affected immediately by the results of the talks. but those are our views of what the principles should be for negotiations, but we believe on all issues on iran wshould havea healthy debate and hence today's panel. and i would say it's a really excellent panel that i think we've put together. i'll just introduce them quickly. moderating will are mortimer zuckerman, who serves as, ceo and chairman of the board of directors of boston properties. also chairman and editor-in-chief of "u.s. news & world report." chairman rch and publisher of "new york daily news "and commentator on mclaughlin group and equally perhaps, an ct aive member of iran task force. sitting to his left is ambassador dennis roth. dennis is counselor right now at the washington institute for policy, recently served several years as special assistant to

president obama, and national security counsel senior director foresen tram region. also, dennis has, was, involved in our first iran task force several years ago. it's good to have dennis back in the building. steve radamaker, on his left, a principle of podesta group, served as assistant secretary of state from 2002 to 2006 heading various bureaus at the state department including the bureau of arms control and the bureau of international security nonproliferation. steve has been also an active member of our iran task force for the last 4t 1/2 years. to his left, ambassador nick burns. he was, he's currently professor of the diplomacy and international politics at the harvard kennedy school. also a foreign service officer for 27 years culminating in his

position at under secretary of state for political affairs, 2005 to 2008. and to his left is elliott abrams, who is currently senior fellow for studies at the counsel of foreign relations. elliott also served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national xumplty adviser to the administration, president george w. bush supervising policy in the middle east for the white house. thank you very much. i'm 2340u goinow going to turn o mort. >> good morning. i'm going to ask the first couple of questions of dennis and the elliott, all baseden 0 the hypothetical fantasy that are now the national security adviser to the president and ask a couple of questions here. how do you assess the iranian threat and how do you assess the quality of u.s. symbol sgleinte

evaluating the threat? >> what it represents from a nuclear standpoint, also what it's embodied in the region, vis-a-vis its neighbors. this is a country that has sought to extend its reach. it has used different kinds of proxies, whether it's hezbollah or sadrs in iraq. clearly is a country that seeks, on the one hand, a kind of hagemini in the region. this supreme leader built an -- towards the united states. so if you are assessing american interests and looking at the

region, you have to look at what iran's behave hear been towards american interests over time. i can say this, actually, even though you're asking me to assume a different persona, back in the 1990s when i was a negotiator in the middle east, we were constantly contending with iranian-inspired efforts to subvert the peace process through acts of terror. so there's a history here of being hofstile towards american interests. we have seen different iranian leaderships 24r50e69 leaderships at least in the forms of their presidents, talking about a dialogue of civilizations and the possibilities of trying to find ways of building bridges between the two sides. he was clearly not able to deliver very much. if anything at all. so i think we have to look at iran through a lens of hostility and threats. i think we also have to look at iran through a lens that, their behave hear, from time to time,

been adjusted tactical. not strategically but tactically when, in fact, it faces an array of pressures that it judges to be threatening to its interesting. the point is, there is a potential to affect iranian behavior and we've had an interest in doing so. so i think the logic of building an approach where the iranians feel pressure and a freed to redur need to create the pressure and you provide an ability to give them a way out is the proper approach. >> elliott? >> i agree with that. i think the conclusion one la to draup from those descriptions of iranian behavior over the period since 1979 is that they cannot be permitted to have a nuclear weapon. champion is the formal position of the united states and the p-5 plus one and the ea and security council. let me turn to the second half of your question which is how confident can we be that we know

what the situation is in iran, a and i would say not very confident. if you think back, we didn't have a great record over the years in predicting that the russian, the chinese, indian and pakistani nuclear weapons programs, in case of iran, not the cia, the mek came up with the original disclosures about the program. when the disclosures came about, they did not happen on the day it was begun. they, they came years later, so that activity had been going on for quite a long time before we and our allies figured it out. so i don't see why we should be able to feel confident that we have -- we have nearly perfect knowledge of the iranian nuclear weapons program.

