that germany will not continue being a deployment country. and once this is on the table then, i think holland and belgium are pretty certain to withdraw as well. the question then is whether the weapons that are placed in those three countries will then be transferred to turkey and italy, or whether they would be withdrawn back to the united states. either i think would still mean that there would be an extended deterrent. i think you could argue that within the alliance as well. i think there would be an understanding for that. you mentioned 20 perhaps. you could go down to five, ten weapons in europe and say there is an extended deterrent. i don't really think it is the numbers. i think it is much more to do with nato not being age to let go of the symbolic value that is attached to those weapons. i think most nato allies, including the central and east europeans really realize they have no strategic importance, and that the strategic nuclear

weapons back in the united states will provide just as much protection, if i can call it that as those that are based in europe. so i don't think it's the numbers that is the issue. i think it is zero or more than zero that is the issue. >> and just one point of clarification. the defense review that was just released by nato in chicago states that the supreme guarantee of allied security are the strategic nuclear weapons of the three countries in nato with strategic nuclear weapons, the u.s., the uk, and france. it does not talk about the u.s. forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons as being voight toll that deterrent capability. and the last i noticed, our european allies are very supportive of further u.s./russian reductions relating to strategic nuclear weapons. jon, other points this? >> i mean, you know, when i was really young, jack mendelssohn

used to call me into his office and explain the way the world had developed. of course i remember his lecture on why we have nuclear weapons in the first place, which goes back to really outdated thinking that the europeans were worried we were going going to decouple our defense from their defense. we need to have capabilities on the ground so that when we had a nuclear exchange to block tanks from coming through the gap, that russia wouldn't then -- they would have to launch at us, and it wouldn't just be a nuclear war in europe. all that of is just out the window and useless in terms of american strategic thought, european strategic thought. does anybody believe that somehow a tactical nuclear weapon from europe on russian territory would not be seen as a strategic threat to russia? if we think we need to challenge russia in a strategic way we have lots of submarines, we have lots of icbms and the tactical nuclear weapons don't have a role. >> pardon me for interrupting.

the question that overall strategic levels, their level of 300, 200, is there some level of u.s. having strategy clear warheads that begins to make some allies and probably some sooner than others nervous? maybe poland or turkey get nervous before germany and denmark do. >> and i think if all we were doing were maintaining everything that we had status quo and started drastically we ducing our nuclear weapons, there might be an argument that the countries would start to get nervous. of course, the concern is they might start to develop nuclear capabilities of their own or the alliance would fall apart. however, as trine said, these things don't happen in isolation. what we need to think about is how you supplement your extended reassurance capables to these countries. and that is a political process. it gets to how often you engage with these countries. it gets to the question where american troops are deployed, what sort of capabilities are being purchased on the conventional side.

i think there is a whole list of things that we could do and should have done and didn't that would make it much easier for the united states to go to much lower numbers. even if that were true, wing is rea long way to go before these countries really start to get nervous. >> i think we have time for one or two more questions even though we have los of hands here. why don't we go over here to the -- to nancy here in the green. and then we'll come over here to ms. cronberg. >> i'm sorry nancy gallagher from the university of maryland. one of the things you mentioned the ddrp did not look at is what the effects of the european missile defense capability are. but i'm wondering whether you think the nato allies agree on what the actual missile defense capability is now and in the near future vis-a-vis the threats we face, and whether you see it as performing primarily a military role or a political role. and if it's really the latter, what are the effects of building up a missile defense capability to perform the same kind of

political role that tactical nuclear weapons have in the past. are we just replicating the same problems we currently have with russia over an issue that is primarily politically symbolic? >> okay. i think the -- you can look at the role of missile defense in two ways. i think it does have a military role, but it's not a military role that is directed at russia. it is a military role that is directed at iran. and that's why they're there. but they could gain the missile defense capability could gain a very important political role internally in the alliance if it was to become the push for example for changing the deterrence posture from one that is based almost completely on punishment to one that is based more on denial. i mean it's going back to very bizarre, very old-fashioned debates that i thought i had seen the back of in 1990, but

