in all matters grown antique, we should avoid translating the current climate intact to a far different era or exploiting our knowledge of the way things turned out. but we do not all conform to that basic premise, i am afraid. the astoundingly good british historian, c.g. wedgewood, offered a crisp summary of the principle. she wrote history is lived forwards but written in retrospect. we know the end before we consider the beginning and we could never wholly recapture what it was to know the beginning only. we should try. and not everyone does. novelist phillip roth has written deftly that one of america's fervently embraced communal passions is indulging an ecstasy of sanctimony about self-defined advancements over

others, condemning failings of others past and present, an ecstasy of sanctimony. carry that home with you. a reminder to the heresy that inflamed the world something that souls are saved only by grace so there is no reason to hue to any moral law or avoid malfeasance whatsoever once you have signed on behavior becomes irrelevant. in a kind of reversal of that, confederates as secular infidels their testimony about lee or anything else does not have standing. a bright youngster from ohio, who loved the civil war since he was a small boy, went on a lot of tours with me. while he was still, he was from ohio, loved ohio troops didn't have any southern enthusiasm at all. none. but as a high schoolboy with great grades he was eligible to graduate with honors and wrote a

paper about the civil war and chose to describe the battle of fredericksburg and talked about the lighting up of the northern horizon and mentioned southerners hadn't seen it because of where they lived some of them thought it was a super natural display in celebration of the great confederate victory. well, the teacher who was supervising the paper, marked this boy down for accepting the notion not there was special meaning to it but that it happened at all because he cited a confederate source as reporting it. the fundamental historical premise, i guess, well worth learning young and early and holding the years, southerners made things up. and they cannot be trusted. well in response to the boy's plea to help him out, i forwarded to ohio some of the ample dose of northern testimony about this, some new englanders, presumable pli bli immune to the

con federals talked about it and the school boy survived his gaffe. george washington who impresses me as steadily as he impressed his granddaughter's husband, r.e. lee, wrote a gorgeously crafted paragraph about the wide chasms that are inevitable between human reactions to the same evidence. thomas jefferson concluded, later in life, that washington's apos tacies from the true revolution according to jefferson could not possibly be straightforward and ingenuous. he decide they'd must have been because washington was growing senile or fallen under the influence, been bamboozled by clever, sinister advisers. in words absent to all of man kind's differences. washington wrote thoughtfully, shall i arrogantly pronounce that who ever differs from me must discern the subject through a distorting medium or be influenced by some nefarious scheme, the mind is so formed in different persons as to contemplate the same objects, in

different points of view. hence originates the difference on questions of the greatest import, human and divine. well the president's dictum i thinks applies to subjective viewpoints on everything we do and for purpose tuesday, to the question of the records and the character and the perceptions of lee or grant, or jackson. or shanks evans or who ever you wish. humans have powerful minds. and contemplative means. reach conclusions that are polar opposites on important issues. on our topic today was lee's performance at chancellorsville foolishness, redeemed by luck or unparalleled brilliance? was he cemetery hill in the fading light of july 1? within reach? was it the key? could it be had? or was it an unattainable

phantasm? those subjective calls or everything we perceive or conclude in our existence day-to-day, produce variable reactions. i thin tick, i believe, yosemite valley is the most beautiful place on the planet. seems that way to me. i could not possibly prove it. a first time visitor in my acquaintance, amid the heart stopping magnificence of glacier point thought it not worth getting out of the car for a better look. how can i prove this. entirely of lee's war time popularity. deserve or not. i would submit that hamlin's razor, offers the only real multiple choice for those denying the truth of th malice, ignorance, sloth in a mixture. looking beyond our own time, i am delighted to contemplate the survival of literally millions of words from r.e. lee's own pen

and countless more from his intimates and contemporaries. there is no need for anyone, now or ever to accept my judgment on lee or to accept his detractors judgment on lee as the conclusion or even as a consequential argument in the matter. you can do it for yourself. that array of contemporary writings always will make it easy for someone who is interested, who cares, to see it all personally. without intermediary, without interference. i have not the least doubt that there will always be a great many young people growing up in far distant climes as i did in the shadow of the sierra nevada a long way from the blue ridge of virginia, who examine that evidence and without any presidential hint of southern propink quitty at all and they will marvel and they will come

away impressed and attached and eager to learn more. [ applause ] trust me, i have had to do this many times before. it really intrigued me when i found out that this conference on leadership sold out in two weeks. leadership, of course, is a big business these days. if you go to your local bookstore, and i hope you actually still go to your local bookstore, you can pick up books on the leadership of such military greats as abraham lincoln, attila the hun and for those who are readers of "forbes" magazines recently, captain james t. kirk of

