and my concern is a volume of civilian force in my words, i see this as a back door brac without the public process and the need, but here's the real question. this is what i ask everyone in every meeting i have. if you're the air force and you're wearing anything that indicates that, you get these questions and i look for the answers. did the air force conduct a comprehensive analysis and assessment to validate the cost savings? as you know in the first year it is 3 $3.5 million, and in five years it's $169 million. when i say comprehensive, not just for the fiscal year '13, but for the spread and then other services that may be

affe affected. example "a" is the joint training facility that's on there. mobility center, that the army uses to move people, the striker force. they use it. it is on air force base and air force personnel participate in that effort. when you reduce down that force the army will have to pick up a tab on this and i don't want to pitch you all here in the middle of this but i look at it from a d.o.d. perspective, and not a service perspective of the savings. so is there a comprehensive cost analysis and then if the answer is yes, is it gross in the sense of what it saves or is it net in what it saves because i believe it is not the latter. it is not net. it is a gross number. please. >> senator, as you know, and we have talked a little bit about this with your staff, i think the turn of the discussion or the question is what you would call how detailed is that analysis? we did do a detailed analysis to make this decision but i am assuring you it is not to the level that you're discussing now, and that is why as you know we have a very team up there that made a much more deep

impact or made a much more deep study of this and we will soon see that next level of analysis which you ask for, and as our chief has said, that if after this next level of analysis that the savings don't pan out as we thought they would, then we will relook at the decision about moving that force. >> i appreciate that. i want to -- here is the feedback so we have it on the record from many people who met with the team that was up there. they felt -- you probably saw some of the reports. they felt the team came up and already had a program of dismantling versus what are the costs, what are the savings? are they real, are they not? as you see that report come to you, i would hope you would ask those hard questions. it wasn't just one or two folks that mentioned this to me, the community leaders that met with them. it was everybody.

they felt like it was not about does this make economic sense, does it really have the savings? and at the end of the day this is an economic issue. it's not a strategic issue. it's about how much are we saving? i recognize that. the response we got was somewhat surprising. i would hope you or your folks would take that hard look of are these real savings and then making sure it is not just through the eyes of the air force but stepping one more step out and the d.o.d. savings. because they may be gross savings, but then you may have these other expenses. for example, the army may have to pick up more costs. which, okay, that's part of it, that should be worked in. at the end of the day, it's how much money we need to save for d.o.d., each service has a requirement. i want to look at that perspective. then there's the construction budget, as you know. there may be needs in j. and i

want to see how that fits in and not just for the 13 but the longer span. we're on the same page and i do appreciate your folks coming the last week or so and working with us and that's greatly appreciated. >> nart senator, i will assure you, i will look at that report. and i wrote down you have a feeling they arrived with a prec preconceived notion. and so we will attack the report in that way and i clearly understand what you're talking about about real savings over the long hundred and other unintended consequences. the team should be focused on those and we'll ask those questions. >> great. again, i recognize the need. and as you know through our markup we did last year, i offered needs and savings and we tried to save the army a lot of money on miads and somehow got jacked back in and not by you guys but the house taken it back out so we're trying to save a few hundred million there. we're game to find the savings, but let's make sure they're sustainable savings. that's how we look at this. again, i have a series of other pieces, but you get the sense. the nepa analysis, when you

build housing and all of these other things, it is all a cost that has to be figured into this. i appreciate that. let me end on one last comment, question, and that's on the red flag alaska operation, and as whatever happens and where does that end at the end of the day? is it third wing, the 354th? you know, where does it -- who owns it at the end of the day? i don't know if you can answer that now. if you can take that and in this analysis that's going to be one of those questions on the red flag exercise and operations who will own that exercise at the end of the day. we know the commitment by the air force, the military, to continue that operation, it is very successful, so i need to know kind of where it lands. >> i will get you a very definitive answer, but i can tell you that we see no change in that. as you said, senator, the red flag of alaska is absolutely critical to the training we're about to do. as our new strategy talks of the shift to the pacific, clearly this is a pacific focused area,

