important aspect of the second track within the p 5 plus 1 discussions. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you, ambassador pickering. now ambassador mousavian. >> thank you very much. always talking after tom is difficult for me and easy both. it is easy because we have our mind-sets are very close. it is difficult because normally he leaves nothing for you to discuss. first of all, i would like to thank arms control association for managing this event. i would like to touch some points of my experience, which i believe would be helpful for reaching a face-saving solution for iranian nuclear issue. the first issue is to depoliticize the case.

i think it's too much politicized. and the two parties, they need to take steps to depoliticize the issue. the second issue is what tom raised about the rights on their npt. definitely there is rights on their npt, because many other countries they have enrichment and reprocessing. if it isn't legal, everybody should stop. why are they talking only about iran, though. therefore the rights is there. the argument is -- the western side is emphasizing, maintaining that responsibilities come first. and then rights. iran maintains the rights come first and responsibility come after. i think in moscow, they -- already they have agreed on istanbul on a step by step plan.

in one step, they can agree on a simultaneous approach. i mean the p 5 plus 1 respects the rights of iran for peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment on their npt. and iran also immediately at the same time accept to sign the tentative draft agreement already agreed in tehran during last visit of amano. this is a work plan which if iran signs this would address all the ambiguities and technical questions of the ia a ea, including the possibility i mentioned. this can mean parallel in order to end the game chicken and egg game. the third one is the focal point of the p 5 plus 1 during last

nine ten years, always they have been focusing on suspension. i believe they should in the future negotiation, they should focus on transparency measures. if they're looking for sustainable solution, suspension would not work. and the last ten years of negotiation proves it has not worked. the fourth point is proportionate recipro indication. they agreed in reciprocation in istanbul, but they failed in baghdad because i believe the p 5 plus 1 was asking too much, giving the minimum. they were asking as greg mentioned, they were asking iran to stop 20% due to a adverse possibility, everything. the maximum iran can do in order to give some spare parts. this deal would never be successful, such a deal. the fifth point i have, i think

there are 14 countries either operating or building enrichment. any solution on iran should have the capacity to be a model for other countries. because iran would never be ready to be singled out and discrimised. the p 5 plus 1 negotiators should have a vision to negotiate for a model to be acceptable for the others. number six is to have a broader vision on negotiation. i think a face-saving solution can accommodate broader cooperation between iran in the west, iran and the p 5 plus 1 on bigger issues, security and energy, regional stability if they have such a vision, i think

they would not hostage everything to the nuclear issue. and number seven is iran/u.s. relations. i believe this issue plays a very, very important role on the nuclear issue. that's why i believe always i have mentioned iran and the u.s., they need to have a direct talk in parallel with nuclear talks between iran and the p 5 plus 1. and issue number eight is impartiality of the iaea. after eight, nine years working on iranian nuclear case, at the end he said during my time at the agency, we have not seen a shred of evidence that iran has been weaponizing. just right after the u.s. cable revealed by the wikileaks set amano is in the u.s. court specifically on the u.s./iranian issue and alleged military

studies of iranian music clear issue. amano focused on the possibility that i mentioned. and the iranians, they have a feeling that more conversation they have had with the iaea, more sabotage, more covert action, assassination of the nuclear scientists. this is a big issue for the iranian side. and my ninth point, the last point also tom mentioned, for iran is extremely important to see the end of the state. the u.s. p 5 plus 1 -- not the p 5 plus 1, because the russia and chinese havor positions. the west and u.s. is always looking for a piecemeal approach. but the russians welcome back want to see the end state, the end game. that's why a step by step plan, a broad package to be implemented in a step by step plan is extremely important.

but for moscow, i think zero stockpile, 20% stockpile initiative would be the best achievement for both parties if they can agree in moscow. the p 5 plus 1 is they're asking iran to stop 20%. this would not be a sustainable solution because maybe for short time at the end, iran would never accept to discrininized. as a confidence building measure maybe for a short period. but they should think about a long-term solution. my idea is zero stockpile for 20%. what do i mean? a joint committee can be established between iran and the p 5 plus 1 to undermine the

percentage of the stockpile of 20%, which iran needs domestically. to convert to it fuel rod. the rest either can be exported or converted to 3.5%. therefore iran would accept zero stockpile forever. this is the best objective guarantee for nondiversion, rather than pushing iran to close or to 20%, even if it works, which i don't believe it would work, even if they accept, this would be a short-time solution. the second issue on transparency, the maximum question on iranian nuclear dossier is possibility that i mentioned, issues raised by the

iaea. what iaea expect and the p 5 plus 1 can expect, the maximum level of transparency. they can define for iran the maximum level of transparency. whether this is additional protocol. if iran accepts to address the possibility of military dimension pmd, it means iran would have to implement additional protocol and would have to give access to the iaea beyond traditional protocol. if iran is ready to sign such agreement, then the p 5 plus 1 also should be ready for at least the upcoming sanctions on central bank 1st of july, and the oil, iranian oil by europeans, even if not by americans. thank you. [ applause ] >> now dr. cronberg. >> thank you. i am the last speaker. i speak from my chair.

