center to remain solid on the nuclear technology program. >> did you have a response? >> i think again, after the revolution, france was france. deploying the contract iran had already with france on enrichment. if you had not declined, if you had accepted the right. the enrichment was supposed do be done in your lab, not iran. the second issue is that if really the problem is nuclear bond, 100% confident that iranian side would accept the

whole military dimensions issue lodged before mainly 2003. there's some continuing disputes. the intelligence community is basically continuing to reassure the judgments made in the 2011 intelligence committee remained. that therefore the pmd question in my view is of the most

importance to, in effect, provide the iaea with the fullest possible information to guard against problems in the future. i would begin the south african model. a no fault process. you tell the truth and the whole truth, there are no consequences. if you don't tell the truth, there are all conceivable contrasts. in part it's a test of good faith. in part it's a way to determine the answer. in part tths to take the burden of the guilt trip off the back of iran. which in my view is not necessary fi if we're proceeding for the future. this may be totally naive. but in my sense, the motion that we're going to spend all our time worrying about the past when the big bang problem is in the future is not a very useful enterprise. and i think what the south

africans did, with respect to their own terrible record and how they handled the office device with difficult problems in the future. not any way perfect. but those who didn't tell the truth suffered consequences. those who didn't tell the truth emerged. they had a record. indeed it was closure. in my sense we need some closures. we need more importantly to have the iaea as fully and possibly as it can in the future. hussein and i don't represent any governments. that's our problem. the problem is the governments aren't there. if that were the case then i think there could be an answer. i think the uncertainties with respect to possible military

developments are not all that salient. the bent result is going to be obscured. what is bent or skewed is iranian good faith. iran needs an opportunity under conditions not punitive to demonstrate that it is prepared the to approach the negotiations good faith. i think there are other tests of guide faith on the other side. i don't exclude them, but now is not the time to explore them. >> you read the aiea's questions. they have two technical questions. one relates to after 2003. which i think 80% to 90% of t h technical ambiguities are reserved. this has already been discussed, and tehran agreed to give a

required access to the iaea to cooperate in order to remove this remaining issues. possible dimension as tom said, relates to 1980s, early 1990s. this is not the current program of the iranian issue, which needs ooirp to implement additional protocol and to give access to the iaea beyond additional protocol. it has been already agreed in tehran. in the previous visit, 90%, 95% of the issues, how to cooperate given access in sections was resolved. they agreed. 5%, 10% are left. i'm sure iran would agree, this is not an issue. let's say if iran agrees to give

all access, inspections, cooperations, with the iaea, then in moscow they would be ready do respect the rights of iran or not. if not, this will fail. >> we have a few minutes. let's take two questions and give our speakers a chance to respond. with all do respect, we understand iran is cleansing and has been working to clean the site. so this is not something that engenders much trust. it seems that what you're saying is that iran is going to trade an agreement with the iaea for something at moscow. but obviously we have a disconnect because what the p5 plus one is saying they want

action on 20% of some return. so if you could address this disconnect, do you see that there's any possibility that perhaps your proposal or something like it could be agreed to on the 20%, or are they just going to go round and round on circles on the right to enrich? thanks. >> well, the 2001 question. in the middle. >> i want to follow up on the question. after the difference. the meeting of -- tehran raised great expectations. they didn't materialize. now the upcoming meeting is again going to raise great expectations for the moscow meeting, which didn't real materialize. isn't it possible that these two streams of the iaea stream wanting answering to questions

about possible military conditions and the diplomatic extremes are really interfering with each other, and we should really concentrate on one or the other, perhaps preferentially the diplomatic stream, and put aside the other stream for the time being? >> the relationship between the two investment sides. it's already been visited two times. this has already been visited two times. you know the iaea, they have enough technology instrument even if things are destroyed, in case there has been some enrichment activities, they can find it even 10, 15 years after. it was not, because there was nothing there. it doesn't mean they couldn't find it, because there was nothing.

but remember in summer of 2011, when even the iaea did not raise the issue. you will remember. the russians, they put the step by step proposal on the table. this proposal included implementation of additional protocol. implementation of subsidy arrangement. address and dimensions. giving access to iaea and beyond. limiting the new installment. stopping -- we remember everything. even the sanctions for a short period. iran responded positively and the foreign minister publicly said we are ready to discuss the case. by 55 plus one rejected. therefore, the russian proposal, which has the measures for # 00%

of transparency. they showed positive in the summer of 2011 even before the issue was raised. >> just a very broof word. >> i won't discuss parching further, except the notion that it has to involve the presence of nuclear material, and therefore is a violation loses sight of the fact that the interest has been high explosive development. it has no nuclear material. so there's a difference there. but there is a persistence in nuclear explosive material. my own view is that's much less important than the other aspect of this with the iaea which is doing it for the future. houssain has talked about that. as long as we confuse the two, and one holds up the other we have a problem. another question. if you're in a horse pr a rapids situation. you don't want to give on the other thing the iranians won't give on. that's another difficult problem for us.