nevertheless, those interest kinds of things that are being talked about. so if you have a different deterrence posture that has moved from deterrence by denial -- no, from punishment to denial, then clearly you have a completely different position within the alliance to discuss what is going to be the deterrence posture in the alliance. that's the first thing that wasn't discussed in the ddpr, which i think is a great shame. but i think it was not discussed in the ddpr because of the way the whole process was run, that it was divided into three different committees. it was not an overall discussion that was looking at a conceptual understanding of what the deterrence and the posture of the alliance should be. now what the other role of the missile defense would be much more political, because there would be a possibility to say all right, well, we don't have the nonstrategic nuclear weapons anymore. they were not needed anyway with it, this new deterrence posture. but we can use missile defense

as another form of showing commitment in the alliance that is completely the same as what has been happening with the nonstrategic nuclear weapons. it's like this wedding ring that you show your commitment. you could do the same with the missile defense. that is what i meant about the missile defense sharing. >> all right. any others on this? all right. we have a question over here. thank you. >> thank you. i'll continue on the missile defense question. at the recent summit of nato, there was this great feeling of friendship with russia, and russia was not even in chicago. what happened in between? and the next question deals with the economics of the plan to finance the missile defense. europe is in economic difficulties. we are in the defense committee and we're talking about pooling and sharing. and actually, no country is increasing its defense budget at this time. so how -- how do you plan to

finance the missile defense in europe? thank you. >> on, trine? >> well, the relationship with russia as i'm sure you know is worse than it was at lisbon, but it's better than it was in 2008. so i think how long is a piece of string? it's difficult to say the relationship with what the relationship with russia is. and i think we also have to take into account that all the negative developments are not completely without reason. i think that the offer that was given at lisbon for missile defense cooperation sounded much better than what it actually is. i have great difficulty in seeing what russia can actually gain from what is being offered from nato. so perhaps it's not surprising that there has been a downturn in the relationship, and then on top of that, a russian presidential election, which has also been important for that relationship, because nato is perceived in russia as the

enemy. in the public, it's very difficult to go out and say, well, now we're friends with nato. nato has been painted as the big devil and it will continue to be the big devil in russian publics for a long time to come. so there are some quite severe restrictions. so the relationship with russia i think will probably get better. that's my hope, anyway. on the cost with the missile defense, well, i think the europeans think that the americans are going to pay most of it. and that is the main benefit of it. and then there is the option for different europeans to contribute towards it. but that is only an option. and this is where my argument is that the option would then to be to show commitment by actually buying into the missile defense system. it may be a complete waste of money. i can't judge the technical details of it. but i think that is the thinking that is going on.

>> i would just say -- i think trine is exactly right on missile defense. we placed it within a nato context at the time which we viewed of a great step forward since this is a missile defense program to protect europe more than it is to protect the united states, versus the old plan. but i think where the economics really come downs is down as trine said on the delivery capabilities. the idea that multiple european countries are going to spend a lot of money on the most expensive fighter plane system ever developed in this budget environment is nonsensical. and the fact that the united states is going to be in position where we're arguing on one hand, get your economies in order, but on the other hand saying no, you have to buy this plan i think is unsustainable. so our f-16s are going to wear out in about 2017. we're not going to have a dual capable capability. i think trine is right. regardless what is written in the ddpr, these problems are going to solve themselves in the midterm and we node to start thinking creatively about how

we're going to put that to our advantage. >> thank you all. we're out of time. we'll be returning to this panel many of these subjects, missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons strategy, deeper reductions in u.s./russian arsenals at future events. i want to -- before i ask you to join me in thanking our panelists, i want to invite the next panel to get ready to hop up here because we're going to resume without a break. so if you do need a break, you're welcome to do so during the course of the next session. but please join me in thanking general dirk jameson, trine flockhart, and john wolfsthal. [ applause ]

