department of justice pursuant to the aqap bomb retrieval? and the leak? >> i'm not certain, you describe a crimes report. there has been -- i know, discussion between ourselves and other agencies as the necessity for an investigation on the leak and as i have said, we have initiated an investigation. in terms of reporting, we, as i think has been indicted, had the responsibility of exploding the ied device and whatever reporting has come out of that has gone to not only the department of justice but other agencies. >> you have a counterterrorism special agent working out of los angeles that has been missing for five days now. >> yes. >> what can you tell us about that? >> we are still searching for that individual.

we've made, met his wife yesterday, and the office has had widely publicized the fact he's missing. there have been searches made in the areas where this agent would aurch run or hike. we're still searching. >> thank you. on sunday, hank crumpton, who you probably know, the former head of the cia's national resources division, was interviewed on "60 minutes." when asked about count eer untilgence, this is what he said. if you look at the threat that is imposed on our nation every day, some of the major nation states, china in particular, very sophisticated intelligence operations. very aggressive operations against the united states. i would hazard to guess that there are more foreign intelligence officers inside there working against u.s.

interests now than at the height of the cold war. i know there's a limit to what you can say, but how would you respond? >> it's difficult to say, but the counterintelligence threat has evaevled over a period of time. more generally, there are certain countries who use greater dispersal of individuals, and then as i mentioned in my opening remarks, the fact that so much of our data is kept in databases on networks and they may by vulnerable to attacks overseas. you don't have to be in the united states to undertake an attack and obtain secrets from the network. the counterintelligence threat has evolved in ways that were not present in the cold war. in terms of numbers of persons, i think that is less important than the ways that foreign countries are seeking to steal

our secrets. not just with individuals, not just with humit, but also with cyberattacks and cyberextractions of information. >> one quick question, sex trafficking of children. >> yes. >> a big issue, large numbers, i think all of us one way or another have run into it in our states. what more can the fbi do to be helpful with this really terrible, terrible thing? >> we have a program that we have had for a substantial period of time in which we focus on this phenomenon throughout the united states. and we have on a number of occasions had substantial ta takedowns of individuals who are involved in it. unfortunately, that does not end the problem. there are many more out there. the gratifying aspect of it from persons who work this is the victims we're able to save in

terms of our activity. it's another area where we would love to be able to put additional resources. we try to leverage what resources we have because every child saved is a child that we'll remember for a good long time. >> thank you. >> senator cobb. >> thank you, mr. chairman. following up on the last point, you talked before about the need to prioritize in the event of sequesteration. every one of these responsibilities that the federal bureau of investigation have are important to nothing, and in many cases, they're important to the entire citizenry. when you said the budget would take a big hit, it would be a very hard hit, is what you just said, i recall when the secretary of defense was asked not just about the hit on the budget but the effect on the country on his ability to help defend the country. could i ask you to respond to

the question about the fbi's ability to do the important work that it has. the secretary of defense called it catastrophic. how would you characterize the affect of the sequesteration of the across the board cuts. >> i misspoke before. i think i said it would be a 7% to 8% cut. i should have said we would lose 3500 positions. as opposed to 15. 3500 positions, 1500 special agents, 1100 analysts, and 900 professional staff. it's hard for me to categorize and use a word such as sc catastrophic. i withed sai eed would say as i a word, devastating for a variety of reasons. >> that's bad enough. >> devastating as you point out, the impact it will have not just in the bureau but on people that

we serve. the programs that we have to save children, the programs we have to protect our networks from cyberattacks, the programs we have to put behind bars those persons who are responsible for white collar crimes. securities fraud, corporate fraud, mortgage fraud, health care fraud. all of which if you do not have the capac tee to put the persons in jail, there's no deterrence and it will grow. it will hamper that. and more particularly, what people tend to forget is the long term effects when you have a hiring freeze or a sequestration where the institution is impacted for years down the road. it may be rectified in 12 months or 18 months or two years, but that hiring freeze and the like translates into a gap in that agency for years down the road. where we are attempting to keep

