community of developers beyond the usual suspects of the defense and department of energy laboratories. to a certain extent the needs documents is a think piece. we hope it will stimulate some thinking about where we go from here on verification and monitoring of arms controls agreements. if you go to their web site and type in b fund it, will come up. i encourage all of you in your organizations to pursue opportunities for track 1.5 and track 2 engagement policies. we should never undervalue the productivity of these efforts. many of the ideas that went into the new start treaty and i know i've said this time and again, but many of the ideas that went into the new start treaty were developed in the years running up to the negotiations through track 1.5 and track 2

activities. and i have appreciated the role of the arms control association and many of the organizations represented here as we prepare for negotiation of the arms trade treaty this july in new york. this is a very important effort that has gone on and we really welcome your efforts overall. now, to wrap up i want to leave you with one final thought. it's one of my favorites and it's one of think about constantly. it's not every day that you think of president calvin coolidge as a source of inspiration but i always like to recall what he has to say about persistence. i think it's not a bad message for this audience today. the president said "nothing in the world can take the place of persistence. talent will not, nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. genius will not. unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. education will not. the world is full of educated derelicts.

persistence and determination alone are omnipotent. the slogan press on as solved and always will sof the problems of the human race. so, colleagues and friend, we must press on. we have no easy task ahead of us. we must simply press on. we have far to go and there are problems that we cannot anticipate, certainly in this job over the last three years there have been many problems that i did not anticipate but we continue to press on. make no mistake, the arc of nuclear history is bending downwards, i am quite sure of that. i look forward to your comments and questions and thank you very much for your attention today. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, rose, for your overview of all that's happening in this field. we have time for questions and there are microphones on either side. so once again, if you could -- if you want to ask a question,

raise your hand, identify yourself and the microphone will come to you. as the microphones get to these two folks here in the front, let me just start with the first question, rose. you ended with the coolidge admonition to persist, which i think is always important in the field of nuclear arms control. one of the things we've been persisting with for a long time of course is the effort to get the thistle material cutoff talks going. you said it's a fight. there are only a certain number of different pathways that this can take. how do you see this debate developing in the next several months given the opposition from one particular country in south asia that shall go nameless? and are there alternative ways in which the p-5 can help make progress as the cd tries to find a way around the consensus rule

difficulties that it always grapples with? >> many of you are aware of the efforts of the first committee and the agenda, you've been involved in wrestling with these issues either in or out of government. and so you know that the pressures, what pressures emerged last october in the context of the first committee meeting in october. and those pressures had to do with a building frustration about the inability of the cd to move off the dime. i use the word impasse. it's a very formidable impasse at this moment in the cd and so pressures are developing within the first committee to basically go elsewhere, to move this negotiation to other settings, the u.n. general assembly, et cetera. so these pressures we were able essentially to let off the steam i would say is a good way to put

it and let off the steam by emphasizing again the -- both responsibility and the interest of key stake holders in moving this issue forward and that's why we have been so intent on getting the key stake holders to the table, working on where we can go, how we can handle this issue, pressing forward. we're slowly, slowly making progress. so i, for one, hope that the key stake holders will continue to be able to press forward. otherwise i do fear that we may be heading in a direction that will not be particularly productive in terms of getting true constraints on fizzon materials. a bunch of countries can get together and negotiate fizzon materials cutoff treaty but if they don't have fizzon material for wednesdayons purposes, it's not going to be that helpful. our important this evening to keep our eyes on the prize, continue to have serious

discussions among the stake holders and try in that way to get a negotiation going. so that's where we're placing our emphasis at the present time. >> for those of you who want to dive into details on this, we did an extensive interview with pakistan's ambassador in the conference on disarmament earlier this year. barbara, want to go ahead? >> barbara slavin from the atlantic council. pleasure to see you again. i wanted you to talk a little bit about the relationship that's developed with the russians in the arms control process and the russians now have putin again as president. do you think that's going to affect the tenor of future arms control talks with them again? how do you see cooperation over ran developing? do you see that this arms control process might bleed into other issues with the russians or are you a little concerned that putin may play the nationalism card a little harder

than medvedev did? thanks. >> as far as russian policy is concerned, i see a great deal of consistency frankly. if you're interested in the official russian articulation of their policy, it very useful to look at the, first of all, the remarks that putin published, they were published under his name in some of the top russian newspapers right before the election. also he put out an election platform. and since that time he has -- his administration has published a foreign policy, their first foreign policy statement of policy after he entered into the presidency. and there's an emphasis in each of those documents on continuing the arms control agenda, continuing arms control work. now, there aren't any details laid out there, but i do think it is important that that kind of emphasis has appeared and

