present military in the region, that could be the target of nuclear blackmail. we can talk about u.s. central command but also the british and french forces. third point, nato partners in the middle east and gulf, where they were talking about mediterranean dialogue -- or have been expressing growing concerns to nato, whether we are talking about formal dialogues or informal conversations in track two meetings. fourth point, the regional chain reaction, i will go back on this element, that's that such a scenario presents, could encounter the middle east's strategic ability.

and finally, fifth point, and i put it at the end because it's not a short-term issue, it's a long-term issue. i would say it might be an expert in the next decade. it would have the capability to strike targets in continental europe. we can go back to the issue of capabilities because it relates to the program as well. now let's talk about some potential features of what would be this strategic situation. and the first thing i wanted to talk with you here is the regional chain reaction, as mentioned before. there is the assumption that proliferation begets proliferation. it's true that starting in 2006 about a dozen of countries in the middle east have started

expressing their new interest for nuclear energy. but although you have to take into consideration this new trends in nuclear programs, i don't think that we can so far talk about the cascade of proliferation. these countries engaging into new nuclear programs i would say are trying to hedge the current iranian program, not trying to launch a new cycle of proliferation. that's in my assessment. again, we can talk about it in the q and a session. but i think that actually the most challenging element scenario where we have nuclear armed iran would be the conflict escalation in the middle east and with clear implications for

nato. a nuclear-armed iran would be a miscalculation multiplier for lots of flash points whether we're talking about naval confrontation in the strait of hormuz, iran has expressed rising uncertainness in the area in last years, talking about the skirmishes with the u.s. navy back in 2008. we can imagine how difficult this would be for the policy process if we had to add this kind of element of a nuclear iran. other flash point where conflict escalation, the escalation matters are blurred. is the flash point of a new is railly conflict. what would be the kind of

escalation, military escalation that we can imagine under these circumstances. but more over in these two cases, i think one thing nato should consider is the nuclear capacity. we usually end up on this conversation saying deterrence should work because it had been working in other regions, so why it shd not be working here. the problem in the middle east is if iran is likely to get nuclear weapons, we can imagine that it could not be fully declaring its capabilities and implementing a doctrine with these arsenal. and we have in that situation a kind of nuclear capacity where you have israel and iran, both arsenals without declaring any policy, any doctrine about that.

and this has implications in terms of how the deterrence system can work. finally, and this leads to my conclusion on the implications for nato. nato as an alliance has partnerships with countries in the middle east and the scope, but it has been acknowledged by two parts from nato and partners. these partnerships are very modest. although we have nice paragraphs about the need to improve the partnerships in this tragedy concept, so far the scope is very modest. and this is for several reasons. first, the fact that the big competition for nato comes from its own members which have privileged relations, bilateral relations with some of the countries in the middle east, which are relying more on their

bilateral relations than on nato relations. but another element to consider is that the content of the partnership has always been on what we call soft security issues. defense planning, but not key issues for partners which are always trying to discuss security guarantees. and although i'm not 100% a believer that we should talk about security guarantees, in the end if we have this contingency, a nuclear armed iran, nato is going to have a dilemma. whether we talk about extended or, security guarantees with partners, all these partners will look for other ways, for

other alternativalternatives. this leads to the issue which is controversial. i don't think the european model is a good model. it's misleading analogy. i think that the best if we are talking about nuclear shearing arrangements, we should talk about conceptual sharing arrangements with these countries, nuclear consultations, common planning information sharing, but there is no likelihood, i would say, that we could imagine extended deterrence the same way that was implemented in europe. and again, another element i think, if we talk about extended deterrence in that scenario, the missile defense resources have to be also discussed in that context. not only the missile defense architecture, which is designed

for nato, but the missile defense systems that the countries specifically in the gulf and israel, are per chasing. this is just some elements, this will be my conclusion. i hope i wasn't too long. and i will leave maybe some elements for the conversation after that. thank you. >> i think everybody can move back up here. our next speaker is geneve mentory he's with amnesty international, and he's going to talk about counterterrorism and terrorism policy in general but also focus on droens. >> thank you very much. if i had a powerpoint you would see a health warning. i am currently working with

