i have asked my staff to begin the process of identifying what those hurdles are. so you know, the anti-border corruption act clearly gives us the authority on the pre-employment. we need to work through internally with our personnel office as well as the office of personnel management to look at what it will take to do polygraphs from the standpoint of at the time of the periodic reinvestigations and in between those periods of time whether it's looking for reasonable suspicion or looking at more like a drug screening type of process where randomly we do polygraphs. i think we have a lot to learn from other agencies that employ polygraph on a more routine basis and we're going to undertake that endeavor. >> let me just say, i'd like to

work with you and cbp. i hope the ranking member would like to join me in this in terms of changing that policy and certainly if any legislation is required to look at making that change, i think this is vitally important. i'll try to keep my time limited. but mr. duncan, turning to tsa, allegations and indictments of tsa employees stealing personal belongings of passengers, improper luggage screening which after we saw the latest attempt out of yemen to potentially smuggle an explosive device on to an airplane, again, a national security issue. we can't afford to have corrupt tsa officers. so what is tsa doing to address that? >> sir, there's three aspects to tsa's efforts to prevent and detect the kind of corruption that the committee is justly concerned about. the first echoes what

mr. winkowski has discussed in terms of background checks to make sure that we're not hiring people into tsa who are going to be problems. in the last three years, our background checks have actually disqualified more than 5,600 applicants who were subject to criminal history checks, financial checks, and other mechanisms to make sure we're not bringing people in who have vulnerabilities. the second aspect really has to do with prevention and we have undertaken various prevention initiatives in the wake of scenarios such as honolulu where we did determine that there was a large number of bags not being screened or subject to security. and some of the working groups is we've created in the wake of honolulu have focused on identifying tools that local leadership can use to prevent and detect violations of our security protocols. i know there's some

recommendations that they've come up with working in conjunction with our investigative office and those recommendations are focusing on metrics, and on other kinds of reports that can be used by field leadership so that we can, you know, identify difficulties before they blossom into full-blown corruption. >> because my time is limited. a 22-count indictment, tsa employees took payments to provide droug couriers unfettered access through the los angeles international airport so drugs could be smuggled into the united states. that is outrageous and really, unacceptable. i understand what you're trying to do prescreening. as i understand it, you mentioned a system, a tracking system that you're implementing to basically a systemic tracking system to look at this misconduct. you have 400 different offices out there. yet, it's not integrated into one system. i understand you're trying to develop that. when do you anticipate that that

will be completed? >> i don't have a specific time frame for you, sir, but i know as a result of the ig audit that has recently been released that the tsa is working not just on coming up with a workable single definition of security breaches but to overhaul its reporting system so that security breaches are reported consistently, that they're validated and that headquarters gets the information from all 450 airports so they can study it and come up with more comprehensive. >> what's the time frame when this would be completed. >> i'll have to get back to you on that. >> moving on to i.c.e., you know, accepting thousands of dollars in bribes to provide documentation, you know, ties to drug trafficking organizations, you know, this is exactly the kind of thing the terrorists want to exploit getting documentation to get into the united states and attack the

american people. again, this is just really unacceptable. what are you doing within i.c.e. to remedy this? >> mr. chairman, we have a vigorous pre-employment screening process, and a thorough background investigation to try to weed out those individuals on the front end, prior to employment. subsequent to that, it was constant all new employees go through ethics and integrity training. we have an annual requirement to take an integrity awareness program which is a policy for all employees to kind of refresh responsibilities and rules of conduct. the all new supervisors attend, get extensive integrity training at the i.c.e. academy as well as law enforcement officers much more extensive training. we put out constant guidance regarding the guidelines and reporting employee misconduct. oftentimes information is received from a co-worker that

sees that something doesn't seem right or they have actual information. we kind of constantly are going back and educating the workforce and making sure that they know what the standards of integrity, what the agency expects from them and the proper ways to report that. then i discuss briefly about we have offices located nationwide, you know, upon receipt of the allegation, we are required to refer to the dhs oig and they may be working the investigation collaboratively with them. but if they decide not to retain that for investigation we refer it back to our office and we would address it as swiftly as possible. >> in conclusion, we need to move on. i looked at some of your manuals. there's really -- doesn't seem to be any overarching policy within i.c.e. and there's no specific ethics policy for i.c.e. employees. it's very generic. and i would ask that you maybe go back and look at that in terms of specific ethics