so we anticipate no changes now. i owe you a definitive answer on that. >> fantastic. thank you all very much and thank you for your service and for the alaskans now starting to come back from afghanistan, we had about 9,000 alaska-based operation folks in the field in afghanistan, and they're all starting to come back. thank you for the service. it is a pleasure to see them in afghanistan when i was there the last trip. thank you all very much. >> thank you, senator begich. senator inhofe? >> thank you, madam chairman. we have these hearings we all hear about the dedication. the fact that what our troops are doing over there and all the services. general austin, i'm kind of like you. when i was in the army, i never believed that we could reach this stage where we are today with an all-volunteer army. it wasn't an all-volunteer army. in fact, i was a product of the draft, and i still think it's a good idea.

you know, i look at this and i see what, to me, it's just a less of a concentration on defending america. we have -- when senator ayotte was talking about the new risk paradigm, i used to chair this committee. when republicans were majority, i was chairman of the committee and i have always had i been wrong on this, i have always thought that risk equals lives, doesn't it? you increase if you're willing to increase your risk, you're willing to accept more loss of lives. am i wrong? >> senator, i think you're right. it is lives. it is also important the accomplishment of the mission and in loss of equipment, so i think what you want to do is have a force with the capabilities and capacities that allows you to accomplish the mission with minimal loss or life or equipment. that really is what we need to have. >> sure. i understand that.

i love all of you guys and i agree that's a problem. we're changing right now. general breedlove, i am reading from your statement, you said as we reduce our force, we will retain the capability to execute each of these missions but we'll no longer have capacity to execute them all in parallel. as a result, the days of engaging in two large scale wars while simultaneously responding to a myriad of humanitarian crisis and engaging in short notice campaigns will not be possible. i agree with you. you had pretty strong statements in there. when you were talking about the age of your aircraft, i know that. i know how the kc-35s are and the b-52s, and i know that the american people really would expect more but they don't know how bad this is. let me mention one area that will make everyone uncomfortable.

that is, i was very close. i served in the house with panetta, and i know that what he said didn't really come from his heart and obviously no one is going to be able to say that. he said that last week that the defense department waged war on global warming by promising to spend billions of taxpayer dollars on more green stuff and all of that. you know, right now, we're trying to survive this thing. when democrats and republicans, all three of them, talked about this half trillion dollars and about sequestration coming along, it is a disarming of america. i happen to be the ranking member and i used to when i was the chairman of the environment public works committee. i know this obsession on all this global warming stuff. i also know that the trends have totally changed. i mean, just came out the other day, only 19% of the tv

meteorologists believe, number one, global warming is taking place and, number two, the man made gases are causing it, and yet i read right here and i appreciate very much, admiral, when you were talking about every one-dollar increase in the price per barrel of fuel is approximately $31 million of additional cost annually above the budgeted level. we're talking about huge amounts of money here. it is great. if the president, and he does, want to use the military as a test tube for his green agenda, he can do it, but people need to know he does it and you guys are in the awkward position of having to say things that fortified the committee. and let me just ask you this. this was a direct quote from last week. in the 21st century reality is that there are environmental threats that constitute threats to our national security. all right.

any one of the four of you want to volunteer to explain to me because i don't understand what are these environmental threats that are comparable to the terrorists who are out there? anybody? want to -- yeah. i don't either. anyway, let's -- i want to get into one thing here on the f-35s. by moving this program to the right, the president is able to say, well, we're not reducing the number of f-35s. however, during the cuts, so that the president's budget request cuts the f-35 budget by $1.6 billion in fiscal year '13 and $15.1 over the fit, and that's true. the fy '13 cuts result in 179 fewer planes being produced during this period. granted, later on down the road

they may be introduced, but we're talking about right now when the problem is. i gave a talk i guess on the senate floor but i researched it pretty good. i said it matches the figures we're getting from you guys. in total, it says since 2008 the department of defense has spent at least $4 billion on climate change and energy efficiency activities that had nothing to do with the actual meeting of real defense needs. the same $4 billion could have been used to purchase 30 new f-35s and it could have been used to purchase 28 new -- if we kept on the f-22s for the budget four years ago and that program was axed, or the c-135 aviation modernization program. i think we all agree, you certainly you agree, don't you, general breedlove in the significance of that program? >> yes, sir. >> i think everybody does.