up with the technology when it comes to responding to cyberattacks, we will miss a generation of individuals who have those capabilities if we are required to cut back and lose 1,500 agents. not only is the impact devastating at the outset. it's devastating down the road. >> thank you for that. i share my colleagues' concern that we must address that and certain before the end of the year. let me also refer to your testimony about investigating the source of the leaks of the most recent, i think you referred to it as an ied, but we can refer to it as another potential underwear bomber case. would the be accurate? >> yes, explosive device. >> you do have investigation ongoing, under way. is that correct? >> yes. >> let me just ask you about -- is it -- how would you characterize how important it is

to find the source of the leak? >> as i indicated before, leaks such as that -- i don't want to overuse the word devastating but have a huge impact on our ability to do business. not just on a particular source and the threat to the particular source, but your ability to recruit sources is severely hampered, and in cases such as this, the relationship with your counterparts overseas are damaged. and which means that inhibition and the willingness of others to share information with us when they don't think that information will remain skrur. it also has some longterm effects, which is why it's so important to make certain that the persons who are responsible for the leak are brought to justice. >> sometimes, there is no other lead that leads you to the result except talking to the

reporters involved. in the past, you and others in the law enforcement community have taken a very strong position indicating your concerns about legislation that would undermine your ability to protect intelligence sources and methods that could seriously impede national security investigations. do you think, is it still your view that it would not be a good policy for reporters to have a special privilege or special right not to talk to fbi or other law enforcement officials if they may have the information that would lead you to the leaker? >> that's somewhat a general in terms of sort of framing a legislation. i have to leave the ultimate decision on the department of justice, but i do believe that the protocols established in the department of justice to protect and assure the media are adequate to accomplish that task. >> i appreciate that.

the question i ask thad generally is that i realize pla policy is set by the attorney general or the administration generally, which is why i ask you about as a general proposition, whether it's helpful or harmful to your efforts, and you have said in the past that your fbi guidelines are sufficient. others have agreed with that. i happen to agree with that and think it's good policy. let me just conclude by reili reiterating the comments of both senators kohl and fine stein about the importance of renewing fisa. there's a concern we're going to kick all of the important decisions down the road until after the election. and even though this dedoesn't expire until the end of the year, i think my colleagues were saying it would be good to do this as soonads possible, just from the standpoint of knowing what you have to deal with in the future, the continuity of your training and law enforcement efforts and so on,

is it your view the sooner we could accomplish this, the better? >> yes, it would give us some certainly. >> thank you very much senator kyl. senator durbin? >> thank you. good to see you. and thank you for your service. you have done an extraordinary job in one of the most challenging times in our nation's history. i thank you personally for taking some time to focus attention on my hometown of east st. louis, illinois, which sadly has one of the highest rates of violent crime per capita in the nation. there's a multiunit task force including fbi agents which is doing its level best to change that. i thank you for your willingness even with limited resources to participate. we have exchanged conversations, correspondence on the issue of training manuals, and i would like to make the record clear today about the current situation. i'm asking to enter into the

records letters we exchanged in april and march of this year when it was disclosed when some parts of the training manuals became public, some things had been stated in the training of fbi agents which had been, i would say, characterized as inappropriate and unfair to a b arabs and muslims. and we have spoken about this personally. i have spoken to attorney general holder. could you tell me at this moment in time, what is the current status of training manuals as in the fbi as it relates to these two groups and what you have done to make certain we don't have the kinds of things that have troubled us in the past? >> yes, senator, as i have indicated in the letter. when this came to our attention last summer, we took it exceptionally seriously, and we convened a group of five individuals, we believe all of whom have advanced degrees, two

of whom were in the bureau, three outside of the bureau, to determine what should be done to make sure that the training we give our agents is appropriate. and with the touchstone document, and i have to apologize. i believe we had a conversation with you that indicates it was a curriculum. it was not, it was a touchstone document that a person has put together as a guidance how to go through and treat the records we were going through. we then had up to 30 individuals, agents, analysts, and others, go through over 160,000 documents, training documents, training documents not necessarily a manual, but training documents that had been used over the proceeding ten years since september 11th along with more than 1,000 slides and the like. we had them go through and pull out those particular documents that were inappropriate for

whatever reason. they could have been wrong. they could have raised the specter of an individual being pointed out that shouldn't be pointed out. they -- for whatever reason, those particular documents needed to come out of our training. we identified 176 of those documents that needed to be pulled out. we found the other 160, approximately, documents, 160,000 documents appropriate. we then, with those documents, we went out to the field and explained why these particular documents with examples were inappropriate. and we interviewed those individuals responsible for those documents and we did more than 100 interviews of such interviews. and making certain that the

