military background. generals should be left alone. possibly a service in mexico with general zachary taylor, whom he admired and influenced him. general taylor constantly growled about influence from above, especially from civilian secretaries of war and presidents. whatever the reasons, davis gave his generals enormous leeway. not only did he face to direct them, he also left them in command long after they should have been removed. unlike lincoln, davis did not fire generals. of course, one of the most famous incidents involving davis and his commanders during the war was his firing of joseph johnston in 1864 before atlanta. yet, that action did not occur because johnston failed to obey orders from richmond. davis fired johnston because johnston wouldn't tell davis what johnston was going to do. even so, in my judgment, this instance was the exception that

proves the rule. a much more common situation prevailed after the failed confederate advance into kentucky in 1862. davis saw high hopes for this, offense into the home native state. as you all know it failed and confederate failure in kentucky came from several directions. at the same time the inability of confederate commanders to cooperate was certainly a central reason for that disas r disaster. i said davis was terribly supportive, and the drawback into tennessee he called these three men to come to richmond. braxton bragg, polk, who was bragg's senior subordinate and edmond kirby smith. he called them to richmond. each man defended himself,

deflected responsibility, and blamed the other two. after hearing these recripple nations davis incredibly left all three in place. he even promoted kirby smith and polk. he said, for the good of the cause they must get along. davis's view, like the opinion of kirby smith, he had given to braxton bragg before the invasion of kentucky, davis wrote about smith. he has taken every permission without the least tendency to question his advantage to himself without complaint when his prospects for disparticulars were remove and danger and hardships were to be met. davis said you must be like this. you must all be like this. when change, when change, when overhaul -- fundamental overhaul was desperately needed, davis stood still.

i could discuss other examples of this type of response or non-response for the possibility of confederate success they happen far too frequently. in the incidents i described as well as others for all the right reasons, a ruthless and pragmatic commander in chief would have instituted dramatic changes including dismissals and transfers. in the army of tennessee, the cancer that davis did not even attempt to excise in the post-kentucky weeks was left to grow even more virulent. in conclusion, the general assessment of davis was commander of chief as a war leader. considering the political dimensions broadly construed of this position, i think davis merits high marks, i do. with a military side much more

mixed, he comprehended the situation facing his country and i find his decisions reasonable and understandal. as a purely military commander in chief, he exhibited serious flaws. too often he did not exercise appropriate command authority over generals or intervene effectively in crippling disagreements among senior commanders. elsewhere, i tried to delineate the practical and emotional reasons behind his inaction. there is no time here for such a discussion. i'm sure you're glad to hear me say that. simply put, he did not have the steel or ruthlessness to make essential command decisions. i would say davis performed ably as a political commander in chief than as a military commander in chief. thank you very much.

>> next week we'll be back at the virginia military institute for another session from this conference organized by the virginia civil war ses ses ka centennial submission. the civil war airs here every saturday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. and sundays at 11:00 p.m. eastern time. you're watching american history tv, all weekend every weekend on c-span3. american history tv is marking memorial day 2012 with programming featuring the stories, recollections and memories of america's veterans. known as decoration day until 1882, memorial day is observed annually in the united states on the last monday of may to honor all americans who have died in all wars. to find out more about this weekend's programming or to watch something you may have missed, visit or website,

cspan.org/history. you're watching american history tv memorial day weekend and every weekend on c-span3. as the presidential campaign enters its final months and the political parties prepare for conventions, american history tv will air c-span's original series "the contenders" featuring 14 political figures that ran for president and loss but impacted american political history. we're air it every weekend from june 3rd to september 2nd on sundays. all here on american history tv on c-span3. join as historians preview the series on saturday, june 2nd at 10:00 a.m. eastern. 40 years after the first full-scale engage between the troops and the people's army in vietnam. they interviews veterans from

the battles in the valley. it was after these battles that north vietnamese forces engaged in guerrilla war father. up next are excerpts and we hear from george forest the commanding officer in the first battalion fifth calvary that supported the calvary after the third day of the battle. this is 50 minutes. >> this is dr. richard barone. i'm conducting a video oral history with george forest. it's approximately 12:05 p.m. we're in crystal city hilton, washington, d.c., as the 40th anniversary reunion. tell me a little bit about your reaction of arriving at x-ray on the 17th -- 16th and on that tuesday. what did x-ray look like to you?