also a very positive perspective on implementation of the new start treaty. so there's been a very positive and i would say practical approach to implementation of the new start treaty. so as far as the arms control traditional nuclear arms control environment, i see a continuity there with the way this issue has been approached from the late 60s, early 1970s and the soviet union, when even when there were ums and downs in the relationship, both u.s. and moscow saw a treaty to be in both there interests. effort in they would continue up again after perhaps a pause. so i don't really see at the moment a difficulty in that realm. i will say that the cooperation with iran at this point has

actually been very, very solid and russia's playing a leading role, as you all know, russia will be hosting the next meeting to talk with the iranians in the p-5 plus process, p-5 plus 1 process. so there will be i think many opportunities for russia to continue to play in moving that agenda forward. so all in all i think one has to recognize that political transitions sometimes cause things to slow down a bit but nevertheless in terms of the overarching agenda and the willingness of the russian federation to engage on it, i have not seen a problem there. >> all right, thank you. ambassador pickering, i think you had a question. if there's anyone in the back who wants to ask a question, you need to raise your hand now so we can get the microphones to the back. >> thank you very much for

everything you do and thank you for the speech. i would remark on the last question that i think new start had a lot to do with reset and i this that's a piece the arms committee shouldn't ignore and it place back into arms control attitudes. what are your top three priorities and why? >> top three priorities are -- well, they're hard to pick out because i really have my top six priorities, which you kind of heard this morning. but i think in terms of -- i'll tell you quite honestly i think that new start implementation is going along very well so i say, all right, we don't not pay attention to that but it's going well and that's a good thing. but do i think a lot about where we go from here on for the reductions. i think a lot about the conventional arms control regime. it's kind of interesting but cfe was a spectacular success. it was such a spectacular

success that we all forgot about it and we haven't been thinking about conventional arms control for some time but cfe has passed its sell by date to be honest. it's a great treaty, it was negotiated when we have the warsaw pact in europe, we need a different type of arms control in europe today. and let me cheat a bit and say it's a combination of those p-5 related issues which include the fmct which i would put in my third diplomatic priority but i'm going to cheat further and say there's a fourth, which is the domestic which is getting the cpct ratified. >> since you mentioned the ctb again, as of us in this crowd know, the long awaited national academy sciences study on the technical issues related to ctcb

was released in march. what's your sense of what those findings tell us about some of the issues at the center of the debate in 1999 and in how much better does that put the treaty in position going forward for serious reconsideration in. >> there are two major issues in 1999 that affected senators' decision making about ratification of ctbt. one had to do with the verifiability of the treaty and the nas study address verifiedability of the treaty. we welcomed their conclusions. we thought that they were in line with the evidence that we had seen without having such a deep dive in technical terms as the academy took. but just on the face of it, i mention in my remarks that the imf system is now over 85% complete. when the inf system was looked at back in 1999 it was barely off the ground at that point.

so just if you look at the -- what physically is available now to verify the treaty, there's just so much more there. the other major issue of course was the stockpile stewardship program and the efficacy of stockpile stewardship in comparison with nuclear explosive testing. again, in 1999 the stockpile stewardship program was barely off the ground. you may recall i was working in boe at that point as the assistant secretary responsible for nonproliferation programs so i was watching the process of getting stockpile stewardship off the ground and it was a very, very good process but it was still a baby. now we can say that the baby's matured into early adulthood and i think that it has proven its metal in terms of showing that it can reserve the -- so those

are the two big changes that have occurred. of course the nas study was focused on the vare fieblt and it basically accords with what we could see as the physical evidence of what's accumulated since 1999 in the imf system. >> right here and then over here. >> thank you. i'd like to ask you about the arms race treaty. >> if you could identify yourself. >> i'm from the european parliament. i would like to ask you about arms trade treaty because at the european parliament we are debating whether it should be a strong treaty, which everybody not signs and whether it could be a weaker treaty which everybody signs. now what is the u.s. position and under which conditions would you sign? >> well, if there's some code word in strong versus weak treaties, i should probably know what it is. but in general the united states would sign up to treaties when

