station blackout occurred in a combination of loss -- as a mentioned, the fact that the sea water pumps were lost -- completely destroyed, therefore eliminating any possibility to remove heat to the sea. now the heat seek without the ability to remove heat from the sea. the only option left was to eject the heat to the atmosphere, which was done, but could not be done quickly enough and then the action sequence accelerated. we had the hydrogen build-ups in the secondary containment and then the hydrogen explosions and so forth. so, the lessons learned from this that i take away is that the flight hazard and risk of

tsunami are that of the size mick earthquake. the periodic risk assessments should be considered data and methods obviously change with time, so we need to refresh our design basis. for the protection of national hazar hazards, at least every ten years and there can't be complacency about nuclear safety. this is the point i want to emphasize. i'm going to come back to it because i have a little vignette to share. the plant operator owner, not the government, is ultimately the primary entity that's responsible for safety. now i'd like to share an account print printed in the "wall street journal" and i'm on may way to wrap up here. on april 13th, about the titanic. the ship carried 2,224 people. and had only enough lifeboats to

squeeze in 1,178. and yet, as this article reports, the titanic was fully compliant with all marine laws. the british board of trade required all vessels about 10,000 metric tons required only 16 lifeboats. the titanic had four more than 16. but the white star, the owner of the ship, had built a ship that was 46,000 tons. four times the limit that was societyuated with the number of lightbulbs. and so the conclusion that this author in melbourne, australia, he writes and regulates entities tend to comply with specifics of regulations not the goal of regulations themselves and all too often, once government takes

over what was private risk management comes regulatory compliance. at this accident's core, he's talking about titanic, is this reality. british regulators assume responsibility for the life boeps, then botch that responsibility. with close reading of the evidence, it's hard not to see that the tie tanic disaster was an example of government failure. why might i mention this? at the time of p measuring i, the industry concluded that mere compliance with regulation wasn't sufficient. it wasn't good enough. just to be compliant with the regulations. that the owners were the primary responsible entity for ensuring safety. and with that recognition, they formed an institute for regular power operations, located in atlanta, georgia, which took

collected responsibility by the owners, realizing an accident some place was an accident everywhere. so i'm heartened and encouraged to learn that now the japanese plant owners and operators are forming their own to improve their operations and that they will be taking full responsibility for the safety in years to come. so with that, i'd like to conclude my remarks and be happy to engage in a conversation with the panel. thank you very much for listening. >> thank you for teaming up, specifically, risk management and lessons learned, two topics. i had started just one month

before hurricane katrina and my role was -- and the worst case scenario happened in august of 2005. katrina has been with me ever since. i had the opportunity to be part of the team to one look the lessons learned from the disaster and two, implement those. invited us to be part of -- deja vu. here is another disaster that had catastrophic consequences where in hindsight, the failures to that response were obvious.

we could call that a black swan. a black swan of course was something that we didn't anticipate ahead of time, but ultimately had catastrophic consequences and in hind site sooigt, seemed so obvious. and i'll make a counterargument. i'll say it was a black swan what happened in japan. it's a black swan because it wasn't just an earthquake. it wasn't just a tsunami. it wasn't just a nuclear incident. it was all three of those things wrapped together. the reason hurricane katrina was so catastrophic is because it wasn't a single disaster. it wasn't just a hurricane. it was a hurricane, by the way, it was a category 3 hurricane when it came ashore. category 3 hurricane. shouldn't be catastrophic. what made it catastrophic was

the failure of the levees. it's something we commonly known as a disaster within a disaster. right? those two scenarios, one of which was unlikely, the levees being breached and one fairly likely, a hurricane, category 3. those two things together make a disaster a catastrophe. what japan faced wasn't just what we faced. disaster in a disaster. it was a disaster within a disaster within a disaster. and i got to tell you, not only was there an earthquake, a tsunami and a nuclear incident, that nuclear incident has such a strong feeling for all of us. particularly, the japanese. that can cause not only physical consequences, but severe psychological consequences. and one of the things that we saw in that disaster was really

the resilience of the japanese people. we all remember the tv images from hurricane katrina or frankly from many disasters we've faced in the united states where i got to tell you, americans, we're not, we're not as resilient. how many of us have food stockpiled in our homes and water and medication? we know we should, but most of us don't. but how would we react to a terrible catastrophe hitting us, destroying our homes, ininjurying, killing our friends and family, then to see on tv the japanese people waiting in line for food and water in an orderly fashion immediately after the disaster was really remarkable. it's a testament to the resiliency of the japanese people. i could only hope we as americans adopt some of these. one of the areas i feel strongly about in part of this task force