"starship enterprise." such books as robert e. lee on leadership, the leadership lessons of robert e. lee and ethical leadership of robert e. lee can be found there as well. and as those titles attest the great confederate chieftain has become a favorite model for leadership studies and management specialists. in their hands, the great captains command of the army of northern virginia, in a high risk environment, marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, instructs, inspires, and even entertains. but such works usually find shelf space, as i said, in the business sects of bookstores. and in the end, are merely the product of adroit cherry picking through lee's long, fascinating 19th century life for the purpose of illuminating specific points in some 21st century leadership philosophy. so what we are going to do is go back and put lee back into his proper historical context. if we respect historical context and evaluate his leadership against the expectations and the

standards of the 19th century as we should, if we look at him, as part of the military culture that produced him, we can still learn a great deal. from the first day that lee donned a uniform, lee became part of and never apart from a military institution with its own expectations for its leaders. what did american military culture teach robert e. lee about commanding an army? the answer is straight forward. not much. thank you very much. i'm leaving now. the antebellum united states had no school for generals, of course. west point graduates such as lee obtained a scientific and military education, heavy on engineering. and company level tactics of the combat arms. cadets had no more than nine lessons, count them, nine lessons on the operations of armies in campaign, and the

generals who commanded them. and they took the classes during the spring of their first-class year, their senior year. amid the distractions of impending graduation and commissioning and massive cases of senioritis. as i look out on this audience it seems perfectly appropriate to say -- think back on your senior year. spring semester, senior year. do you remember the courses that you took? do you remember any nine lessons in any one of those courses? did you at any time stop and say 30 years from now i might need to remember that? i'm going to guess no. so it tells you an awful lot about the lack of preparation lee or any other senior commander of his generation, would have had from a west point education. by necessity, the lessons that they did learn came from translated european military treatises.

trumpeting the accomplishments of frederick the great and napoleon. the u.s. army possessed no such literature of its own studying the campaigns of washington or jackson or anyone else. for those soldiers who continued their professional reading after graduation, lee was one of the ones who did, but most said, that it was very difficult to carry textbooks around in their, saddlebags while they were chasing indians. those european texts would have taught them that successful generalship, successful leadership, rested on two main qualities. those two main qualities were character and competent. of the two, character mattered more. character always trumped competence. a swiss military theorist, one of the leading military authors of the day, wrote, the character

of the man is all above all other requisites in the commander in chief of an army. the essence of character, the prime military virtue was usually captured in a single word, and that word was courage. a good general, the swiss wrote, first must possess high moral courage capable of great revolution, secondly he must show a physical courage which takes no account of danger. a good general somehow, through self-study or experience or even formal schooling, also had to master the principles of war, beyond that it was not necessary he be a man of vast erudition. courage plus character could make a good general. but what made a superior general was an additional and extra ordinarily rare trait, that trait was called genius. when opportunity or crisis loomed, a general possessed of genius could grasp its dimension in their entirety, define a definite end state, desired end state, identical obstacles in

the path, design a plan marked by boldness and creativity to defeat his opponents, and energetically ensure its successful execution. no one can teach genius. a general genius is born and not made. thus lee came to professional maturity likely understanding the kind of man a successful general must be and the specific body of military knowledge he must know. but lee's books rarely explained how to translate character and competence into action. they did not really tell him what a general should do. there was an awful lot in those books about crossing rivers or going through forests or going through mountain gaps, things that in the field, a captain or a colonel might be in charge of. but it really didn't explain a very much, very much about what a general should do. the author seemed to work from the premise that a general possessing genius for high command and confronting an opportunity to display it could

figure it out for himself, there was no reason to really explain it. everyone else, those who did not possess genius, pretty much had to figure out how to apply the principles of war as best they possibly could within their own limitations. so where does lee fit into all of this? he was too modest a man, of course, to claim to be a man of genius. as a soldier, lee belongs to an army. a complex, hierarchical organization for it to function at top effectiveness everybody needs to play his part at all times. up at the war college when we look for a way to try to, just provide a framework, framework for discussion, we basically say that all soldiers, regardless of rank, always have to deal with three obligations, only the circumstances, change depending on range and assignment. and those three are -- number one, a soldier must act in such

a way as to support his superior's efforts. secondly, he must act in ways to help him do his own job, as effectively and efficiently as possible. and, third, act in such a way to support, to support his subordinates efforts to act, to work toward a shared goal. how? and how well did lee do this? let's begin with the first one, lee's obligation to support his superiors. this he did in many ways. as the swiss theorist had written the first care of a commander upon taking the field is that he should be, it should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war. from the first day he donned his uniform, his gray uniform, lee made very clear to davis, his unequivocal agreement with the president's desired political end state, independence. lee always respected a founding premise of american civil military relations, i.e., the principal, the prime massey of civilian control over the

