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thinthingshappening, regulator. whp what do yrwhat do you t ultimate answer? p >> t>> th >> the ultimat gettir gettigetting out of thim -bust cycle? it wouldn't take a lot of cases. but again, i think it's a multi-facetted question. it goes to the question about boards and it goes to the question of investors. so it's massive. so there are a lot of failings at every step of the way. so what can we do as individuals to try to change this dynamic? this is the toughest question i get and i'm very disappointed to say that i don't have a ready answer because it does feel like individuals are powerless.

it does feel like individuals have no voice and are particularly up against ever increasing power on the other side of some of these very important issues. so i'm not without hope but i think that the idea is that people have to take some of this on themselves, whether it's complaining to your fund company if you don't like the way they vote your shares, voting no against excessive pay at companies, even if you only have ten shares. i mean, it's a message that you can send but it really is, i agree with you, there is a sense that it's not going to get a lot of traction. that's unfortunate because we're ultimately the people who are paying the price. thank you very much for your time this afternoon.

the undersecretary of state in terms of arms control says implementing the u.s.-russia -- she spoke this weeks at the arms control association in washington. she was introduced by the group's executive director.

>> all right. we're about to resume our program. i hope everyone's lunch was good. don't get up and leave, please. we're about to resume. please take your seats. ladies and gentlemen. good afternoon. welcome back to the 2012 arms control association annual meeting. i'm darrell kimball with the arms control association. and i wanted to take a minute to remind you that arms control association members and i hope all of you are members, are invited to join senior staff and members of the board for a view of our programs and our work that will take place at 3:45 later this afternoon. this year has been extremely busy and productive for the arms control association. and we have lots of work to do in the future. and in part we're going to focus

on promoting diplomatic solutions to prevent a nuclear armed iran, which we heard about this morning, and try to resume progress to denuclearize north korea. we're going to be working hard to help achieve further reductions in the number of all types of nuclear weapons worldwide. we're going to be encouraging the senate to reconsider and ratify the conference of nuclear test and treaty. we're going to be continuing to work for faster actions to secure weapons usable material keep it away from terrorists and to end the production of the material, promoting better implementation and full compliance with the chemical and biological conventions, and we'll be working very hard to encourage government included and effective arms trade treaty next month to rein in international transfers of weapons and ammunition, where there is a risk, they could lead to human rights violations, just

as we're seeing in syria and sudan today. all that work and more depends on you, our members and our subscribers. i want to thank everybody who has helped support the arms control association in the past. and into the future. and in particular, i want to thank the institutional supporters who make our work possible, including the carnegie corporation of new york, the hugh let foundation, the mcarthur cooperation, the prospect hill foundation, and a key sponsor of today's annual meeting. and i would like to ask sebastian from the foundation here in washington just to take a couple minutes to say a few words, and then we'll introduce our luncheon speaker,

>> we are happy to speak at the arms control foundation. we are present here in washington, d.c. with an office, meanwhile the largest office of the german political foundation and we have 30 offices worldwide also in some of the most difficult region such as lebanon, we just opened an office in tunis and we have an office in ramallah so very important work we are doing there. we share a lot of objectives d with the arms control

association. we enjoy the european perspective adding to the discussions here in washington, d.c. and i think we had two terrific panelists this morning here. last but not least, i want to thank you for your support and the entire team. i issue an interesting key note now and look forward to your input now. thank you. >> thank you very much, sebastian. you thanked our staff before i had a chance to. that's very gracious of you. my staff will say something will that later, i'm sure.

>> now we're honored to have with us rose gottemoeller. rose has been a key reason for the progress we've seen on several key nuclear reduction risk initiatives. she a key architect and negotiator of the new start agreement, which was spoken about earlier today. she's played a key role in the nuclear station's posture review, successful conclusion of the review conference. we also have here ambassador susan burke, who was critical to the success at that meeting. also undersecretary gottemoeller has been part of the p5 dialogue on nuclear transparency issues and helping to revive reconsideration of the conference treaty and much, much

more. we're very happy you're here today, rose. we welcome you up to the podium to give us an update on the progress to date and the path ahead and she will be taking a few questions at the end. so, rose, i welcome you up. >> thank you for the opportunity to bring you up to date on where we are. i'm always glad to be at the arms control association's annual meeting. before coming into government, i served on the board and i know from the inside out how

important this commission is. so for the work you do and all your talented staff do as well as the membership of the organization, i truly want to thank you because now i'm on the inside of a different beast and we really do appreciate all the work that you do to support our efforts in the government. i know many of you have heard me speak a few times. i'm not going to sing the same old song today. in the simplest terms i would like to make clear that this president sets an agenda in prague and we have done some important this evenings to move that agenda forward. we're approaching the lowest level of deployed nuclear weapons at any time since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age. we are also coming to a time in october of this year where we

will mark the 50th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis. and i think that we should look upon this as an important anniversary truly mark our own progress as we move forward on the president's agenda played out in prague, to move toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. we have come so far since then, that is the cuban missile crisis of 1962, and now we are setting the stage to move toward new accomplishments. i understand you've already taken up the topic of the new start treaty this morning, so i'm not going to go into details of the treaty per se, but i did want to reiterate and underscore that the implementation of the treaty is going very well indeed. the russians just arrived in the united states this weekend for another inspection under the treaty, they're out at malstrom air force base.

