between then, which would have been the 8th of march and the 17th when the cabinet made its decision to go to war, my whole time was spent trying to get support of the security council for a second resolution. and frankly, who mr. blair was talking to on the telephone was neither here nor there, unless it was about getting support for the second resolution. >> but how important was it politically to get a newspaper on side, because the people public would have to be convinced? >> well, it was certainly important, sir, to have the newspapers on side, and it was my recollection that the national newspapers were not the only papers that were on the side.

and it is -- yes, of course it's far better to have them on side than not have them on side, so i'm not trivializing it, but it wasn't ever part of the discussions that i was ever involved in. it's worth bearing in mind that there was widespread support for military action. i know there was also widespread opposition for military action, and the opinion was polarized. but what people are -- many people are now doing is looking at those events with the benefit of hindsight, including the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction. and the awful aftermath, the chaos of the aftermath, after the fall of saddam. but if you're looking forward, it was actually very different circumstances and bear in mind that the whole international community had said in resolution 1441 that saddam posed a threat to international peace and security. 1441 as far as i was concerned and the british government was concerned, that had authorized

military action if there were a further material breach by saddam, which we believed and still believe there was. so there was a huge weight of international opinion as well as opinion here in favor of it. in europe, half the member states of the european union were in favor in military action. a number of those put troops in. so this wasn't what is now presented as sort of an evil minority activity at all. there was a very large consensus behind it. and it's also just -- sir, if i can just mention this. bearing in mind that the conservative party, not all of them, but the conservative party was strongly in support of military action as well, and that was bound to affect the character of support from the newspapers in practice. >> mr. straw, move on to the

topic of media influence on public policy. first of all, section 12 of the human rights act. now, we have the text of section 12, which is really the end point in the process under tab 6. >> do you want me to look at it? >> please. you'll know this actually. >> i do actually know it by heart. but i'll try not to -- >> maybe someone following this will understand the significance of section 12. it is a procedural provision dealing only with the stepping stones as where the high court is considering whether to grant any relief which might bear on the article 10 rights of freedom of expression. >> yeah. yep. >> and there are two key points. the first key point is the high court weren't granting relief

unless satisfied more likely than not that publication should not be allowed, which to be clear, that sets a higher bar than the general law in relation to getting these injunctions. >> yes. >> and then the second point is under subsection 4, the court must have particular regard to the importance of the conventioned right to freedom of expression, particularly in journalistic cases, and also will have regard to matters such as public interest to the extent that it may become available to the public, and of course any relevant privacy code. the privacy code would be capable of accommodating the pcc. >> yeah. >> so that's what section 12 is about. you deal with this in your witness statement, paragraphs 100 to 111, mr. straw. >> yep.

>> see if we can summarize it in this way. there were two concerns which came from the press, but who was leading the press cause, as it were, was the then chair of the pcc. >> yes. >> first of all, though, was a concern about a burgeoning or clandestine privacy law which the human rights act in general might hold or usher in. and secondly, there were concerns about preaction with strength. which is what section 12 is about. can you tell us about how those concerns evolved and how you addressed them? >> yes. lord wakeham himself has written evidence and gives a lot of

factual detail about this. but once the white paper called bringing rights home or rights brought home, the white paper was published and the bill obviously various interest groups weighed in to say they thought the bill as drafted might adversely affect them. one group is the churches, the roman catholic church and anglican church were very concerned that it might affect them. so the result of those negotiations was what became section 13. and the other was the press. and they raised these concerns through representations originally to lord irvin who was handling the bill in the house of lords. it started in the house of lords, not the house of commons. and then lord wakeham raised them on the floor of the house. and he said in his written statement i think that he did that not as a representative of

the press, but to reflect his own opinions. but he happened to be chairman of the pcc. and i was very anxious to achieve a consensus on this legislation. because i have a principle, which is that major constitutional change should only go through if there is some kind of greater legitimacy, either through consensus in parliament or through a referendum. the conservatives were opposing the bill, that second reading, and i was anxious to see whether we could reach an accommodation so we could get their endorsement to it. and also i thought part of what lord wakeham and the pcc was saying was reasonable. if i may refer you to paragraph 103 where i refer to the letter lord wakeham wrote to chris smith on the 12th of january, 1998. he said there are two central problems. one was issue of prior restraint.

