inspection activity under the treaty, and so far we are able to say quite clearly that the treaty's verification regime works. and i'm very pleased with that, because when one negotiates something, the procedures and so fo going to fall in place. but it's been going very well, indeed, and will be important to setting the first stage -- the next stage of reductions, because of the mutual confidence and the trust that is being built up in the course of implementation of the new treaty. mutual trust and confidence, of course, are crucial to any mutual success in arms reduction negotiations. now we are working on the next steps that will set us further along the road to achieving the prague goals. as part of the 2010 nuclear posture review, the u.s. government is reviewing our nuclear deterrence requirement, that knew lar plants are aligned to address today's threats. we are considering what forces

the united states needs to maintain for strategic stability and deterrence, and assurance to u.s. allies and partners. based on this analysis, we will develop proposals for further reductions in the nuclear stockpile, which currently stands at approximately 5,000 total nuclear warheads. as the president said recently at the second nuclear security summit in seoul, we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. once complete, this study will help to shape our negotiating approach to the next agreement with the russians. regardless of numbers, the president has stressed that the next nuclear reduction agreement between the united states and russian federation should include stjic -- nonstrategic, and nondeployed nuclear weapons. of course, no previous arms control agreement has limited or monitored these last two categories. so the next negotiations will be

breaking some new ground in important ways. we are going to need, more demanding approaches to modification and monitoring, but i'm kflt that we can find ways to respond to such challenges. beyond responsibly reducing the number of operations, this administration is committed to reducing the role in security administration well. we are not pursuing new nuclear missions. we are working towards creating the conditions to make deterring use the sole purpose of our nuclear weapons. we have clearly stated that this is in our interest and in the interest of all other states that the more than 65 year record of nuclear nonuse be extended forever. recently we worked through the nuclear policy issues that are important and relevant to our nato allies. at the nato summit in chicago a

few weeks ago, the allies reviewed an appropriate mix of nuclear and defense i have forces that nato will need to turn the defense against future threats to the alliance. focusing on the elements, the allies reaffirmed their commitment to recreate the condition for a world without nuclear weapons, while remaining a nuclear reliance for as long as nuclear weapon exist. the review found the alliance currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrent and also defense posture, and that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons may be contemplated are extremely, extremely remote. the alliance acknowledged the importance these independent and unilateral british and french negative security issues have in discouraging nuclear proliferation. looking to the future, allies reiterated that nato is prepared

to consider further reducing its requirements for non strategic nuclear weapons in the context of resipry kol steps by the russian federation. leaders agreed they should issue two related committees. first, the developed concepts for ensuring the broadest possible burden sharing, including in the event nato decides to further reduce its reliance on non strategic nuclear weapons based in europe, and second, to further consider what nato would expect to see in the way of actions to allow for significant reductions in forward based nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to nato. nato expressed its support for continued mutual efforts by the united states and russia to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce the nuclear weapons. the allies also reiterated their interest in developing and exchanging transparency and

confidence building ideas with russia. with the goal of developing detailed proposals on inand creased mutual understanding of nato and russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons in europe. now let me turn to conventional arms control, which in my view, has not received adequate attention in recent years. we're spending a lot of time focused on the future of conventional arms control and in the role in enhancing european security. there are three conventional arms control regimes that play key roles in european security.

they refused to provide information to other cfe parties on the military forces as required by the treaty. after trying for several years to overcome the obstacles and encourage russia to resume the imply menation. we concluded they can no longer resume the obligations. in late 2011 the united states joined by the 21 nato allies who are party to the treaty, as well as by georgia and muldova seized carrying out our obligations with regard to russia. the treaty remains in force according to its term and is being implemented at 29. by 24 of 30 states parties give u an opportunity to consider the

current architecture our future needs and the type of arms control measures to help achieve our security goals. in other words i see this period now as a period of true opportunity. to consider what we truly need for arms control in europe. our nato allies have reaffirmed in its declaration our determination to preserve, strengthen and modernize the regime in europe, based on key principles and commitment, and we will continue to explore ideas to this end. we must modernize the arms control to take account of current security concerns. i've be so lit sitting their view for the way ahead. with the goal of informing our own review. that will serve as the security

