the two people that have looked at that have different opinions about whether his formula actually won money or not. so i don't know, there's still some question as to whether this mathematical formula works. he was extremely good at math. and what that helped him do, it helped him take complex situations and translate them into very simple concepts that could be understood by other people. so if you look at his tactics on the battlefield, they can be summarized almost always very, very simply. now, admittedly, some of the maneuvers and things that he has to pull off in order to make those things work are very complex. but you can always -- you can see the pincers or an

envelopment. they can always be explained in very simple ways. i could actually go on talking about bradley, but i want to leave some time for people to ask questions. but one thing -- one question that i know often comes up and that i'm often asked is why did i decide to write omar bradley? and i think i've covered that somewhat, hopefully anyway. i still wonder that why historians -- why so many people -- why did it take basically, why did it take 65 years for someone to re-examine this record and to find out that this guy did all of these things we're talking about and that we go into in the book? and i think that the problem is

that too many of us -- too many of us have that preconceived opinion about someone. and whether we're historians or readers of history, i think that we often are willing to accept what we've seen either in other books or we've heard people say about it. and we don't bother to go any further. and i think that examining the -- examining the record and re-examining the record and critically reading what we write, what has been written and asking questions about that is absolutely essential. and i think that in a lot of cases, a lot of times we -- and i'm guilty of this, too. we believe the distortions that are in those books because of the name that's on the cover.

the truth is, in a lot of cases, the name on the cover just didn't go deep enough. and because of that, a lot of our history is lost. and not only are we losing the facts, but we're losing our understanding of what history is of what happened. we end up thinking that we can win a war by peeing in somebody's trench or shouting or wearing fancy guns and being cool when the truth is, the way we win wars, the way we do anything, the way we make any achievement is we do our homework. we listen to what people -- other people are telling us. and we carefully, unemotionally, consider what has to be done. we take advice or we protect people because of their abilities, not because we get along with him or don't get along with him. and i think that -- i think it's an important -- not only is it

important that we understand this, but it's also important that we have people who can explain this and who can show us the history. we really need to know that the general -- the generals who won this war didn't look like the images that we see, didn't look like george c. scott. but, in fact, kind of looked like some of our grandpas around christmas sometimes. kind of rumpled. i think i'd like to close and then just open this up to questions. we can get into more detail about different things if you like, talk about battles or whatever anyone wants. i'd like to say, if you take anything away from this, don't take away from this presentation. in fact, jim defelice wrote this book about this unknown guy. don't take away that it's about time somebody did this. don't even go away with the idea that omar bradley was a lot more important than people realize. what i think you should go away with is the idea that there's a lot -- there are a lot of

important stories that have to be told. go away with the idea that we always have to question our assumptions about the stories we already know and we think we already know. because frankly, facts are an important thing even if history occasionally distorts them. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> jim's ready to take questions. if you would help us out by standing at the microphone back there to ask the question, that would be useful. matt, are you heading to the microphone? >> i could lean on you. >> well, i'll start while you're thinking. we had a discussion at dinner about how difficult it is to evaluate the evidence in terms of what people's opinions are of others.

and i have found in the patton papers, which jim had alluded to, this entry by george patton. bradley is a man of great mediocrity. now, that's his thesis. he failed to get disciplined. and so he goes on with all of these criticisms of what he says are the faults. and then he says, on the other hand, bradley has many of the attributes which are considered desirable in a general. now, which of those two theses are you prepared to believe? then he puts his tongue in his cheek and says he wears glasses. has a strong jaw. talks profoundly and says little. and is a shooting companion of the chief of staff, general marshall. also a loyal man. i consider him among other better generals. so jim, how did you evaluate such pieces of evidence? >> you know, that is -- that's

great. that passage is so typically patton. patton is a wonderful individual to write about. even if, you know, frankly, if patton had been a lousy general, he still would make a great subject for a book because he's left so much material. he had a fascinating mind. and i have to say that while i do occasionally pick on patton in the book and in other places, he was an intellectual in the best sense, the best sense. but to get to that specific thing, patton is very mercurial. patton has a lot of different opinions about people. and we see in that, patton, a lot of times when he's writing in his diary and in his letters, he's blowing off a little bit of steam. you know, he's reacting to something. and he's really mad. in this case, he's really mad about bradley, saying that

stinking thing. and then he kind of steps back. and he says, you know, and you can see the transition. he starts, oh, yeah. he's a great general because he shoots with marshall. which is an allusion to the fact -- and bradley did, actually, was at times a hunting -- or had been a hunting companion with marshall and was, as i said, an excellent hunter. but then he comes and does this remarkable turn. and you have to understand that for patton, to call someone loyal, and this -- that is, in patton's mind, that is the most important quality that any soldier can have, to be loyal. now, being loyal to, you know, george patton, you know, is above all other qualities. but patton recognized -- i think that patton recognized bradley's abilities. one of the amazing things, the two men had known each other during the war.