i thought they had a point there. but lord wakeham went on to say there was a second issue which you described as far more serious, which is whether the pcc should be a public authority within the terms of the bill. now, in fact the pcc was not public authority under the terms of the bill. but what the pcc were trying to secure was a situation where the media were out with impact of the bill, so you just throw a ring around them somehow and they'd be excluded from any adjudication on the conflict in the articles 8 and 10 or anything else. now, that was just impossible to meet. and i had to explain that to them and we didn't meet it. it's also simply incorrect for anybody now to say that nobody knew that human rights would lead to a law of privacy. of course they did, they said so. but as i brought out in my

gareth williams lecture, we all knew it was going to do that. that was discussed endlessly in parliament. but to be truthful, the politicians thought they'd like will the end of law of privacy, have the means to the strand and the law lords, because it's tricky if you're a politician with the law of privacy and we thought their lordships on the bench would do a better job. so it's really a question of passing the parcel to them. everybody knew what was happening. >> so the pcc wasn't listed as a public authority for the purposes of section 6, but as a matter of ordinary principles of jurisprudence, it would have been so deemed and there was an opinion to that effect. >> there was a great debate about whether in drafting the bill that you had a list of public authorities or whether,

as happened with the freedom of information act, for example, they are scheduled. as a matter of certainty whether an authority is public or not. whereas in the human rights act, it's structured in a different way. i haven't got section 6 in front of me directly, but there is reference to what the definition of a public authority, but it's much broader than that. but what the -- but of course the cause of public authorities and what the pcc had worked out was since the courts of public authorities as public authorities have to follow the obligations of the human rights act and the convention articles, they would, therefore, reflect those in their judgments and, therefore, indirectly the pcc or its members or anybody else

would be subject to the convention. and that was what they were worried about. >> the second point, the law of privacy would develop on a case-by-case basis once articles 8 and 10, as it were being incorporated. that was a point which lord bingham made at the time in 1998. >> and aside from the fact that it frankly suited the convenience of politicians on both sides to have the courts do this job, i also thought the courts would make a better job of it, because this balance is to be able to achieve in respect to privacy is so tricky, because where as i said in my gareth williams lecture, defamation is easy enough in one sense because you're dealing with what is and what isn't true.

with privacy, what you're dealing with is whether something which is true should nonetheless be kept private, and that is very complicated. and i think the courts have done a good job in developing -- >> of course one of the consequences of that, possibly it's not relevant for this inquiry, but it's important worth making. that the flak has been directed to the judiciary rather than to anybody else. >> i accept that, sir. and i also think and i said in my gareth williams lecture that that there is a need now for parliament to amend the law so there is a tort of breach of privacy which applies -- doesn't just apply to public authorities, it applies to everybody. so i think it is time for parliament to accept the responsibility we passed to the judiciary. >> the media genesis to section 12, would you kindly look, mr. straw, under tab 9 to the debate.

>> i wonder if i could -- to reduce the bundle, i left some of these -- if i could ask somebody to pass me the other tabs, would that be all right? >> of course, of course. >> my researcher there can pass them to me. i made a very poor judgment that i'd never be asked about them. >> this is the second reading of the bill obviously in the commons on the 2nd of july, 1998. it's an internet printout and runs 21 pages. >> anyway, if you don't mind, if you go on, i'll find it in due course. >> no, no, no, no. i'd rather you -- >> i think i've still not got number 9. >> well, let me give you mine. >> i'm very sorry about this. >> no, no, don't worry. >> i've got ten. i've got three.