they are strong. and i will emphasize that our view is that it is a treaty that covers arms trade per se. there is a legitimate trade in armaments in conventional arms internationally. so we see a real importance in ensuring that that trade is carefully regulated. and so that's the value that we see in an arms trade treaty. but we do believe that there is a legitimate trade in conventional arms and so would not support if it's treated as more of a nonproliferation treaty, that we should not have any trade. that is not our position. >> that's transitions began at the united nations on july 2nd. go for about four weeks and arms control association was playing close attention to that. >> we have another question here and then to the back row. ben, if you could bring the

microphone up to treenia and then in the back. >> i'm from the danish institute of international studies. i was going to ask you because as i understand it, it's a russian precondition for even talking about these weapons that they are first withdraw from europe. so do you have any evidence that perhaps the the europeans will be willing to withdraw the weapons from europe in anticipation of arms control negotiations? a bit of chicken and egg problem. >> well, you know, it's very interesting about that russian condition. that has been a condition in place since the soviet union. it's not a new condition. it is a very, very longstanding condition that all so-called -- we used to called tactical nuclear weapons must be withdrawn to conis, the

continental united states, before they'll be talk about this. so like any number of conditions that can be piled up in advance of negotiations, i think we have to be very careful about considering them as chicken-and-egg problems. we just have to work them -- the russians clearly aren't going to come to the negotiating table unless they see a negotiation to be in their national interest. we would not either. nor would we expect or nato allies to join news an effort to negotiate such a treaty, unless they, too, showed it in their interest interests. the mugss have piled up clothes. i see them as issues that must be worked in the runup to megss. they may see an interest over i'm in standing further what's going on, in, for example, former war saw pact.

they may be interested in learning more about that. let work the issue and see where we get and then we'll see what we can do about a negotiation. i would just urge us al. sometimes you catch your head because you see some russian commentator piling up what looked like condition after condition. i'd be very cautious about treating them as big blockages. we just need to work them is all. >> we're going to move to the lightning round of questions. i think we have type for two or three more. i'm going to ask the folks to raise their hands. we could take two, three at the same time. ari -- you've got the mic, sir. we'll go to the next one and rose will take a couple at the same time. >> i'm peter. i worked on and struggled with the issues of the conventional arms control negotiations for about two years ending in 2009 and in particular what to do

about cfe in gates' office. now that we find barriers to do with the basic structure of the new treaty even, which is apparently unsearchable in many respects to russia, as well as regional issues that have gotten in the way of our ratification like muldova, georgia, mutual concerns in other areas, this is kind of an unfair question but i'm wondering what sort of path one might explore, whether it's a totally new treaty or whether one begins with small political confidence raising steps perhaps by in reaches of tension and then builds up to something bigger. i know you said you were just

exploring ideas so i don't want to put you on the spot but i'm curious has to what's in play and what one -- whether the most promising approach is a global solution or a piecemeal solution or combination. >> then natalie goldring, the microphone to the right. thank you. >> thank you. hi, rose. natalie goldring, appreciate your endorsement of the arms trade treaty even if it didn't make your top four. i'd like to ask you about consensus. the u.s. is insisted on it in the arms trade treaty process, some of the same skeptics you encountered in the fmct process are present in the arms trade treaty process and play same role. how do you think we can keep the u.s. insistence on consensus and keep the skeptics from derailing the treaty.

>> actually -- let me come straight to natalie's question. the reason why it's not in my top four is as far as my heavy lifting is concerned, at least at the moment, roberto martin has done a fabulous job preparing the way. the reason we're talking about a four-week negotiation is we think there is a real shot at getting this thing done in four weeks. there are many difficult issues to get through in july, and you know, it's not a done deal. but i would say that the ground is very well prepared. and again, thanks to the work of the non-governmental community but also the work of our negotiators in the prep coms in good shape. it's not because i don't consider it important and significant from a policy perspective. it's because you know, just in terms of my own personal heavy lifting. we'll see, maybe july 31 will come and i'll be in new york all night long. we'll see what happens. at the moment i'm very positive about the preparatory work that has gone into it so far.