it is their seventh inspection this year, this treaty year which begins in february. so there is an intensive pace of inspection activitynd the treaty and we're able to say quite clearly that the treaty verification regime works and i'm very pleased with that because when one negotiates and something, the procedures and so forth, you're never sure if it's always going to fall in place but it has been going very well indeed and will be important to setting the first stage -- the next stage of reductions because of the mutual confidence and the trust that is being built up in the course of implementation of the new treaty. mutual trust and confidence of course are crucial to any future success in arms reduction negotiations. now we are working on the next steps that will set us further along the road to achieving the prague goals. as part of the 2010 nuclear posture review, the u.s. government is reviewing our nuclear deterrence requirements

to be sure they are aligned to address today's risks and determine what forces need to be maintained to security deterrence and deterrence to u.s. allies and partners. based on this analysis we will develop proposals for further reductions in our nuclear stockpile, which currently stands at approximately 5,000 total nuclear war heads. as the president said recently at the second nuclear summit, we can already say with confidence we have more nuclear weapons than we need. once complete, this study will help to shape our nettigotiatin approach to the next agreement with the russians. the president has stressed the next nuclear agreement between the united states and russian federation should include strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. of course no previous arms control agreement has limited or

monitored these last two categories. so the next negotiations will be breaking some new ground in important ways. we are going to need new, more demanding approaches to verification and monitoring but i am confident that we can find ways to respond to such challenges. beyond responsibly reducing the number of nuclear weapons, this administration has been committed to reducing the role in our military strategy as well. we are not pursuing new nuclear weapons and missions, we are working toward creating conditions to make deterring nuclear weapons the sole use of our nuclear weapons. we have clearly stated this is in ourtory tr and in the interest of all other states that the more than 65-year record of nuclear nonuse be extended forever. recently we worked through the nuclear policy issues that are important and relevant to our nato allies.

at the nato summit in chicago a few weeks ago, the allies proved the deterrence and defense posture review. focusing on the elements of the ddtr, the al lie three affirmed their commitment to create conditions for a war without nuclear weapons while remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. the review found the alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrent and defense posture and that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons may be contemplated are extremely, extremely remote. the alliance acknowledged the importance for an independent and unilateral u.s., briptish

and french u.n. security forces have in discouraging nuclear proliferation. leaders agreed that it should issue two related task to the appropriate nato commissions, first to develop concepts for ensuring the broadest possible burden sharing, including in the event nato decides to further reduce its reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons based in europe and, second, to further consider what nato would expect to see in the way of reciprocal ration action to allow for significant reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to nato. nato expressed its support for continued mutual efforts by the united states and russia to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency and further reduce their nuclear weapons. the allies also reiterated their

interest in developing and developing and exchanges transparency and confidence building ideas with russia with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increased mutual understanding of nato's russian and nonstrategic weapons deployed in europe. now let me turn to conventional arms control, which in my view has not received adequate attention in recent years. we're spending a lot of time focused on the future of conventional arms control and its role in enhancing european security. there are three conventional arms control regimes that play key roles in european security, the open size treaty, the revienna document 2011 and conventional armed forces in treaty or the cfe treaty. each regime is important and contributes to security and stability in a unique way. when they work in harmony the result is greater confidence for all of europe.

today i must tem you the conventional arms control in europe is facing challenges. unfortunately russia ceased implementation of its cfe obligations in december 2007, refusing to accept inspections or provide information to other cfe parties on its military forces as required by the treaty. and trying for several years to overcome obstacles and encourage russia to resume implementation, we concluded we wee can no longer remain in the treaty with russia while it shirked its obligations. the united states, joined by 2 is allies ceased carrying out its obligations under the cfe treaty with regard to russia. the treaty remains in force according to its terms and is being implemented at 29. the secession of implementation of cfe with regard to russia by

24 of 30 state parties gives us an opportunity to consider the current security architecture our future needs and the types of arms control measures that will help achieve our security goals. in other words, i see this period now as a period of true opportunity to consider what we truly need for 21st century conventional arms control in europe. our nato allies have reaffirmed after the chicago summit in its declaration our determination to preserve, strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in europe based on key principles and commitments and we will continue to explore ideas to this end. we must modernize conventional arms control to take account of current security concerns. i've been meeting with my european counterparts, soliciting their views on key objectives and basic principles for the way ahead with the goal of informing our own review of these issues as currently ongoing here in washington.