amnesty international, but none of my views represent their positions. if you do have notes, you will probably find variations between my views and amnesty's views. i've seen this banner here, i used to work with him and his staff and there are many people who have views but after 36 years you would not find anybody in this city that cares more about these issues, certainly the global, than this son to be formal 123450r. many people have different views on his career but it is with a great deal of sad in as that we will look back on this career and the gap that he will leave in washington and across nato in terms of how many people you can work with on both sides of the aisle. if you forget my intervention on his behalf. you know, i really have the task of talking about terrorism and i'm not sure how much i can say in ten to 12 minutes. so i have a series of questions some of what i'll try to answer

myself and some i'll leave out there. and many of the points won't seek to anything definitively because frankly a local of these things don't have definitive actions. the brave new world, i think a lot of what happens on terrorism is like groundhog day. if you look in the 1960s and '70s, you'll think there's something quite amazing. we have forgotten what we knew ten years ago, 20 years ago. man hunt, the search for bin laden and i'm throog at the lessons and if you look at the work on al jeeria or northern ireland, you see the same things. over and over again. and a lot of the things -- especially in d.c. people think are new and different and radical, if you look back are

not that different at all. and one of the best things i ever read on terrorism was a piece in "the economist" was about the turn of the century and what was happening then in 2005. so my first point would be is this all about 9/11? i think it's very easy to forget if you're a european just how searing 9/11 is and was and how so many people were affected from different countries. people all over the world. again i had a lot of friends who worked in and around those buildings. and they were from everywhere. the idea this is just an american phenomena is quite wrong of the but at the same time, i went to a political conference in oslo in 2004, who ever would have thought that oslo would be the victim of a

horrific act of political violation. in some ways we have the same back drop and in other ways we're looking at different problems when 77 people were killed last year, and if you're looking at a threat, this threat is evolving and changing. the second point is, and it may seem silly to an audience like this, are we talking about a war? because the answer is if you're looking at d.c., from the bush administration or the obama administration point of view, the answer is definitely yes. these people are out to kill us. we need every single tool at our disposal. we need to harness the power of the state in a different kind of way. and if you're a european, the answer is no. this is really a policing action that takes place within the context of a domestic law enforcement frame, which again from a nato perspective is problematic, because you've got countries working together and pulling apart in different directions. and it's fundamental. it's fundamental in d.c. whether you see it as a war, they don't

want to go back to a pre-9/11 world where they see the biggest enemy for the fbi and cia and vice versa. the biggest enemy is overseas and you have to see that and make together. if you're european, you look at it in a completely different framework. even if you come from additional security institution, you're going to see it differently. most of all, do you see an ex-extension threat or a threat that's there to be managed. and most scholars here in d.c. would say the concept of a war, where you have a victory, an enemy that you can label is kind of nonsensical. terrorism is a tactic. it's not something you can say we're on war against terrorism. what about af pack? i try to do my homework, p the first thing you would say is

afghanistan is not a counterterror mission. and it's not. but it's like looking at a puzzle saying i only do the blue parts. you can't do it without having it connected to the other parts. and frankly if you're not working for nato but if you're working for the red cross and in pakistan, last week they had a serious debate whether they pull out of cities because of terror against them. if you're working for amnesty, you're confronted daily by terror. she is simply trying to get something done for an ngo. but you're certainly confronted by terrorism. you're confronted by things that are designed to get an effect, designed as political violence there to send a message, whether you're trying to get power

working, whether you're trying to get law enforcement done at every single level that the things that afghanistan, nato are involved in, you're confronted by terrorism. are you kicking down the door or not, you're certainly involved in the same frame. and so i would urge some caution. i can understand entirely why we don't say we don't do terrorism, we're just in afghanistan. why are we in afghanistan and what is the point and what would happen if we were to choose to leave? certainly to young women, people who are trying to vote, peesm trying to work in those pleases, those would be acts of terror. whether you define them astra digsal terror or not, it's all connected. if it is a war, do we have rules? and the answer is there are rules. even for the u.s. under the bush administration, or for any any