also from an event hosted by the arms control association, former ambassador thomas pickering said today it was extremely hard to see how talks over iran's nuclear program will move forward. the ambassador suggested a final agreement would not be possible without bilateral talks between the u.s. and iran. he also spoke about the ongoing sanctions against iran and past negotiation attempts with the country. this is a little over an hour. >> as those in this room know, we're now at another critical juncture in efforts to negotiate a regulation to issues surrounding iran's nuclear program. after a long interval, the six hours reengaged with iran on april 14th in istanbul. on may 23rd, 24th in baghdad, the parties discussed specific proposals. the six powers called for iran to end its enrichment of uranium to 20% and a ship its stockpile

of this material out of the country in exchange for providing 20% enriched uranium in the form of fuel plates for the iran research reactor nuclear security assistance and a critical parts for civilian aircraft. the iranians presented their own five-point plan offering greater international access to its nuclear facilities in exchange for easing of sanctions and recognition of its right to enriched uranium. iran's chief negotiator voiced disappointment about the lack of sanctions relief in the six powers' offer and complained that their proposal was unbalanced. the head of the six-power delegation, europe's catherine ashton was more positive, hoping for more tangible progress at the next round of talks in moscow on june 18th and a 19th. meanwhile, the head of the international atomic energy

agency a, yukia amano went to iran for addressing specific concerns about past iranian activities. by the end of june, the united states is scheduled to tighten existing sanctions by beginning to sanction all foreign banks that process iranian oil transactions through iran's a central bank. the europeans are scheduled to ban all imports of iranian oil starting july 1st. and the centrifuge just keeps spinning, and suspicions about possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program linger. as with the israeli/palestinian dispute, it's easier to sketch out the shape of a realistic ultimate solution than it is to figure out exactly how we get there. so to help us sort out this most difficult task, we have a panel of three eminent experts.

by graphic highlights have been provided to you in writing. but let me introduce each to you with just a few words. ambassador thomas pickering has headed more u.s. embassies than many diplomats ever have a chance to work on in their entire career. he has led the u.s. mission to the united nations and has served as undersecretary of state in political affairs. ambassador hossein mousavian has served as iran's ambassador to germany for seven years as head of the foreign relations committee of iran's a supreme national security council and as spokesman for iran's delegation to talks with the european union 2003 to 2005. he is now a research scholar at princeton university and the author of the new book "iranian nuclear crisis, a memoir" which will be launch heard in this building tomorrow.

tarja cronberg is the member of the free alliance faction and the european parliament and share of the parliament's delegation for relations with iran. an a engineer by training, she has doctorates in business and administration, has served as minister of labor for finland, and speaks six languages, the most difficult of which is finnish. without further ado, let me turn to our speakers for brief remarks on where we are in the wake of baghdad and what we need to accomplish in moscow. ambassador pickering, if i could ask you to go first. >> thank you, greg, very much for the kind introduction. it's a pleasure to be on the panel. hossein and have i done shows together. if it won't really destroy his

reputation at home, quite together on a lot of the ideas, particularly the importance of negotiations. and i've just met and had the pleasure to talk briefly with dr. cronberg. let me also compliment the arms control association. i'm a new and recent member, having emerged from the obscurity of government service in business. i believe you continue to make a major contribution to thinking and indeed to constructive expectation i think in a way that is a policy in this critically important area. i'm honored and pleased to be here. and many old friends in the audience. i'm delighted to have a chance to address this critically important issue. i was asked to address two questions. one, what is my judgment about istanbul and baghdad. and secondly, what is my view about the process ahead. i'll do that against the backdrop of a third issue, the question of the overall situations i see it at the present time. i used to frequently tell the story about the man jumping out of the umpire state building

