strategic discussions with my folk was, i actually did think it made a difference to us with voters. business was a significant part, business was on side. ief the first labor leader to be able to go to the launch of a manifesto and have a whole lot of business people sitting alongside us. i still believe people on my side of the political fence, that if you don't have substantial business support, it's hard to win the economic argument. so i think these things actually do have an impact, but anyway, that's -- that's my business, not yours. >> i've been asked to put you some questions in relation to the issue of union reform. we saw that hintied at in one o the extracts i've recently drawn to your question. and the question is did you reach an understanding with rupert murdoch after you became leader of the labor party but before you became prime minister that he would not repeal --

that's you would not repeal the restraints imposed on trade you know 81s by the various trade unions act and associated legislation passed in the thatcher era and the quid pro quo was that his papers would endorse your election? >> no. this was a position i took because i believed in it. actually it was completely consistent with the positions i had taken when i was employment spokesman for the labor party. >> as i put to mr. murdoch a piece in "the times," i think it was the 31st of march, 1997, which indicated your position. but cause and effect here is completely disassociated, is that it? >> yeah. my view was one of the essential things labor had to do, you know, we were dogged throughout the '83, '87, '90, '92 elections with a position that said we were going to repeal all this conservative legislation, which i thought was not simply foolish

politically for us, i thought it was wrong. you know, i went through all those campaigns. and in the end, i thought the closed shop was wrong as a matter of principle. i still do. so i didn't need rupert murdoch or anyone else to tell me about that. now, it's true, had we had a different position, i think that would have been a big problem with their newspaper, but we didn't take the position for that reach. it was a position i believed in. it was for me a very, very important part of new labor. >> the subsidiary question i've been asked to put, was it not part of this agreement that whilst you insisted that a statutory recognition procedure should be introduced, he insisted, that's mr. murdoch, there should be a clause within it which specifically enabled the existence of a nonindependent staff association like nisa to block an application for recognition by an independent trade union at a news international title?

>> no. i understand why these sort of conspiracy theories arise, but i mean it's not as if my position on unions and so on was a matter of great surprise. it was actually for me a very, very strong article, belief. to me trade unions are a very important part of a maude eoder democratic society but it's interesting actually that their argument through the '60s and the '70s, and i grew up with this argument, was that they should not be subject to legal constraint. that was was an interference with the democratic principles of trade unionism. as time went on, i couldn't argue that. they had power, they should be subject to some sort of legal framework. so this was -- my view of this was because i genuinely believed these positions for the labor party should change and have to

change. >> joe mandellson in his testimony drew the powers of old and the modern power of the press. do you see that as a neat analogy or as a mismatch? >> i think some of the arguments are a little, to me, somewhat the same in the sense that i remember at the time people used to argue within the trade union movement that just this whole concept that someone else could tell them, you know, here are certain standards was wrong. so i assume there's a certain reflection of that, but i think you can take that analogy too far quite quickly. >> i move on to the proddy intervention if i can so describe it in 1998. we received already quite a lot of evidence about that. can i inquire into the melting pot another extract from mr.

mullens' diary, which is page 17 of our bundle. we're now in march, 1998. do you see the second paragraph there. murdoch came up again at the parliamentary committee. the papers are full of stories alleging that the man, that's you, of course, has been ringing up the italian prime minister or murdoch's behalf. i asked who initiated the call to proddy and, two, what is our relationship to murdoch? the man was visibly irritated. i don't reveal private conversations. i just wanted to know who initiated it. he seemed to say saying that it is a load of bull. then he relaxed and said my relationship with murdoch is no different than that of any other newspaper pro prietor. >> such irony in this one. >> i certainly detected the irony but whether i delivered it

in probably the right tone, probably not in my desire to maintain impartiality throughout. but in terms of the gist of your conversation with mr. mullen, is this a fair account or not? >> yeah. i mean, again, i can't honestly remember this, but it probably sounds to me about right. you know, as i say in my statement, the call was initiat initiated. basically i raised the issue of whether the idea of having someone from the outside come and own part of media set would be resented or not. he gave me an answer and i mean i can't remember how this was relayed pack, but i'm sure it was. but my point about that is, you know, i would have done that for anyone with substantial british interest. i would have done that if another media group had asked me to do it. >> mr. campbell's account, his