policies that you could direct towards your employees. a lot of this is just common sense though. and you know, as i said public service is a public trust. when you see that violated in these egregious examples, it's just unacceptable. and again, overall, though, the majority of employees are honest and hard working, do a great job every day. with that, i now recognize the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. a couple comments i want to make. first of all, taxpayers are spending enormous amounts of money to try and make sure that safety is ensured in their travel. and american citizens are going through enormous personal intrusions themselves going through the gate, getting screened, getting scanned. having their belongings gone through. this is a very serious matter. and i would think given the fact

that our security and what the public puts into this that at this hearing we would at least get the people that were requested from tsa and from i.c.e. to show up. that, to me, says something about how seriously they're taking this issue. or how not seriously they're taking this issue. i want to be clear about that in the beginning. secondly, this is just an old saw that we've had. before my time here, as well. the 9/11 commission has made it clear that one of the primary problems that has to be addressed is the issue of jurisdiction. and this patchwork quilt of jurisdictions conflicting with each other still is with us. and it seems in every hearing we have, it's an underlying theme that we have, and i think it's here again today. so it prompts a couple questions i have. mr. edwards and mr. winkowski, last year in testimony before the senate committee on homeland security and government affairs,

commissioner burson stated and i quote that there is more than tension and friction between cbp ia and dhs iog. so between customs and border and department of homeland security. there was outright confrontation in an unacceptable situation. that's the end of the quote. the fact that cbp and oig are both part of one department of homeland security had to enter into a memorandum of understanding in the first place for oig to perform a function that statutorily belongs to that office raises some grave concerns. has the inclusion of cbp ia employees as required by that memorandum improved that cooperation at all? even though we had to do that to get there, has that improved the situation? >> thank you, senator, for the question. august 11th of last year, i signed the mou with commissioner

burson. i can assure you that we have taken every step to work closely in a number of my offices i have cbpi agents working closely jointly with us on cases. there is absolutely no turf battle. oig, cbp and i.c.e., we're all working together because this is not just a dhs problem. this is a problem for the entire nation. we want to make sure that we address each investigation effectively and in a timely manner. >> just a couple of comments. i agree with mr. edwards that the mou i believe has done a good job of really laying out the path forward as mr. moynihan had indicated. cases are being transferred from the ig over to i.c.e., and cbp is part of that process.

so i think we've come a long way since former commissioner burson's testimony. >> just a couple of questions, too, that came to mind. if it's possible to give us a generalization, the bulk of the people that have been involved in this corruption, unethical conduct, what's their salary range? i know, you know, i just want to give a generalization. how much are these people getting paid, most of them that are committing these things? >> i would say in the average a base salary when you look at a border patrol agent or a cbp officer at the gs-12 level which i think is about $75,000 a year. and then there's overtime associated with that. >> pretty good. >> especially when you look at the southwest border, there are some of the highest paying individuals down there in some of those communities.

>> a question for mr. edwards. your office has primary authority over the investigation instances of public corruption and employee misconduct within the department of homeland security. however, you have the right of first refusal there as well. now, recently, there's that right has been heavily exercised and your office has transferred hundreds of cases to cbp and i.c.e. to handle. what contributed to that? was it a result of a backlog that you did that? what contributed to that backlog, if that's what led to this? >> sure. thank you, sir. we had 2360 open cases. i have 219 agents. clearly, the workload for each agent is more than 12 cases per agent. i've been working actively with cbp to have their agents detail to our office to work the cases jointly.

there's 3% increase in border patrol allegation corruption in the last several years. border patrol agents have doubled in size. oig has not had the resources that it had requested. in short, i cannot keep piling up these cases. i need to act on it. this is a dhs problem that we have to address. so under my supervision, i have transferred 374 cases of named subjects to cbp, i mean i.c.e. opr. they are cbp folks detailed over there. i'm not transferring any crcl cases. it's employee corruption, program fraud and miscellaneous cases. 301 of those cases are cbp cases and 73 of those cases are i.c.e. cases. still because iso pr has an average of 4.5 cases per agent. so clearly i'm taking their resources and you know in some

of my fema fraud cases an agent is carrying 25 cases. clearly i cannot keep taking these cases long time to close. i need to bring resolution to these cases quickly. so for this one time on the named subjects, we took that effort. out of the 2360 cases, 40 of them are unnamed subjects. we have an analysis group to vet those unnamed cases but cbp also has those resources, so does i.c.e. so our intention on this to work jointly on these unnamed subjects and try to see if we can come up on some leads on that and investigate. i think talking to john morton and dave aguilar, this is a joint effort and this is one time i'm fairly confident with the systems we have put in place and the initiative, we're going to address this problem effectively, and as soon as possible. >> and it's partially resulting in your budget situation? >> absolutely, sure. >> i want to be clear on that. with that, mr. chairman, i yield