of the united states, our nato allies and partners, and also the russian federation. now i would like to turn to multilateral treaties, the test band which daryl has already mentioned. this remains a top priority for the administration and a key element of the president's prague agenda. as we continue laying the ground work for u.s. ratification, we remain optimistic about the prospects for the entry into force. albeit mindful that achieving the goal will require considerable effort from every single one of us. as such, the united states remains kplited to the completion of the military's moderating regime. international monetary system, which is now more than 85% complete and once completed will

provide global coverage to test and identify nuclear tests in violation of the treaty. development of the onsight inspection component is a priority task of the comprehensive test treaty organization, and we will be assessing the progress of onsight inspection efforts during the 2014 integrated field exercise. very useful, upcoming activity. since 2011, in addition to our annual assessment, these have totalled over $40 million. given the tough budget environment here in washington, those contributions clearly demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the ctbt and the vital importance the united states attached to completing the verification regime for the treaty. now let me turn next to the cut off treaty. we are also continuing our fi t fight, and i will gladly characterize it a fight to launch the negotiation of a

cut-off treaty. such a treaty is considered to be by the majority of the international community, the next step in the process of multilateral disarmaments. we have worked closely to achieve the start of the negotiations in the confrontations of disarmament. creative and insightful ideas on how to move forward have been employed to no avail. we are very disappointed in the results so far. the current blockage over fmct is a formidable one. each attempt to overcome the impasse makes it clearer. certain countries must engage on fmct. without that no progress on the margins or outside of it can make real progress. this is a leadership issue. for this community. as well as a practical matters.

countries most affected are the key stake holders. the countries that need to be most active, the most determined in any effort to achieve such a regime. although we are continuing our efforts own disarmament, we are couldn'ting to consult on other ways forward for nfmct. our most recent meeting in this pc-5 plus effort in london april, and we're making plans to meet again soon this summer. we are not making headlines, but the states participating are very invested in the process, which is a good sign, gradually we are making progress, but we are going to need toe pu push a push intensively in this arena. let me turn to the p5 process, because it's one that is quite current now. we're planning our annual meeting in washington. the p5s have been meeting regularly to review our process

towards fulfilling our obligations and our commitments under the 2010 nuclear nonproliferation treaty review conferences action plan. this is a venue with an ongoing 55rks engagement. during the ongoing p5 meetings, we've covered verification, transparency, confidence building, nonproliferation and other important topics, all important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament measures. at the 2011 paris p5 conference in june of 2011, a year ago. they reaffirmed the unconditional support. stressed the need to strengthen the energy safeguard.

following up on the 2009 london conference and the 2011 p paris conference, the united states the hosting the next p-5 conference here in washington june 27th to june 29th. the united states looks forward to having further in depth discussions, candid discussions, very useful discussions, i must say, on a variety of issues with our e5 counter parts during the conference. we also look forward to hosting a public event as part of the washington conference. this will be on june 27th, for those of you interested. three pillars for peace and security, implementing the ept. the event will focus on the the mutually reenforcing nature of the three pillars and examine how all three are essential to create the conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. now finally let me turn to some of the work we've been doing

inside my own bureau, the bureau of arms control verification and compliance. you may know i'm juggling two halves now. i've maintained my role as the assistant secretary. i was joking that i now have one of the longest titles in washington. but it does encompass a broad, a broad empire. but i wanted to talk a bit about the work we're doing on future verification technology. and appeal to you, as we move forward on all the the fronts i've laid out today, we are going to need the help of everyone in this room. not just on the advocacy level. we need your creativity and your ideas. as i mentioned before, reducing to lower numbers of all kinds of weapons will require that we push past the current limits of our verification and monitoring capabilitie capabilities. whether we're trying to monitor missile launches, count nuclear war heads or detect an unexplained biological event, we

need ever improving tools and technologies. the state department bureau of arms control verification and compliance, works very hard to be on the cutting edge of new technology, not for the sake of being on the cutting edge, because we know that's the best spot to get the leverage for develop developing new capabilities. because of this need for new technology that i'm particularly proud that we have for the first time ever made available to the public our so-called verification technology research and development needs document. this document has been published on an annual basis. it's a catalog telling the community what we believe are the most pressing technology needs to answer arms control questions in the future. now with the publicly available document, we can expand our community of developers beyond the usual suspects of the