diary entry for the 1st of april, 1998, page 19. near the end of the first paragraph for that date. t.b. said he didn't fear them coming at him about me but about the relationship of murdoch and didn't fancy a sustained set of questions about whether murdoch -- was that an accurate statement about your state of mind? >> yeah, because what you knew turned out to be the case. what was an intervention, which i think was perfectly justified, that lasted about two minutes ended up occupying days and weeks of time. >> so is this your point, this is an example of a conspiracy theory that really has developed like turvy out of a story that had no validities? >> absolutely. as i say, when you actually come

to the how we decided media policy, now, it's correct that what we decided not to do was to do a big media, you know, regulation an so on. but in respect to the specific issues that came up along the way, we decided -- as i say, i didn't warn them against or in favor. i wasn't saying it was a good idea he bought media set or not. all i was doing is finding out whether a foreign owner would be welcome or not welcome. >> the answer, i think, was not welcome and mr. murdoch didn't press the matter at that point, is that it? >> so i don't think that's unreasonable for that to be asked or -- you know, as i say, if another media group had been interested in the possible acquisition, i would have done the same. >> with perhaps an issue of more substance, the human rights act, mr. blair, which was one i

suppose of the -- certainly the most significant achievements of your first term and one which you had been committed in opposition for some significant period of time and so that, therefore, a lot of time was devoted to it, was it the position that news international, i suppose together with everybody else, were lobbying for complete press immunity from the human rights act? >> yes, that's right. and they wanted no suggestion that you would move outside the bounds of the pcc and self regulation. >> and were you generally supportive of that position? >> yes, that was -- i mean my -- my view is that if you were to deal with this, you had to deal with it head on, as it were, not through the human rights act, which would be sort of a side way of dealing with it. also, we were at that time -- i

think i'm right of saying it was lord wakeham who was head of the pcc who's someone who i thought was doing quite a good job at that. and the pcc were pretty fierce on behalf of the whole of the media, not any one particular part of it. >> was the position reached that following, if i can put knit these terms, pressure from lord early, then your lord chancellor who i think was responsible for piloting the act through parliament generally, certainly of course through the lords, that he persuaded you that your position was incorrect and we ended up with a compromise, which we see in the form of section 12 of the act? >> that's right. >> in terms, though, of what

your position was, what was the problem in allowing a privacy law to develop incrementally through article 8, which is what has happened in any event with the introduction of the act in the form in which we now see it? >> well, as i say, look, i felt we should still be with the self regulation argument, and i knew that we were going to have quite a big battle over it if we changed that position. in the end we did come to a compromise and i think that compromise was perfectly sensible, by the way. but at that time, when were we there, 1998? i mean we had taken a position in favor of self regulation, that was the position. but i felt, you know, derrick was making very strong arguments about this, felt very strongly

about it. you know, had i absolutely felt very strongly about my position, i would have not wanted to compromise. but in the end i thought -- i listened to him and thought this is a way through this. >> the development of a privacy law through the gateway of article 8 would be entirely consistent with self regulation, wouldn't it? >> yes. that's not what they felt at the time. i mean my recollection of this was that the pcc itself was really the lobbying organ on this one. >> what did you think about that? you may be right, but what do you think about the idea that the pcc is actually acting as a lobby rather than doing the job which might have been thought that it should have been doing, which is to provide a mechanism of redress? >> that's a good point.

i suppose, look, they felt, you know, they were defending their own position as the custodians of press standards. but yeah, i think that's a perfectly reasonable point. >> your original position in line with the press position, which would have placed the press, as they were, outside the human rights act, would certainly have removed all the force of article 8 and arguably would have given force to the common law position, which is effected in article 10. why was there a policy issue here? surely the position, particularly after princess diana's death and everything which existed in that stage, it was appropriate to have a system whereby article 8 and article 10 would be balanced and the privacy law would develop in that way, which is what has occurred? >> absolutely. that was the point that derry made very strongly and in the

end prevailed. the alternative argument was more a political argument. it was that after events surrounding princess diana's death, there was actually a tougher attitude than taken by the pcc for a time and so on. i think people felt that lord wakeham was a more credible chairman of the pcc an all of that. but it was a political question. i'm not sure either i devoted a vast amount of time to this one. no, the point you make is a perfectly reasonable one and probably if this thing had cropped up in 2006, not 1998, i would have, you know, gone along with the original compromise in the beginning. >> move forward in time, mr. blair, we're now in 2001 in your second election victory. mr. campbell's diaries again,

