duplicating such as missile ballistic defense, intelligence sharing, reconnaissance, maintenance, readiness, training and force preparation as well as effective engage innocement. with minimal casualties and high levels of preparedness. no wonder with woe have a cyber defense issue as well. smart defense is a priority for nato. it should be, and it is, the continued revolution of the initiative aligning national k35b89 priorities with those of nato as it actually, supernationalizes policies with cooperative and consensus level agreement that produces a cost effective projection. planning and application in both theater but also real world operations. specialization, therefore, is a key word. it is the essence of coordinated efforts, low cost fiscal human cooperation effectiveness and guarantee of engagement for the future. specializations a form of cooperation of geographic interests or of strategic

sharing of cost collectively or individually but positively decisively directed. smart defense is therefore a long-term viable solution. defense ministers have paved wait. foreign ministers agreed the forthcoming chicago summit elements are expected to be addressed. overall defense packages are supposed to be negotiated. a smart defense is, therefore, expected to rise up to the level. it will be a new approach, a new commitment, a new mind-set of capabilities political and military. a new security culture understanding and application that is now expected to be decided. whereas in short, engagement of smart defense will equally mean reapproachment of collective understanding in the new york atlantic identity but also fidelity. now, let me go on to what smart defense is associated with southeastern europe. is it engaging the expertise. simple. it is not. it is not well comprehended for

political and thus military edge gaugement. good news, they are interested in learning more. unfortunately, in time of austerity measures and political challenges, but also change, issues sump as smart defense say or become a secondary issue of concern. nonetheless, national and collective defense remains at the forefront of interests of states with issues that of are security and defense concerns. as long as there are regional at peripheral concerns, smart defense and, therefore, security issues will be raised. eventually implemented. even complemented up through initiatives of support. to what concerns smart defense in greece? i would say that we are interpretable, we have the 2012, have already made engagement, are well prepared. we have high quality level of deliverables, credibility and unlike the political situation that actually exists this week

in greece. what do we need to do now? as greeks we need to reaffirm commitments, re-align relations and alliances, develop and resolve issues of concern whether regional or peripheral. yet we need to request more human capital applied positions that will level the concern, the burden, also promote new security culture both internally but also to the alliance and to the members separately. and if you give me a minute, i will sty what is expected to the chicago summit, but also to the chick summit me chicago summit meeting we need to create a smart defense utilization, specialization affording a new security framework and culture deliverables, looking forward to a new engagement with minimum court and minimum -- thank you very much. >> yes. thank you very much. all right. i'm going to open it up for discussion. we have 35 minutes. i would ask that you try and keep your comments and questions brief, and try and show the

panel do likewise in replying. can we take them in batches of three, please, and also identify yourself and your affiliation. the man in the front here, and the then -- a couple more. >> specifically, about the missile defense across europe there. i was in a navy. ron fisher, we the people now dot org. the last submarine, i could have wiped out over 100 bases or cities with warheads. the apm is against the -- i'd like to know, to we really want to build that system? because i guess the international treaty, it is also ineffective. do we want to build an abm? >> in the center here.

>> thanks. andrea bauman, center of for transatlantic relations. my question is about something that some of the panelists have touched upon, but i would like to specifically ask you with regard to your expectations for the chicago summit whether the discussion about specialization and coordination will be accompanied by a debate over a vision of what nato actually wants to do with a smart defense force, in terms of, in the sense of going beyond just counting budget numbers and weapons programs, but really discussing what there is, actually, a vision of what this force should be for and i would say, in order -- coming back to the buffet metaphor that ms. smith used, you know, of course you want to make sure that no everyone brings salads and forgets the brownies but you also want to know what kind of party you want to throw and does

nato know what type of party it wants to throw in ten years' time? >> thank you. and someone just behind there. thank you. >> thank you. from the defense college. my question also about the analogy, and that maybe the other panelists can also answer my question. the analogy i think is relevant and convincing in the case of the u.s. in the case of european allies, more skeptical, and i was wondering what's the threshold you identify under which the decrease of the defense expenditures can no longer maintain the credibility of nato as an alliance to fulfill its commitment, more specifically, article 5. you mentioned the brigades and the u.s. nuclear weapons. if we remove them, all the u.s. military footprint in europe, how do you convince, for instance, the partners -- not