military. even as his military authority grew, lee remained davis' exemplarily follower. throughout the conflict, lee's correspondence with civilian superiors included reaffirmations of their willingness to respect their decisions and refrain from taking military actions they deemed incompatible with larger political initiatives. he counseled generals recently commissioned directly from the civilian world to adhere to their new obligations as military men to respect the chain of command and obey the president's orders. lincoln should have been so lucky. much of lee's continued success in his relations with his political superiors also rested on superior interpersonal relationship skills. as davis' military adviser in the spring of 1862, lee especially understood the president's preference for detailed and frequent updates, especially in critical situations. thus, after he assumed command of the army of northern virginia in june of 1862, on the outskirts of richmond, lee

immediately begin to work within davis' preferred comfort zone. our position requires you should know everything and you must excuse my troubling you, became a recurring theme in lee's frequent updates during the seven days fights. as davis' confidence in lee grew, and, and his confidence in lee's judgment grew, lee could begin to send messages of, with a slightly different tone. even during the tense days in september, 1862, as lee marched north into maryland, he could begin messages back to davis with, when you do not hear from me, you may feel sure i do not feel necessary to trouble you. and davis didn't have a problem with that. clearly in short order. a channel of communications opened up between the two men, neither of whom were particularly open individuals by nature. and they were able to enjoy frank exchanges on matters that quickly extended well beyond the limits of lee's formal authority as a military commander.

while davis had good reason to believe himself to be as well-informed on military affairs as any american political leader of his time, the concept of military strategy itself still remained in its infancy. the swiss theorist defined it simply as war on the map. military operations beyond the battlefield. the theorists of the era, generally limited their discussions of strategy almost exclusively to the realm of the military itself. but such a narrow definition proved too simplistic for the complexities of a conflict on the scale and scope of the civil war. davis needed at least a few knowledgeable and trusted advisers such as lee to help him think through things. lee did this in spades. clearly, lee freely provided input on many elements of national military policy. he offered well-informed critiques of legislation on military organization, advised davis on personnel matters, from conscription to the appointment of general officers, and did so in ways that impacted

confederate forces well beyond the army of northern virginia. he also tried hard to keep himself current on the action of all confederate armies, not always successfully, but he often tried to apply the principles of war, especially that of concentration, to help davis think through, how to deal with multiple crises with a limited resource base to draw upon. he helped davis decide if, how, and when, where, to shift troops or supplies even if they were to come away from lee's own army. he certainly doesn't quite, suffer quite so badly from virginia myopia as some of his critics accuse him. lee also, in, in, advised davis, this is important, on diplomatic, economic, political and social matters. aspects of national life well outside the recognized sphere of professional military expertise at the time. lee wrote to state governors to encourage cooperation with national military manpower initiatives. in expansive exchanges with

richmond, lee considered at length the importance of protecting civilian morale and and respecting private property on the home front. he also bemoaned the inequity of sacrifice between the front sacrifice between the front lines and the home front. he discussed mixed prospect for northern anti-war sentiment before key national and state elections. he offered suggestions for system tooizing railroad repair, for encouraging entrepreneurial spirit in the south, for labor reform supplying workers for night caves to produce gunpowder. lee and davis discussed the implications of fluctuations in the new york gold market during the summer of 1864 and they discussed -- and they shared their frustrations over the french and the british, who continued to believe that the war was between a party contending for abstract slavery and the other against it while entirely ignoring vital rights that were involved.

davis even asked lee whether he thought it was advisable to resurrect the society of the cincinnati, that post-revolutionary war organization for officers from washington's army. at the time back in the new republic it had created a whole lot of hate and discontent because there were those who believed that the society would help to create an artificial aristocracy or a military elite. lee of course would have been ineligible for membership in such an august organization, but lee decided that it was not in the south's best interest to restore an organization like the society of the cincinnati because it might stoke class tensions to undermine a common commitment to the goal of independence. late in the war, lee offered support for raising black troops to the military service, which we all know, but he also ruminated a lot about the consequences of such a course upon traditional southern society. lee's usefulness to davis covered such breadth that it's

no wonder that davis once wrote him, "i need your counsel. you are required in the field and i deprive myself of the support you give me here." in short, lee passes his first obligation, his first test. he far exceeded contemporary expectations for a general, as laid out by the greatest authorities of his age. those same military authorities offered very few useful suggestions concerning the discharge of the second obligation. to adopt practices designed to help set oneself succeed. indeed, most of their comments seemed entirely unsuited to robert e. lee. military theorists tend to view generalship as a young man's endeavor. one french general who was very popular among civil war-era readers commented that a general required great bodily strength as proof against the greatest fatigue. indeed, the general should be

