25%, in this election, the three top islamist candidates between them won roughly 35% of the vote. this is between the lead front-runner, which is mohamed mursi of the brotherhood, the independent islamist candidate represented by dr. abol fotouh, and mr. salim al awa, who is a lesser-known islamist candidate who garnered roughly 6% of the vote. between them, they won roughly 35% of the votes. we also see the sharp shift in the political map in the fortunes of the remnants of the national democratic party, which was the ruling party during the mubarak era. the ndn the parliamentary elections won virtually no seats and did very badly in those elections. now the remnants of the old ndp network seem to have mobilized

for a highly effective campaign in support of general ahmed shafiq. so we see here -- and in addition to that, we see -- and this was a remarkable surprise -- the socialist candidate hamdeen sabahy really turned out to be the dark horse in this election. he ran as an independent as a clear leftist agenda. all of the polls seem to have dismissed the fact that he would do well in this election. but very surprisingly, he came in third garnering roughly 21% of the vote and also winning in areas that have been known to be traditional strongholds of the muslim brotherhood. in the big cities -- cairo, alexandria -- and also in the poor rural districts of the delta.

so, the political map that emerged from the november parliamentary elections, which saw roughly three-quarters of the vote go islamist and one-quarter secularists, now we have a completely different map that is highly diverse and shows what i think is a very healthy sign that political pluralism is very much alive and well in egypt. this makes for what is turning out to be a very competitive race. third, and i think related to this, it shows that the electorate is highly engaged and highly mobilized. i think what we've seen over the course of the last few months is that the electorate has focused very, very closely on the ups and downs of egyptian politics. and i think the most significant corrective mechanism that we've seen in this election has really taken the form of what seems to be a backlash against the muslim brotherhood. there is a rising concern of the

prospect of the muslim brotherhood monopolizing all of the levers of egyptian politics, and that was clearly reflected in the fact that they did so well in the november parliamentary elections. their tendency to monopolize the constitution writing process, the fact that they are contesting the presidential elections after they had committed not to do so at the very start of the revolution. so i think what the electorate -- what we've seen in terms of how the votes have split reflects really the fact that the electorate is now highly engaged and watching the developments of egyptian politics extremely closely. it is mobilized. it is politicized. and it is highly engaged in the political process. now, if we move to the negative side, i think the outcome that is before us between the election that will feature

general shafiq and mohamed mursi represents for a very polarized outcome. general shafiq is -- seems to be the complete antithesis of everything that the revolution has stood for. the revolutionaries will argue that egypt did not go through this remarkable transition and this very historic revolution only to see the restoration of the old order represented by general shafiq. egypt did not have to go through all of this just so we can go back to the old order. the same applies to the muslim brotherhood, which thus far has by its behavior has tended to confirm the worst fears of mainstream egyptians of one political party monopolizing all of the levers of power. so we have in these two candidates what are very polarizing tendencies, and this

actually adds to what is or what has been a very problematic transition since the overthrow of mubarak. if we factor in the fact that the turnout for this election was less than 50%, roughly 47% to 48% of the electorate, then each of the candidates or some will claim will have only garnered roughly 12% of all the votes cast by eligible voters. now, so the claim will be that they represent only a minority of the electorate. however, i think on the other hand, the days when an egyptian president will garner an absolute majority of the vote, i think those days are long gone. now, to explain this situation, which i think -- and as greg mentioned, already this highly

polarized situation leading into the runoff in mid-june has already triggered some incidents that we've seen develop over the last 24 hours. i think that the reason why we have ended up with this polarized situation is really a function of the polarized nature of the transition itself. over the course of the last 15 months we've had a situation in which there was a highly polarized debate over the issue of religion, so religion versus secular politics, the old guard versus the new revolution, the scaf versus the protesters, the muslim brotherhood versus the protesters, and all of this in a highly charged political environment where there was really no negotiating forum for all these forces to develop a consensus on the transition moving forward. but i think more importantly the reason why we have this

polarized outcome has to do with what really is the anomalous nature of the revolution itself. now, the revolution started out really much more as a protest movement than a full-fledged revolution against the regime. it was not a revolution, of course, in the classic sense where we had a very defined leadership that can put forward an alternative vision for the old legitimacy which crumbled with the fall of mubarak. the revolutionaries themselves, because of this quality of -- their leaderless quality, had a very hard time transitioning from protest to politics. and this left a vacuum that was inevitably filled by others. so the revolution itself did not put forward a consensus candidate for president. and this left the field to other