>> probably a side like we have never seen, my unit unlike the other units, we walked into x-ray. we had spent the previous night at l.c. columbus, and then the next morning went overland into x-ray. so on the way into x-ray, we could see some of the casualties at least of the north vietnamese casualties as we got into the landing zone. we saw guys who were absolutely physically exhausted. i think jack smith characterized it once. they had that blind combat stare. >> did you all know what had happened there? >> we did not, because communications were poor. we were not on hal moore's frequency until we actually got

into x-ray. >> do you remember the then lieutenant colonel? >> absolutely. absolutely. he was probably this monumental figure standing in the middle of all of this chaos with total control of who he was, what he was, and what he wanted us to do without hesitation told me this is where i want your unit in the perimeter, and move out. so we basically did and deployed immediately. at some point later we came back for a more thorough briefing by him what went on and what he had anticipated would happen the rest of the day and the next night. >> he came and addressed the company commanders? >> he had company commanders that came in. i guess it was part of his normal early morning briefing or afternoon briefing. we got that fairly early in the morning. >> right. what did he tell you? what did he say he thought would

be happening? >> he knew that the north vietnamese forces were still there. that we needed to do policing the battlefield to try to recover as many american soldiers' bodies as we could and get them back inside the perimeter. and then go through your normal routine as a company once you go in line. establish your positions, put out listening posts, do all the kinds of military tactical things that a unit should do. then establish good communications with the unit on the right and left and to the battalion headquarters. >> so you stay there the day and the night. >> uh-huh. >> before you walk off. what was that night like? >> there were a number of probing attacks at least aalong the sector that we were on. as i recall, we were on the -- probably the western side of the

perimeter. no real heavy probes and the company being. >> tell me a little bit about your general feelings what kind of commander was he? >> before? >> yes. >> i didn't know him. >> even if he'd been there the whole time, i didn't know him. he was a battalion commander of another battalion, remember my unit was attached. >> you were attached, right. >> i'm asking, because did he make contact with you all? >> didn't make contact with us, because we didn't fall under his command until we were ordered to

move out. i mean, i could say the same about hal moore. i had not laid eyes on hal moore until the morning that we walked into the o.z. he had a reputation of being a tough commander, and he was in a separate brigade in a separate battalion and we were attached. being attached to a unit is like being a stepchild. in my case it worked well. >> you get through that night, and then the decision is made to walk to albany. what do you think about that decision to walk? there's also a question of why you wanted -- why people were going to go there? >> right. in hindsight or -- >> yeah, in hindsight. >> well, yeah. on that particular morning when

the colonel calls you to the command post and the orders of day are we're going to move out. we know a portion of this unit is going to be air lifted out, and some of you guys are going to walk. aga again, i overlay my attachment mentali mentality. they're not going to fly with the stepchildren, so we assume that we would probably be one of the units that walked out. i think the concept was at the same time we had also established communications with my parent battalion. and there was some discussion of marrying up with that battalion at albany, and that was an assumption on my part, that we were going to go -- once we got to albany, we would be air lifted back to my battalion so we would marry up with my battalion. now after 40 years i understand one of the reasons that we walked out is because there was

not enough air lift, helicopter lift support to fly everybody out. the months leading up to albany, there was lots of flying, and most of the helicopters were at their 100-hour maintenance -- mandatory maintenance. a number of them were probably down. again, that's after i read the book. >> so you all move out, and you're in the rear? >> uh-huh. >> were you tasked with the rear guard or were you just the stepchild? >> no. again, understanding the military tactics, when you are the last unit, there are in military missions implied tasks and specified tasks. an implied task of being the last unit is you're rear security. that was a given. that was ft. benning 101. so we, being the last unit,

