right decision. >> i think we better backtrack a little here. because obviously this is going to bring you into direct discussion about a fella named deke slayton and we haven't established the fact that deke like you was knocked out of flying, so let's go back over a little of that, particularly because that happened back in the "mercury" days when deke was getting ready to fly. >> right. >> and i wonder when you first heard. >> yeah, deke had already been assigned to follow john, uh-huh. right. >> and suddenly he got bumped with his "mercury" flight. that was a heart condition, wasn't it? >> yeah. there was a lot of controversy about that.

because it was a heart murmur or a palpitation. some irregularity. but one which was not obvious. i mean, it was not a continuous kind of thing. it was not as if he was, you know, getting ready for cardiac arrest or anything like that. it was just occasionally he'd have a little twitch down there. >> but a real blow. i wonder what your reaction was to it at the time and if you can give us a little background on it. >> well, back in those days, as we have discussed before, we were still highly competitive. there was still seven guys going for whatever flight was available next. and slayton had been chosen to make the second orbital mission after glenn when he had this little heart murmur. as i say, it wasn't anything real noticeable. i mean, it wasn't continuous. it just showed up once in a while.

but yet it made the medics very nervous. and even after really exhaustive tests showed that it was not repetitive to the point where it would have interfered with the mission, there was still the sense of, well, we just can't take a chance on anything on the hardware or the astronauts, so he was grounded. flat grounded. and at that point the feeling of competitiveness was deke turned into one of camaraderie. one of feeling sorry for him. a sense of, you know, well, let's get you back on the schedule, oh, old buddy, somehow, because you really felt sorry for him at that point. because it no longer was competitive. but on the other hand, to have a guy in that position, and knowing how tough -- how tough that could be to him. so, he was grounded. obviously the benefit for us was to have somebody -- someone of us who could immediately become a spokesman, because he had decided to stay on. i think he resigned as air force reserve at that point. i'm not sure.

but i think so. anyway, somebody who could speak for the group and not, you know, have to worry about some of the ins and outs of training. so, it was an obvious advantage having him as a leader and as a spokesman on the group. >> and so he became, what, chief of the astronaut office? what was his title? >> well, i think, yes, chief of the astronaut office. >> and so it was a job that

eventually you wound up with by title. >> yeah, things would change around, of course -- >> but once you went in to "gemini" all of a sudden, there were two of the seven that had been grounded, deke and al, what a team. how did it come about that you wound up becoming chief of the astronaut office while deke by this time had assumed quite some power as head of astronaut affairs? >> well, as i'd indicated earlier, i decided to fight this meniere's, to stay with nasa, and during the time period when i was grounded, i could become very, very useful in the -- in the astronaut training business. and i suppose that we really had grown, if you consider the number of chaps that were involved in the simulators, for example, in the suiting procedures, taking care of the suits and so on, direct supporting facilities for the

astronauts, really quite a number of people involved. so they decided to make it a separate division. deke was the head of that division, and i was given the job specifically of the care and treating of these -- of these astronauts, in charge of their training, helping deke with crew assignments, that sort of thing. >> was it deke primarily that got you the job, or was it just the fact that you had all the qualifications? how did that work? >> well, i think it was just -- it was just a matter of saying what do we need. when i became grounded, informed nasa i was going to stay there, then we had two guys that really

could have -- either one of us could have done the job. one little difference i think perhaps that i knew i was going to somehow -- something was going to happen soon with me. i was either going to get the ear fixed or i was gone. with deke i think that he was more or less resigned at that stage to the heart murmur business. and the medics would keep giving him a bad time about that. so, i think it was really that deke probably was more of a long-term commitment than in my particular case. so, i think that's really why really they established it, and, you know, we talked it over with kraft and giruth and they sort of decided it was a good selection.

>> you two had quite a reputation for running a tight ship. >> of course, deke and i were both mad because we were grounded. we'd both been training as astronauts. we knew where every skeleton was in the whole process, and we just wouldn't let those guys get away with anything. i mean, we knew what they had to do and we knew how they had to do it, and if they weren't doing it, we would bring them in and tell them about it. maybe i was a little more forceful than i would have been normally, because being grounded. i believed they called me the icy commander or some friendly term like that. >> steely eyed? >> oh, yeah. we knew where all the skeletons were.