but your question about consensus is a very important one for those of you who don't know, the arrangement for decision making in the att negotiations is as matter of substantive decision making, such decisions must be made by consensus, procedural decisions can be made by a majority kind of approach. so, it's a different approach. we've been quite hesitant about it although we were willing to see how it works in this context because it's difficult many times to draw a bright line between substance and process and we're concerned about that causing difficulties going forward. but we'll see how it goes. let's see how it goes this july and see where we go from here. that's all i can say to you at the present time on that. as far as the conventional arms control, peter, those questions are very, very good ones. i will say we're looking at a rather broad spectrum now. you made some mention of not

being able to ratify a treaty. at the moment we're taking a very broad ranging look at this arena of conventional arms control. we have a solid foundation and that the conventional forces in europe treaty is still in force according to its terms. given my experience on new start, new start and cfe, conventional arms control are much different. conventional arms control is multilateral, new start was bilateral. in both cases i think we have accumulated some excellent experience in terms of the verification and inspection regimes, which we need to bear in mind, they have been great in raising confidence and may play a role in the future. but at the same time i think we need to look very broadly at what the purpose of conventional arms control in europe is these days, we're not dealing with two alliances ranged against each other. what the regional security situations are, and furthermore,

overall, the way europe is, you know, handling military forces these days is much different. there's a lot of budget cutting going on, a lot of effort at having, you know, shared capabilities across borderlines. and so we just need to think, i think, very -- in a broad ranging way about where we want to go on conventional arms control. that's the effort we have under way in government now. no decisions have been made but we are taking a very, very serious look at it. and i expect this summer we'll be coming to some decisions about how to proceed. so, if any of you out there have any ideas on this agenda we would welcome the chance to talk to you about them. >> an invitation. all right. in speaking of persistence let's go for last question to mr. larry wiler in the back there who has persisted on these issues longer than most of us here for those who don't know, larry was one of the

nonproliferation treaty negotiators. your question. >> yes. well, i was negotiating as i mentioned to you in an earlier occasion i think, with -- on nonproliferation treaty, 57 years ago. time flies. i'm getting older. and i have an unfair question. what is your estimate of whether or not we're any closer to getting the necessary votes in the senate than we were three years ago? >> three years ago? >> on which? >> on the ctbt. >> again, larry, i have had a very interesting experience in watching the ratification of the new start treaty because up until the final week we didn't have any votes aside from, well, we had the democratic side of the house, we had senator lugar. votes on the republican side of

the ledger we didn't know. you just got to work it. and again, i found that one of the most valuable aspects of the new start ratification debate was that the senators were willing to really take a serious look at the treaty, and to really consider their responsibility under the constitution with regard to the national security of the united states in giving their advice and consent to treaties. to make a long story short, they wanted to hear the details. they delved into the inspection regime in ways i never would have predicted. they delved in, a lot of attention went to the budget side and the concern about the budget for the national nuclear security administration and so forth, but to me it was very impressive how much they wanted to understand the details of the treaty and how it would improve our national security, our confidence with regard to what the russians are doing in their

strategic arsenal, and overall enhanced predictability with moscow. so my view is this is a time we need to get the word throughout about what the ctbt can do for us, what it will do to enhance our national security, we need to ask all those concerned, both inside and outside of government, on capitol hill and elsewhere, to take a serious look and be ready to listen, to get some questions answered and to debate. but we're not asking anybody at the moment to say yea or nay. i hope people will not say yea or nay now but have a serious and intensive debate on the merits of the comprehensive test ban treaty. >> i think we're drawing to a close here. i think your time is up. i want to thank you very much for joining us here once again. and i hope to have you back again. we'll take up your invitation

for ideas on the conventional forces in europe treaty. we always have space in arms control today for more ideas on that, long running issue. and we will promise to persist which is very important admonition from you, given -- >> and calvin coolidge. >> and calvin coolidge. we'll have to use that one in the future. thank you very much, rose. [ applause ] >> federal reserve chair ben bernanke is on capitol hill today to answer questions about the economy. right there in the middle of your screen. he is delivering his economic outlook to the joint economic commit they morning. back in april the fed upgraded its most recent economic outlook for this year, predicting more growth and lower unemployment than it had three months earlier. when the may numbers came out u.s. employers added just 69,000 jobs, the fewest in a year and

unemployment went up slightly from 8.1 to 8.2%. the federal reserve made two rounds of bond purchases to try to lower long term interest rates and encourage borrowing and spending. after those purchases ended the fed started a program called operation twist including selling shorter term securities. that program is set to end at the end of the month. >> the hearing will come to order. thank you for being here, chairman bernanke we're grateful for your presence here and your testimony. after my opening statement we'll have vice chairman brady go ug