so let me ask you, do you think that -- do you really believe that it's more important to be experimenting with this green stuff than it is to go ahead with that program? aviation modernization program? that's axed. that's done in this budget. >> senator, i can't speak to the broader d.o.d. programs, including that amount. on the navy side we're putting a significant amount of our investment in efficiency, and making our forces more efficient. >> that's not the point. i'm getting down to how important this program is which i think is very significant. i have a lot of quotes here from all you guys talking about how significant this program is. the fact that is knocked out of this budget for the benefit of a green test tube experiment that the military is being forced to do. let me say this. i know my time expired and i have to leave anyway, but i can

remember back when -- back when -- who was going to be secretary of defense when we were -- yeah, back when rumsfeld was before our committee, and it was a confirmation hearing and i said to him, this is way back when we were majority, i guess about ten years ago, and i said, you know, the american people believe that we have the very best of everything and we don't, and certainly general austin, you would agree. our cannons. there are five countries that make a better one than what we have. i said if you're going to take over this position and i can say the same thing to panetta, but i didn't do it during that confirmation hearing, you're going to be advised by a lot of smart generals. there are a lot of smart generals out there. all four of you guys are as smart as you can be, but you're going to be wrong. i recall the last year i was in the house on the armed services committee with i would say our current secretary who is seated next to me, we had someone

testifying in ten years we would no longer need ground troops. so what is the answer? how can we meet the expectations of the american people that our number one concern should be defending america, not all of this other stuff and that we have the best of everything and our kids go out in battle and they've got the best equipment. his answer was this. he said we probably should go back to what we did over the last century. he said the average, in fact it was right on this number in times of war, in times of peace, for 100 years in this country that we spent 5.7% of our gdp on defending america. at that time it was dropping down precipitously and this is after the clinton administration and now we're looking at about half of that. so i guess what i am saying, i am not asking any questions here. i'm saying you guys are doing a great job. we're doing a lousy job because we're not dealing you a hand. with the hand that you have, you're playing it right.

you need to have a better hand. thank you, madam chairman. >> thank you. i am going to resist the temptation to do any rebuttal of senator inhofe here because i want to stay focused on -- >> no, this might be a good time to do it. >> no, i'll wait until you leave. i'm not dumb. i think what's really awkward is when people like you are kind of pulled into some of the politics that swirl around this place. we all do this politics stuff all the time up here and one of the things i admire so much about our military is the loyalty and support that you give one another and you stay focused on your mission and that you try as much as you possibly can to stay away from politics and you understand the commander in chief is the commander in chief, and i have deep respect for you in that regard. i want to talk a little bit

about nonstandard equipment. the services have invested billions of dollars in nonstandard equipment since the beginning of combat operations which have ranged from mwraps to flat screen tvs. and i know there are various efforts to look at the nse and to figure out future usefulness in that regard and this is one of those things that can get left in the corner of the cupboard as we focus on standard equipment and with all the protocols we have in place for standard equipment. what is your all's best estimate on the overall size of the nonstandard equipment, and what are we going to do with all this stuff? and what i'm worried about, is with my background as an auditor, i'm really worried about the accountability piece on this. i am worried about whether or not we're doing anything in a way that could resemble joint, and whether or not we're having duplicative efforts and