called to the chief command at an early age while still enjoying wonderful energy. as a man in his 50s, lee's cardiac episodes and his increasing personal health problems certainly put him at odds with the best thinkers of the era. i feel compelled at this point to point out to everyone that while there were restrictions on age discussed frequently, there were no restrictions on height that were ever discussed. it's difficult also to see robert e. lee living up to the french general's prescription to adopt a mode of living as magnificent as fortune may permit. or to take pride in a headquarters designed for the exercise of the greatest hospitality. lee routinely sent gifts of food sent to him to the hospitals and dined regularly on delicacies as boiled cabbage. many visitors to his headquarters walked away both disappointed and hungry.

he preferred his tent to a house, however willingly offered. he did, however, possess what most authors considered to be the ideal demeanor for a general, especially in the presence of subordinates. an outstanding general, it was argued, must demonstrate a bearing characterized by calmness but without eliminating entirely that dash and impetuosity so well calculated to inspire and carry with it those who witness the same. think of all those lee to the rear episodes that we're all so familiar with, and you'll see how well lee could pull that off. lee always placed service over self. sometimes so much so that he did not always apply his best professional knowledge to implement sensible organizational changes that could help him do his job better. notably, lee never enjoyed sufficient staff support for a

force the size of the army of northern virginia. nor did his staff officers generally hold rank commensurate with their responsibilities. when a louisiana senator introduced legislation in 1863 to improve staff efficiency, lee's letter of support to jefferson davis revealed a deep understanding of contemporary professional debates over the organization and qualification of staff officers. yet he rarely applied his well-considered views to his own staff. for most of the war he made due with a handful of field grade military secretaries to handle paperwork and a small cadre of field-grade general staff officers to carry out logistical duties. as one writer of the era asserted, a good general will dispense with writing. in active operations his head and not his hand should be kept active. the number of items in the archives that all of us have

found in our historical research has suggested that lee did far more writing during his campaigns than these french experts would have ever approved of. but lee never appointed a chief of staff with a wide authority to act in his name as called for by the military authorities of his age. he briefly contemplated appointing his west point educated son custis, already a general officer, as either his chief of staff or his chief engineer, but concerned more about the appearances of nepotism than improved efficiency, he never pushed for it. lee engaged actively, almost obsessively, in matters relating to intelligence gathering and operational security. as yeomany had written, how can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant what his adversary is about? lee regularly relied upon traditional practices such as scouring captured northern newspaper, corroborating local items through cavalry reports or personal observation, and

forwarding important snippets of information to davis with his own opinions on their credibility. he also asked davis the secretary of war repeatedly to use their influence to stop from printing -- that didn't work well. but lee showed less confidence in newer elements. often identifying detachments as overpopulated and occasionally underperforming. he wanted many of those signal guys back in ranks. well, he routinely -- while he routinely used a telegraph for day-to-day messages, he strongly preferred that information relating to troop movements not be sent over the wires. toward the end of the war in his own operations and in his interactions with his political superiors in richmond he openly admitted greater confidence in the security of a mounted

courier than in the speed of a telegram that might be intercepted. with the exception of his fascination with railroads he seldom adapted readily to the newest tools available to him. and adapting to change is certainly something that a forward-looking leader does. but this seemed to be a specific challenge for him. instead he focused an awful lot more of his energies on his third obligation as a commander -- setting up his subordinates for success. throughout the war lee clearly differentiated between his officers and his enlisted mar e and he clearly had higher expectations for his officers ppz when he took command in virginia before the establishment of corps he made it a top priority to interview every one of his division commanders. he got rid of some and actively began to mentor the two he thought showed the greatest promise. including that capital soldier james longstreet. [ laughter ]

and ultimately, his success underpinned -- his success in doing so effectively underpinned his ultimate command authority. when he was asked about it, he once said, "my job is to bring my men to the right place at the right time. and then i leave it in the hands of god and my subordinates to win the great victories." he had a great deal of faith in those men. of course, lee took great pains to identify the strengths and weaknesses of all his generals from corps to brigade command. he led by example and he taught by example. he believed that officers must see and be seen by the soldiers. he held generals accountable for readiness at all times. he wrote his lines frequently. and when he traversed a segment he deemed insufficiently prepared to receive an enemy attack, he immediately sought out the errant commander. when lee found one such general relaxing in camp, he -- who was not able to explain the status of the earthworks along