the partner, the allies in the baltics, which are actually a very frightened by the russian activities. how do you convince them that article 5 is still critical? so that's my question. >> thank you. so i think we've got a question on the russian missile building defenses particularly in the context, of is this part of the smart solution? the details of specialization and cooperation. how does that fit into a broader vision, when nato wants to go and on the context of dieting when is enough, enough. i think was -- i'll ask all the panelists to consider those questions. you can dip in and answer either all three of them or pick and choose, if you like. if we start with you again, julie. >> okay. well, i'll try, maybe, the second one and then say a word about missile defense. as was noted earlier on the panel, i think nato ever

since -- it's obvious. i mean, we've said this at numerous conferences. countless conferences over the year, but ever since the end of the cold war, yes, the alliance has struggled to have that single vision of what the future holds, and obviously, if you take a short tour through portugal and poland and norway and estonia and canada, you get different answers. there are lots of different threats that are listed by allies when they think about what the future is for this alliance, and it ranges from, everything from the more traditional article 5 to energy security, to cyber, arctic issue, high north. the list goes on and on, and so what was useful in at least bringing that together in some sort of comprehensive vision was what we went through at the last

summit. to sit down at nato's 60th anniversary or birthday and have a check and rewrite the strategic concept. one could argue that maybe it doesn't provide enough detail, but i think it was a very helpful exercise for the alliance to go through. frankly, having worked and it behind the scene, it was painful and difficult, simply because as i just said, you do have some competing visions, and that balance between, you know, finding the sweet spot between article 5 and regional/global security provider is challenging. but i do think that the strategic concept does provide a basic level of guidance in that regard, and, again, there will be differences, but i think with that guidance, you can determine that there's certain levels of capabilities that are required, and, frankly, the gap between

article 5 and more broader global regional security providers outside the euro atlantic area isn't as wide as i think some would believe. i mean, the truth is, you're going to need a basic level of expeditionary capabilities to respond to an article 5 scenario, whether it's something inside the euro atlantic area, or a threat that's challenging the alliance or the euro atlantic community from beyond than region. if portugal is thinking of responding to some sort of scenario in the baltic, it needs to be expeditionary. this is not a scenario anymore where we expect the threat and the challenge to come to nato, to, you know -- the vision of tanks rolling over the border and coming to you is fading away. and so i think while again different countries can choose to play to their strengths and their regional expertise, i think you can -- it's not that challenging to begin a

conversation about the level of capabilities or the types of capabilities this is going to need, and i think taking that conversation coming back to the first question, the alliance has decided collectively at its last summit that it wanted to pursue a missile defense system. it decided that it wanted it to be nato providing that system, not simply the united states moving ahead with the epaa. the nato system is anticipated to bring more to the table than the epaa. the epaa is, no question, the core of nato missile defense, but i think the vision is that over time, countries will be able to add on capabilities to it. we now have a situation where we have countries coming forward with contributions. the netherlands has indicated that it will be upgrading some of its frigates to add missile defense radar. germany will be contributing

patriots. different countries are trying to figure out, france is working on early warning. ways in which they can contribute to the system, but the commitment was made in lisbon. we now have reached phase one of the epaa, the u.s. contribution to the system, and, again, we will declare this capability interim capable at the summit in chicago. >> i'd like to warn those who -- who use this obesity analogy that, that's a very, very dangerous path to go down. if we look back to the last 20 years, my big concern is that actually we have started spending piece dividend too fast and too early, too happily. and so, so i think we just have to get back to the understanding that this -- this really -- we

have to figure out thousand be rational about our spending, and i wouldn't encourage the united states to spend less. and i -- i would just say that an, i guess we europeans are pleased with the u.s. spending so much, because honestly, we count on you. we don't say it. but we count on you to be there for us, when we need you, and that's really has -- has kind f of, kind of put us in a mind-set where, honestly, i think most europeans think we can get away with this. this is not that important, because in the end the u.s. will be there for us, and the real worrying messages in the last couple of years is that, you know, the u.s. might -- might not be there for us. and so i think it is important that it is up to us europeans,