>> and knowing that, in a very peculiar way, from a nasa point of view, perhaps it was for the betterment of the space program that you and deke both were doing what you were doing at the time you were doing it. did you ever think of that? >> well, i think certainly there was a need for coordination. there was need for representation at executive level. other chaps could have done the job perhaps equally as well or perhaps even better. but it seemed like -- it seemed like we turned out some pretty good crew. >> i don't think anybody could fault the selection of crew, alan, all the way through the "gemini" program and all the way to "apollo," and it was the time of "apollo" by which time you had finally located through stafford's ministrations as you described earlier, a way to treat the meniere's syndrome in los angeles, and suddenly the skies opened again for alan

shepherd. or did they? you had to get back into the program, didn't you? >> well, of course, when nasa finally said i could fly again, i went to deke and said, we have not announced publicly the crew assignment for "apollo 13." i have a recommendation to make. and i had picked two bright young guys, one of them a ph.d. and one of them a heck of a lot smarter than i was. and made up the team to go to -- for an "apollo" flight. and i said, i would like to recommend that i get "apollo 13" with stu russo as command module and ed mitchell as lunar pilot. deke said, i don't know. let's try it out. so, we sent it to washington.

and they said, oh, no way. wait a minute now, shepard has to be at least as smart as the rest of these guys, maybe a little smarter. and they said, yeah, we know that, but it's a real public relations problem. here this guy had just gotten ungrounded and all of a sudden, boom, he gets premiere flight assignment. so, the discussion went on for several days and finally said, all right, we'll make a deal. we'll let shepard have "apollo 14." give us another crew for "apollo 13." and so that's what happened. >> oh, and did it ever, because suddenly "apollo 13" on its way to the moon ran into huge problems. i wonder what you thought when the problem developed and what did you do during that time period. >> well, of course, the

immediate thought was how do we get these guys back. obviously right from the start, it was the end of a landing mission. no question about that. but it was -- it was interesting to see the entire system, the entire system, being flushed out, being made to come back with any kind of a recommendation. of course, kraft and gene kranz were the guys that held everybody together on this thing. and said, look, we've got to find a way to bring these boys back. failure is not an option. and as you well know, the whole system was vibrating. any corner of the manufacturing processes, the vendoring

processes, nasa's people, everybody was working toward a solution for this problem. as it turned out, there was more than one solution. i mean, there were several different areas of engineering had to be addressed and corrected. and i think that it's probably nasa's finest hour, when you think about it. i think that certainly from a pilot's point of view, it was just as an important event as stepping on the moon on "apollo 11." >> you had the next flight. did you approach it with fear, trepidation, or did you approach it with the knowledge that you probably were going to make a pretty good flight out of it thanks to what had been learned from "apollo 13." which way was it? >> well, i think that people have -- i know people have

expressed the opinion that it might have been a little bit more dangerous to fly on "apollo 14" than it would have been had there not been "apollo 13." but recognize that almost a total redesign had to be done. well, not necessarily redesign, but a total reassessment of the package had to be done, to find out specifically why the thing blew and to fix that, to look for similar situations throughout the service module. but, again, to reassess the whole scheme of things. you know, in missions like that, when you're in basic research, there are always decisions along

the way that, well, maybe we should fix this particular piece of equipment because the chances it might fail are 1 out of 100. on the other hand, it's only a small part of a huge process scheduled to go at a certain time, and if this fails, we have the crew to back up. there's always these little decisions to be made. so, obviously part of the assessment process of "apollo 13" had to be to go over those decisions again. now did we have the time to make some corrections of these 1 in 100 chances of failure. and, of course, several were made in addition to the corrections of the basic problem. so, it's a feeling of security, and we obviously were part of the process. >> by that time, too, i had forgotten, you had been through the trauma of "apollo 1." and the fire and the redesign of