we're security but more importantly security in my particular unit was paramount in my mind. >> tell me about your lieutenants. >> good lieutenants, young. had one ocs, larry haas, and he was the one that was killed. terry martell, and terry martell was a -- i believe, an rotc lieutenant from bareo, ohio. my other lieutenant was jim patswa from baltimore. i had one platoon that was command by the a noncommission officer. his name for whatever reason -- last night when we were talking, i kept trying to get the guys to refresh my memory so that when i did this interview today i would be up to speed on who was there. then i had my -- which was an unusual scenario. my xo was also on the ground

with us. his name is don adams, and don's from atlanta. >> and your radio operator? >> radio operators, again, hirh from allentown, pennsylvania and jimmy smith from north carolina. >> so you all move out that day. a lot of people said you were weighted down, the whole group was weighted down with a lot of -- moving a lot of materials. >> a lot of -- i wouldn't say "a lot," but we had equipment that normally -- anticipating being flown out, soldiers carry a lot more stuff than they would if they had the -- to pack it. we normally had the canteen -- the two canteens of water and extra ammunition and others.

again, a lot of -- we had got resupplied, and so a lot of the resupplies that we had we still had, because we didn't do -- we didn't expand an awful lot of ammunition that night. again the ammunition that we expended we replenished in the morni morning. i wouldn't say we were burdened down, but it was an unusual load for an air mobile company to be walking around in the woods. normally what happens is airplanes came and picked us up, and we got a free ride. >> i wouldn't say we were unusually burdened down. it was probably more than we were used to carrying. >> what was the train like? >> for the first part of it, it was fairly clear because of the

initial walkout was, again, part of lz x-ray. as we moved further -- let me get my direction. as we moved further north, the elephant grass became more prevalent, so that became an issue in terms of visibility. up until then relatively flat. i think when we went back in '93 and looked at it, it looked more like north georgia woods than we imagined with the elephant grass added. so the visibility was really limited, and at least a portion of it. of course, the closer we got to albany, there were these -- the terrain that sticks out in everybody's minds are these enormous ant hills, which still don't know how, why, where, whatever. they became part of the terrain.

again, i would imagine that visibility probably no more than 100 meters either to the right or left or even to the front. so i think eyes were pretty closed. >> did that worry you? do you remember being concerned about that? >> every day that i was in vietnam, i was concerned. not so much concerned about me, but concerned about the welfare of those guys that depended on me to do some stuff. so concern? absolutely. after all we had just witnessed horror, and some people probably talk about a letdown because we weren't a more relaxed -- i have to tell you, the commanders of the leaders were not relaxed. i know none of my ncos were relaxed. they were always cautious about what we did, because we didn't have the normal intel. we didn't have the kind of

navigational aids, good maps to basically point out what the terrain was. so we were kind of stumbling in the dark. >> didn't you have one map? >> right. >> you got someone to make a rudimentary map? >> we did some. the reason was because, again, going back to how we got there in the first place, we were doing highway security on a pass just south of there. our mission was to provide outposts highway security. we got a call that you're going to be air lifted into lz columbus for an operation. no maps. not even the kind of communications, the exchange of communications that you would normally get when you exchange units like that. so flying in, the chinook

pilots -- again, we landed on lz, a non-secure lz in ch-47. >> we can go into detail on that at another time. >> a new story. >> captured by delta company unfront. if they run into them, they get them and call all the company commanders to the front. >> uh-huh. >> how did you feel about leaving your company and going that far up the column? >> again, reality and what i know now. my thought process has changed over 40 years, but at that point, you know, you have to remember i was a good infantry captain. >> you went, and you said, yes, sir? >> who if they said we want you to come up front, i didn't go

