reaction? >> we did it. no, really. i just felt i knew for sure that we did it, and that the president had to know about it. i'd been there three and a half years by that time, and that's the way things operated. i saw things -- everything that happened, nixon was the choreographer. he was the director of everything. and if he knew about it, haldeman knew about it. they were the two that had to know about anything that happened, and i still feel that white house aides don't go off and handle things willy nilly. they're at conscious as anyone or more so that anything they do reflects on the presidency. so i don't think there's a lot of careless stuff going on there. i think it's directed, and i still feel that way. although since i've been here talking to scott and john, who are far more -- about this thing

and have a far more thorough knowledge than i, i defer to their wisdom, but that's what i saw up close. i was in and out of his office all day, sat in on conversations with him and nixon in his very funny way ran the show. >> scott, how about you? what was your first reaction as it started out -- and you learned of woodward's reporting and your reaction? >> well, you've got to go back in time to what a different world it was. it was a very partisan environment, and not just partisan democrat/republican but partisan because of the vietnam war, and my generation was trying to shut down the vietnam war and felt very powerful, but we were outsiders, and the establishment was closed. and here were reporters and then eventually the watergate committee. i was the sixth person on the democratic side, the majority side. there were seven senators, four

democrats, three republicans. and there was a sense of partisanship that was kind of twofold. there was the democrats and republicans and people protecting nixon and democrats who for partisan reason ps might want to go after him, and then there was us. i was 27 years old at the time. jerry garcia, the grateful dead, were my notion of how i should dress for work. which was a lot different than the white house or the senate at that time. stl so there was a skepticism. and i remember the first day of work i interviewed haldeman and ehrlichman who just resigned and they went back and said they had been interviewed by a group including a panther, and bizarre. within a day or so i realized how divided things were. >> at the committee.

>> at the committee. john had come in and begun to tell the majority staff, the democrats, what was really going on and didn't have a road map. john was providing a road map to it and we were -- at least my position was, we were skeptical. we had to find out what was really going on. but the partisanship, john reported that howard baker, who was the senator, who was the minority co-chair of the committee, had a bad channel to the white house, and had had conversations with john and other people there, and so this was quite astounding, the notion that we were running a committee and yet there was this back channel to the white house that there was -- had republicans terms, and baker stopped having meeting because he knew john had now reported this to the majority staff. we weren't telling the minority staff what was going on because of the fear of them undercutting john or doing something to cover up further, and the question was, we having executive session

where is there was some exchange between the minority and the majority and then information was getting back to the white house. so they assumed that it was somebody close to baker and his chief of staff -- his committee director, staff director, was a fellow named fred thompson later to become a senator and now a spokesman for reverse mortgages on late-night tv, but thompson was too busy, and we couldn't figure out how he could do anything. we kind of monitored his phone call, frankly, to make sure. the assumption was it might be jim johnson, i think was his name, anyway, one of baker administrative assistants. so i came into the office and dan said we've got to figure out if he's the source. can you help us? i said, well i have an executive session. we had an executive session. i followed johnson. he jumped into a cab, i jumped into a cab, just like in the

movies and he got out at the executive office building where most worked and went in the side door. i came back, reported this. we still don't know who he's reporting to. give me a second. i called the staff counsel we thought he might be working with -- >> was that mozart office? >> i think it was. my friend had come over from the pentagon, their kind of go-to guy in sinister and mysterious things. i called up the office and said, can i speak to -- i think his name was johnson, the name of the aide, and i need to speak to him and they brought him to the phone and he was quite surprised to hear me and why are you calling me? i said, just to prove you're there, and he resigned that night, because it was considered to be such a breach of trust that he had immediately left an executive session, and they're very quiet meeting at the senate and gone over to the white house

to report. that was it. it was done. so that was the kind of atmosphere we working. the majority staff working with john but testing his ideals, was he still the evil work for mitchell and responsible for a cover-up? we were kind of trying to understand following the details that he gave, trying to establish them independently and we weren't doing a very good job up through the time john testified, this remarkable testimony, and in the middle of -- i think just before he testified, nixon said, you have to stop the committee hearings almost immediately after john's testimony, where two more people had to testify, because leonid brezhnev, the premier of the soviet union was coming to the united states, big date, hot meeting and you couldn't have watergate going on during that period. well, this gave us a little bit of a reprieve. a little respite. just before that, we said, this