>> well we now are just a short period away from the may 23rd talks, and i'd like to address this to nick and steve. how would you define a successful outcome from those talks? what do you think we need, and is the only way we can imagine a successful outcome if there is a credible threat of a military response to iran? >> thank you. i just wanted to follow jum on what dennis and elliott said. when i coordinated in the state department between 2005 and 2008, of course, i went around the world talking to governments what what they thought the iranian was doing and i very much agree with dennis and elliott. there's no questions in the minds of every leading government in the world that iran is seeking a capability to about nuclear weapons power. that the russians agree with that. chine ooepz agree. all the europeans, all the airp states and of course our kurccoy as well. we don't have a lot of insights

into the decision-making of the leadership because we haven't had an embassy there in 32 years, but there is no argument around the world about what sirn trying to do. that's seek a nuclear weapons capability. i think these talks in baghdad will be obviously quite critical. interesting to me seeing what the iranians said after the first round of talks in istanbul. they read out the talks. they talked positively. about a beginning. now, we haven't seen the iranians talk positively about discussions with the p-5 and germany since 2006. when this process started. and elliott and steve and i were involved in the bush administration trying to get the irans to the table and they refused. the fact they're at the table and willing to go back for a second meeting is positive. i believe both president obama and president bush have been correct in assessing that our ability to negotiate successfully will be a function of our ability to make the military threat credible. so why are the iranians at the

table? two reasons. first, prime minister netanyahu made the threat credible, as as barak's in consistent public statements. that has been very helpful to the united states, and to the rest of the p-5, although some of the countries might not acknowledge that. i can't imagine the russians and chinese acknowledging that, i think the americans should. that we can narrow the gap the more we should do that. one reason they're at the table. second, the eu has taken a very big decision to go beyond financial sanctions, well beyond the u.n. security council resolutions towards and oil embargo, which is going to be phased in starting next month, and the united states with the help of both congress and the administration is going forward towards central banks sanctions. these are the toughest sanctions that have ever been put on iran knop question iran is being forced to disengage from the international financial system, from swift and other financial

institutions and this is all positive. that's why they're at the table. what would be a success? to keep the talks going. here i want to draw a point that some may disay glee with. i don't know. i think there's a high integration between president obama and what president bush had been trying to do. if i look back to '06, to 2012, i don't see a lot of differences in the main in what both presidents have been trying to do. president obama deserves some time. we haven't had a serious, sustained conversation with the iranians on any issue in 32 years. serious and sustained. and substantive. if there is going to be a diplomatic sdugs and there's not a high probability of that, we can't just give it one or two meetings. the president's going to need many months of trying to find some arrangement with the help of the europeans, russians and chinese, where the iranians will stop well short of a nuclear weapons capacity. perhaps to limit themselves consistent with both the last two administrations to civil

nuclear power. some measure of that. the details important, but no way this is going to be worked out by may 23rd in iraq. i would not be in favor of any effort to in essence say by june, july or august, deploem sip's failed because there's no agreement. i think the president deserves more time and space and he'll know that he's got to the stay at the table long enough to test the proposition of whether diplomacy would work. he can't stay too long. if there's no freezing especially of iranian centrifuge construction. the president will know the line and that's the difficulty of diplomacy but i think the goal is 0 to have a series of meetings and the p-5 plus 1 context and at some point i would hope we'll see the u.s. and iran break off to have bilateral discussions, much in the way that president bush did with north korea. in the six-party talks. i would hope for sustained deploepsy for the course of 2012. >> a lot of analysts have commented that this moment

appears perhaps more right for a deal than at any time in recent years, and nick touch and some reasons for that. iran is under significant economic pressures as a result of international sanctions. both with what the europeans are doing and the united states with respect to legislation passed by congress late last year to target transactions with the central bank of iran. the israeli military threat, i agree with nick, has been deployed in a credible manner. thas certainly focused the attention of the iranians in my opinion. i think it's also had affects on the other partisan negotiations. i don't think as nick said, i don't think the chinese would want to admit it, but they have serious energy concerns. they do not want to see a military conflict in the persian gulf. i think, this actually is one of my concerns. i think the obama administration as well has serious economic concerns with a pending