page 20, the bottom of page 21, 30th of october. so this must be the year 2000. at the bottom of the page t.b. saw murdoch in steltser and then in brackets murdoch adviser and asked them outright whether they were going to back us. murdoch said they were unelectable an that was that. t.b. seemed to take it at face value. is that an accurate account or not? >> yes, i think that would be an accurate account. >> so we do have you asking a direct and explicit question of mr. murdoch and getting a blunt answer, don't we? >> yes. i mean he wouldn't -- i don't think it was -- that other media people also asked him what his attitude was going to be. again, i didn't see any -- they were going to make a decision

about it. so why not ask them. >> was this the only occasion in which you were so outright, to use mr. campbell's phrase, with mr. murdoch or do you think there were others? >> no, i think before the 2005 election i probably would have asked -- i actually don't recall that as well as i recall this partly because the diary brings it all back, as it were. but i have no doubt that i would have in effect, even if i didn't full on, i would have wanted to know what the situation is. but as i say, i don't think that's -- i think i would have done that with any major group that i thought where there was a possibility of securing support. >> obviously for many newspaper groups, there's no point asking the question because you know what the answer is going to be. >> right. >> but just in the cases where there might be some doubt -- >> i can't recall ever doing

this specifically with other groups. but there was the possibility "the guardian" might have backed the liberal democrats or the "financial times" might have backed someone else. but i don't think there's anything wrong with asking them if they're going to support you or not. what's obviously different is if, you know, you're conditioning that in some way. >> now mr. campbell gave evidence that over the period 2002, 2003, this is tab 3 of the big file, mr. blair. he gave his evidence on this point on the 14th of may. it's page 36 of the transcript. >> 36. >> yes. i'm afraid there's two transcripts under tab 3. the one for the 14th of may is the one i invite to your

attention. he's suggesting that about 2002 there started to be internal discussions about putting the pcc on a statutory basis, kre 8ing a right of reply, et cetera. first of all, is he right about that? >> yes. look, there was a big debate going on with the people around me. some of whom felt very strongly, jonathan was one, there was another, that we should take this issue on. i was reluctant for the reasons i give. so -- i mean he says here that -- i think you -- you're quoting from jonathan, i think, jonathan powell, aren't you? >> i am, yes. >> yeah. i mean i remember that

discussion taking place. i think some work was done on it. but i mean this never got to the stage where i was anywhere near taking a different decision to the one i had taken up to then. >> i suppose you reached the point in your -- this was your second term. some would say you were at the zenith of your power really. the situation may or may not have changed later. it was the opportunity insofar as there ever was one, is that fair? >> yes. i mean, look, some people say you could have done after 1997, you just won this landslide victory, that would have been a chance. some people say after everything that happened after the death of princess diana, that would have been the chance. some would say right after the 2001 election, you won a big majority, that would have been the chance. the decision i took, rightly or wrongly, as i say, was there was

never going to be a moment when this was not going to have to squeeze out the rest of the government agenda. and, you know, however supportive they seemed or however powerful i seemed, this was going to flip like that the moment you put such an issue center stage. you see the degree of focus on this inquiry now. so if you being the government of the day said i'm going to legislate on this, i think it would have been -- anyway, that's the decision i took. you know, i had a -- we were by then in my second term really starting to move forward on reform in public serves. so academy schools were being introduced and competition within the health service. we were really getting things changed. we had major law and order legislation. later we had legislation on terrorism an so on.

i never felt that i could risk putting all of that to one side to fight this. now, that's the political judgment in a way that you have to make. so some people would say to me an some of them did say, look, you can do this along with everything else. i used to say to them you're being completely unrealistic about this. you take this issue on as prime minister, an you're the prime manager. you're the person they think they're holding to account. so in the some ways you're the worst person to do this. you want to control us an put us into a straitjacket. so i never felt that i could take a different strategic decision. and i think, as i say, it's only because of this and because of what has happened that you're in a position where a prime minister could an indeed should. >> but, mr. cameron may say it's