and my notes are so spread after the others. i will try to fill in as much as i can. first of all, i am a finnish member of the european parliament, member of the foreign relations committee, and a member of the defense committee, and also the chair of the parliaments delegation with relations to iran. this doesn't mean that the delegation, even if it's called a delegation, is located in iran. on the other hand, we are in the parliament. it consists of different politicians from different groups into parliament. and our goal is to understand what is going on in iran. we follow the nuclear negotiations. we try to follow also the human rights situation, and many other aspects of the iranian society. we try to have contacts with the parliament, and also with the civil society, as well as people outside of iran. so i am not a part of the

negotiations, but following the negotiations closely. as you know, the negotiations are led by catherine ashton, the representative of foreign policy in the european union. and i think this is why in the european union are on the other side of the atlantic, yes. ambassador pickering said we like to talk about the eu 3 plus 3 rather than the p 5 plus 1. but i don't think it does make a big difference. i'll first comment on the current situation, and then try to look at what i feel is too narrow focus on uranium enrichment in the negotiations, and then go on to the european. what could be the next step the european union could do. first of all, catherine ashton sent a letter to the iranians and mr. jalali saying there

would be respect for peaceful uses of iranian peaceful uses of technology. and this i think created the hope among the iranians that actually uranium enrichment could be discussed. it was a negotiable thing, and it would be on the table. they were willing i think to reduce their 20% requirement. but no such proposition was on the table. actually, the question was that the p 5 plus 1 insisted on suspension of uranium enrichment. i think the second thing that there was this question of that the iranians needed guarantees of being able to access 20% uranium because of their one million cancer patients and no such guarantees were provided. i think there is a history i

presume that iranians have had a hard time in getting 20% uranium, enriched uranium for these medical purposes. on the other hand, of course, giving up may be the 20% enrichment that the iranians would expect a relaxation on sanctions. no such proposal was on the table. i think there was this proposal of airplane parts and maybe minor things like that. so there was this clash. and the question is how to proceed. the iranian approach has been that the chief of the iranian nuclear establishment has said that they will not give up 20% enrichment. maybe what was just proposed the idea of not stockpiling 20% enriched uranium would be a solution on this question. but the stance is toughening,

and the language is a different one. now why do i feel that the focus on uranium enrichment is too narrow? i think the goal is to prevent a nuclear armed iran. and nuclear, the military aspects of nuclear weapons, it's much more than uranium enrichments. this is only one of the aspects. i think the other aspects have to be taken into account, design an implementation of weapons and how far is iran from this aspect. i think we're talking about longer time than just one year or the sort of the one-year free time before have a nuclear weapon-dominated iran. so much more than uranium enrichment. and these aspects should be included also in negotiations.

the second question is the sanctions. the iranians expect some signs of relaxing sanctions. and the west, at least the western powers are not willing to give this indications. this may be a step by step procedure. i don't know what it means on end result of the sanctions. but the question is of course that in -- i understand that in the u.s. the situation is such that since it's the congress that legislating on the sanctions, it will be required more time and it will be more difficult to relax any sanctions. in the european union it's the european council, the foreign minister that can decide on this question of sanctions. maybe there should be some discussion of first of july the european sanctions will be fully picked. and in moscow they should be a discussion of this deadline.

the third point on the uranium enrichment is the npt context. i think what the iranian case shows is that it's very difficult to define the limits of the peaceful uses as opposed to the military uses. we have actually a treaty where there is no clear divide on these two aspects. and i think this is very detrimental for the negotiations there are interpretations one way or another. iran feels they have the right. on the other hand, the p 5 plus 1 feel that iran has not respected its obligations. and the question is maybe what comes first, obligations or rights. i think they should be in balance, of course. but the iranian argument is of course that there are double standards in the npt and nuclear powers have not respected their obligations to disarm, that there are double standards in

terms of other countries which have nuclear weapons outside the npt are not pressured equally as iran. and a finally, the right to fuel cycle. what does it mean and how will it be defined? >> so in this case, the npt, i think there is a fundamental question of the future of the npt in this case. and a we should consider that as well. if there is a military strike, which i hope will not be the case, it is a question of a country outside the npt with nuclear weapons attacking a country within the npt, and a at least as far as we know, without the decision to produce nuclear weapons. so the question is how important is the npt for news the future. the fourth dimension i would like to take up is the question of regional security before going to the next step for the european union.