>> normally in order numerically. >> sir, what i did -- >> it doesn't matter. >> to reduce the bundle on the train, i thought i don't need those. that was a really stupid thing to do, and i'm very sorry. >> you were debating what was then clause 13, which became section 12. and on the second page of 21 at the top, you told the commons, as the committee will know, there was concern in some sections of the press that the bill might undermine press freedom and result in the privacy law by the back door and you said that was not the government's view and you dealt with that issue. but on the issue of prior restraint and what became section 12, the third paragraph. >> you say we recognized the concerns expressed in the press, as i've made clear, for example, in the exact impan on the churches, we're anxious, et

cetera, to deal constructively with it. in light of those concerns, we decided to introduce a new clause specifically designed to safeguard press freedom. we thought long and hard about it and this is clause 13. and then at page 6 of 21 towards the top of the page, you make it clear that there were discussions which involved you, lord williams, the late lord williams and lord wakeham. in the third paragraph, the new clause, which is number 13, was drafted in consultation with lord wakeham and representatives of the national and regional press. they had given it a warm welcome. so the upshot is, is that part of the explanation for the genesis of section 12, consultation agreement, if you like, that you reached with lord wakeham, who may well have been speaking for a large section of the press, is that fair? >> yes. certainly was speaking for a large section of the press.

whatever his position in the house of lords, he was chairman of the press commission. >> it's probably the other way around, isn't it? he couldn't really do as was chairman of the press complaints commission, which is independent. i thought he was doing it in his personal capacity. >> my recollection is quite a lot of the correspondence was signed by him in his capacity as chairman of the pcc. >> yes. well that itself raises a not uninteresting question. >> yes, i -- >> i'm not going -- of historical value only. >> yes. but it wasn't a piece of private enterprise by lord wakeham. there would have been no purpose served in busy ministers spending their time talking to lord wakeham if it was just a personal foible. he had a very influential position and he was planning to speak on behalf of the press. yes, mr. jay, you're right, i worked on the basis that if i could square lord wakeham, i'd square most sections of the

press, which is what i wanted to do. >> i understand that. and that's how it worked and it's quite clear looking at the documents that you've provided for the relevant period, that's exactly what happened. but it does raise a question ongoing for the future as to whether that is the appropriate row for somebody who holds that position in whatever body -- >> yes, i agree. oh, i'm sorry, i've been slow. i think for the future if there is -- yeah, that if -- as there will be a very different system for dealing with press complaints. that person will, as it were, being in a quasi-judicial position. and that should be very separate from somebody who's -- to represent the wider interest of the press and the change in discretion. yes, i accept that.

>> some fairly sophisticated points were made by mr. garnier. >> he always makes sophisticated points. >> i think it's fair to say although he was quibbling as to whether section 12 would have much substance and effect, there was generally speaking cross-party support for this clause. >> yes, there was. and the added advantage of dealing with lord wakeham, because he had been a leading figure in the previous conservative administrations, and -- i mean he's -- i had a good relationship, i still do. i have a good relationship with him. i have high respect for him. his successor as chairman of the pcc been of a similar caliber, the pcc would not have ended up in the state that it is. but i don't think we ever had this explicit conversation, but

i worked on the basis that if lord wakeham said yes, he would certainly be delivering the press and almost certainly be delivering the conservative front bench as well. and that was unsaid, but there. >> what you made explicit though, mr. straw, was to underline your government's commitment to the need to preserve self-regulation, because we see that in the third paragraph on page 6 of 21 and indeed on the fourth paragraph, would you agree? >> yes. and that was a view we were taking at the time. i mean that the pcc had been improved -- i mean some good evidence, not because of the way in which lord wakeham was operating, that the pcc was becoming effective. i say we all knew that we were going to end up with the law of

privacy, and anyway, we all had loads to do. why at that stage start on an agenda which had been unformed about how to regulate the press. there would have been no point. it certainly wasn't in my mind. >> it certainly wasn't a labor party manifested commitment in 1997 and the death of princess diana the end of august, i think 1997, did that cause any change of thought or not? >> not -- not directly. no. the sort of media surrounding it was terrible, but not directly. and i think insofar as we had that conversation in government, the view was let's see where this gets to. the pcc plus a developing law of privacy might work.