defense and the department of energy laboratories. to a certain extent, it's a think piece. we hope it will stimulate thinking about where we go from here on verification and monitoring of arms control treaties and agreements. it's easy to find if you will go to the bureau's page or, or to the website and type it in, it will come up, and you'll have a chance to look at it. i also encourage all of you in the organizations to pursue opportunities for track 1.5 and track two engagement policies. we should never undervalue the productivity of these efforts. many of the ideas that went into the new stark treaty, and i know i said this time and time again, many of the ideas were developed in the years running up to the negotiations through track one and a half, and track two

activities. i have appreciated the roles of many presented here as preprepare this jewel in new york. this is very important effort that has gone on and we really welcome your efforts overall. now to wrap up, i want to leave you with one final thought. the it's one of my favorites, and it's one i think about constantly. not every day you think of calvin coolidge as a source of inspiration. but i always like to recall what he has to say about persistence. it's not a bad message for the audience tair. the president says nothing in the world can take the place of persistence. talent will not. nothing is more uncommon than sun successful men with talent. education will not. the world is full of educated derelicts. persistence and determination

alone the slogan press on has solved and will always solve the problem of the human race. so colleagues and friends, we must press on. we have no easy task ahead of us, we must simply press on. we have far to go. there are problems we can not anticipate. certainly in this job, many problems i did not anticipate. we continue to press on. the arc of nuclear history is bending downward. i'm quite certain of that. i look forward to your comments and questions. thank you for your time today. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, rose, for your overview of all that's happening in this field. we have time for questions u, and there are microphones on either side. so if you want to ask questions, raise your hand. identify yourself, and the microphone will come to you.

as the fik phone gets to the two in the front, let me start with the first question. you ended with the coolidged a persistence, always porpimportan nuclear arms control. one thing is the effort to get the cut off talks going. and you said it's a fight. there are only a certain number of different pathways this can take. how do you see this debate developing in the next several months, given the opposition from one particular country in south asia, that shall go nameless, and are there alternative ways in which the p5 can help make progress as the cd tries to find a way around the consensus rule, difficultties that it always grapples with?

>> many of you are aware of the efforts of the first committee and the wrestling with these issues either in or out of government, and so you know that the pressures -- what pressures emerged last october in the context of the first committee meeting in october and those fre pressures had to do with a building frustration about the inability to move off the dime. i use the word impasse. it's a very formidable impasse at this moment in the cd, and so pressures are developing within the first committee to basically go elsewhere, to move this negotiation to other settings. the u.n. general assembly, et cetera. so these pressures we were able essentially to let off the steam is a good way to put it and let off the steam by emphasizing,

again, both responsibility and the interest of key stakeholders in moving this issue forward and that's why we have been so intent on getting the key stakeholders to the table working on where we can go, how we can handle this issue pressing forward. we're slowly, slowly making progress. i, for one, hope the key stakeholders will continue to be able to press forward, otherwise i do fear that we may be heading in a direction that will not be particularly productive in terms of getting true constraints on fissile materials. it's a bun of countries can get together and negotiate fissile material cutoff treaty but if they don't have many fissile materials for weapons purposes, it's not going to be all that helpful. so i think the important thing is now to keep our eye on the prize, to continue to have very, very serious discussions among the key stakeholders and try in that way to, you know, get a

negotiation going. so that's where we're placing our emphasis at the present time. >> thank you. and for those of you who want to dive into some of the details on this we did an extensive interview with pakistan's ambassador to the conference on disarmament in arms control today earlier this year. so i think we'll start out over here, barbara? >> barbara slavin from the atlantic council, good to see you again. i wanted you to talk a little bit about the relationship that's developed with the russians in the arms control process, and the russians now have putin again as president. how do you see cooperation over iran developing? do you see this arms control process might bleed into other issues with the russians, or 0 are you concerned that putin may play the nationalism card harder than medvedev did? >> as far as russian policy is

