soviet union to change. instead, shows gorbachev how much he to gain from an relationship with america, reagan persuaded if was safe to open up the communist bloc which bolster the our interests as well. i think the second lesson is related to the first and that is that patience is a virtue. it took reagan five years to find a partner moscow with whom he could negotiate, and it too another three years to actually reach an arms control agreement with gorbachev. in other words, it took his entire presidency, essentially, to reach any agreement with the u.s.s.r. to slow the arms race and that came after four decades of american policy during the cold war during which american presidents mix the resolve and diplomacy to defend u.s. 2re69s and in the case of ber layne city deep in its opponents sphere of influence without ever provoking an actual shooting war wir the soviet union pand even cold wars take time to win.

that's worth keeping in mind as the u.s. and its allies try to obtain ambitions of countries like iran, showing no inclination to limit their newer check programs. convincing iranians to give up the nuclear ambitions won't happen overnight if the it happens at all. in my mind, that's no reason not to try. while the frustration many americans feel about the current struggle in afghanistan and the add min installation's deliberation over wlaer to do there is understandable, it's important to remember that american trechts are almost always better served through prudence rather than rash and impatient action. finally, reagan's speech in berlin is a reminder that for presidents, words really do matter. i hoped with ronald reagan the line or joke about hard work. but reagan really did work hard. he worked hard on his speeches. he rehearsed them over and over, even the ones he delivered hundreds of times before and he rewrote many of them entirely from scratch. he did this, because he

recognized, as james baker told me, that giving speeches is one of the president's most important duties. reagan's gift was his ability to speak candidly about the realities of the age while still presenting an optimistic vision for the future. in his best speech, most. he ramably in my mind at the brandenburg gate, found a way to defend american interests and inspire people to believe that the world really could become a better place. and the challenge for our current president and i think all those that succeed him will be to do the same. i've now spoken for longer than ronald reagan did in berlin so i hope you enjoys book and i'm ready to take any questions that you might have. thank you. yes, in the back. >> i have a question. thank you very much for your presentation. during this time period, what -- what was gorbachev's vision and

expectations and hopes for the soviet union and for russia at this time, and how did his relationship with reagan affect his vision and his -- his hope for the future for his country? >> yeah. so the question is about what gorbachev was trying to achieve and what his vision for his country was at the time. you know, gorbachev was a patriot. gorbachev gorbachev admired the early leaders of the soviet union and their ability to lift a poor country into the modern age. he believed that the soviet and socialist experiment should be saved. that's what he was trying to do. he believed it hl to be reformed. he believed that the country's priorities had gone completely out of whack spending something like 21% of gdp on defense

spending. all of those thoughts he thought needed to be reined in and it was ultimately futile for the soviets to try to maintain their grip on eastern europe. so i believe that he -- he never intended for the soviet union to dissolve. he believed that perhaps if you shrunk the soviet empire and you reined it in and you -- you basically told the governments of eastern europe that the soviet union was no longer going to come to their defense if they faced some internal threat, that, that would be sort of manageable, a manageable way in which you could sustain the socialist experiment. you could mend it, not end it. but i think he also did firmly believe and he recognized early on that the soviet union needed to become integrated with the rest of the world and that as long as you had this hostility between the soviets in the west

between soviet union and moscow that was impossible and he believed would onlien achieved if he reached some agreement with reagan and recognized reagan was someone he to could business with. yes? the question is about what putin was doing. well, i talk a little bit about that in the book. putin was, as a kgb agent, based in dresden in east germany. he was basically involved with recruiting east germans who could basically pass at west germans and travel to the west and spy on nato. that was the main, the main nation putin and his fellow kgb agents wereta tasked with. he drove a better car than the east germans themselves. he was living at home, but what

happens is that by the end, when the wall comes down, putin talks about this in his autobiography, he was at his station in dresden and after the wall came down, the station was besieged by east germans basically finally had decided they'd had enough of the russians and who they worked with, the east german state police, and there's a scene where putin and his agents are basically burning so many of their files they'd gathered on people, that the furnace burst, and he actually called the local division of the red army that was in a barracks nearby and asked them to come and defend him, and he never came. and he wrote that this was deeply shocking to him. that this country that he served and believed in basically had disappeared overnight, and in many ways, you know, it's one of those moments that i think probably had a formative impact