presidential election, and i think for the obama administration the threat of a military attack by israel right now is deeply troubling. and one of my worries is that i'm very happy for the iranians to come to the table, highly motivated to reach a deal. i don't want the united states to be too highly motivated to reach a deal because that could lead to compromises that ultimately would not serve our national interests. >> in answer to the question, what would be an acceptable outcome, i think we have to keep our focus on iran's uranium enrichment program, which has always been the crown jewel of their nuclear weapons program, and any deal that permits them to continue enrichment, i think is bad deal for the united states. and what they've done over the last three years of the obama administration is just as president obama ratcheted up pressure by trying to apply tougher sanctions starting in

about 20107, the iranians decided to ratchet up pressure on the international kpucommuni by stepping up their program and reaching to a higher level getting them closer to nuclear capacities. in way it's a race between -- between the united states and iran, a race between heightened economic sanctions on one hand and heightened enrichment activity on the other and who is gaining more leverage over the other with this competition? i worry that you do hear voices that say, well, at this point, the 20% enrichment program ham to be our focus. stop paying attention to the 3.5% enrichment program which was always it's centerpiece of their program. i think that kind of advice is really very dangerous. >> the, there are at least a couple of differences between the united states and israel. one is that the united states seems to be implying that it is the achievement of a nuclear weapon and israel seems to be referring to the achievement of

nuclear capability. how important do you think those kinds of differences play a role in the effectiveness of whatever we might be doing with iran? >> i -- i'm a little skeptical that there is such a difference between the two on this point. when the prime minister was actually here, he actually used the word nuke colclear weapon i own speech. i think the critical issue is, what is a, a threshold is not acceptable. the idea the iranians would develop a nuclear weapons capability is what should be a source of concern for us. an example of what i mean. if the iranians decided, gee, we're not going to test, assemble a weapon but we're going to create 50 bombs' worth of enriched uranium and just keep doing this and we're going to get to the point where we'll find a breakthrough on our next generation of centrifuges, they could put themselves into a

position to confront the world with a fait accompli and no one could do ago about it. can cannot be your own nuclear weapons, at time of their choosing they could confront the world with a reality you could not undo. i think that's something appreciated by the administration as well. i think the key area where there is a difference between the administration and the israel irs is a function simply of the different realities that we each deal with. we have much more capability to be able to militarily, to take out or at least to lay and set back the iranian nuclear capacities. the iranians -- the israels have a capability as well. the point is, because they have less capability, the juncture at which they arrive at what they're defense minister calls immunity, meaning the point of which the nature of the iranian program is so wide, so deep, is in a sense so profound, that it could be recons stufted quickly,

even if israel struck, takes place much sooner for the israelis than it does for us. that's just an objective fact, and the challenge from an israeli standpoint is going to be, not to allow diplomacy to go on so long they lose military option. here again, the gap between the two sides may be less than meets the eye. particular the prime minister left here after his meeting with the president, he said the time for action is not measured in days or weeks nor is it measured in years. now, between days and weeks and years, you have a space for diplomacy. that's really what nick was getting at. the president, by the way, said there is a diplomatic window, but it's closing. and time is running out. here, again, i think there is a time and a space and i think the actual gap between the united states and the israelis at this point, as i said, is not as great at might meet the eye. i don't think this notion of weapons versus capabilities is, in fact, such a gap between the two sides, and i do think the time and space for diplomacy

exists clearly we may feel we have more time for that but i think we also have an test in having the iranians understand and i think this is the reason the president made the point, this cannot be a phony process. this is not be a rope-a-dope approach. we'll know the difference. if, in fact, there's a serious approach on their side, it's something we'll be able to see. if there isn't, we have an interest in having enough type, apropos what nick was saying, an interest in demonstrating to everyone, our own public and the world, this was a good-faith approach to negotiations even to the point where we might publicize what we put on the table, demonstrating what was on offer to allow the iranians to have what they claim they desire which is a civil nuclear capacity and they simply turned down that opportunity. we need to be able to demonstrate that diplomacy was tried and if it didn't work it's because the iranians just didn't want it to work.