>> some would say it's a traditional british approach. let's see how the law develops. you know it's going to move in a certain direction. and the ramifications of that can be seen over the forthcoming years. >> yes. if i may say so, mr. jay, it's not a bad approach to do things gradually, because the risks of disaster are reduced. >> okay. that probably covers the issue on section 12. now, i address now the amendment to the data protection act in 1998 following the reports of 2006. you picked this up, mr. straw, in paragraph 82 of your witness statement.

this is our page 02555. mr. thomas is arguing very strongly for increasing the penalty for a breach of section 25 from a fine only to a term of imprisonment. you say in paragraph 82 hm government agrees. >> yes. >> can you tell us why, please, mr. straw? >> why we agreed is because we thought the case he had made out was a very good one. that the penalty did not to be strengthened because of the evidence of abuse which he provided in that report, which was in may, 2006. i just say here i agree with this, but for the first 14 months, this was handled not by the -- i was leader of the house. i became leader of the house two

days before the publication of this report in the first week in may, 2006, and stayed in that position until the end of june, 2007. so this -- the policy, therefore, is one i inherited. as it happens, i only agreed that we ought to increase the penalty. >> was it then government thinking that it was simply a question of increasing the penalty rather than changing the test in section 55, because i think subsection 4, the rest is a purely objective one. but we know in section 78 that the 2008 act, it's part objective, part subjective, if you take into account the reasonable belief of the editor. was the government's view all we need do is increase the penalty without at the same time without introducing this part objective, part subjective test? >> the part subjective test came later.

>> that was part of the ultimate compromise. >> that was, sir. it was. >> but the case -- the case for increased sanction was if it was purely financial, then the law was quite clear on comfortable territory now. the law is quite clear that you have to have regard to means. and if people of little means broke the law in this way, then actually there was very little that could be done by way of sanction. and that was so whether you were doing it because you wanted to find out about your daughter's boyfriend, for example, or whether you were doing it for industrial or commercial reasons. >> yes, you're right, sir. you are, if i may say so, the expert on sentencing.

but my own view is that -- the maximum sentences laid down by parliament, although very rarely applied by the courts, they convey a message about the relative seriousness which parliament and, therefore, the public attach to that particular transgression. and i regret the fact that in the data protection act, which is also a bill which i put through, we had not spotted that this penalty was too late, but we hadn't. >> but if i pick up the point that was made when we were discussing this, i think with mr. graham, that actually if you're doing it for the purposes of business and at a high volume, it is something which

society should disapprove of rather more than might be for those that range offenses that are purely fiscal penalties. >> no, i entirely agree. it may be, let me say, this is a very recent thought i've had, that in the light of what we think may have happened, that the penalty itself should be higher still. i mean tougher still than two years. but certainly i think the case for having a two-year penalty was -- maximum was very strong. >> on the basis, as you really identify, that then the court is in position to calibrate the gravity of the offending and in appropriate cases to discharge or fine or pass a penalty or ultimately custodial sentences.

>> indeed, sir, yes. >> as you say in paragraph 83, the press objected. when you were referring to the press there, are you able to be more specific, mr. straw? >> well, it was -- i don't know -- the people who came to see me were mr. dakor, mrs. brooks, from the telegraph, mcclellan, a chief executive and sometimes guy black, who had been the secretary of the pcc and i think was working as an adviser to the telegraph. it was those -- those were the core. but i understood from them that they were representing the views of the national press as a

whole. i had no reason to think that they weren't. >> because these were the most powerful figures either within the pcc or on the editor's code committee. was that your inference? >> i didn't say can i see your precise credentials. they were clearly powerful figures who were representing -- >> well, you knew them and you knew that's what they were. >> yeah. it wasn't an issue. >> in paragraph 83 you refer to a meeting that the minister sponsoring the bill had on the 17th of january, 2008. we have the note of the meeting under tab 44. i don't think it's necessary to turn it up. we know mr. brett and mr. garnier had a powerful voice on that occasion. >> yes. >> then moving forward, in paragraph 84, you met directly

with mr. dakor, mr. mcclellan, mrs. brooks. i don't think mr. hinton. >> mr. hinton i don't think was there, no. >> and that is referred to in a letter you wrote on the 12th of february. exactly clear from that letter. it's under tab 46 when the meeting was, whether it was over lunch or over dinner, it may not matter much. >> i don't think the meeting was over lunch or dinner, i think it was in my office. in fact i'm almost certain it was in my office. yeah. >> we could look at the text of the letter. you write to mr. dakor. you say we're not proposing to criminalize any conduct which is not currently against the law. however, we do understand you and the media's concerns about