candidates who tried to claim the mantel of revolutionary legitimacy. dr. abdel moneim abol fotouh certainly was one who claimed to speak for the revolution, but he assembled a very odd coalition of secularists and really didn't quite manage to convince the broad electorate that he was the one who spoke for the revolution. moussa, the same thing. he claimed that the mantel of the revolution on a platform of gradual change from within the system, and of course hamdeen sabahy, all of them claimed to speak for the revolution, but none of them really represented the type of consensus candidate that can form or leave what can be termed as a third force in egyptian politics between the muslim brotherhood on the one hand and the military establishment and the old order on the other handle represented by general shafiq. so, from the beginning, the

revolution was always ambivalent about the formal political process represented in elections. the revolutionaries were the biggest losers in the previous parliamentary elections held in november, and now they find themselves heading into the runoff on january 16th, 17th without a candidate to represent them. so there really is no clearly defined center in egyptian politics as of yet anyhow. and what we have now is the polar extremes represented by mr. mursi and general shafiq. so given this background, what can we expect heading into the runoff? i think much will depend on how the next three weeks develop. we will see two competing processes, i think, between now and the 16th. we will see a process of politics and a process of protest.

the process of politics has already begun with the two leading candidates beginning to woo the independent voters that have broken for the three candidates who didn't make it into the second round. and there are all sorts of talks of political maneuverings, deals between the candidates, certain guarantees, especially on the part of the muslim brotherhood for the independent candidates to give them their support. so that i think will be one process that we will see. the other competing process will be represented by the protesters. and here, this is what we've seen over the course of the last 24 hours, whereby the disaffected revolutionaries will seek to delegitimize the election itself. this will take the form of protest. this will take the form of legal challenges against the process itself. so i think we will see these two competing scenes as we head into

the runoff. i think, however, just to conclude, i think given everything we've seen in terms of how this process has played out and the political landscape which has developed, which has shown a remarkable degree of pluralism, i think the trend overall is consensus heading overall is towards consensus heading into the elections and the runoff, but more importantly the consensus that the new president will have to base his legitimacy on after the elections. and i think, given everything we've seen, i think we can assume that it is that consensus that will be the hallmark of how the next president will seek to govern. let me end there. and i'm sure there are much more things that the two other panelists will address and that we can talk about in q&a. thank you. >> thank you, karim, for such a comprehensive analysis. now i'd like to turn to thomas for his comments.

>> presidential elections. let's say it's another turning point. it's another historical moment. and it's another step toward democracy. i'm trying to say how the people are describing it. and this time is done in the name of presidential elections. it is hard to believe that all these turning points, historical moments, and these steps have taken place in the last 16 or 14 or 15 months and are still taking place in egypt. and yet more will come. more is expected. and more we'll see, sooner than later. i will try to be as much as i can to be realistic, because it's like always we say, okay, it was optimistic or pessimistic. this is main question people ask

about any, whether in our personal life or public life or let's say in this case egypt life. and the most answers -- because as you will see in my speech or my presentation, i will try to act like what they call in facebook language the admin, which is like collecting ideas and throwing them to people, and see what they are going to say. i mean, maybe they like it or whatever, poke it, well, i don't know what you are going to do. anyway, i will try to do my best in this admin post. so the main thing is optimistic or pessimistic, the main answer is coming in this way. most egyptians are pessimist in the short term and optimist on the long term. okay. there is another question i usually ask people. how do you see the full half or the empty half of the cup?

yeah, one of the best answer i get is that i see the full half but it's full of what? that's the main question in this case. and the main question in the coming weeks, i will say, not just two weeks, four weeks, four weeks during which egypt will be shaped, and you will see some of the question will be answered. as a matter of fact, in the last two or three weeks, whenever you read any analysis by experts, observers, analysts, and most of their questions are unanswered, still the situation is fluid. still egypt case is unclear. and it's true, because many factors, as mr. haggag explained it, this is the platform on which -- or the case which is in front of us. there is history, there is

politics, there is religion factor or the use of religion as a factor in shaping things or misshaping things. in the same time, all these factors are now, as a matter of fact, they are acting or reacting or preaching or cheating people in the name of the revolution. which is reality. i mean, everybody has agree, which means the people want. they usually say what they want to say, and they say this is what the people want. so in the coming four weeks, why it's important? as a matter of fact, i will start from this week. two days later -- i mean thursday -- today is tuesday. thursday the parliament will decide if they are going to extend another year of emergency law, and this is going to be another bargain between them and scaf.