is the need for individuals to take the responsibility seriously. if you think the government, whether it's the japanese government or the u.s. government are going to be there to help you in a disaster, you're crazy. you're going to be on your own. the department of homeland security tells you you're going to be on your own for at least 72 hours, but they're serious. you're going to be on your own and local governments and state governments and certainly not the federal government cannot be this for you in your time of need. on the risk side, we talked about this being a black swan. i mentioned that for the same sake of argument, it was a black swan. we need to realize that we have to be prepared for extremely low probability, high consequence events. and i would say that japan example is probably the best example of a low probability, high consequence event. those three scenarios all rolled

into one. who could have predicted that? it seems easy, of course it does. but one, who's going to allocate resources to that event? by definition, not going to happen or not very likely. now, the probability isn't zero. we say it was zero, say we don't need ail kating -- it was one in 1 thourks. as a policymaker, how would one allocate those resources? this is a vexing challenge we face in the united states for years. something we call homeland security and homeland security grants, for example. it was very very controversial we started this program and giving money to state and local governments to prepare for disasters. which states do you give more

money to? on a per capita basis? or is every state deserve a certain amount? does north dakota deserve the same amount as any other state? eventually, we came to a solution and today, grants are ail kated based on risks. probably the number one variable that goes into that is population, but there's a lot of other things to consider. it's not perfect, but at least we're using science here. that still won't prepare you for the black swan. that black swan is going to be so catastrophic and again, in hindsig hindsight, you can rationalize it. you have to embrace the all has ars aproch and realize that some of the practices we have such as on evacuation or infrastructure rebuilding and resiliency, are going to be common no matter

what type of disaster happens. if even just one happens in japan, whether it be an earthquake, a tsunami or nuclear since -- is absolutely critical. so let's invest in planning for hazards and requirements just as we heard japan is now going to do. i frankly do not blame japan. it's very easy for us to say in hindsight japan should have been prepared. i think the japanese government should have been too hard on themselves. i think the japanese have actually have a lot of lessons we can learn. for example, i talked about individuals. we do fire drills, right? we're lucky if we do one a smaser. at the elementary school level or even the collegiate level.

in japan, do you know they have monthly earthquake drills in many places? they do that because they see that as a high probability, high consequence event. we need to be prepared, whether it be the elementary school example of the public at large needs to understand that for the particular risk, they face, they need to be prepared for. some areas are well prepared. floridans are well prepared for hurricanes. why? because it happens almost every year. also, the florida government, the state of emergency is one of the best in the nation. why? because they also have disasters. major hurricanes frequently. get example of california. earthquakes. there's probably no better state or no individuals better

prepared in the united states than the california people and the california government. they understand the risk they face. they prepare for it. again, i don't fault the japanese. they were prepared. probably prepared for a tsunami as well, but those two together with a nuclear incident, i think it's unrealistic to expect that anyone could have a, predicted it, but b, allocated significant resources for that particular low probability high consequence event. so in closing, i hope that we do embrace some of the lessons learned. we as americans as well as japanese, from this zdisaster. but i urge us to look at it from an all hard. >> harry: adthree particular events rolled together, happening again in the near future because it could be a 1,000 year event, but individually, these or other

events we don't even predict, will certainly happen and we need to be prepared for those. thank you. >> this is my honor to speak here with the speakers today and i'm not expert -- but i can talk about public view in japan and also, i was in the -- when we had this disaster. i walked from company to my home for three hours. i couldn't forget the scene so i couldn't forget how much i felt how fear of fukushima -- you

guys understand. thank you so much. and also, washington, d.c. has rare earthquake last summer just right after i move to here, so i'm kind of qualified expert of experience emergency. so, today, i will raise three discussion questions to your perception here between the u.s. and japan. plus, why japan stopped all of nuclear power reactor.