country you engage in conflict, i'm often reminded of one of my favorite movies butch kasdy and the sun dance kid. when he's pulled into a fight and he says there has to be rules here. the same as in terrorism. it's a point of pride that at the height of nazi power, the uk is phasing down the might of the german army and they decide not to employ torture because it knows ultimately it would be successful. on the flip side if you study the uk behavior in ireland, there's certainly a lot of abuse to go around and then some. and on the flip side, the u.s., lots of people here are proud of the fact we faced down the odds after 9/11, it's a different age, we're willing to do different things.

they only waterboarded three people. only three. and not for very long because they found out it wasn't effective. some people would say abusive interrogation works, then why don't you do only three people? it's no where needs the end of the spectrum. you can walk around london and buy a pack of cigarettes everywhere and everybody is going to see you because there's cameras everywhere. why were they put there? to fight the ira now? and the cameras are still there. and good luck to your privacy because that went out the window a long time ago. for those who are fond the james bond and covert action, look to france. those guys are really the original karate chopping, fast driving guys who will do everything to get to the end of

the spectrum. it's sad and here's a kubttory that faced nazi germany, they imported the lessons to china and north african and have fought many people who have fought for france twice in the french army and again in italy. and that's what makes it sad. but if you want to see how effective torture is or is not, read that back. because everything we think we're learning has already been done. so there are rules and there are limits. so if i could touch briefly on the topic i should have talked about, what is nato doing. a lot of it is like an egg and the shell is basically cooperation on homeland security, intel sharing being the common denominator, but a lot of things are being done under national rubrics because

again they're within a domestic law enforcement sphere and a lot of the information is being shared within those pillars. so each country brings assets. the most interesting things that are being talked about are by folks who aren't doing anything. because it's about intelligence sharing. a lot of those wars have come down post 9/11, people are working together in a new and dramatic way and they're trying to build resilience. again that word resilience, and managing problems about homeland security, working together, what if we have another oslo, what if we have an attack, how do we react to it? how do we deploy resources on chemical bio issues? for things that are normally held for good reason at a national level and are pooled and then shared. but some of the most interesting

stuff is frankly you're not going to hear about either here or in other places. because the life blood of counterterrorism has to be intelligence. if you don't have intelligence, or if you have intelligence, have you got any intel, you aren't going to be able to do anything. and the fascinating to thing about, the most interesting to think about from al jeeria or kenya or israel or the uk was how they looked at intelligence and how they gathered that intelligence. and now it's even more fascinating. i urge that's out there that's got a credit card, to go by, i should get a commission for saying that i love the book "the power of habit" contained in that book is a chapter on target and how much of an e signature you leave every time you leave this building, pick up a telephone, use a credit card. i can't go anywhere without somebody saying what's my zip code. why do you want my zip code?

why do you want me e-mail? what happens to this information? and what kind of trail we leave behind for intelligence people to collect and look at and track people and how they do it, how they analyze that information and how they suck it up. and frankly all that leaves a trail. all that trail that is collected by private companies, again, many european, many u.s., what happens to that information, how you protect it. and how you can track it. and again in "man opportunihunt other books, there's how you collect it on the phone and everything else. you're sending a message when you turn your phone off. and a number of people, when the cia ran, other folks ran, a lot of people only turn their phones on in certain places. they did when they went through a toll booth. they did it every time they put

money in a parking meeting. so in terms of the signature, what are we looking at in terms of the brave new world of those assets that one day and still could be played by nato as soon as its terms in north african and the obvious answer is drones. a lot of the challenges that we're facing in terms of intelligence gathering, in terms of gathering information, and operating are the ones which people have felt can be served and solved by non-human technology. this is really a program that grew out of the agency, the cia, because it really had a challenge in terms of getling people on the ground in pakistan and afghanistan in the years before 9/11 when the air force didn't want have to go to do with it. and it was only in the early years of the obama administration and the dying days of the bush administration there have been this explosion. there have been over 300 strikes in pakistan alone.