back. >> i thank the ranking member. the gentle lady from new york is recognized. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i thank all of our panelists for coming in to share their insights with us this morning. i want to follow up and pick up on mr. keating's last question and ask that both mr. edwards and mr. moynihan respond to this. from fiscal year 2010 to the present, i.c.e. opr has received a total of 26,983 allegations of employee misconduct. some involved corruption. while others did not. in any event, this number is extremely high. in addition to investigating these matters, i want to know does i.c.e. opr work with i.c.e. at large and cbp to incorporate lessons learned from these investigations into new standards and procedures and given what you just stated,

mr. edwards, having to deal with the budgetary constraints, you know, how does this actually work out when i.c.e. seems to have a whole host of their own investigations to conduct? i mean, i think if you add up all of the allegations together, i don't even know how personnel is able to manage. but that's for you to answer. >> yes, ma'am. thank you for your question. even for oig, the complaints we received in fi 12 so far has been 10,438. nonetheless, i think even before this investigation, this is -- there needs to be an all the components are doing is the proactive effort in terms of the prescreening, the preemployment screening, the periodic background investigation, integrity briefing, ethics briefing. we do a number of those as well

and let the employees know what to look for when there's potentially fraud happening. then when the allegation comes in, we go through the vetting process just like i.c.e. does the same vetting. and when a criminal case is there, then we worked jointly not only with i.c.e. opr, with i.c.e. hsi, with fbi, with any number of partners jointly because the more aggressively we try to do this is going to get to a resolution sooner. so looking at our caseload and what i.c.e. has presently, i think this effort that they've taken on is going to address these problems quickly. >> thank you, ma'am. >> first i'd like to -- the joint intake center which is like the central clearing house for i.c.e. and cbp for reporting allegations of misconduct as well as other reportable information, it's a collaborative information and

sits in cbp's office space and staffed by both i.c.e. and cbp internal affairs personnel. which is a great working relationship and the collaboration that's existed since the creation of dhs. the number represented as far as allegations, those are actually items that were reported to the joint intake center. so they may involve lesser degrees of misconduct or items such as lost, missing, stolen property, things that are not necessarily allegation based. so that number seems much larger. it's things we want to the document and make sure there's a proper record of. but not all those 26,000 allegations are true allegations of misconduct and warrant investigation. and i can get back to you as far as a specific number of what was. from our case inventory perspective, we have about 600 cases in our inventory right now and in addition to the 374, that mr. edwards will be transferring here shortly. but we're working closely with cbp internal affairs full participation. we during this transfer,

obviously it's a big lift, it's a large number of cases at one time. we've set up teams together to triage, look at cases that have viable leads and most egregious allegations that are showing us the greatest vulnerability. we'll do that in an effort to address them as quickly as possible and the most serious -- >> my question is, what happens with those employees who are -- who have alleged to do something, do they remain in their posts? you know, how is that handled because certainly, you know, we're concerned about the public. and interactions with these individuals who have alleged to have some sort of misconduct, whatever that may be. and also their colleagues. you know, sometimes one bad apple can spoil a bunch. so, you know, how is that

managed? >> absolutely. ma'am, i also want to, before answering your question, about the number of open cases, i just want to make it clear, we have open cases and we have closed cases. butcases, but as you may know, a lot of cases that we have done all the investigations that we have done and then we are waiting for some judicial action. so there's another category that really is not classified. we have within us, our systems, working with our partners here we're going to classify another like many law enforcement agencies have the j-type of cases. while we're carrying on with this criminal investigation, we also get the -- we want to get the administrative portion of it working as well because a lot of times if there's no -- if the u.s. attorney is not going to accept the criminal as a criminal case, we want to make sure that we have done enough work on the administrative front end so the components can take

quick administrative action. it's a dual view that we work with the components. >> do you want to add anything to that? >> ma'am, i was going to say that every case stands on its own merits, and you know, just the receipt of an allegation depending on the aagreej yusness or as the case develops and evidence is developed, we work with close wi whether it's i.c.e. math or cbp management to make a decision whether that vulnerability of leaving that person in that particular decision is too great. we have to put them on administrative duties while the investigation continues and reassign them or depending on the level of evidence and the seriousness or the level and position of that individual, they may be put on administrative leave or things. each case would stand on its own, and the facts and circumstances would help us base that decision. >> if you just indulge me for a