that occasion. let's go back over that for a moment or two. >> talk about feelings. >> because that must have been a tough one. >> of course, "apollo 1" came as a real shock, no question about it. it came as a shock because it was unexpected. and i'll get into the reasons for it being unexpected a little bit later. but to lose a crew in a ground test, i mean, they're still sitting there on the ground. to lose a crew really woke everybody up. and that was important. because all of us, every single one of us -- and deke and i discussed this, unfortunately, after the fact. but we were part of a group that had gone through "mercury," had gone through "gemini," manned, we're leading, we're beating the

russians, you know, nothing can go wrong. and it had led to a sense of false security, no question about it. deke and i remember talking about it. gus would come back and he had a complaint about this. he said this is the worst spacecraft i've ever seen, complained about that, and, of course, he was complaining to engineers as well as to deke and to me, but deke and i insidiously became part of the problem because we said, okay, gus, go ahead, make a list of this stuff, and we'll see that it's fixed by the time you fly. not that we'll see that it's fixed before they stick you back in there for a test where you're using 100% oxygen. see, there was that sense of security, sense of complacency

that everyone has, including myself and including deke. i think some people felt that sense of responsibility, neglect, bad decisions more than others, more personally affected by it more than others. but i don't believe more than just a few hardheads that didn't feel in the long run that they were part of the problem. >> as it worked out, perhaps because of "apollo 1," "apollo" went on to be a hugely successful series of flights. >> oh, yeah. i don't think there's any question about the fact that the "apollo 1" fire did shape up the whole system. did make people realize that they had been too complacent, that they were overconfident, and it resulted, of course, in the total redesign of many of

the parts of the spacecraft. and i'm sure contributed to what was a very highly successful -- you know, we're still basic research. you're still putting people on the moon, and you did it six times and you only -- you only miss once. i mean, that's incredible. >> and the one time you got the people back. let's go back in time a little bit more to some of the older history, because you were really there when the flight to the moon was born. wasn't that right? about the time following your first very successful suborbital mission. tell us about it. >> well, you know, it's an interesting thought. and i've heard it expressed a few times, and that is that the decision jack kennedy made to go to the moon was made after we only had 15 minutes of total space flight time.

and a lot of people chuckle and say, sure. but the fact of the matter is that that is true. and this is how it happened. we were invited back to washington after the -- after the mission, and i got a nice little medal from the president. and which, by the way, he dropped. i don't know whether you remember that scene or not. >> vividly. >> but jimmie webb had the thing in a box, and it had been loosened from its -- from its little clip, and so as the president made his speech and said i now present you the medal, and he turned around, and webb leaned forward, and the thing slid off the box and went

to the deck. and kennedy and i both bent over for it. we almost banged heads. kennedy made it first. jack made it first. and he said, in his damn yankee accent, here, shepard, i give jackie's sitting there. she's mortified. she said, jack, pin it on him! pin it on him! he then recovered to the point that he pinned the medal on and everything was fine. we all had a big laugh out of that. but originally louise and i were supposed to proceed to the congress after the white house ceremony. and then leave the reception and leave town, but jack said, no, i want you to come back to the white house, have a meeting, and let's talk about your flight. so, we had the reception at the hill. drove back and in the oval office, there were the heads of nasa there and the heads of the

government. jack, of course, was there, lyndon johnson was there. and the picture of me sitting on the sofa, jack is in the rocking chair, and i'm telling him how i was flying the spacecraft, and he's leaning forward, listening intently to this thing. we talked about the details of the flight, specifically how man had responded and reacted to being able to work in the space environment. and toward the end of the conversation, he said to the nasa people, what are we doing next? what are our plans? and they said, well, there were a couple of guys over in the corner talking about maybe going to the moon. he said, i want a briefing. just three weeks after that mission, 15 minutes of space, is when kennedy made his announcement. folks, we are going to the moon, and we're going to do it within this decade.

after 15 minutes of space time. now, you don't think he was excited? you don't think he was a space cadet? absolutely. absolutely. people say, well, he made the announcement because he had problems with the bay of pigs, his popularity was going down. not true. not true. when glenn finished his mission, glenn, grissom and i flew with jack back from west palm to washington for glenn's ceremony, the four of us sat in his cabin, and we talked about what gus had done, we talked about what john had done, we talked about what i had done, all the way back. people would come in with papers to be signed, he said, don't worry, we'll get those when we get back to washington. the entire flight. i tell you, he was really, really a space cadet, and it's too bad he could not have lived to see his promise. >> when he first made that announcement, what was your personal reaction?