i'm sorry, the two men had known each other before the war. but it's not really until africa, until 1943 and africa that they're really interacting in a really serious, long, prolonged way. and it comes about like this. the american army invades africa. and i have to be honest. the american army, unfortunately, gets its butt kicked. and does not -- i have to say, does not do a very good job. we were not a good army at the time. probably the best way i can say it is that the british called us their version of the italians. not a plus. not a plus. so with things going poorly, marshall tells eisenhower, you know, you have to straighten out. and among other things that happens, bradley gets sent to

africa to take a look at the situation. and interestingly enough for bradley and a lot of people who think that bradley, the g.i. general, is a real nice guy and everything else. bradley makes a lot of recommendations, but kind of to boil them down into layman's terms, basically, you know, the american army doesn't like to kill people. and you've got to change that. we've got to kill these s.o.b.s, and that's all there is to it. of course, he used really fancy military terms to say that. but basically, that's what he was saying. at the same time, patton is or roughly the same time, patton is assigned to take over that army corps and to get them into shape. now, patton comes in, and patton and bradley spend a few very concentrated hours, and then it works into days, together. and patton's first really important decision in africa is

to appoint bradley as his second in command. now, it seems to me kind of a remarkable decision that he picks this guy that unfortunately has never been in combat. he's been in the army for roughly 30 years. he has a reputation as a trainer, but, you know, patton, you know, patton doesn't really care about that, frankly. and yet -- and patton is in a position where he can pick essentially anybody he really wants because the american army is not in good shape. they have to fix it. and so he -- if he insisted on a certain lieutenant, he could get him. and historians -- this goes back to distortions historians make -- have tended to say, well, patton wrote in his diary or his letter, or he wrote somewhere that, you know, that he didn't want to spy in his

camp. and so the best way to deal with a spy, said patton, was to hold him close, just like the mafia belly. and so i'm going to make him, you know, my lieutenant, and he'll make him his lieutenant, and that's what happens. i have to say that there is some documentary evidence for that conclusion because patton is always writing and expressing his off-the-cuff opinions, says something along those lines at some point, and unfortunately i can't recall whether it's in a diary or a letter or wherever. the problem -- the problem with that is that in order to believe that's true, we have to think, you know, that patton is "a," the most insecure person in the world, "b," that the most -- that patton thought the most effective way to deal with a spy was to put him on his staff. you know, unlike the other quote/unquote spy or fact finders like these other guys that are basically being frozen

out by other commanders. and that patton, even with all of that, just, you know, just thought that that was the best way to deal with bradley was to, you know, stick him in this position and got give him any authority. and the problem is, you look at the record. bradley, patton comes to trust bradley. you know, in just about everything. he has bradley fire an important general who happens to have been a mentor of bradley's. bradley ends up doing a lot of the planning not only while patton is there, but then patton leaves and bradley takes over. bradley's the guy that comes up with all of the plans and stuff, the end game in tunisia. plans, by the way, in a campaign that's praised for this great, fantastic armored assault! and only a genius like george patton could have done it.

well, the truth of the matter is -- and you have all of these stories that say that -- the truth of the matter is, patton's back in casablanca planning to invade sicily. his plans were bradley. bradley was the guy, for better or worse, who did all that planning. he's really the guy, and he didn't get the credit -- for the most part, he didn't get the credit in the news stories at the time. a few -- eisenhower tried to -- and some of the staff tries to correct the record, brought the reporters in and said, you know, bradley was really the guy. bradley actually came up with this stuff. you should give him some credit. and so there's a couple of news stories, including one that's in bradley's personal scrapbook that says, well, you know, the war -- the campaign had entered a different kind of phase. we needed a different kind of warfare, so bradley was there. you know, i'm not sure whether we went from africa to greenland or something. suddenly they weren't using tanks across the plains of tunisia. i don't know.