going past the 25th floor, everything was simply splendid. i have to modify that a little bit, take to it the west coast. the guy jumps off the golden gate bridge. he survives in the water and the currents sweep him away. we're sort of more in that mode at the moment than we are on the empire state building where even with the new york police holding the safety net, the chances are 99.9% death. we have struggled very hard, and so have the parties to get us to the negotiating table. and it's very important obviously that maximum use be made of this. against that backdrop, it is extremely hard to see how and in what way this process will move ahead. there are 32 years of mistrust between the united states and iran supplemented by galloping misunderstanding, and indeed, the lack of communications has been a thoroughly and i think

completely de lly deleterious experience. it has become an art form and is indeed more of a controlling piece than the beginning of an ability to talk. i think that is very significant. the f executive plus 1 or the european three plus three, depending on which side of the atlantic you prefer is a process which has now begun and holds a faint crack open for the future. my sense is that in every serious commitment of this sort, that crack must be kept open. an estimation of istanbul and a baghdad is pretty much the golden gate bridge leap of faith story. the good news is that both have tended to produce a continuation of talks where as the old pattern a was to have a one-night stand meeting, go away

replete with disagreement and spend the next eight months trying to negotiate the next meeting. i hope we're past that stage, but we could slide back. that istanbul had some good news in the sense that i believe the iranian side suggested some thoughts that the non-iranian side agreed to, including proceeding with stage by stage examination is and perhaps resolution of the problem based on the notion that there would be balance and reprosty in each state. iran would like to make the guide posts of this particular set of arrange aments, pretty exclusively the nonproliferation treaty. while the non-iranians could agree, they also had other guide posts including the security council resolution that asked for the cessation of iranian enrichment to bedevil the problem further. i have a sense that coming out of the baghdad meeting, there could have been three results.

minimal, better, and slightly better. minimal was to have another meeting. and they did with the benefit of a sandstorm, keeping them another day, agree to have a meeting in moscow on the 18th and 19th of june. i remember as ambassador to moscow, there used to be an old soviet story that there was an aeroflot contest, and the first prize was a week in moscow. and the prize was two weeks in moscow. let's hope we go for second prize there is a strong and i think an important piece that the new president of russia who is really the old pressure of russia and has been president of russia despite the fact he has been prime minister for some time has now gotten himself hooked on to this particular issue as i think he has become hooked on to syria because of his veto. and we have to do everything that we can to persuade him that some further success in moscow, whether it's just hanging on is important. the second piece of baghdad which didn't result was a small

agreement. as a greg said, perhaps the trr for 20% enrichment cessation. and the third piece was perhaps some endorsement of what amano had worked out with his interlocutors. the third point i want to make is looking ahead. here i believe an estimate of the situation has to very much take into account some of the domestic imperatives that influence both sides. in that regard, my summation is that for the united states, smaller is better, particularly to begin. with and for iran certainly bigger is better. that's where the two sides are coming at this. smaller is better for the united states, because in an election year, i speak quite frankly, the president takes great risks in making big compromises because the poyfns attack are multiplied and indeed explaining why he

went so far particularly very early in the game is a very difficult situation. on the other hand, the president has a national interest imperative in finding a diplomatic solution. and the effort to continue to find a diplomatic solution is a small, but not very conclusive make way against precipitative israeli action to attack iran. so keeping the process going is valuable. but keeping the process going until after the elections with no movement also has a kind of conclusion of sterility and a fecklessness that arrive sooner or later to great the process if something isn't achieved. so my own view is the smaller is important and better from the united states' perspective still a remains. on the iranian side, there is very definitely a significant degree of mistrust over the united states, and has been for a year, and indeed over the western side in the sense that the real policy is regime change. and while we have perhaps tried