concerned, i see a great deal of consistency, frankly. and if you're interested in the official russian articulation of their policy, it's very useful to look at, first of all, the remarks that putin published -- they were published under his name in some of the top russian newspapers right before the election. also he put 0 out an election platform and since that time he has -- his administration has published a foreign policy -- their first foreign policy statement of policy after he entered into the presidency. and there's an emphasis in each of those documents on continuing the arms control agenda. continuing arms control work. there aren't any details laid out there, but i do think it is important that that kind of emphasis has appeared and also a very positive perspective on the

new stark treaty. there's been a positive and i would say practical approach to implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. as far as the arms control traditional nuclear arms control environment i see a continuity there with the way this issue has been approached since the late '60s, early 1970s and the soviet union when even though there were ups and downs in the relationship, both washington and moscow saw nuclear arms control to be in their national security interests. so with fits and starts and sometimes negotiations would halt for a while, certainly they did during the 1980s for a while, nevertheless, they would continue up again after perhaps a pause. so i don't really see at the moment a difficulty in that realm. i will say that the cooperation with iran at this point has actually been very, very solid, and russia is play iing a leadi

role, as you all know. russia will be hosting the next meeting to talk with the iranians in the p-5 plus process, p-5 plus one process. there will be many opportunities for russia to continue to play in moving that agenda forward. so, all in all, i think one hases to recognize that political transitions sometimes cause things to slow down a bit but, nevertheless, in terms of the overarching agenda and the willingness of engaging on it, i have not seen a problem there. >> all right, thank you. ambassador pickering, i think you had a question. and then if there's anyone in the back who wants to ask a question, you need to raise your hand now so that we can get the microphones to the back. >> thank you very much for everything you do and thank you very much for the speech. i would just remark on the last question that i think new start

had a great deal to do with reset and that's a piece the arms control community shouldn't ignore and that it plays back into arms control attitudes. with respect to your speech and unfair question, what are your top three priorities and why? >> top three priorities are hard to pick out because i really had my top six priorities which you kind of heard this morning. but i think in terms of -- i'll tell you quite honestly. i think new start implementation is going along very well. so i say, all right, we don't not pay attention to that but it's going well, and that's a good thing. but i do think a lot about where we go for the reductions. i think a lot about the c conventional arms control regime. it's kind of interesting but cfe was a spectacular success. it was such a spectacular success that we all forgot about it. and we haven't been thinking about conventional arms control for some time, but cfe is past

its selby date to be quite honest. it's a great treaty. i'm glad it isn't according to its terms but it was negotiated when we had the warsaw pact and nato ranged against each other in europe. we need a different type of conventional arms control regime in europe today. so that also preoccupies my thinking quite a bit. and let me cheat a bit and say it's combination of those p-5 related issues which include the fmct which i would put in my third diplomatic priority, but i'm going to cheat further and say there's a fourth which is a domestic priority of getting the fmct ratified. i went from three to four. >> since you did just mention the ctb again, as many of us in this crowd know, the lopping-awaited national academy of sciences study on the technical issues related to the ctcb was related in march. what's your sense of what those findings tell us about some of the issues that were at the

center of the debate in 1999, and how much better does that put the treaty in position going forward for a serious reconsideration? >> there are two major issues in 1999 that affected senators' decision making about ratification of ctbt. one had to do with the veri verifiability of the treaty and the study addressed verifiability of the treaty. we welcomed their conclusions. we thought that they were in line with the evidence that we had seen without having such a deep dive in technical terms as the academy took but just on the face of it i mentioned in my remarks that the ims system is over 85% complete. when the ims system was looked at back in 1999, it was barely off the ground at that point. so just if you look at what physically is available now to

verify the treaty, there's just so much more there. the other major issue, of course, was the stockpile stewardship program and the ef kaes of science-based stewardship in comparison with nuclear testing. again, in 1999 the stockpile stewardship program was just barely off the ground. you may recall i was working in d.o.e. at that point as the assistant secretary responsible for nonproliferation program so i was watching -- i was watching the process of getting stockpile stewardship off the ground and it was a very, very good process, but it was still a baby. now we can say that the baby is matured into an early adulthood and i think that it has proven its mettle in terms of showing the science based stockpile stewardship can really preserve the security effectiveness. those are the two big changes that have