on him and fueled his desire to try to bring russia back. yes, sir? >> yes. i appreciate your informative talk. you've obviously researched gorbachev's letters. were you able to talk to him or any of his aides to get any background from their side? >> yeah, i did. i did meet gorbachev earlier this spring and talked to some of the people who -- who served with him. and you know, gorbachev -- i think feels that his role has been overlooked to some extent. i think he feels certainly in russia that he is a forgotten man, and he's not a popular figure there. which is unfortunate, because i think what he was trying to do, as i said, was save the russian empire, not destroy it.

but, you know, he's blamed by a lot of russians for essentially giving away the store and l allowing the west to turn russia into a vessel of economies. but he's had a little resurgence. out front in this campaign to push for a world without nuclear weapons. others involved as well so. so i think he's having a little bit of a resurgence and met obama in the white house. so i think his reputation will rise again as time goes on. let me take one over here. sure. >> [ inaudible ]. >> well, he was younger, for one thing. he was the youngest member of

the politburo when he became the general secretary. and so he had a different perspective. what made him different? i think he recognized far earlier than others that the system itself was corrupt. and that it could not go on as it was and maintain the support of the people, if he didn't if it didn't undergo pretty drastic reform. and you know, the soviet system was a very complicated place, and i think in many case, people -- pursued nings th s t basically in their own bureaucratic interests not necessarily in the interests of the people as a whole. i think gorbachev recognized that the longer that went on, the more and more they would

lose the support of the people and that ultimately that had to change. i think he also was willing and happened to be someone open top seeing reiagan in a different light. the soviets sought reagan at the ultimate hard-liner, thought he was a very dang eerrous guy and gorbachev saw that reagan was different from the image people created of him. >> yeah. did vice president bush play any role in the speech, reagan's -- you know, just this event? >> well, as far as i can tell, vice president bush was not really involved in a direct way in the reagan speech's in

berlin. bush when he became president had a different view about gorbachev than reagan did. bush believed that reagan had gone too far in developing this personal relationship with gorbachev. and so the bush people actually, when they came into office, basically ordered a pause or a halt in our dealings with gosh clave. they thought we had to depersonalize the relationship, because the longer we personalized it the longer we would be taken for a ride and our interests wouldn't be served, but basically, by april, may of 1989, they could see that things were just moving at a pace that was unstoppable, and they realized that gorbachev was very much letting that happen. and as soon as they recognized that, i think bush came to develop a much warmer feeling towards gorbachev and a more cooperative relationship with him and ultimately bush and gorbachev worked together very

closely on german reunification in the 1990s. so, you know, bush was an important adviser to reagan, but there were a lot of powerful people. george shultz and others, and george shultz i think was probably the most influential foreign policy figure in the second half of the reagan white house. yeah? >> what was the interplay between the u.s. and west germany chancellor kohl's party? i was at the city when the speech was actually given, and we 2r56traveled out to temphalf they had a huge party for press reagan and the chancellor. was there any interplay between chancellor kohl and president

reagan? >> yeah. i mean, they were very good friends, kohl and reagan. the west germans had an interesting role in the sneetpe in at least the authorities in the city in west berlin were very nervous about the speech. they thought, a, very nervous about the protests taking place and there was going to be just huge demonstrations against reagan when he came. so that there was actually a huge police mobilization. you may remember, more police called up that day than i think at any time in the history of the city. and they specifically did not want him to give the speech at the brandenburg gate, but because according to the rules that were established at the end of world war ii, technically, berlin -- west berlin, the entire city was under the control legally of the four powers. not the west government. so the united states representatives there could say,