is not the way to investigate. i'm serious when i say the law, the criminal process in particular, but even the law when it applied to, in the senate context. you can't just go around questioning people under oath. you're not going to get the truth. you have to go work around the edges. one of the things we found out, there were all of these invisible people in the white house, and the invisible people to some extent were the lower level staff but particularly women. we didn't have any women professional staff members at the time. the white house didn't have very many, scarlett hills, i can't leeb th remember who they might have had. >> the secretarial staff. >> the secretarial staff. talk about sexism, like the remarks made last night. it was an invisible world, and here we would sgee the white house sboe ingo into the white

house and get nothing. the deputy assistants and whatnot, but if you talked to their secretaries and they felt comfortable, weren't represented by somebody from the white house staff that worked outside, including remarkably john's own secretary, who was a very forthright person and gave us enormous help. that's when we began to realize we could reconstruct things. so there was a day, i remember going to the monica restaurant right near capitol hill. they have paper -- cloth tops -- >> tablecloths. >> over the regular white tablecloth and we sat there and said, this is not the way to investigate. i was systems analyst among other things and made an organizational chart of the white house. the question was, here's nixon. here's dean. we knew from john's testimony john didn't have notes, material, little on the meetings with the president.

there wasn't going to be paper documentation. we had to figure out who else would know so made a satellite chart of all the people in touch wi with nixon. all people in touch with dean. here's dean up here. you looked at a flow chart effectively where information flowed. there's the office of the counsel of the president. there's a guy who controlled everything in and out of the president's office, alexander butterfield and lots of other people. we began going down that list particularly talking to their secretaries. that was the process we were using to reconstruct things. >> amongst the development of the satellite one of the things that popped into my mind. i wonder if you ever had occasion to go over to the dnc and actual lly visit those facilities where the arrests occurred? >> we did, but, again, all under these odd circumstances. the democratic staff going to see the democratic national committee. we not -- i mean, really

investigating as much as we just looking at the scenery a rry an although it's skeptical, at least i was, of larry o'brien who was the chairman. >> were you pretty able to fill in your satellite chart as to who was there that you might want to reach? >> yes. i mean, we -- >> did you ever find the fact i did hire one of the first female attorneys in the white house? >> the -- well -- >> valerie moles. >> i had forgotten that. we looking for people that were knowledgeable of these interactions with the president. >> i just wanted to share that with jill. let's proceed along, develop the satellite chart. there are now people you haven't talked to.

some you're talking to talk to, informing, tell us how you reach alex butterfield? >> what happened, butterfield was on a list of people were were going through and you've got to look at the senate side. we had no -- at that point later was a woman named mary diorio, became tfirst women staff. a lot of people around, stenographer, secretaries, whatnot. then were just as bright. but i was one of those people from the jerry garcia era that women were human beings and i liked to spend time with them. and because they were invisible, people said things all the time in those days. the white house, they didn't think there was anybody else in the room if there were just women there. and same is true of our staff and i treated these women with respect, and one day about -- 11:00 at night, i was working late, and this staff, they're

very dedicated and work around the clock. this woman came by and said -- we in a converted auditorium and had opened booths, open work areas, little cubicle, and she said, i'm about to put a memo that you would like to see on the desk of the deputy republican staff member, and i wouldn't go in as a matter of principle, wouldn't go into his cubicle and she said the cubicle, his desk was about three feet inside the door of the cubicle. she said i will lay it ourt, t.d and i wept there and le-- went and it was given to fred thompson, minority leader to the go-to noon continue the cover-up, if you will, and lazart was asking what to tell

dean about his meetings. i saw this. said, wow, we've got to get a copy of this and arranged quietly to get a copy of this. read it. an extraordinary amount of detail. very much what we were told that always a little twist at end, in which it was john coving up and the questions were all oriented in that way. by this point john had testified when i'm seeing this memo for the first time being typed up and i said, well, this is why they're -- the republican questions -- it was not a sharp staff. i mean, these were not the -- these were not the sharpest knives in the drawer. they were spoons, if anything, but they were asking pretty pointed, direct questions of john. this is where it came from, and i thought, wow. this is really interesting. so we -- one of the first interview, not the very first, but one of the first interviews on this satellite chart of who would have known things was this former air force general.