saturday it is expected that somehow, somehow a verdict of something will come regarding to mubarak trial. and we will see what will happen as a reaction. as a matter of fact, two days ago, it was announced that -- some news, any way. two days ago it was announced that the arab league foreign ministers are going to take a place -- a meeting on saturday. it was not possible, but it was transferred to doha instead of cairo because on saturday there will be the trial, the verdict of the trial of mubarak. so this is something is this week. of course from now on till the election, many things will happen. still we are figuring out how this 50 million people will vote. as a matter of fact, which is a good number, you can chew on it, 50 million people are there. those who vote are 46% of that. it is like 23 million. the first two candidates or

front-runner, they got about 10 million. there was another 12 million or 13 million people which is distributed about the other three or the rest. so we have out of the 50 million -- sorry, 23 million people they vote, how many of the rest will come out to vote? as a matter of fact, one of the issues were raised yesterday, the database issue. maybe there is -- there is something people talking about fraud or not fraud. this is another case. because in the parliamentary elections, those who participate in the elections, according to some numbers, and even before that in the case of the referendum in march 2011, the number were -- the number was 46 million. so more -- in the last three, four months, according to some people, judges or some lawyers or some politicians, they are saying almost 4 million to 5 million people were added to the

database. who are these people? how were they added? did they do anything for the votes or not? did they have preference? who did it? who is asking? who is not answering? and all these issues. in the case of egypt, which is very interesting, because why i'm asking this question is a matter of fact when karim was elaborating about the political scene, it is very interesting that we are asking all these questions. as a matter of fact, in the last ten -- let's say in the last ten years before january 2011, only question was asked somehow raised if gamal, mubarak's son, would come or not. as a matter of fact, it was not just in egypt. it was even in this town the main question, whether it's asked in english or in arabic or russian or german.

is he coming? and then people ask, if he is coming, how we will -- how we will be able to come out making any problem? as a matter of fact, even most of the issues were raised, it was not complicated or related to anything except this one issue. so it's a nation of 80 million people or more than that. 50 million now going to vote. what about the rest of the 80 million? nobody knows. and there was another issue which is very interesting about the coming days we have to figure out, which is after the election, let's say, most of the question -- i mean of the presidential election, as a matter of fact, greg put some question mark or exclamation mark or whatever mark you want to call it, about what is the

president, let's say simple way, job description? i would not say the power. job description. what he wants to do. as a matter of fact, nobody knows. simply, at the beginning of the revolution, people were saying we don't want another pharaoh, but with this situation, any person came with the same power would be another pharaoh and you would not be able to say that mubarak was the last pharaoh because he's happy with it. so this is another issue. first, what is the power or let's say what kind of power he has. i cannot says she has just now. i don't know. so in the future, maybe. so we are having this issue. the second issue which is very important, what is going to be the supreme council of armed

forces situation, starting from july 1st. it's not that far. july 1st. everybody -- they promise before to leave the power, and this is -- the world seemed to believe them, including washington. i'm saying washington because part of our discussion will be, as greg mentioned to me, it's part of how washington and cairo, let's say, foresee or see the future together. so what is going to be the situation with the scaf? what kind of power? still people are arguing about issues, i mean, that it's going to be civilian? okay. if a former military person is there, a military person, we may argue about that he's not wearing the uniform now, that's another issue.

i don't know how we are going to resolve it, but it's still there. so islamist. that's a big issue now because the whole issue of this, we are going to be like what? usually people in egypt asking, you see, is egypt going to be -- as you see, i am asking a lot of questions because it's a question time. i don't believe somebody have an answer to it unless has a crystal ball or magic, whatever, wand and all these things. so it's like -- so it's going to be -- the question is now, which is -- which is a question or a challenge, how islamists are going to control the situation if they want to control it? they want to monopolize as hakim was saying about it? probably. it's what they want to do.