do we address the question of how much of a level of enrichment will be permitted. even temporarily or permanently in some arrangement with iran. as i said before, i'm prepared to accept a level of civil enrichment if in fact the iaea has a situation in which it is satisfied it is doing the best of all possible job and inspengs and can, in fact, improve that as technology improves and thingscan go ahead. it appears that's on the table. my feeling is that that that's too big for the present time, for if u.s. to accept in the context of an election. and i'm sorry to say that. but maybe it will be reversed. maybe blit seen as a real victory. i would hope so. but at the moment we seem to run scared on this issue. there is an israeli position of deep distrust on this that basically says for them the only seable thing is zero enrichment. although nobody has sat down and explained quite why zero

enrichment with weakened inspection is better than some enrichment with the strongest possible inspection, which is the shape of the deal you could get. and even then the president, in my view, would have to face up to the question in the middle of an election campaign, does he want to present another issue he could be widely attacked, even if unfairly? and that's a difficult question. i don't have the answer to it. it's not at 1600 pennsylvania. >> in the question of verification, i think it's very interesting that concrete proposals that have been put forward on the process and how it could be carried out are put forth by former directors of the international association. they have come up with a proposal, and he is now working at harvard has also come up with a recent proposal on the verification, which is very implicit on how you can take the

steps and verify the of the military uses. so this are technical proposals. i think this is a political problem. >> thank you very much. please join me in thanking our speaker. [ applause ] >> the final portion from this arms control discussion is a keynote address by the lead in charge of nuclear weapons treaty. she said implementation of the latest u.s./russia accord is going well, but efforts on la regulation still faces hurdles. this is a little under an hour. >> all right. we're about to resume our program. i hope everyone's lunch was

good. don't get up and leave, please. we're about to resume. please take your seats. ladies and gentlemen. good afternoon. # welcome back to the 2012 arms control association annual meeting. i'm darrell kimball with the arms control association. and i wanted to take a minute to remind you that armed control association members and i hope all of you are members, are invited to join senior staff and members of the board for a view of our programs and our work that will take place at 3:45 later this afternoon. this year has been extremely busy and productive for the arms control association. and we have lots of work to do in the future. and in part we're going to focus on promoting diplomatic

solutions to prevent a nuclear armed iran, which we heard about this morning, and try to resume progress to the nuclearized north korea. we're going to be working hard to help achieve further reductions in the number of all types of nuclear weapons worldwide. we're going to be encouraging the senate to reconsider and ratify the conference of nuclear test and treaty. we're going to be continuing to work for faster actions to secure weapons usable material keep it away from terrorists and to end the production of the material, promoting better implementation and full compliance with the chemical and biological conventions, and we'll be working very hard to encourage government included and effective arms trade treaty next month to rain in international transfers of weapons and ammunition, where there is a risk, they could lead to human rights violations, just as we're seeing in syria and sedan today.

all that work and more depends on you, our members and our subscribers. i want to thank everybody who has helped support the arms control association in the past. and into the future. and in particular, i want to thank the institutional supporters who make our work possible, including the carnegie corporation of new york, the mcarthur cooperation, the prospect hill foundation, and a key sponsor of today's annual meeting. and i would like to ask sebastian from the foundation here in washington just to take a couple minutes to say a few words, and then we'll introduce our luncheon speaker, rose. zebs a chan? sebastian? >> thank you very much. let me take a moment to say something on behalf of the foundation. we are very happy to cohost once

again the annual forum, the annual meeting of the arms control association. it's one of the general foundations. we are here present in washington, d.c. with an is the largest office of the german political foundation, and we have 30 officers worldwide, also in some of the most difficult regions such as lebanon, we just opened another office, and we have an office in romala, so very important work we are doing there. we share a lot of objective aims with the arms control association. and that's why it's no surprise the 30 years that we are supporting the annual meeting of

the organization, that we really enjoy helping countries in the european perspective to discussions here in washington, d.c., and i think we have two terrific panelist this is morning here. last but not least, i want to thank you, daryl, but also tom kalina and tim for their support and the entire aca team. so i wish you an interestinginginginginginging g i interesting keynote now and look forward to this. thank you. >> thank you very much, sebastinan. very gracious of you. my staff will say something about that later i'm sure. and now we have with us -- vn honored to have with us today, acting undersecretary for state

arms control and international security. unofficially speaking, rose has been a key reason for the progress, i think, over the last three years on several key nuclear risk reduction initiatives. she was a key architect and a key negotiator of the start agreement, which was spoken about earlier today. she's played a key role in the administration's nuclear posture review, which we were discussing the morning, the successful review of the amputee conference. we have investor susan burke who was critical to success at that meeting. also the undersecretary has been a part of the ongoing p5 dialogue on nuclear transparency issues, and also helping to revive reconsideration of the conference of test and treaty and much, much more. so we're very pleased that you're here today, rose. and we conclude you up to the podium to give us an update on

the progress to date. and the path ahead, and she will be taking a few questions at the end. so, rose, i welcome you up. [ applause ] >> it's always great to be in this room and to see so many friends and colleagues here. so thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you again today. and to bring you up the to date on where we are on our arms control and nonproliferation agenda items. i'm always glad to be at the arms control association's annual meeting before coming into government i served on the board, and i know from the inside/out how important this association is. so for the work that you do and for the work that all your talented staff do, as well as the membership of the

organization, i truly want to thank you, because now i'm on the inside of a different booesz, and we really do appreciate all the work that you do to support our efforts in the government. i know that many of you have heard me speak a few times about what's going on in the arms control arena with this administration. i'm not going to sing the same old song today about the standard metaphors. that is, we're setting the stage, we're repairing the way, et cetera. in the simplest terms, i would like to make clear that this president set the agenda, and we have done some important things to move that agenda forward. we are approaching the lowest level at any time since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age. we are also coming to a time in o ok of this year will we will mark the 50th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis.

and we should look upon this as an important anniversary to truly mark our own progress as we move forward on the president's agenda, laid out in prague. to move toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. we have come so far since then, that is the cuban missile crisis of 1962, and now we have setting the stage to move towards new accomplishments. i understand you've already taken up the topic of a new stark treaty this morning. so i'm not going to go into details of the treaty, per se, but i did want to reiterate and underscore that the implementation of the treaty is going very well indeed. the russians just arrived in the united states this weekend for another inspection under the treaty. they're out at an air force base. it is their seventh inspection this year, so far this treaty year, which begins in feab. so there is an intensive