also, to make sure that the u.s. understanding that we don't want you to go away, and that we will be rethinking our own spending in order to make sure you understand that we're in it -- in it together. i just want to the say a few words about, about defense industry. i think it is important that the u.s. understands that there is this concern in -- in europe that basically smart defense will mean more american equipment in europe, and i think it is in your interests, as it is in the american interest, and it's in our interests that we find a good balance between good competition. between competition that enhances technology. making sure that there is no protectionism in the arms market, but at the same time, that -- that europe itself also keeps up wit technological

developments and will be able to provide proper equipment, proper european equipment. that, by the way, might be used in the u.s. as well. so i'm not advocating european arms for europe. what i'm advocating is that it is important that the european armaments industry stays a part of the alliance, armament -- armament industry. >> just before i pass it on to the remaining two members of the panel it may be useful some of the numbers bandied about about reductions and the kind of withdrawal. i know that the u.s. military doesn't like to talk about it in terms of withdrawal from europe. they talk about it in terms of rebalancing its commitment to europe and are looking to make a reduction of i think around 15% in the current troop numbers in europe and are currently 80,000

u.s. troops based in europe. and tln were something like 400,000 during the height of the cold war. so that's an indication. part of that rebalancing is additional commitments they're putting into europe including nuclear defense, for maritime forces and also includes special forces as well, which have been deployed into europe. i think on the -- just another set of figures. i think there is a case to be made about the -- looking at the level of u.s. defense expenses. i looked up the -- the nato producers, nato produces an annual statistics of expenditures late to lines. as we take peek here of defense spending in 199a 5 and follow through. collectively european nato is spending about the same as it did in 19 t95 at the peak of th

cold war. in 1995 only 14 members of nato. now there are 26. so in terms of individual member states spending it has gone down, and gone down significantly, but overall, collectively, european nato is still spending the same. given we moved from the peak of the cold war into a security environment not necessarily involving threats. to me that seems quite reasonable. if you look at the u.s. defense spending for the peak of the cold war to where it is today. it's gone up something like 75%, that kind of confirms what was said early perp again, there is a context for saying that the capabilities gap is in part kind of a supply push on the part of the u.s. now, whether, you know -- i guess i'll throw back to the panel, because one of the questions was about, you know, how much is enough? and so i just want us to kind of set that and give it a little

context. >> may i just say something that is really important. the withdrawal of the troops from the -- the u.s. troops from europe, will have important, not only military but sociological impacts. and i think that is something that -- that should not be underestimated. so i think both sides have to work on, how do we replace that? because don't forget, the presence of u.s. troops, their participation in local societies. the message they convey. they're closeness, and you could go on and on have been a very important part of -- of how this relationship proceeds. >> sorry. but i would add that two of the four brigades that are stationed in europe have not been on european soil, more or less, for the last decade.

so returning those two brigades to the united states means that they will not return to europe from afghanistan. i mean, i fully appreciate what you're trying to say, and trust me, as someone who was actually arguing to keep that third brigade in europe, and succeeded for at least a year, i -- i -- i take your point, but it also needs to be known that two of the four have not been present, and those interactions have not been occurring. and so one could say with the new brig grade assi brigade assigned to the united states, some of that connective tissue will occur once again, that's been lacking since we went into afghanistan. >> john? >> yes. i mean, i think that you very adequately and numerically expressed the problem. the piece dividend -- the peace dividend disappeared in the 19

the 90s. we were able to balance the budget, do a little bit with some of the someone we saved, but that disappeared quite rapidly with the doubling of the u.s. military budget after mili 2000-2001. we did not prepare for transformation of our manufacturing base and we saw the erosion of our manufacturing base as a result of that. it's not that the complete causal relationship there. it's only one of the contributing factors. we did not prepare for with when we had a peace dividend for a transformation or our manufacturing base. in terms of the obesity analogy, we are the biggest in the world. we are responsible for the largest amount of military spending in the world. but we're not the only fat cat. there are some pretty pudgy people out there.

some europeans are kind of pudgy, too up there in the top five, uk, france, germany, pretty big spenders. they could use a little slimming in my humble opinion. how much slimming? i don't know exactly. but i do think as they say with diets it's not just cutting the amount of food you eat. it's lifestyle. it's changing your whole approach. if we're going to be cutting in europe, we have to change the lifestyle. the approach to securities issues. a nebraska louse, topic, granted, but yes, looking at a variety of different approaches to the threat of a nonmilitary base. the outline the various threats that face nato, we have this hodgepodge of threats. cyber terrorism, you know, piracy, that add up to not a whole heck of a lot in terms of the needed capabilities to address them.