>> oh, we were delighted. we were delighted. but there was a little bit of a gulp in there because -- because he put -- he put a time cap on the deal. and i don't think that any of us thought that we would be able to make it within -- that was 1961. within 8 1/2 years. but anyway, delighted, but a little bit of, well, maybe -- maybe the president is a little enthusiastic. >> well, we finally got up to that point where we were in to "apollo," and what was your choice, you and deke, what was your best bet as to which would be the first flight to make a manned landing on the moon? >> well, i suppose that we felt that the schedule as it was laid

out after we rescheduled the "apollo 8" mission, we felt that missions 9 and 10 adequately demonstrated the lunar module's capabilities, that we really deep down inside felt that we could make it. we could have very good possibility of making it on the first try. >> and, of course, you did. >> of course, we did. >> and then along came 14. we were just along about at that point when we changed tapes a while back. because now you had picked your team. you had sweat out "apollo 13," and you were ready to fly. must have been a big moment when you were ready, waiting for takeoff. >> well, i think that -- in retrospect, the obvious advantage here was that "apollo

13" gave us more time to train, no question about it. not that we would not have had enough, but it gave us a little higher level of comfort with that extra training time. i think obviously the changes to the spacecraft were good ones. not only the changes which related directly to the explosion, but others that were made as well. there was a lot of confidence. as i said -- as i said, i picked a couple of bright guys. to go along with me, and there was really a lot of confidence. gene cernen, of course, was my backup. the funny story about cernen. we were at the point, i think we

were approximately four or five days away from liftoff, scheduled liftoff. we were all in quarantine, of course, on the cape. at that time we had to do 21 days before, 21 days after routine, because of the bug stuff. and cernen was out early in the morning flying helicopter. because we all -- the commanders used helicopters to train. and, you know, the last few hundred feet of the landing. so, we're having breakfast, and we knew gene was out flying helicopter. all of a sudden, the door opens, and in walks cernen. he is absolutely covered with soot. he's got scars on his face. we said, cernen, what happened? he had been flying the helicopter over the river which

was absolutely calm that early in the morning, like a mirror, and he had been distracted by something or other, because he was looking at the land instead of the water, and he flew that helicopter right into the water. nosed over, blades all over the place, tail, rotor blades all over the place. fire because the tanks -- the gas tanks, or saddle tanks on that dinky little chopper, they split. and there was fuel all over the place. cernen is going down like this. and, of course, being a good navy-trained pilot, he knew how to cope with, you know, being under water, so he got out and he swam to the top and realized he was in fire, so he splashed around like this and took a deep breath and swam a while and came up and splashed around some more and swam a while. finally got out of the smoke and flames and all that stuff.

somebody -- somebody had seen the crash obviously and, of course, the banana river, you know, isn't that big a deal. but he came on the shore. came out, and there he was. and just totally bedraggled, so he looks at me as my backup pilot and said, okay, shepard, you win, you get to go. >> alan, you're now on the moon. you've gotten there on "apollo 14." and i wonder what the feelings were and -- >> you got to let me tell the story about how i got there? >> oh, yes, of course. >> well, actually, the flight had gone extremely well. we had one or two problems. docking problem earlier. a problem with the -- something floating around in the abort switch, which closed, made as if we were pushing the abort switch closed. all of these were taken care of. now we're on the way down,

flying up on our backs like this with the engine pointing that way. slowing down and getting gradually more steeper and more steeper. we had a ruling that the computer had to be updated by the landing radar. the reason being is that while you're on your back, obviously you can't see the ground, you can't see the mountains, you can't see the rocks or anything. so, we had a rule that said if the landing radar is not updating the computer by the time you're down at a level of about 13,000 feet, then you have to abort. you have to get out of there. well, the landing radar wasn't working. and so they called us up and said your landing radar is not working. we said, thank you very much, we're aware of that. and a little bit further on they said you know what the ground rule is about aborting if you're not at 13,000 feet. well, yeah, we knew that.