through this checklist of how do i evaluate the commander? why is this guy not using the radio? no. it was, okay, guys, off and on. off your feet, off your ass, on your feet, we're going forward. that's basically what we did. >> tell me about mcdade and the conversation you all had up there when you got there. >> didn't really have a conversation. when i got to the position where we were actually starting to assemble to do the briefing, we started to get incoming mortar fire. my immediate reaction was, i don't know -- i don't know anyone in front of me. i don't know any of those guys on the side of me. the only comfort zone for me in this whole scenario is back down that trail where a company first to the 5th is. so my response to the incoming fire was a reaction of i need to

get out of here so that i can get back to a position. again, in hindsight now i think about it and was it a conscious thought of i need to go back and save my guys, or was it a conscious thought i'm scared as hell and i need to get out of this particular environment so i can get my thought processes together and do the things that i was trained to do? i haven't quite figured out what the answer was. i think it was more training. i think it was more instinct. i think it was more a response to it a dangerous situation. this may send mellow dramatic, but the safest place i believe for me on that battlefield on that particular day was back at a company 1st to the 5th. i knew these guys. >> did you ask mcdade

permission? >> no. didn't do the traditional click your heels salute three times and turn around and go. it was turn around and go. >> the trap has been sprung in the middle, and there you go. you're off. how fast are you going? >> it's in the book, but i want to know. >> miles per hour? i'm being facetious. >> were you dragging the guys behind you? >> no. i was young, but these guys were younger than i was. they had more equipment than i did. >> yes. >> but, again, because they were so good, i never had to look for them. whenever i -- whenever i went, they appeared. so my assumption was that these guys are right there with me. and i'm thinking that probably

for a portion of that trip they were, and i would hope -- i'll probably never get the answer to that, but i would hope that i didn't leave them. i would hope that they were able to stay as close as they possibly could. obviously, it was not enough because i got there and they didn't. >> how long did it take you? was this five minutes? was this 30 seconds? you're traveling about 560 yards. >> right, right. in my mind, in my mind it seemed

like forever. i think in actual time it probably didn't take very long at all. 600 yards is a couple of football fields, three or four football fields. so the actual -- to qualify it in minutes or whatever may be five minutes, six minutes. >> what do you remember seeing? were it a trail? was it more of a trail? >> it was more tracing the steps that i had come up, because, again, this was not a conscious effort of if i don't say on this trial or get off the trail i'm going to get lost. i laugh all the time about

paying attention to where you go so you can always know how to get back. again, that's another one of those learned infantry officer things that they put in the back of this little computer. it's there. so i kind of retrace where i was going to actually -- to see actions to the right and left. to see guys fighting and firing those kinds of things. that's a blur. these guys were looking at me li like, now that you're here, you got to do something. tell us what to do. >> what did you tell them? what did you do? >> guys, number one -- i didn't have to tell them. they already knew. we have been ambushed. we need to execute the processes that we know that go about. the first thing we needed to do is establish a position where we

could be fairly secure. one of the first airplanes that landed in the makeshift perimeter we had were medevac choppers. when they came in, i basically went over to the first bird that landed and talked to the pilot. basically said, this has what happened. on the way back in if you can bring ammunition, water, medical supplies, whatever we need, because we've been hit pretty bad. we're in pretty good shape, but i imagine the units in front of us are having more problems than we are. the combat effectiveness of my unit was probably 75%. after having read the book, you kind of know what the guys up in front of me were like. >> yes. >> so it was the -- once we started to, again, get the wounded out and get some supplies in and whatever, then

we concentrated on, again, accountability, where everybody is. >> can you describe kind of the physical layout of your perimeter? how did you set up? >> it was wide enough that we could accommodate at least three platoons, and i had my weapons platoon inside at headquarters. p so pretty good-sized. large enough helicopters could come fairly close. i don't think they landed inside the perimeter, but fairly close. probably two sorties, maybe three sorties of medevacs came in. it was getting pretty late. the battle about 1:00, 1:30. by the time everything kind of calmed down, it was getting dark because i remember tully and his