figure out how we're going to transition it out of an operational tempo to a different kind of tempo? and could you call address the nonstandard equipment issue for me? >> well, thank you, senator, from -- and certainly i share your concern about how much nonstandard equipment we're able to maintain over time. as you well know, 60% of our cost, lifecycle sustainment is lifecycle cost is sustainment, and so we have to be able to afford to keep what we have on hand or we have to choose to transition it to some other place. we are very concerned about that in the army. we're taking a hard look at numbers of vehicles, numbers of weapons that we're going to keep on hand. we're going through that assessment right now, and i have even gone down to visit a company arms room recently to take a look at what our soldiers are actually required to

maintain. of course when the vice chief of staff shows up in a company arms room, it's typically an emotional event for that unit. my focus was to -- >> i think calling it an emotional event is one of those diplomatic words. i don't think they would call it emotional, general, probably something other than that. >> i have a real concern about how much equipment we're asking our troops to maintain that we may not be -- that may not be useful to us anymore and we may not be able to afford to sustain. so we're going through a very deliberate process of making sure that we keep what we need and we transition things that we don't need and can't afford and that will take us time to work through that. clearly we share your concern. >> what about the mraps? do we have repair marts to buy in supply? are we going to have to continue to rely on contractor logistics? that's i think a big question mark right now. what's the answer on the mrap

issue? >> certainly we won't be able to afford to rely on contractor logistics for the foreseeable future because as you know, that's very expensive, and so we're going through and doing an assessment on how many mraps we're going to keep and what the disposition of those is going to be and then again we'll outline what the maintenance and supply chain will be as a result of that. >> i want to get to guam before we leave. thank you, general, for that. i want to get to guam before we leave. did anybody else have anything on nonstandard equipment that you wanted to weigh in on? general breedlove? >> ma'am, it is really less about nonstandard equipment, but the worry i have is we have had a period of time where really good ideas have been brought to the battlefield and quickly adopted to help our soldiers and marines on the ground and the mc-12 liberty aircraft is a shining example of getting it right and also we have some examples where we have

multiple starts to try to get to capabilities and others where we have several that are competing and many in the same mission space, and i am concerned that we are able to get to the right number and type and then transition them into long-term use and we have been able to do some of this work because of oco money and now as the oco money goes away, we have to start making prudent decisions about some of these multiple starts in similar missions. >> i think that's really a good point, general. when you have oco money, it is almost embedded in that that you keep looking around and trying different things and it almost breeds a certain inefficiency that is required by the nature of the mission, but now it's really imperative that we decide which of those starts are worth continuing to go down. i mean, as i said before, one of

the biggest problems our military have if you want to call it a problem is there is nothing you guys don't think you can do. when you're going down a road and you're hitting bumps, sometimes you just keep deciding you're going to go over the bumps and keep going down the road instead of saying maybe we need to pull the plug on this journey, maybe this is a road we can't afford to go down, and i am hopeful that what you're talking about there, general breedlove, is exactly that. we can't afford to go down multiple paths, especially if there's overlay and duplication, which i don't need to tell you guys, it's happened a few times. >> i would like to follow up and give you some degree of confidence we recognize the challenge you raised and we're actually have a process in place to look at it. in our case just on order of magnitude we have about 600 pieces of nonstandard equipment as a result of the last ten years. we've gone through and we're in the process of continuing to go through each and every item to determine which would be transition to program of record and to give you some idea, we probably will have transitioned

about one-third of those 600 to programs of record to date. the other question which i think is an important question is where are we with regard to integration in the joint world? i think we all sit on the joint requirements oversight committee. we also have subordinate organizations and the marine corps board, for example, that takes a look at things that are unique to ground forces. and i am pretty confident, particularly in the case of nonstandard equipment, that we have the right processes in place to look at that equipment and make the proper decisions about transition and as general breedlove alluded to and we are now as a result of our significant experience identifying those programs that had some promise years ago but absolutely don't have a future and in those cases recognizing, again, the period of austerity we're in and recognizing the tail associated with some of nose programs, we're making sure those programs are ended and we properly dispose of the equipment that's been useful in afghanistan but perhaps will not