>> would you comment on that, elliott? also, take into account the fact that it's now a new coalition in israel that has just been formed and how does that affect the credibility, shall we say, of what israel is about? >> well, two new governments that i think are worth mentioning. you have a new president of france. 's in the last couple of year, the country that has had the most incisive analyses and toughest on the iranian nuclear question has been france. it is possible that some of the officials, many who are career people who continue in office, but it is possible the french policy will now weaken under the new president, and that's something that i think will have an impact several on the eu approach. the british, french, german approach, and maybe the american approach as well. it isn't year the impact of general afuad joining the netanyahu government is.

he has in the past sounded very tough on iran and at other times sounded more conciliatory and the most recent interview i've seen with him, his explanation really was, you know, when you're in the opposition, you c because that was my job. now it's not going to be my job. so it may be that the gap between barack and netanyahu on the one hand and mofaz on the other does not exist. which would mean a tougher israeli sense, because you now have a broader coalition supporting it. i would only add that i do worry a great deal about the solidarity of the p-5 plus one position, partly because of hollande replacing sarkozy. and we've had too much agreement here. so let me say i disagree with nick about north korea. yeah, we had one-on-one talks with north korea. they were not, in fact, authorized by the president when cris hill started them. and they went nowhere.

now, under three presidents of both parties, we've had endless talks of north korea, and they have flimflammed us for decades. february 29th was the last flimflam where we had a deal with them that lasted three weeks. so i don't know that the model of north korea and breaking away for our one-on-one talks did anything but help north korea. and it is not reassuring that the person who led those talks in the clinton administration is leading the american delegation in these iran talks. because i believe we've never seen a real explanation of a kind of what i think went wrong from wendy herman, who is lead the talk. so as i look at the north korea example under clinton, bush and obama, it seems to me it's a kind of catalog of how talks can be used by a country that is developing a nuclear weapons program to continue the program year after year after year, rather than a model of

successful diplomacy for us. >> one other thing. please go ahead. >> can i reply? yes, by all means. >> thank you. president bush and secretary rice authorized ambassador hill to meet the advice foreign minister on several occasions. and wendy sherman when she was in the clinton administration. here's the larger point i'm trying to make. if there is a reasonable prospect that the united states or israel might go to war withish awit withish iran and the united states has not had a serious conversation in three decades, it's in our self interest and not a gift for us to seek out bilateral talks with the iranians, within the frame work of the p-5 plus one talks. because we've got to get a very clear sense, if there is a bottom line where they can make a deal with us and the other countries that would stop them well short of a nuclear weapons capability. and everyone in the room will tell you, the russians, the chinese and the europeans, this is more about the u.s. and iran

than it is the europeans and the asian countries in iran. point two would be, i share elliot's -- let me just say one more thing. if anyone knows under secretary of state wendy sherman, they would know she is tough, she is very smart, and i think she is a perfect choice to lead these negotiations. the second point, i think the p-5 is a patio tension problem here. in two respects. one i share he will lots, and here's where i agree, doubt that president francois hollande was the steal in the p-5 plus one. china is a major problem. the letter of the law -- the security council resolutions, but they become iran's lead trade partner, subverting the sanctions on a de facto basis. the key country might be russia. russia does not. to see iran go nuclear, russia is closer geographically than

anybody else. russia has influence. and i would hope that president obama would work with president putin to see if president putin could be a partner in trying to isolate the iranians and convince the iranians they've got to turn towards a diplomatic agreement or else. so i think this p-5 makeup is going to be very important for president obama. and right now i cthink with the absence of sarkozy probably weaker than it was last month. >> is there any significance to the fact that putin changed his mind about visiting the it's al out president put and i know his motivations. i will say this. the russians -- i negotiated for three years on sanctions and resolutions against iran. they're very tough and sometimes very frustrating. but at the end of the day, i think the russians have a much more highly strategic and more sophisticated view of this issue than do the chinese. so if anyone is going to make a difference on our side, if we can convince the russians to be constructive, that would help.