well, still an air force general, but the head of -- colonel. okay, i've promoted him already. who had left the white house and gone over to the faa, and so i called up and said we would like to talk to you about procedures and whatnot at the -- how thing, run at the white house. it would be a very informal interview and he agreed to come. >> so no idea there was a taping system? it's a fishing expedition? >> a fishing expedition but from my point of view, once i had this bizarre memo to thompson, two things were fortunate me. one, how was this reconstructed by the white house? and i thought it probably came out of nixon's trying to come up with an account, but i thought that process would be interesting. i wasn't thinking tapes. >> do you think at some point that planted in your mind, well, come along, you didn't pop the actual question that it had sanders -- not that were you not going to let up on the issue? >> the question was, where it

came from, and thousand ghow it. second thing, remember howard baker was embarrassed about the testimony and his chief of staff had to resign when it was discovered. i was thinking thompson has to resign and thompson will have to lead the committee. pretty naive, but that was my beli belief. >> being frank, one of the things die in the pre-session before i appeared publicly, i decided to let baker, howard baker, know that i knew he had a back channel to the white house, and pretty much what he's said, because i'd written the president's talking papers and helped facilitate and set up the meeting. rather than pull the rug out from undermeanpu publicly i think it neutered him.

he said what else do i know that he wanted to be careful about? and i knew -- i knew from my dealings with sam dash in preparation of my appearance that howard was -- much too -- the frustration of sam dash seemed to be always taking very anti-positions about my testimony in private. as soon as the majority resolvaled they needed my testimony, he would come out and make it look like it was almost his position. so i tried to use this strategically when i did. >> tell us how -- keep this moving along, how it comes down to -- once you get al flex there, what happens? >> well, it's a -- it's friday the 13th, which i was not something that occurred to me at the time. i understand an absolutely sweltering washington friday? >> one of those 90s, felt like

110 because of the humidity days, and we met in the air conditioned basement of the dirksen -- of the -- yeah, dirksen senate office building in a little room that was maybe 15 x 20 that was never cleaned because we afraid it would be bugged, and it had originally been a very formal kind of hearing table-type things with felt covers, but over the course of months of interviewing constantly, it become -- it was just filthy. there were dust balls the sides of number 5 kids' soccer balls on the floor, and everybody that came in with an attorney, the attorneys smoked cigars in those days, there was a kind of permanent cloud that never left the room that came down to where the edge of the door was. and in this unpleasant circumstance, alexander butterfield walks in and not accompanied by counsel.

it was very rare, and we start going through, and i was methodical. i wanted to think systems analyst again. not lawyer. i wasn't going for the questions at the beginning. i wasn't forcing him somewhere. i went through every drawer in his office held. i went through every procedure. i went through how they kept track of the president's time. who took notes. how they gave him briefing memos. how they recorded the briefing memos and whatnot. it was quite enlightening. for three hours. it must have bored him to death but was useful for us. the presidential calendars, the secret service, how they mond monitored and didn't. i took off the front part indicating exactly wa it was and gave him the part that described the meetinging between the president and dean. >> they were set up like a tribute? summary transcript jrch.

>> like a summary of the transcript and in a sense -- everything had a twist, tracked it dean's testimony and prepared before dean's testimony but always had a twist that dean was responsible for whatever the evil act was at the end. if there was something afraid it would come out, but none was available -- none came out publicly. this was not known. so with this document, i handed it to alex and i said, can you explain, given the systems you just described, how this would be reconstructed? what's it from? and we went tluf the president's dictabelts. i assumed it was a created document by nixon baitsed and what they thought dean would testify to. how did they know? but it was very precised and detailed, and my protection is that alex took it looked at it. he been very straightforward and he said, well, this is -- i asked a couple questions.

could this have come from the president's dictabelt? no, too detailed. could it -- no john was the only note-taker and we know john didn't have notes. where did it come from? alex took it and very deliberately took it and set it down in front of himself. said, well, let me think than for a minute. and the questions went off in -- i finished up. the questions, don sanders, very skilled fbi agent. very fair. >> before we get to don, let me turn to alex at this point. alex, let's back up just a little bit and get your head as to when you'd been called to come up to the senate. what are you thinking? what's in your head? what in your heart? and what are you anticipating? >> i had called howard baker on sunday to see if i could come over and see him. only because he was a republican

and the co-chairman of the watergate committee. >> this is before you'd been in there? >> no. >> back all wait up to before you even arrived. when you get a call to come up and visit with the senate. >> all right. i said i'd be free friday at 2:00 and i was conscious, very conscious of the fact that i was due to go to the soviet union on the following tuesday, and i'd be gone for almost three weeks. so if i was going to meet with this committee staff. >> and do what in the soviet union? >> i was leading a government industry trade group cutting a ribbon at a trade fair and then the faa was going to be negotiating, we hoped, with the soviets a contract to upgrade their air traffic control system. >> at that point you're the administrator of the faa? >> yes, yes. >> and not an unimportant trip? >> no. not an unimportant trip. and i had been at the faa for