be useful and not be a part of our future. >> i think that's -- good luck if that equipment is built in more than 25 states. which seems to be a habit that some of our contractors have. they figure if they get the pieces of it in more than 25 states, they immediately have senators that are protective and parochial. i know you have not witnessed that in all your time that you've been here. my time is up. i know my colleagues have more questions. i do want general dunford to make sure if i don't have an opportunity to question again that you address the marine corps as it relates to guam, and as we look at our budget, i haven't had a chance to sit down with senator ayotte yet about the authorization budget. i really am anxious that we do not -- that everyone stays in the corral so to speak until we're certain what the future is

in guam. i don't want to waste one dime doing anything in guam until we get to reconsideration of the agreement to a place that we think it makes sense for the united states, for our military, and for the people of guam and japan. so thank you for that. senator begich. excuse me, senator ayotte. >> thank you, madam chair. appreciate you raising the issue of guam. i think it's an important one, with what we need to do in markup. i wanted to ask each of you and i raised it in my opening statement. we know that defense sequestration is coming in january if the congress doesn't fail to act to come up with other responsible budget savings, and i am a strong advocate for us doing that. we've heard from each of the services, as well as from our secretary of defense, the devastating impact of defense sequestration including hollowing out our forces along

with all the other consequences, but what i would like each of you to address for me is timing because i'm worried there's a general feeling around here that we can kick this can until december to make the decision on how to avoid defense sequestration and undermining our national security. i met with a group of our defense industrial base the other day and they pointed out to me there are things that they are going to be required to do, for example, issue layoff notices under the warn act and other legal requirements they will have to undertake. can you help me, each of you, if we wait until december, what are the disadvantages and consequences of doing that as opposed to resolving this issue much sooner, particularly for each of our service branchs? because i think this timing issue is very important for

people around here to understand. >> a degree with your assessment, senator, if this does come to pass it would be devastating and because of that i think it would drive us to go back and redo some of our planning and certainly make new assessments. that takes time. that certainly consumes a lot of organizational energy, and so we are a bit concerned about that. i think from an army perspective, you know, as you -- again, we've not done any planning on this, as you know, as you've indicated, but the back of the envelope calculations are such that this would probably mean a loss of probably another 100,000 troops, 50% of those in the garden reserve and with those kinds of impacts that probably would drive us to go back and relook

at our planning efforts here. >> general, that would be in addition to the 72,000 that we're looking in terms of end strength reductions? >> right. >> another 100,000? >> right. >> thank you. and would that not take time and obviously thinking about this concept of, well, first of all, if we're going to reduce armed forces another 100,000, how do we not break the faith there? i mean, i don't know how you can possibly not break faith, but even the implementation of something so devastating, so wouldn't it be more productive if we could tell you sooner that we resolved this for you? isn't there an urgency? that's what i need -- i think that's what we need to appreciate around here. would you agree with me there is some urgency that you not have this hanging over your head? >> absolutely. if we didn't have that hanging over our head we would be in much better shape. >> thank you. admiral.

>> senator, i think there's two significant impacts. if you look at sequestration and the impact on the navy from the $600 billion defense reduction would be about $15 billion a year. that's the amount of the entire ship construction account we would have to figure out how to spread in our budget and reduce. waiting until december and then not having a resolution at that point would allow very short cycle for planning. it will not allow us to make efficient or effective choices. it would also cause us to go back and relook at the strategy because the force that comes out of sequestration is not the force that can support the current strategy that we're operating under. second concern would be the industrial base impacts that you alluded to. our industrial shipyards and our providers and corporations have to start making some investment decisions with respect to notification of employees, if there is furloughs, if we're forced to break contracts and not be able to execute them under a sequestration scenario, so i would indicate that the