rogue states seem to brk you know, a kind of return of the 1990s in terms of the nato's search for a rational. syria, iran, countries that pose a threat not only to their region burk the global order and therefore nato has to bulk up for that. but i find that a problematic cob september as it was problematic in the 1990s. so resurgent russia that's always in the background of people talking about what nato might be useful for. but ultimately, you know, i think that looking at different capabilities in europe that can replace the military capabilities that are either being removed by the united states or being reduced by european countries is a necessary conversation to have. and i look forward to having that conversation. it's not going to take place in chicago, unfortunately.

but maybe later at a subsequent nato summit. >> we're buying weapons that we're not deploying, we're just keeping. this is my argument to support, what is my counterargument? yes -- well, we don't have any money. you probably realize by now that we don't have any money. so the options are very specific. what do you do then? do you sort of close that country and good-bye? or you reinstate your status all over. the idea is basically a button

like a reset. where you know what were the mistakes and you learn from the mistakes of other countries. we have common history in this one. history plays a very important role. no wonder why we do not allow so easily neighboring countries to join nato so suddenly. the issue is that we cannot as a country, we cannot play the role of burden sharing as other countries do. so instead of basically this is my point of view. instead of making a fool out of ourselves, we've been doing that quite a while for the last year, we decide that we need to specialize on something.

i remember when i was here we were talking about specializations. what is the key point for countries that have water all around it, have a lot of natural resources and a lot of issues when it comes to security, to regional security stability. you specialize on the issues of the concern of the world and that is transfer of goods through the waters. that is called piracy issues. counterpiracy issues, maritime issues. in this case unlike the whole government economics and all this stuff we have seem to have a lot of money. we're talking about billions or trillions. the problem is that not everybody has a flag of their country on the back due to taxation. so why don't we specialize on this one. maybe just maybe other allied member countries can specialize in the things that they're

interested at. find a common ground where they can decide the way that i interpret thing and the way that i've been receiving things down tomato there is a bit of egoism as well, who's the best, who's the worst, who leads, who doesn't lead and all that stuff. and so in -- each country specializes in one thing and you create the services. you do the human capital training. from universities to institutes and so on and so forth. that is a very simple because basically you cut back on everything and you leave only one sector, which basically makes you a very important player in the world arena. and unlike my colleague here whom he said they need to cut spending, the united states made a very good job into understanding what are the global threats at an early time.

whereas we europeans we do not. we're still thinking about integrating ourselves again and again and again and more and even more from the coal and steel to the europe yoon community. from the european commune. now we have a currency. the problem is the currency's falling apart. it's not only greece, it's spain. it's portugal. other countries, ireland, hungary had problems. holland has problems so on and so forth. yes, big countries like germany need to -- they do that. they take all the burden sharing like france does, but instead of arguing and fighting who's the best and who's the worst, when you specialize you cut back on everything. this is the most viable solution you also need to take care of the political situation that is rising right now in europe. and it's not a good one. it's not a good one. it's not a viable one. it's not a credible one. it's not a trustworthy one.

so i would say let's be more honest. let's say yes, there are things that we're missing. yes, there are things that we need to negotiate. yes, we need to find a solution like they do many the vatican where they close themselves until they find a new pope. and at the same time let's be honest and sacrifice some issues in order to resolve some others. the world is not safe. we're nearby syria and i know how unsafe things are. if we go down the euro zone there's going to be a come know effect. if any country fall there's going to be a domino effect. not only greece. let's be honest and let's give nato a chance. let's give sol dare tay a chance in this case. >> i'd like to take another batch of questions. we're running out of time. so try and be brief.

>> address that last point, one of the precise problems -- i'd like to address the last point one of the main problems in that specific region of the world is the lack of solidarity between two nato members and i mentioned you've gone around the word turkey and that's your regional base. your expenses are not cold war, they're vis-a-vis turkey irk historical debate as you said. and what can be done within nato to begin to reduce the tensions wean the two. if you emphasis sea power as you did, sea power is to guarantee the resources and you know there's a burgeoning conflict between turkey and greece over the eastern mediterranean over cyprus and that's linked to lebanon and the palestinian question. and that growing tension i think is really crucial and it's an