moment, mr. chairman, mr. win cow ski, i think that you looked at those you may have had some something to add? >> i'd like to add a couple of issues here, a couple thoughts. i think it's very, very important, and that these allegations be worked quickly. we have a responsibility to exonerate people as well, so someone writes -- i think the panelists will aagree with that to have a responsibility to do that. we also have a responsibility if we have an individual that it's under some kind of suspicion that we really need for that investigation to move quickly because that individual is still on the line if you will. they're still processing people. they're still processing cargo. once we're notified by the investigation and the investigators that there's an issue, we will take that person off the line. and put them in administrative

dutie duties. once that individual is put on indefinite suspension and it's dealt with through the court systems. right now we have about 11 people that are on indefinite suspension. to the other point of year question, and i think it's a good point here. what do we do after that? we have the investigation. there's an indictment and conviction. what do we do next? what we do in cbp is through our office of internal affairs, we dissect that. we look at where the vulnerabilities are, what do we need to do from a standpoint of changing policies or changing processes so our management controls or internal controls so it doesn't happen again. it's that constant layer effect that we've implemented in cbp, which incompetent is very, very important from the standpoint of making inroads and is very, very

important subject. >> let me just in closing associate myself with the ranking members' remarks in terms of the seriousness of these charges and indictments and convictions. federal law enforcement bribes taken by tsa to improperly screen luggage, first of all, stealing personal belongings as people go through these screeners all the time and scanners and yet the idea that tsa officials are stealing personal property, but beyond that as a national security implications. the idea that a tsa officer would take a bribe to allow thousands of pieces of luggage to go through improperly screened or to allow drug trafficking organizations to have unfettered access, this is precisely what the terrorists are looking for.

i.c.e. providing fraudulent documentation. all these cases that we look at, they're trying to get things through airports, improper screening, improper documentation. that's exactly what they're trying to exploit, you know. then, of course cbp taking bribes from drug cartel organizations. and gin the seriousness of this, i do first want to see thank you to cbp for showing up at the policy level, but i do want to express my extreme disappointment that it tsa and i.c.e., given these allegations and not just allegations but proven fact, did not bring forth the policy level of witnesses that we requested. so it sends a signal to the congress that either they don't take it very seriously or these officials are just trying to hide from the american people. so i am not very happy with that.

again, i associate myself with the ranking member with his remarks and with that the committee stands aadjourned. consumers are very frustrated right now that their mobile devices and smartphones are working so lowly. >> robert mcdowell on sfek trum auctions, the universal service fund, competition for wireless space and two new commissioners. tonight at 8:00 eastern on the communicators on c-span 2. >> tonight live remarks from president obama as he delivers the commencement address to students of job lynn high school in missouri. it's been one year since a tornado killed 161 people and destroyed six schools, including j joplin high. see the president's speechl at

9:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. retired supreme court justice john paul stephens spoke today. during his 15 minutes of remarks he discussed his dissent opinion in the burk v. gore case and talked about the redistricting cases. he stepped down from the court in 2010. he was nominated by president ford in 1975 and was the third longest serving supreme court justice in u.s. history. >> justice stevens is in my mind the very perfect justice of the united states supreme court, but let me tell you why. because his life experience is so broad, his compassion so deep, and his intellect so very far-reaching. let me tell you how i first met justice stevens, because i think

it offers an insight into the kind of human being he is. many years ago in albuquerque, new mexico, justice stevens and his wife snuck in to play in a bridge tournament. one of my partners at the time happily had been the clerk and invited he and his wife and barry and i to dinner. i couldn't even imagine meeting a justice of the supreme court let alone having dinner. we had an incredibly wonderful dinner, which justice stevens told us all about what it was like to be a justice of the united states supreme court, go to a bridge tournament, and have no one care anything about it except what you had just played. they felt quite free to tell him what they thought of what he had just played. at the end of the evening there was a kind of uncomfortable silence, and just stevens finally said to his former law clerk, greg huffaker, greg,

don't you want to invite me to meet the lawyers at your firm and law clerks? of course, we couldn't imagine having the gall to ask him to do that. in albuquerque, new mexico in the summer in a law firm of 21 people, our law clerks thought we were the smartest human beings on the planet. but what happened was even more remarkable. when justice stevens sat down in our very small conference room in the old bank building most famous to that moment, because the movie "the muppets take manhatt manhattan" took place in that very conference room, he spoke for a few minutes and then he said, but i have questions to ask you. he spent the rest of almost two hours asking people what it was like to practice law in albuquerque, new mexico, what it was like theno