whether we can or not is an open question, because putin is a different character than medvedev. >> dennis and steve. >> if i could just comment on the question of how long we -- how patient we should be in the negotiating process with iran. i think it's important to recall that 15 months ago was the last time the two sides met. and at that time, iran came to the meeting and essentially said, end all your sanctions on us, and then we will be prepared to talk about our nuclear program. so it was essentially a non -- it was like, you unilaterally disarm and then perhaps we'll talk about what you're concerned about. 15 months later, they want to have a more serious negotiation. what has changed? well, they're under substantially more pressure. that's what's changed. they're under additional economic pressure and they're under additional military pressure. and that has changed their calculation. they want relief from that pressure. maybe the way they want to get relief is by negotiating a deal. but it could well be they simply want to use the process of negotiations to break the

momentum, and slow down and all of the developments that have led them to reassess their approach over the last 15 months. and that cannot be in our interest to let them succeed and simply using a diplomatic process to break the momentum of the pressure that we have successfully brought to bear against them. >> a couple points. one, i think there's no doubt that the iranian strategy is to try to split the five plus one. and i also have no doubt that they will probably put something on the table that's designed to be attractive or they think will be attractive to some of the members of the five plus one. this leads me into this second point. i think russia is the key here. and while it's hard to know exactly what the russians will want to do here, they clearly want to establish a kind of demonstration and independence from us. but i would just note one thing right now, that might temper the russian behavior. right now the russians are seen as protecting the syrians. this is not doing their interests and the region very much good.

if they are now seen as protecting the iranians on top of that, then they put themselves in a position where i think they threaten their long-term interests in it a region quite close to them for a long time to come. the russian capacity to evaluate their own interest i think is quite high. and this is something that i think we should be playing upon. now, is it something that we can count object on is going to produce the outcome we want? no. i think it brings us back to the idea, how do we reconcile conflicting realities. one, we can't allow this to be an open process, because the iranians will exploit it. two, we have to give it enough time to be credible and we have to be in a position where we also demonstrated, we put something on the table that was credible and the iranians turned down. if in the end if it turns out force has to be used, force has to be seen as a product of the iranians having brought this on themselves. partly because the end of the day, there is no military solution to this. the use of force can set the iranian program back. they have the know-how, the engineering capability, to

reconstitute. we need to put them in a position if force is used where it's hard for them to be able to reconstitute because they're isolated and contained afterward. indeed, they have to see the cost of them is very high of having to reconstitute. because that then gives us some chance of succeeding over time. so you do have to reconcile these two kinds of competing realities, if, in fact, you want to achieve the net -- the basic objective that we're after. >> so on the general theory that experience is what enables you to recognize a mistake when you do it again, what mistakes should we avoid if we're trying to get an agreement with iran and what can we do now in a very short run, because you have, as we all know, a much shorter fuse in the israeli public policy than you have in the american policy. why don't you start with that. >> well, i do think there is a value in picking up on something that elliot was noting. i think it's -- we shouldn't discount the north korean example. it should be a lesson to us, in part because it may also be a

lesson to the iranians. if they look at it as an example for themselves and draw a conclusion that, look, the big mistake the libyans made was giving up their capability, and the fact that the north koreans didn't give theirs up, put them in a different place, then we need to be very mindful this could be the kind of model they're looking at. here again, i think there is a certain value in being able to convey to others in the five plus one, and to the iranians, as well, the idea that there is a time limit here. i don't know that i would go as far as, say -- and put out a time limit in public. because i'm sure -- i have a suspicion that actually makes it harder for us with the other members of the five plus one. but in private, i think we should do it. including, i think we should do it with the iranians. because the iranians should understand, when we say our patience is limited, they need to understand that's for real. so i think the combination of learning the lessons from the north korean experience, number one, two, alsoar