more or less to avoid conveying that notion, from the iranian optic, it is possible to see through whatever prism they're looking at that almost everything we do one way or another is examined in that context, and is looked at them as a very serious challenge in that regard. to escape from that, and indeed to make some progress, and indeed to deal with what their preoccupation is, the notion of two features on the landscape make a certain amount of sense. a and friends and i along with many others proposed some years ago that the essential trade-off would be some permitted enrichment, perhaps limited to civil purposes. it certainly should be in return for much greater transparency about the iranian program. while this was not a sovereign answer, it provided the best that we could think of at the time, and seems continually now to swim in to the picture. and i'm quite pleased that iran is in favor of that. i think underlying this particular process is the notion

that something that large so soon from the u.s. perspective would be very difficult. and something too small from the iranian perspective keeps in mind the lurking shadow, the 900-pound gorilla of regime change, which is not dispelled, and the notion that the real purpose continues to be to take iran totally out of the nuclear business. now iran is in the nuclear business for reasons that are difficult fathom. and my friend hossein has been challenged in his own way to make it clear. why the hell would you spend billions of dollars and build 10,000 centrifuges for a program for which you have no apparent use for the output? and that worries us. it worries everybody. there is from time to time talk of going back to the shah's 20 reactor program, a and there has been recent talk, i think hopefully of building one or two reactors within the next five to ten years. but a at the moment, the large accumulation of enriched material and the large alati

accumulation of enrichment technology is continuing. and that is one of the reasons why there is a western preoccupation about enrichment per se, even though it could be limited. underneath this and obviously affecting the negotiations, and i'm getting to my final points, there is a continuing problem about what i would call different interpretations of the npt. hossein and his friends and i agree with them quite rightly believe the npt provides a right to enrich. but in my view, it doesn't provide a right to enrich for purposes that are unrelated to civil programs, and may be related to military programs. and that is one of the difficulties. my sense is that a reasonable interpretation of the npt is you can do what you need to do in a nuclear sense in order to try to get a sufficient amount of material for your civilian programs. but going beyond is difficult. and on the iranian sense, i think it is something that

doesn't represent proof of diversion is permitted by the treaty. and getting ready to make a decision, or putting yourself in a position to make a decision to go for nuclear weapons is in a sense the underlying deep difficulty here, or one of them that we have to look at. where to go. my sense is that the next stage ought to be within the p 5 plus one, an effort to get an agreement around the trr in some cessation of 20%. doan embellish it. don't foul it up with much more. maybe it could be slightly enhanced by some willingness not to institute some of the sanctions that have been approved, some of which may be small but not insignificant. someone has once suggested perhaps the signings ensuring petroleum cargos from iran could be a way to indicate the u.s. is ready to move on sanctions. the second piece is much more difficult.

but i think very important from the iranian side. and it goes to my deep concern about mistrust. i think that there ought to be a serious effort. and so far i have to say iran has stood in the way of this, of opening bilateral conversations in the context of the f 5-1 talks at a significant level to convey assurance of rell position of country x and country y is being conveyed. this could do a lot of things, including some of the things that kissinger first did, when things opened with china. but it could begin to talk about an end game, an a end game in which weapons were prohibited in accordance with the fatwa and in a binding national relationship with no uncertainty about the npt. a set of relationships which included much more transparency, i hope designed and carried out by the iaea. a set of relationships in which we accepted iranian right to enrich for civil purposes, and

perhaps sequestration of excess material at the iranians have produced until they're ready to use it. and then finally a gradual but significant removal of the nuclear sanctions as this process proceeds. and some serious effort to deal with the problem that has now arisen that there are sanctions on things other than nuclear, which very much also impact iran. they're there for purposes that people consider legitimate and right, including human rights issues, but somehow need to be factored into the discussion in a painful but i think useful way. if these two tracks could proceed as a result of moscow and beyond, thing is a slight way that we could thread the needle, if you want to call it that, into a position where perhaps after the american elections bigger and more useful things from the iranian perspective can be done. and my own view is that we have to get there. but giving the iranians some notion of the end game, even on a private basis ul