materials we're using are in accordance with our -- are appropriate. one of the things it did teach us and one of the things that comes out is that we did not have a mandatory review for training documents such as this. so we have put into place apart from this a review of training so that anybody who is giving a training can't just go up and put together their training materials. it has to go through a screening process. we have taken it exceptionally seriously as i think you can understand given the personnel we put on it. where think we have gone a long ways to resolving the issue. >> critics have said this is all about congressional medaling and political correctness. i would like to have your characterization because you stated to us earlier one of the key elements in fighting terrorism is connections, cooperation, and you have said

attorney general holder has said, that muslim americans and arab americans have been a vital part of our effort to keep our nation safe. i would like to have your characterization as to whether this is just an exercise in political correctness. >> for us, and me personally, it's not an exercise of political correctness. it's doing what we think is right given what we have seen. i believe the five individuals we selected to have the professional capabilities to guide us in this way and it's absolutely essential that our agents, are given the best possible terms and those materials that are in accordance with our core values. i reject any assertion it was as a result of political correctness or any such other characterization. it's what needed to be done. i will follow up as i have before and say many of the cases we have done are a result of the muslim community bringing to our attention individuals who needed

further attention. we would not be as safer as we are today without the support of the muslim american, arab american communities in the united states. >> i only have a brief time left here. i'm sorry because we went through this exercise and it was unusual where all members of? senate, democrats and republicans, were invited to classified hearing, fbi was represented, department of defense, so many other agencies on cybersecurity, which you mentioned. there's a bill pending to try to make our nation safer from the cybersecurity threat. i'm trying to look at this through the prism of our individual rights of privacy as individuals and the basic liberties and values that we share. can you tell me in the brief time remaining here, do you feel that the cybersecurity legislation proposed by the administration compromises any of the rights of privacy that individuals have customarily enjoyed in this country under

wire tap statutes and other, i could go through the specifics here, other legislation, or are we changing the standard when it comes to cybersecurity? in terms of the disclosures of any individuals' e-mails or texts in the name of security? >> it does not change the standards by which the government can obtain information relating to an investigation, let me put it that way. and while i'm somewhat familiar with the administration's proposal, i'm not thoroughly familiar. i do not think from what little i know that it changes that dynamic at all. i will say the only way to prevent a cyberattack, a substantial cyberattack is to exchange information. the same way to prevent terrorist attacks, you need to

exchange information. the success, any successes after september 11th have attributed to the fact we are working closely with state and local law enforcement, the intelligence community. we understand the borders no longer protect us and we have to share information. we have to do the same thing. but it's going to have to incorporate the private sector. in ways that you did not have to incorporate the private sector when we were facing the counterterrorism threat. but the cyberthreat is no less -- will be no less than the counterterrorism threat. there will have to be the exchange of information and it needs to have an exchange not just between the intelligence community, the law enforcement community ux but intelligence, law enforcement, dhs, and the private sector. >> plny more questions, i thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for joining us, director muller. i want to thank you not only for being here but also for serving our country.

yours is not an easy job. last year, you expressed some concerns about the national defense authorization act for 2012. specifically in a letter that you wrote to senator levin in november of last year. you expressed some concerns with section -- with what became section 1022 of that legislation, stating you were worried about that provision introducing a degree of uncertainty and potentially inhibiting the fbi's capacity to convince covert arrestees to cooperate immediately and provide important intelligence. my concern with the ndaa focus much more on what became of section 1021. to some extent, i think the president indicated he shared some of the concerns. he indicated in his signing statement on december 31st,

2111, as follows. i want to clarify my administration will not detain people without trial. i believe that doing so would break with our most important traditions and values as a nation. my administration will interpret section 1021 in a manner that insures that any detention it authorizes complied with the constitutional laws of war and other applicable law. in light of that statement, you know, i was encouraged by that statement. i think it's good. i still had some concerns that future administrations might not hold that view or that this administration might change its position at some point. in light of that concern, where joined with senator feinstein in introducing s-2003, the due process guarantee act to insure that u.s. citizens apprehended on american soil are not detained indefinitely without charge or without trial. i guess my first question is do

you share the president's commitment, as i assume you would, as to the fact that u.s. citizens shouldn't be detained indefinitely without trial under 1021? >> well, yes. in the sense that -- yes. yes. but let me just say that there is no change to our activities. our authorities remain the same, how we handle things are not changed by the president's declaration, but yes, i would assume that would happen. that would be the case. >> some people have suggested that military detention may be necessary. you know, in some of the circumstances because fbi and other civilian authority lack the resources or the capabilities to deal with the unique circumstances associated with the apprehension and detention of terrorism suspects.