rather easy for you, the other party to say now is the time for the prime minister to grasp the nettle, but i've become rather depressed as i've listened to you. do you think it's different now? >> yes, i think it is actually. i mean i think what has happened -- you know, this is what sometimes happens in life, never mind politics, is that something that people have known needs to be sorted out. suddenly the circumstances become such that people say it's got to be sorted out. now, i think what you do about it is very difficult. i don't think it's so difficult in relation to these appalling abuses and so on. i think the political aspect is quite difficult, for reasons we can go into. but i think you can get a

political consensus today and keep it, so -- and i think there's a lot of responsibility on the rest of us, by the way, if the prime minister is now faced with decisions arising out of your report. it's really important people don't play politics with that. because my anxiety -- see, there was never anything of this nature that came up in this way. my anxiety, frankly, about the strategic risks of going down this path was i could see a situation where your opposition would immediately be going to the media and saying, well, i don't know why he's doing this. even people in your own party and in your own cabinet would say he's gone crazy now, he's trying to take on -- i -- my actual view was it was not possible. now, i do think, though, what is very unfair would be to leave this prime minister -- you know, i'm trying to work out how, if i

were him i would deal with it. and i think if there are reasonable recommendations that come up, an we can come on to what manufacture those things might be, i think it is very important that he is not left in a position where he's politically exposed on this, because that is not fair to him. no doubt this is going to be extremely difficult. but i think it can be done and it should be done now. >> right. >> 2003 now, mr. blair, the communications act took some time to pass through parliament. it's an act of some complexity and tessa told us all about it. she also said in her evidence, this is under tab 6, that within a couple of days of being appointed, this is one of the pressing issues, and then she saw you, had a conversation which was, she said, i think,

necessary. and she asked you directly whether or not any deal had been done with rupert murdoch on the reform of the cross media ownership rules, an he gave me an absolute assurance, which i completely accepted, there had been no prior agreement. first of all, is her evidence accurate on that point? >> yes, that's correct. >> were you surprised that she asked you that question? >> not particularly. i mean we're talking 2002, are we, round about? by then this issue to do with me and rupert murdoch, and so on, so it didn't surprise me that she asked that question. >> in terms of the substance of the matter, though, do you feel that the communications act reflected in any way an implied deal with mr. murdoch or not? >> no, absolutely not. for a start, the thing that we

did, which is boost offcom, is the thing he absolutely disliked. and it was often written about this. channel 5 was not his -- i mean i never thought he was behind channel 5. channel 3 would have been a far better fit for him and that he was unable to do. i mean my thing within this communications act, because i did talk to the ministers about it several times, my thing was very much to do with trying to open up the media ownership thing. this issue to do with media ownership, i mean i have a view on this that is different from many people who worry about media power. you know, there are two elements sometimes people worry about. concentration of media ownership. sometimes people worry about

foreign owners coming into the british media space. i thought the first was always best dealt with as a competition issue. i thought the second, i just disagreed with people, that if you said, okay, to any foreign owner, you're going to now put all the media in british hands, i wasn't ever sure that was going to produce a different situation. i actually remember during the course of this piece of legislation, i actually wanted to see if there were major media companies, i mean people -- the time warners, viacom, i think they were, axle springer, other big organizations, that if you had a more open media policy would be prepared to come in, because what concerned me was, was that you needed -- it wasn't necessary just to have other media owners, it was necessary to have other media owners with heft, with the ability to put

major investment in and, frankly, with the type of global media position that i could see the world moving to. so i didn't have any -- some people took a different view from me. i had no belief that if you turned bits of the media over to british as opposed to foreign owners you were going to necessarily get a fairer crack of the whip. >> okay. the last point is the 2004 referendum on the european constitution. we've covered, of course, with mr. straw and with lord mandellson. the position from their evidence is that really that had nothing to do with the position of the murdoch press. is that right or not? >> yeah. and it wasn't the murdoch press's position, it was the majority of the media would have been in favor of a referendum on the constitution. i didn't want to do it, by the way. but as i think i say in my

statement, jack straw then wrote me a memo saying it's going to happen, so do you want it to happen to you or do you want to take the initiative. an his advice very strongly, and i thought rightly in the end, was to take the initiative. >> i'm sure you'd want to draw express attention, mr. blair, to 05575 under particular questions where you collect together six examples where the government turned down the positions, as you said, of the murdoch media and you start off with a man you bid, then bbc, new channels, the increase in the license fee, greater powers to offcom, high tv and listed events of sports. you said that's clear evidence of the absence of any express deal. >> yeah. i feel on very, very strong ground