i think the question is there are some security concerns in the middle east. we all know this. and i think it's interesting to note when the continuation of the npt was agreed in 1995, there was an agreement of a conference on the wider middle east on nuclear weapons-free middle east. at the review conference 2010, it was agreed that this conference would cover the whole scope of weapons of mass destruction and the conference would take place in 2012. we have the situation where this conference is going to take place. the countries that sponsor this issue, uk, russia, and the u.s., actually proposed that this conference will take place in finland, and there is a facilitate they're is now traveling the world around, actually trying to discuss the question of mass destruction,

weapons-free middle east. the question is difficult, i know, and no practical steps will probably be taken for a long time. but it's important that all these parties will meet at the same table, and that we'll be able to at least start the process. so i think these negotiations in baghdad and next time in moscow should also be seen in the context of this region namnal security and this u.n. conference this is coming up. they should not be isolated and at least there is a timeline. probably this conference will take place in december. so if the negotiations break up before that timeline, which also coincide was the new u.s. president, then it would be very, very unfortunate. so i would actually like to -- like to appeal to the arms control association that you observe that this conference is

taking place, and that it's important that actually this question of the negotiations will be related into the scope region's security in the middle east. now a few -- how many minutes do i have? two. >> about two. >> okay, fine. the european prospect working out the next steps of trying to concentrate on those. the european union has accepted the approach. so sanctions were improved in the end of january. and the intention was to send two messages. first a message to iran that the european union is serious. and secondly send a message to israel, not to strike and not to provide military solution. i think this decision was unique in the sense that it was actually the first time the

european member countries supported the common foreign and defense policy. this is the first time the europeans actually agreed. there were different positions in the european union. sarkozy we on the other extreme. supporting tough sanctions. maybe tougher than obama and keeping president obama on the sanctions line. and then on the other hand, sweden was actually went along with the sanctions rather reluctantly. so there was an agreement. the european parliament has supported sanctions, and has a long time standing position that no military solution is possible. so actually the european parliament stands on diplomatic solutions with or without

sanctions. now the problem is that they are leading the negotiations, but it lacks a long-term strategy on iran. contrary to the u.s. position, which actually sees iran as an enemy, the eu does not see iran as an enemy. there's no enemy picture related to the question of diplomatic contacts with iran. so this is a different position. so i think the european union should have a long-term strategy with engagement rather than containment of iran. and as the first step in this long term engagement, there's a proposal by the european parliament to establish presence in iran, actually in the form of a permanent delegation. secondly, it is pornd to know that the nuclear issue, it's

only part of eu's relationship with iran, and this should be balanced with economic incentives as well as the question of human rights, which is very important for the european union and particular to the parliament. so the nuclear proliferation issues would be combined with these incentives. and thirdly, there's the question of the region's security, which is important for the europeans. and here i think we should at least support the confidence that i mentioned before, and see turkey as an important bridge for us. finally, i hope that the negotiations will continue at pace and will break down and, i think for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and for nuclear nonproliferation, a military streak would be a fundamental mistake. thank you. >> thank you. [ applause ]

>> we have about 25 minutes for questions. we're going to move quickly to them. i want to use my prerogative to ask one follow-up question. we also here cited as a model for future negotiation of nuclear cooperation agreements the one that we negotiated with the united arab emirates as the gold standard. we in the united states obviously prefer a model that

does not involve fuel cycle, does not spread the number of countries that have a full infrastructure for uranium enrichment. i gather you would be in favor of encouraging companies like jordan and turkey to use iran as the model for nuclear development? >> no. >> no? okay. >> let me explain. >> yes. >> i think the enrichment today is because of the u.s. policy. right after the revolution when iran decided to shrink in u.s. activities, the u.s. position was no nuclear power plant for iran. that do not recognize the rights of iran for a power plant. and this was the reason the arabians could not do anything to complete the unfinished projects. the western countries left iran with billions of dollars of unfinished projects. iran had no plan, no problem for enrichment. and the revolutionaries, they decided either to decrease to minimum the ambitious projects. they canceled many projects.

but when the west challenged iran with the rights, even for nuclear power plant, you left no other option for uranians to go for self sufficiency. then after iran mastered enrichment, then the u.s. said, okay, now we recognize the rights of iran for nuclear power plants. after iran mastered the enrichment, this was the best way in order to convince the u.s. that you should respect the rights of member for actually civilian power plants. and then that time again the u.s. position was zero enrichment. when iran mastered 10,000 centerfusions, now the u.s. and

the europeans, they are thinking, okay, not 30%. maybe 3.5%. the mistake is from the beginning. iran was never going to have enrichment from the beginning. you just pushed iran to this situation. if at the beginning of revolution, the germans have completed the power plant. iran had even no program to have the second power plant. it was the u.s. proposed iran to have 23 power plants before the evolution. after the evolution, iranians said we don't want 23 power plants. now after 30 years which iran has paid hundreds of billions of dollars of cost because of your pressures, now you are expecting iran to -- to -- pick up everything. it doesn't work. it's very different with united emirate. you cannot compare iran with united emirate. >> thank you. we'll take questions for the floor. wait for the mike. give your name. be brief.

francois. >> i am the head of the delegation of the european union here. i've been also working -- for five, taking part in talks with iran. and that's why we reflect a lot about this issue about u.n. security council resolutions, and i have to say, doesn't it compete with a presentation