so my question for you on that point is what are the fbi's abilities in this regard? do you feel the fbi would lack the capacity to handle these circumstances to deal with the apherengz and detention of terrorism suspects? >> no. the answer at the outset is no, but would they be talking about a different class. if you're talking about 1022 persons, we're talking about individuals who are non-u.s. citizens, individuals who are participating in a plot with al qaeda and the like, where 1022 kicks in. going back to your initial question, i had some concerns about clarity as to what would happen at the time of arrest. those concerns have been put to rest by the protocol that had been -- was established by the

president. regardless of whether it is a person is obtained in the united states by the fbi or ultimately it could be by the military. if it happens on a base, for instance, i have no question that ourselves and the military would be capable of handling the consequent investigation and search for intelligence. >> okay. so given this protocol that was developed in light of the president's signing statement on december 31st, given what you added to that, would it be fair for me to assume that the administration would not object to legislation that would put this rule in place by statute? in other words, to say we wouldn't use 1021 to indefinitely detain citizens? >> that would have to go to the department of justice? that's a step too far for me. >> understood, understood. in your testimony in your

written testimony, you stated that you support the reauthorization of the fisa amendments act. among other things, those amendments authorize the government to surveill various categories of non-u.s. persons abroad, outside the united states, without the need for a court order to each individual target. a although these amendments don't appear to allow the government intentionally to target a u.s. person or intentionally to target any person on u.s. soil, it does seem that the amendments have the potential to result in warrantless surveillance of communications that involve u.s. citizens. can you explain in light of this potential what steps can be taken, what steps might be taken in order to protect u.s. citizens? >> we're concerned about both the thrust of the stat ult as

well as the provisions of the statute that minimize the possibility of this happening, but beyond that, i would have to do it in closed session. >> okay. but you do share the concern that there is that potential and you share a commitment to taken steps to protect u.s. citizens? >> yes. my understanding is, as the statute was winding its way through congress, those concerns were raised and addressed in the statute. and yes, we fully comply and understand the thrust as well as the letter of the statute. >> okay. my time has expired. thank you. >> thank you. >> good morning. i want to join other members of the committee in thank youing you for your extraordinary service over many years. many challenging and difficult years on many challenging and difficult topics.

and obviously, particularly in the area of terrorism, the fbi has taken an increasingly important role, not just in terms of apprehending and prosecuting terrorism here in this country, but also abroad. and in the area of white collar crime, you continued to be an extraordinarily important presence. i would like to ask first about the jpmorgan chase investigation. can you tell us what potential crimes could be under investigation without asking you to conclude anything or talk about the evidence. would it be false statements to the federal government or what area of criminal activity? >> i'm hesitant to say anything other than what is available under title 18 or available to

the s.e.c. would be the focus of any ongoing investigation. >> and can you talk at all about the timing of that investigation? >> well, all i can say is we have opened a preliminary investigation, and as you would well known, have done this business for a long time, it depends on a number of factors. >> i'm not going to press you further, but i would just encourage you without your needing any encouragement, i'm sure, to press forward as promptly and expeditiously and aggressively as possible because i think that the american public really has lost faith in many other enforcement agencies partly because of the delay and lack of results, and i think that the fbi's involvement is a very constructive and important presence in this area. >> thank you.

>> turning to the violence against women act, where again the fbi has been a leading role in stopping assaults and intimidation and harassment of women as you know, the senate has reauthorized, it's now under consideration in the house with provisions on cyberstalking that seem less forceful and robust than the ones that we adopted and i have urged and drafted to adopt in this body. i wondfer you could talk to us about how important cyberis in the area of domestic violence and violence against women generally? >> well, i must say i'm not familiar with the differences between the two proposed statutes. i will say on the other hand that cyberstalking is -- it can be difficult to define, but i once defined the impact as substantial upon the