there really was no different phase. they needed patton to go back and to plan for sicily. so, you know, again, it's one of those things that unfortunately historians tend to find -- and i'm sure i've done it as well -- we tend to find those smoking guns or those little moments. and those moments, unfortunately, helped distort history rather than illuminate it. >> after you did all the research and wrote the book, what do you think was the most intriguing thing about bradley, to you? >> one of the things i think that's interesting to me about bradley is that he was -- he was able to be in like a really nice guy when it came to anyone from sergeant level on down. and his junior officers. and he did deal with people with a lot of respect, i have to say. and yet at the same time, he was

basically a blood-thirsty general. i mean, there's a situation -- there's an incident in normandy where american soldiers, unfortunately, at the time some germans would pretend to surrender. they'd have a grenade under them and blow themselves up and kill a couple of the americans. and bradley was told about that. they'd say, well, general, what do you think? bradley said, "good, goddamn it. it's about time. maybe they won't be so stupid taking prisoners." that's a pretty blood-thirsty thing. i know that would not be politically correct today, but he had that side of him. and again and again, we have to kill the germans. the way we're going to win this war is to kill people. you know, it's a terrible thing. it's kind of, you know, a strange thing to be saying. and yet it is, unfortunately, the ultimate value of war. you try to stay out of war as much as you can but once you're in it, you're in it. and that's how he believed. >> in your opinion, after doing

all of this research, you know, you mentioned that he was involved in north africa and then again in the d-day invasion. what do you think was his most significant tactical victory? >> actually, that's actually a pretty easy question. cobra was -- there's very few battles -- there's almost no battles in -- certainly in world war ii, and absolutely now where you can say, well, one general was responsible for this victory or something. cobra, which is the breakout from the -- it's not from the beach heads, but it's from the peninsula, was absolutely planned, and there's good documentation on this, was absolutely planned by bradley. and he came up with a very innovative use of strategic air power using it tactically.

the way that he moved his troops afterwards. you know, i don't know -- you know, i don't know how we would rate it in the great scheme of things. that's tough to stay. clearly he is the man on that battle. and there's a lot of cases where you say, well, patton kind of altered this or that. but really, cobra is bradley. it's like the one case of that war where you can say, well, this one guy really is the guy that came up with this plan. and at the time, and he didn't want trench warfare. and the british had failed -- the british original plan had totally failed. and frankly, some of the interim plans before cobra hadn't done -- they hadn't really succeeded either. cobra -- bradley really sees cobra as the last chance to get out of there and to avoid world war i which he absolutely hated. he's often said that he's kind of a plot against the germans, but he's actually entirely the opposite. he didn't want to go anywhere near that kind of war.

>> sir. say your name first. >> how you doing? james willjek. i write for the marist circle. i know you said it took you four or five years ago to finally -- >> i don't like to admit how long it actually took. it might even have taken longer. >> with all of your research and everything that you covered, was there any experience that was rewarding to you that you walked away from after you were finished writing the novel? >> i think, to be honest with you, the research, if i didn't like it, you know, i wouldn't do it. the amazing thing is to find, to hold the original document in your hands or a copy of the original document and say, this is tremendous. to look at the maps, the campaign maps or we call them campaign maps, the real ones bradley had.

i mean that's almost like kind of a ridiculously emotional or spiritual moment but those moments you kind of think about always -- the day that you finish the book, perfect. the greatest feeling in the world. unfortunately, then the editor checks in and it goes downhill from there. trying to get more attention to bradley or correcting or adding to the historical record is extremely gratifying. because there's something, in my mind, hopefully -- i don't think this is the last book on omar bradley. i think the next book will be better and the next after that a lot better. people reading those books 50 years from now probably -- certainly ereaders, however they're doing it are going to

learn a lot more about how to win a war. maybe how to prevent a war than we really know, but to have a small piece of that i think is tremendous. it's a high, really. . >> i know patton said a good plan now is better than a great plan executed later. is bradley's more cautious approach to leadership and the thinking about taking action, did that of conflict with or limit patton's plans? >> no. actually -- i don't know that -- i think that bradley wasn't so much -- bradley was cautious in dealing with patton, because basically, anybody compared to george patton is going to be -- is going to seem what cautious, you know. no, george. we're not going to do an end run around europe and attack from the back end. we're going this way.