but how they can do it? that's the big question. there is a call about who is going to do what, who is going to form the government. people say, okay, the parliament form the government, but there are some, according to military people, there are some ministries that don't want to get rid of it. i mean, let's say departments. foreign ministry, defense, finance, and interior minister. so they want to -- the president to appoint them. okay. but what kind of power has to be president? president will be able to dissolve or parliament or not? still we are talking about constitution. another factor, which is we have to think about it, i mean, as long as you are talking about people from congress or people from state department or people living in this country, is this relation between u.s. and egypt, how it's going to be in the coming years. is it shaping different way? maybe.

don't forget, i mean, in the last ten years that's another thing, not just mubarak, the relation between washington and middle eastern countries mostly was based on security partnership, especially when it's related to getting the terrorists, anti-terrorists and all these issues. so it was an issue of terrorists, security measures, and the stability of the region. nobody is always -- i know all the time when they are talking about islamists or military, they will raise the issue of who is a good friend or not friend. they will keep the treaty with israel. more or less, all of them said we are not going to talk about it or we can keep it but not argue about it. maybe they argue about the presence of egyptian forces in sinai because it's related to the stability of the region of the sinai place so they need some security measures.

in all cases, there is a lot of those who worry about egypt, there are a lot of people, by the way. i mean, it's not just the people, especially when the islamists are there. we have to say that there are a lot of people. women are worried. liberals are worried about everything. and it's not a matter of exaggeration, because it's a matter of reality. why it's reality, because it's not a matter of islamic or non-islamic. it's a matter of the perception of power. what is the perception of the power? are you going to rule the country or control my life? this is a very important concept of people are looking for it. and if they are looking back to 18 days in tahrir square, they will remind people that it's not a matter of christian and muslim and woman and man. it's a matter of principles, human dignity, and social justice and all these things. maybe it looks like romantic now, but it was reality.

and in this case, we have to believe that this is the whole idea of concept of the coming days. it's a lot of challenges, and i'm sure that when we start to discuss and you ask a question, you will realize that more things are, just i'm trying to explain. thank you. >> thank you very much, thomas. you gives us a lot of food for thought with all of your provocative questions. now i'd like to turn to mohamed and have him speak a bit. >> thank you, greg. thank you very much for the center for national policy. wow, you guys made my job really difficult. that's why i'm going to send just a few messages about looking at the near term, what happened about in the elections, how can we interpret what happened. first, what have we learned from the first comparative elections in history? first the forces learned the hard way if you don't unite you lose. second, public opinion is a

lousy job. am i a conspiracy theorist to think this is not just a statistical failure? it's a possibility. i'm just sending some messages to think about. however, if we look at the very low profile that shafiq has kept throughout the election period, low ratings on the polls, maybe this works in his favor. second thing, the revolution and the revolutionaries, who won and who lost? actually, i think it goes both ways. the revolution won from one perspective. look at some of the votes that all the revolutionary candidates, all the candidates who can be counted as part of the revolution have gone. [ reciting names ] compare this to 5.7 million.

they have definitely got way more. from one perspective they didn't unite. if we add mohamed mursi to them as a revolutionary candidate from one perspective we're speaking about 15 million votes. compare this to 5.5 million that shafiq has won. speaking about almost triple the number of votes. so from one perspective the revolution won. from another perspective it lost because we only have 51% turnout. this is definitely a loss for the revolution. why is this the case? a number of perspectives. from one perspective prolonging the transitional period. this is really a dangerous thing in a system like egypt, which is very centralized. you can't leave the top executive office empty for such a long time. ironically, this is one of the things that mubarak was for. he said, you know, early elections and he's going to leave in six months. lots of people don't trust mubarak. myself, i don't trust him. i don't think he would have left. however, i think it's very important -- it was very important not to prolong the

transition period. the other thing is the divisions among the revolution forces which caused them -- lots of people prefer security, lots of people prefer let's go back to our normal lives. the other thing is with lots of protests or gatherings, people didn't understand the purpose of these gatherings. so all these mistakes, ended up with 51% turnout, however, still, i think at least 65% of the votes went to the revolution. the interesting situation is at the moment let's look at 2005. and i worked with greg in 2005 at the national institute. 75% of the egyptians in 2005 didn't vote for the muslim brothers. 75% of the egyptians in 2006 or late 2005 didn't vote for mubarak. now we are asking them to choose between shafiq, who is an extension of mubarak, and the muslim brothers, who arell