we're not even at war with them. what's interesting about it is that recently there's been a debate where they have things called signature strikes aimed at people. but now you have situational strikes. you don't even have to be a named person to be a target. simply by behavior, and that makes sense, if you're acting in a strange way and we can't collect necessarily a defentive idea of who are you about we know you're a bad guy doing bad things, should we be allowed to target you. the administration thinks yes and it doesn't matter where you are. you could be in yemen, you could be in somalia, you could be anywhere and be the subject of these strikes. in libya where there's no congressional mandate, there were 146 strikes in libya. where's the conversation? where's the check on this? well, you know, that's all very

well, but are drones works? on one level, yes. information is the life blood of operation. you can have a constant 24 hour presentation, the information is precise, you don't have to be in the theater physically. you get high grade info that will cost you fewer lives, less money, the maintenance costs, compared to a machine to people in theater is much lower, it's more efficient and any pilot will tell you the biggest limitation of a high performance plane is the human factor. you take that out, that thing is going to fly much more effectively with the lower chance you're going to have an accident or any other issue. and frankly, a lot of these guys can live in nevada or where ever else, not even leave home, can fly their drones on a shift. you don't have the rotation issues of in and out of theater. second and third generations are much more efficient and can

carry a much more effective pay load. we have a concern as to who decides. john brennan recently said there were no civilian casualties in terms of drone strikes which i found extraordinary. where's the debate? who decides who gets on the list, who gets off the list and who signs off? it's amazing how little information is coming from a democratic information on any of these issues. and where's the oversight? who decides whether you've done the right thing or bought the right things or bought the right planes and done the right stuff. and command and control, if there's a problem, how do we know? we're never told anything. and there's some interesting law of war issues that arise. if this is a war and you're flying a drone from an air force base in nevada and you're in your uniform and you get into your car on your lunch base and

somebody fires on you, is that an act of war? it doesn't sound like a crime to me if you're at war. if you're a combatant, you're a combatant. if you were to gather a whole bunch of law professors, people would say yes, it is allowed and people would say it's not. there's no sthaunderstanding as what this means. to all intents and purposes the u.s. is running an assassination program. the biggest challenges are going to be on the civil liberties front. each country would have a different version as to what the threat looks like. if we were to pool the resources, who would use them and how we would employ them. but as you can see from the uk or other countries, if you do have that, it tends to be a door you can only walk through once and you don't come back again.

long after the ira has disappeared, the cameras are still up. the problems with civil liberties are still there. it's a great thing that in nato you can have a common denominator approach, and in some ways it's a real concern that individual countries will not only have a different tradition, but will have assets to allocate into those traditions and it will be good to see a debate. in the weak of what happened in oslo and the wake of what's happening right now because of the olympics. as the father of a small child, i would say terrorism is a daily occurrence that you're dealing with. you only have to deal with somebody trying to break your glasses once. >> we're going to move right

along to sean lawson and he's going to be bring cyber security issues into this conversation, then we can open it up for q and a. >> okay. so my name is sean lawson. i'm a professor in the department of communication at the university of utah. and so really, my goal for this presentation will be to provide a broad overview of cyber conflict with an eye toward the challenges that nato faces in trying to address it. so i'll begin, because i assume not every one here focuses their attention on issues of cyber conflict. i'll begin with definitions and by laying out a typology. second i've provide a historical overview. third, i'll provide a preef overview of nato's current

stance, including relative organizations, principles and activities that nato is carrying out. and finely i'll end by highlighting a few of the challenges that nato faces in its attempts to respond to the advent of cyber conflict. so let's begin with that typology. i'll present these in the order of least to most damaging, which also happens to be the order of most common to least common. so the first is simply just cyber act vism. it allows activists to collect and public information, to engage in dialogue, coordinate their actions and to lobby those in power. we've seen this most recently that the important use that the occupy wall street people have done for those purposes. the vast majority of occupy's of