four months from when i left the white house. so i met with these people and had been interrogate add number of times before. we all had. >> were you worried about the tapes coming out? >> no. not terrible. the only thing that hadn't come out from the your testimony which preceded mine by about three weeks i thought a lot about the tapes. i said, there they are. i know about them. only seven people knew. maybe eight. i guess four secret service guys and haulldeman and higbee and myself and my secretary only knew partially about the tapes. about the cabinet. so, no. but i thought i would be called, as i usually was, to tell people about the white house. i worked late eed right there. the adjoining office and oversaw

the-d. process questions? >> yeah. process questions. so i was good for that and thought it would be more of the same, and i, of course, thought about the tapes, but i did not think that it was likely i did anything on the tapes. >> and you had no question at that point of their significance? >> oh, no. yeah. how significant they were. yes. things were running all the time. the only thing i remember differently from what scott just said, i remember getting that piece of paper early on in -- shortly after 2:00 in that four-hour session with the staff and scott was the lead inve investigator and i remember only one sheet of paper. and when they said, where might this have come from? i looked at this thing, and it was, in fact, it looked exactly like a transcript, a verbatim transcript. it had a p for president, d for

dean and it made sense. it was -- i mean, i didn't follow the discussion but i thought, god, it's out. this had to come from the tapes. the very thing i'm so worried about. so i handed it and i said, gee, this looks very detailed the president had great retentive pow but this is too detailed for that. >> your headset, or your mindset at this point is, you don't want to be perceived as a whistle-blower, but you really -- in heart of heart, understand the importance of this evidence and maybe you do have to reveal it? it's a real -- you're really in a conflicted state? >> that's, absolutely. yes. i hate to be the one, and i felt it's a though i were a peripheral person, really. i wasn't that involved in watergate or the cover-up, but

anyway, i said finally. i sort of panicked. i threw it back down. slid back to the center of this conference table and i said, let me think about that for a while, and to my great relief they went on to other items. until sanders was -- until scott turned it over to sanders representing fred thompson. he was the minority deputy counsel, and he said -- he started with a few filmary questions but then said, getting back to that paper, he said you had mentioned a -- what do they call it, scott? the other -- i can never think of of what they call it. the other recording device. >> a dictabelt. i had mentioned it. that was just for rosemary. the president dictated things on

a dictabelt to a few contributors and rosewoods was the grand mogul of the dictabelts. no one was supposed to touch them except rhodes. he said apart from it, the dictabelt, was there ever any other listening device in the oval office? and as i had said to my wife at breakfast that morning, if they -- i guess if they ask me a direct question, i will just have to answer. and know that -- i mean i knew would be the end of my career, certainly in washington. i just knew that. i mean, you can't imagine how nixon -- was so bugged on this thing being absolute secret. and it was an absolute secret all that time. we know that from what's on the tape. >> did you have any thoughts of calling the white house before going up? >> no. i certainly called him to say i would be testifying. my point of contact, when we left the white house, we all had a point of contact.

and mine was len garmin. so i called len and told him is would testifying, or i thought i would be testifying and i told him about the, the friday 13th meeting. after that meeting. and then on monday mork whennin i was called before the main body, the principals on the committee i told him i was going over. he shouted at me. well, get your own lawyer. i was just reporting -- >> shouted at you? >> yeah. get your own lawyer. i said, i'm not calling for an attorney. i don't plan to have one. i never did understand that business about having an attorney. i knew what i knew and i didn't know what i didn't know, and i -- just didn't understand the necessity. >> it's kind of interesting, after -- let's go to what happened after the revelation by

alex. >> describe the revelation? >> oh. right. i was, wasn't i? >> thank you, counselor. >> so i said, when he said that i said, i'm sorry you asked that question. that's the way i remember it. yes, there was. to -- don simms. then i picked up, that's where this had to come from. and i still don't know. that is still a mystery. >> asked whether or not i was aware? >> no. >> you don't remember that? >> no. no. and then we spent 45 minutes -- i was describing the system. i felt reasonably sure that they had not heard that from any previous witness. it was just too close hold, that secret of nixon's, and now it was out, and i remember being more concerned about foreign

dignitaries who had been in our president's office, and the repercussions from that than i did the domestic. >> members of congress? >> fallout. hmm? >> not members of congress? >> well, yeah. just anyone. >> not chief justices? >> no. in my ear, prime minister wilson and all the people i just thought that would -- and i hated to be the one to do that, and i know -- i knew that haldeman hadn't come up yet. >> when foreign dig tears stayed at camp david, you actually removed the facilities. is that not correct? >> yes. eventually. i didn't tell anyone we put it in, in the president's little office and the cabinet. his lodge. i shouldn't say his cabinet. >> other than the president? >> hmm? >> other than the president, no it was in there?