well, you don't want us to do it at the brandenburg gate. too a bad. that's where we want to do it. and they. that's essentially what they did. kohl is a very important figure, because he was one of the people hoop -- who always had, focused on unification. the goal was, was one germany. there are a lot of people in the west and the east who were willing to live with and felt that it was preferable in some ways to live with two system, but converge. and kohl always has eyes on eventually a united germany, and that was a vision reagan shared. so they -- they had that pretty much in common, and kohl, on the night-i mention this in the book. on the night that germany was formally unified, kohl called

bush, and said, i've just come back from berlin, and there were -- 100,000 people celebrating on the very spot where president reagan called on gorbachev to open the brandenburg brigade. on that very night he thought back to the reagan speech. yes? >> the -- [ inaudible ] the crack in the wall during the berlin airlift and its failure to keep things -- frozen? >> yeah. the question is about the role of harry truman and the berlin airlift, and absolutely, i -- the first chapter of the book is a sort of brief history of berlin and the dispute over berlin that unfolds after world war ii. and, yes. if you remember that the city had been divided into -- into

four sectors. the western powers ended up fusing their sectors, and introducing a new currency. the easterns refused to -- or the soviets refused to allow that currency to be used in their sectors. they introduced their own currency. and then sdipded ed tdecided t access from west berlin to the west of -- certainly you remember, berlin sits in east germany, which was occupied by the soviets and at that point, harry truman decides we're not leaving berlin and we're going to airlift goods and supplies into our sectors to -- to the people there. that was hugely important, because i think it showed that the western powers were not going to abandon the city. i think it turned a lot of the

attitudes of berliners in our favor and against the soviets and then this is -- berlin became the kind of central theater of the u.s. soviet conflict and i think a lot of people predicted that if there was going to be a nuclear -- if there was going to be a war between the united states and the soviet union it would be over berlin, and -- but throughout all the year, despite the city was so deep in the opponents' sector, the west never left it, and that is as much a part of the story, i think, and explains why the wall ultimately came down, if anything. >> yeah? >> one of the -- primary underestimations of ronald reagan, the greatest mistake people made, they underestimated him, and i think he the idea.

there's a saying, nothing more strong than an idea whose time has come. he had that idea long before that time had come, but having said that, what impact do you think that the pope had with respect to that idea that he implanted in poland about nine, ten years -- >> the question was the imt ppa of the pope. obviously, he had a major one and one we only learned about as time has gone on. you know, the pope early on, after the crackdown on the solidarity movement in poland, the pope established ties to the labor movement in poland and secretly was lending his support to -- to the clerg hiy who forma kind of alliance with the

workers against the communist government. so i think the pope also as a -- as a sort of spokesperson and a moral example to those living in the, behind the iron curtain, i think, was hugely important. and reagan before he went to berlin appropriately enough, met with the pope in rome, and discussed his dealings with gorbachev and the pope was on his way to make another trip to poland, and actually, you asked about kohl's involvement in the speech that shortly after reagan gave the speech, he and kohl met together right before reagan left for, to come back to washington, and they were at an airport waiting lounge, and kohl brought up the pope's visit to poland, and he said, you know, ronnie, he had a million people come out to see him, and reagan said, if i could get crowds like that, i never would have left hollywood. [ laughter ]

so -- yes? >> [ inaudible ]. >> right. this question is about this question is about margaret thatcher's impact. obviously she was someone who shared many of reagan's views about the need for communism to be defeated. she i think was not nearly as optimistic as he was about the prospects that you could actually end the conflict. but i think what she did was face down a lot of opposition that was growing throughout western europe to reagan's policies and the effort to take a more aggressive posture in response to what the soviets were doing in eastern europe.

so when the united states decided to deploy the missiles to west germany and to britain, thatcher was one of those people who really led the fight and stood tall and was determined that that would be -- should be done. she thought actually that a lot of reagan's ideas about a world without nuclear weapons and negotiating an end to the arms race she thought like many conservatives here she thought that was somewhat naive. but i do think she was extremely important for being so steadfast. i think also, you know, the recovery of the western european economies in the late '70s and early '80s was very important. it was not entirely evident that the western capitalist model at least in western europe was actually going to thrive.