bradley, when you actually look at a lot of his plan, he's not particularly cautious. as a matter of fact, he actually turns out to be fairly aggressive, and i think that one of the key things with bradley is that he was willing to revise his plans on the fly, when after the breakout, as the breakout from normandy peninsula, bradley actually changes the plan. patton basically take as right turn. he's supposed to take breaths, and one of -- and patton is following the plan and bradley comes up and says, no, no, no, no, no. let's go this way. these guys are over there and totally tear up the plan. fortunately, some of patton the lieutenants had actually been suggesting it, and patton had objected to that, but bradley said, no. the fight is over here. let's go. so bradley was actually very aggressive. he's just not -- you know, it's hard to compare his aggressiveness, you know, when

you're contrasting with patton. patton was sometimes a little too far over the top and bradley would bring him back a little bit. with hodges, it's totally the opposite and that's one of the reasons hodges gets beyond the rise. go, go, go. it really depends on the situation. >> last question. >> john wesley, hi. point of '94. looking at leadership one of the things we all want to know is kind of leadership styles. my kwep for you is kind of, how would you summarize his leadership style and if there was kind of a one story that you would summarize that with? >> i think -- that's a really good question, and the thing with bradley is it changes over time. as a younger man, as a young officer, he -- he's very

athletic harks kind of a physical presence and while he's a little bit -- he had denture problems and was a little self-conscious about that, he's able to use his physical presence in a quiet way to be a leader. in a lot of waifs like the leader, the manager of a baseball team might kind of adjust how he goes. give one guy a pat on the back. one guy a talking to. one guy a rah, rah, rah. that's kind of his style through -- as he goes on, although obviously as he gets older, when he's up to 30, i think he has a lot more -- he depends on somewhehaving done h homework. he's a very quick study. also, he's a master of whatever it is they're talking about. whatever tactics they're doing or something. not that he won't listen. not that he doesn't want input, but he knows what's going on. he knows the abilities of what a

division, as corps commander says, in the second world war generally had two or three divisions. as a corps commander he knew what divisions could do because he trained them. he had the 82nd infantry division and did such a good job in the 82nd airborne and he knows how to use the smaller units. so people listened to him, because he was very knowledgeable and because he's willing to listen to them. they know he has a lot of respect, but he's willing to let them take credit. you know, he let's them lead the march into, you know, into the city that they've taken and he'd rather work on his thing. i think because of that, first they can see that he respects them, that, therefore, they're willing to you know, to turn their respect there. it's a little bit different. as i say, as he gets older, you can't use that physical stuff, because he's not -- not that he's not, you know, an active guy or general, but let's face

it. when you start hitting -- you get a little older, the 20-year-olds are going to have a -- you're going to have a tough time keeping up with him. although there are stories of him doing forced marches with allegedly -- "allegedly" helping the privates and the privates didn't realize it was a general who was there. i think that's hokey. any private that can't figure out that's a general marching alongside him is a pretty dumb wit, but -- >> jim, thank you very much for sharing your thoughts on omar bradley. it's wonderful to have you return to your alma mater. i'd like to showcase those who are successful, made great use of this education there. let this be an inspiration to all of you who are students. you can grow to be a great writer. you just have to be persistent and you have to be talented, and you see both of those here tonight. the other thing did you is you brought general bradley to life. when i was a cadet as looked at

bradley barracks. a stone granite barracks, and here tonight you've made that barracks become the man that really helped to win that great war in world war ii. so thank you, sir, for your insights and your presence. [ applause ] >> i'd also like to plenty with a copy of the hudson valley review. my students are reading this and they'll try and catch up with you. enjoy that. maybe you'll even read the article some day. >> thank you very much. thanks everybody for coming out. i think we'll do a book signing, or if anybody has any other question, talk when the program's over, i'll be happy to take them on. thanks again. thank you very much. mr. gorbachev, tear down this wall.

>> sunday nigh at 9:00 pacific, mark the 20th anniversary of ronald reagan's 1980 speech from the brandenburg wall's in jest germany. also this weekend on c-span3, our series the contenders. 14 key political figures who ran for president and lost but changed political history. this sunday at 7:30 p.m., 1884 republican candidate james blaine. american history tv. this weekend on c-span3. join american history tv next saturday, june 16th for an in-depth look at war of 1812. it's the bicentennial of this little known war and we'll learn how it bolsters america's international sensibility fostered patriotism and gave us our national anthem. the war of 1812, saturday june 16th live from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. eastern here on

american history tv on c-span3. the b-52, you know, everyone thinks back to vietnam. they think linebacker operations. they think of the history of the b-52. cold war. so there's a different kind of power associated with the b-52 as opposed to other long-range bombers. these are two friends. union and confederate, who knew each other prior to the civil war, who fought against each other at the battle of pea ridge in 1862 and here they are at age 100 sitting on the porch talking about the old days. >> we have one to the east is marked 9:01. the gate to the west is marked 9:03 and they really reflect or reference the moment of the bomb, which was at 9:02. >> watch for the travels of c-span's local content vehicles every month on book tv and american history tv and look for the history and literary culture of our next stop in