moving forward together we can arrive at solutions that will best serve the security of the united states, our nato allies, partners and also the russian federation. now i'd like to turn to multi-lateral treaties, the comprehensive trust ban which daryll has already mentioned. ctbt remains a top priority for the administration and a key element of the president's prague agenda. as we continue laying the groundwork for u.s. ratification, we remain optimistic about the prospects for the ctbt entry into force, albeit mindful that achieving that goal will require considerable effort from every single one of us. it is central toward leading to a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear competition. the united states remains committed to the completion of the so-called imf system, international monitoring system, which is now more than 85%

complete and once completed will provide global coverage to detect and identify nuclear explosive tests conducted in violation of the treaty. development of the on-site inspection component is a priority task of the comprehensive test band treaty organization, the ctbto, and we'll be assess be efforts during the 2014 integrated field exercise ash very useful upcoming activity. since 2011 in addition to our annual assessment, our extra budgetary contributions to the ctcbo have totalled over $40 million. given the tough budget environment in washington, it clearly demonstrates or ongoing commitment and the vital importance the united states attaches to completing the verification regime for the treaty. let me turn next to the cutoff treaty. we are continuing our fight and i will gladly characterize it a

fight to launch the negotiation of a fizz om treel cutoff treaty or fmct. such a treaty is considered by the majority of the international community the next step in the process of multi-lateral nuclear disarmament. we've worked closely to achieve the start of negotiations in the conference on disarmament. creative and insightful ideas on how to move forward have been deployed in geneva to no avail. we are very disappointed in the result so far. the current blockage over fmct is a formidable one. each attempt to overcome the impasse makes this clearer. certain countries must engage substantively, constructively and frequently on fmct. without that no progress be it in the cd on its margins or outside of it can make real progress. this is a leadership issue for this community, as well as a

practical matter. countries most affected by an fmct are the key stake holders, the countries that need to be most active, the most determined in any effort to achieve such a regime. though we are continuing our efforts in the conference on disarmament, we're continuing to consult among the p5 and other key stake holders on ways for forward. our most recent meeting in this. -5 effort was in london in april and we're making plans to meet again soon this summer. we are not making headlines right now but the states participating are very invested in the process, which is a good sign. gradual gradually we are making progress but we're going to need to push and push intensively in this arena. let me turn for a moment to the p-5 process because it is one that is quite current now. we're planning our upcoming meeting in washington about

which i'll say a few words. the p 5 have been meeting regularly to review or progress in fulfilling out obligations and the 2005 proliferation treaty. during p-5 conferences and the ongoing p-5 meetings, we've covered verification, transparency, confidence building, nonproliferation and other important topics, all of which are important for establishing a firm foundation for first disarmament evident. for example, at the 2011 paris p-5 conference in june of 2011, a year ago, the p-5 reaffirmed their unconditional support for the m. t, reaffirmed the commitment in the action plan, stressed the

need to strengthen the international atomic energy safeguard and worked in support of their shared gold of the article 6 of the mpt. following up on the 2009 london conference and 2011 paris conference, the united states is hosting the next p-5 conference here in washington june 27th to june 29th. the united states looks forward to having further in depth discussions, candid discussions. these have been very useful discussions i must say on a variety of issues with our p-5 counterparts during the conference. we also look forward to hosting a public event as part of the washington conference. this will be on june 27th for those of you who are interested. it is titled three pillars for peace and security, implementing the mpp. the event will focus on the mutually reinforcing of the three mpp pillars and how all

three are essential for elimination of nuclear weapons. now finally, let me turn to some of the work we've been doing inside my own bury, the bureau of arms control, verification and compliance. i'm juggling two hats. i'm the acting undersecretary but i've maintained my role as the assistant secretary. i'm joking i now have one of the longest titles in washington but it does encompass a broad empire. i wanted to talk a bit about the work we're doing on future verification technology. and appeal to you because as we move forward on all these fronts that i've laid out today, we are going to need the help of everyone in this room. it's not just on the advocacy level. we also need your creativity and your ideas. as i mentioned before, reducing to lower numbers of all kinds of weapons will require that we push past the current limits of our verification and monitoring capabilities. whether we're trying to monitor missile launches, count nuclear

warheads or detect and characterize an unexplainable biological event we need ever improving tools and technology. the abc, my own home bury, works hard to be on the cutting edge of new technology, not merely for the sake of being on the cutting edge but because we know that is where we can best leverage the small budget that exists in our government for developing such new capabilities. it is because of this need for new technology i'm particularly proud to announce that we have for the first time ever made available to the public our so-called verification technology research and development needs document. this document has been published on an annual basis and it is a catalogue of sorts telling the r & d community what are our most pressing technology needs to answer arms control questions in the future. now with the publicly available document, we can expand our