and was actually, you know, going to provide better living standards than socialist model. there were a lot of questions about it. i think the fact that those economies recovered and became as dynamic as they did in the '70s and '80s highlighted this gap between the west and east that reagans and others called attention to and were able to exploit and ultimately i think convince a lot of people on the other side that they were better off with a different system. yes. >> did you see or hear or did anybody discuss the connection of his speech in berlin. >> the question is about whether people connected the reagan speech, the kennedy berlin speech. yes. the kennedy speech is -- remains one of the most important

moments for germans since the second world war. it was a much different moment. the wall had only recently gone up. it was an incredibly emotional moment. kennedy said that he was actually a little worried that people might try to tear down the wall after he gave his speech. they were so whipped into a frenzy. the reagan people were very conscious of not trying to duplicate what kennedy did. they knew they were not going to get a million people in streets as kennedy did. he had about 500,000 people there in the city square. peter robinson who was the main speech writer of tear down this wall watched and told me he watched the kennedy speech. he was very conscious that he didn't want to invoke it. and so that also influenced the site selection. the reagan people didn't want

his speech compared unfavorably to the kennedy speech. they wanted to pick a location that would look just as grand and have just as much stature which is one of the reasons the brandenburg gate was so appealing but would be in an area that would not look like it was empty if he didn't have 500,000 people there. so the west berlin government actually asked him do you want to do it at the same place where kennedy did? and they said, no. >> i was wondering how the actions and policies of the president's previous to reagan during the cold war affected what he was able to do? >> the question is how did the actions of the president's prior to reagan affect what he was able to do. well, as i said, i think this

story, this story of the cold war and the peaceful end to the cold war is one that is not just about reagan. it's about a whole set of policies that were put into place in the immediate aftermath of world war ii. all of which i think formed the foundation for what reagan was eventually able to do. that's everything from the establishment of nato, which i think was hugely important. the rehabilitation of western europe through the marshal plan. and the efforts that were made that were very real by administrations proceeding reagan to try to reach some sort of understanding with the soviets. reagan was not the first person and not the first american president to have a relationship with a soviet leader.

and others had tried to establish and open a dialogue with the soviet union. john kennedy was one of those people. and there's some evidence that had he lived, he was moving toward a relationship with cruise clever that may have slowed the arms race and the cold war. i think reagan was building on a foundation. but he came along at a time when there was a partner in moscow who he could work with. i think gorbachev is really significant. there was no one quite like him until he came along. we have time for one more. bl it's been said that ronald reagan intended to bankrupt the soviet union during his administration military spending went up dramatically. the soviets then tried to match

that henceforth the 25% of their gdp. was there a master plan of the reagan administration to bankrupt the soviet union? >> so the question is about whether the reagan white house had a plan to bankrupt the soviet union. they certainly did have a strategy. they did believe that the soviet union and reagan really believed this from the get to that the soviet economy was weak and that it would crumble under pressure. their ability to actually, you know, carry out that strategy is not entirely clear. it's not clear there's anything the united states could have done. we had sanctions imposed on them. there were efforts made that probably on the margins did make a difference or at least continue to soak up more of

russia's spending. i don't think there's any single thing we could have done that on its own could have bankrupted the soviets. but certainly under pressure that the administration was putting on the soviets in afghanistan made a difference. i think there's some evidence that by encouraging the opec countries to boost production and lower the price of oil that that really damaged the soviet economy. as i said, i think economic explanations and the idea that economic collapse is what brought the soviet union down is not entirely satisfying. because many countries can survive for long periods with weak economies. it has to require someone to make a decision to change and i think that's what gorbachev did and that's what unleeched all these events that ultimately

ended the cold war. [ applause ] thank you. >> mr. gorbachev, tear down this wall. >> sunday nigh at 9:00 eastern and pacific on american history tv, mark the 25th anniversary of president ronald reagan's 1987 speech from the brandenburg gate in west germany. also this weekend on c-span3, our series the contenders. 14 key political figures what ran for president and lost. but changed political history. this sunday at 7:30 p.m., 1884 republican candidate james blaine. american history tv. this weekend on c-span3. this is c-span3 with politics and public affairs programming throughout the week and every weekend 48 hours of people and events tellin