the answer is because it is hard for japanese to trust japanese government especially information. note in his paper, the rest of the economic benefits must come first however, the japanese people do not have confidence in the japanese government. the biggest project is protect people's live. i have a good example why -- nuclear reactor or not. it was hoping for japanese people when the news came out that even the japanese government has resout of speedy

assistant -- the japanese government did not tell to japanese people. instead, the government get -- the u.s. government in this association, how could japanese people trust a government even if the government says a nuclear react reactor, it isn't hard to believe it. so there was a news a couple of days ago. nuclear industries and agency concluded what. one of the nuclear reactor and then nuclear safety commission -- i think the japanese government have to make trust through information sharing and providing -- why

japan has had information sharing program. i think there are two reasons. one was caused by unique situation in japan. i understand the japanese government has some reasons for not informing japanese people at the time. japan is small country. japan didn't have the place, the transportation system for so many people to evacuate. japanese government didn't disclose speedy information because it wanted to avoid the cost and panic in case of evacuation. at the time, japanese media had some trouble to cover. they could not provide the information the people wanted.

avoiding panic in japan. i can't explain this point. movies. there are lots of movies to help understand the difference between u.s. and japan. or something but for example deep impact and -- like this. the japanese usually don't have evacuation. i have a good example. which is in tokyo, but wanted --

witho u.s. has more space. this is why u.s. projects has -- it is not so easy to move around in japan because things are very tight. the second reason is the japanese didn't have information sharing. they have done best what they can do, but we don't have system. u.s. housing. u.s. created an information sharing system. through this system, the federal and local government can share information in the wake of emergency. u.s. government may not know -- 2004, to make information sharing systems for a major emergency.

which is after the emergency happened and what governments should do. is played to government to -- normal operation in one month. the government, operation, information sharing system identify. to get information. in the government. as long as i know when the hurricane katrina hit louisiana 2005, the u.s. government activated coupe. it was improved from hurricane katrina. i think they have have learned from 911, 1995. especially information.

in the case of -- local government in particular understand necessary for such information sharing system, however, i heard that japan has not been able to discuss about it yet. third, why this has affected japan, i think. as i mentioned, it has promoted to communities, some advantage. we made beautiful rhyme to get food and to some supply. they don't have any place to run away. we must think of after that.

so they must operation in their community, but the other half in the governoring process, such a community structure sometimes has a disadvantage, too. they're not peer pressure. that prevents people from -- and challenge. people aboard discussing each other. this is not only to the program, but also it is a nationwide program in japan. i think u.s. does a good job on making lesson out of programs. like the business school -- and they broke the fastest study on how to gather information in early 1990s.

i hope u.s. and japan can corroborate in the project for the sake of japan and all of country in the world. this would help me to guess what natural disaster and nuclear program. i think the population project has especially too early. making 50 nuclear safety standards and information sharing. thank you very much. >> okay, now we're going to have the q and a. thank you to all of our speakers. i would ask you, we are on espn live, so if you have a question, wait -- not espn.

cspan. espn would be more fun. but please make sure you've got the microphone in your hand before you start the question so they can hear the whole question. what i, we have one right there, so i will hold my -- let you guys get started. please stand up, identify yourself. >> dave fitzgerald, private consultant. i have a question about mitigation, which i didn't see in this report. mentioned specifically, but it involves a lot of money. a lot of money spent by local governments presumably. it all is based on the idea that people are living, some people, some communities are located in the wrong place. they know from experience it floods, earthquakes. it's a bad place to be living. you've got to move the community. that's a huge economic cost. it's a huge political, psychological cost.

how does any government really do that? we have a problem now in tokyo where they talk about the land filled areas and liquefaction. you've got problems all the time in the gulf with you know, bailing out new orleans or other places that are -- let's let the panel comment. >> anyone would like to go first? >> sure. i'll it first. a great question and mitigation is essential. mitigation actually has a high return investment and just so you know, say you're spending money now to reduce expenses later and some studies suggest if you spend a dollar now in mitigation, you'll save $4 on the response base, so it's a good investment. so problem is, you have to actually spend that dollar and it can be very, very expense

sieve. hundreds of millions of dollars to move a community away from a very at-risk along the shore. so from financial terms, you'd have to potentially invest a lot to save some done the road. two, there are huge social costs, too. you can do other measures. raise homes on stilts. you can harden them for different times like earthquakes. it does require a large up front cost. >> any other panel members like to comment on that one? okay. we have a question right down here in the front. >> good afternoon. my name is david trujilo. the question about data flows in the middle of a crisis.

in the bush white house, the bush administration, that was a big challenge with katrina. you have bits of information, sometimes it's not accurate. but massive poamounts of information. i'm curious for the panel to cleez comment on how you observed the japanese government and society to handle that and if there are in contrasts you mikt draw between katrina and the japanese experience between the data flows. thank you. >> would you like to go first on that?