ourselves be harassed out of it. but he had a lot of opposition in washington. one was mac bundy, one was dean rusk, secretary of state who said to clay, you shouldn't react to everything that the soviets and east germans do. you should only react to when they affect our vital interests. nobody knew exactly what that meant. in any case, clay didn't listen to him. the british prime minister harold mcmillen who wanted us out of berlin and he told kennedy that, called clie a senile imbitered old as which was not a term of endearment, but which reflected the british policy. i wonder if the documents show some of this. the british attitude on this was really very different from

clay's. check point charlie. on october 22nd, when alane lightener was trying to go to easter be lin to watch the opera he was stopped demanding additional identification which he wouldn't show. clay was notified. he sent a squad of soldiers. they escorted him in and out. american soldiers could go through that check point and east germans had no authority to stop them. in fact, within 24 hours the east germans were no longer at the check point. there were just soviets there manning it. they were not going to take a chance. now a week earlier, clay had sent kennedy a cable, which i saw. and he said our problem is that the sovietings are letting the east jer mbas harass us and do things while they themselves stay in the background. so they bet up on us but they themselves appear to take no

responsibility. the next time this happens i'm going to confront them and i'm going to force the soviets to show their hand. and clay saw this as the ideal opportunity. after alan left that evening, we waited a couple of days and then clay sent in a patrol, a um couple of g.i.'s in civilian clothes to try to do the same thing. well, low and behold they were stopped. we walked them through with squads of soldiers with bayonets drawn. this went on for several days. about the third day, clay brought up a group of tanks, a squad of tapgs. or platoon, i don't know. about ten tanks. which was about 1/3 of all that we had in west berlin. and he brought them up not to the check point itself, but to one of the many empty lots around there. a soviet officer walked over the

line, which they could do, they were authorized to come into west berlin. he looked around and he said we have tanks too. which was not exactly a mystery to us. and low and behold within 24 hours, there was a group of soviet tanks that appeared on an empty lot in east berlin. their markings had been rubbed down and covered so they could have been east german. but journalists and others went up to those tanks and heard the crew speaking russian. we knew they were russian. clay was delighted. he said this is exactly what i told kennedy i wanted to have. i wanted the russians to come forward. so the next thing he did was to bring the american tanks right up to the check point. well then we had an odd ballet. we brought our tanks up to the check point and then pulled them back. then the russians came up to the check point and pulled back. it went on like this for a while. then suddenly on the evening of

the 27th, the day we sl brat today, the 50th anniversary, both groups of tanks appeared at the same time. they faced each other about 100 feet apart. with their guns pointing directly at each other. well, big crisis. all the journalists said this is a potential war. the soviets and americans are facing each other directly. we've got to do something about that. and kennedy's people came to him and said you have got to order clay to pull back the american tanks. and clay said -- excuse me, kennedy said i'm not going to order clay to do anything until i talk to him. he called clay. and he said, general, what's going on? and when clay said, hole he, mr. president, the operation center

in berlin fell dead silent. they wanted to know what was going to be said. what was said was this, kennedy said what is happening, can you tell me? clay said, all very calm. it's all very relaxed. soviets have brought up ten tanks which is what we have. they could have brought up 1,000 tanks, but they didn't. it's a sign that they don't want trouble. we can go on and stabilize the situation but we don't need to worry. kennedy said to him -- can something get me a glass of water. thank you. kennedy said to him, don't lose your nerve. clay replied, mr. president, we're not worried about our nerves, we're worried about the nerves of the people in washington.

and kennedy replied, some people here have lost their nerve, but i haven't. one of the most important things that kennedy ever said because it showed that by then he'd gotten the drift of what was necessary. there were times when it was just required in the berlin situation to hang tough. and that's what he did. next morning the tanks left. but in any case, the point was that the soviets had been shown that they could not play this game any longer. and they didn't play it any longer. from then on, we had more direct confrontations. some of them weren't terribly pleasant. but there were things going on which we always felt was just enough to provoke attention, just enough to make us appear weak. but not enough to generate the

kind of crisis that would lead to war. check point charlie confrontation became one of the most important moments in the cold war. it became an important moment in berlin history. there's nothing very much to say about it because so many people have written about it, that's it's not worth talking too much. there was one other element of crisis, potential crisis. and that was in february of 1962, the soef yets not the east germans, the soviets began to reserve air space in the air corridors. air corridors aren't shown on that map, but one went north, one went south and one went straight west. the air corridors were limited to 10,000 feet through tra degrees which we accepted, but we didn't like it. what they would then say is we

want to reserve the air corridor, the southern air corridor from zero to 7,000 feet. or they would say we want to reserve the central corridor 7,000 to 10,000 feet. the idea being that they were trying to create a situation where our planes, our civilian aircraft could not fly into west ber rin along the altitudes that they had so-called reserved. clay objected to that. he said, we have got to fly through those zones. washington of course didn't want to do that, but again kennedy backed clay, saying no, you can fly through those zones. the berliners loved flying through those zones. any time they saw a zone reserved, they hoped to fly through it. they wanted to show that they were ready to resist whatever the soviets demanded.

it happened obviously that other people got involved. one of the people who didn't send all his cables to us, but we understood was involved was general -- i'll be happy to see what the documents revealed. what we understood was that nor stat wanted to take control of the civilian aircraft so that he could fly them in accordance with soviet directions. clay wanted us to fly fighter aircraft. through the reserve sections. kennedy would not do that. he thought that was too much. none of -- we flew right through the reserve zones. i may -- by may the reservation stopped. clay left shortly thereafter. we kept saying to ourselves, why has the harassment stopped?

why have the -- clay sent a message to kennedy saying, we have now ended the present crisis, but we should be prepared for something else. and that of course is what you know was the cuban missile crisis. in the summer of 1963, i'm almost through, i hope you survived. in the summer of 1962, the soviets began building pipelines across east germany from poland to the west german border. large pipelines to carry oil or gasoline for troops. they usually did this in conjunction with maneuvers. but they never went quite so far. there was a wonderful man at the

cia who briefed me on this. we all knew that it meant something, but we don't know what it meant. and interestingly enough by september soef yet troops began coming intoest germany and going close to the west german border and going close to berlin. so there was something going on. we didn't know what. we found out a little later when kennedy revealed that there -- that the soviets had installed missiles in cuba. khrushchev felt that the cuban missiles would help him solve the berlin crisis. he told interior soviet ewe dal who was visiting moscow at the time and who khrushchev called on much to surprise, that quote, we will put kennedy into a situation where it is necessary to solve the berlin problem. udall very per lexed and briefed

the president and said he didn't know what that meant. but it was obvious there was something in khrushchev's mind. he also called the german ambassador and said to him the same thing, essentially. we are going to solve the berlin problem. he went back in a message saying, i don't know what this means, but we have to take it very serious. a foreign minister in the meeting with kennedy which became famous because kennedy knew about the missiles but didn't tell the minister. told kennedy, that khrushchev was planning to go to the united nations that october and would hope at that point to meet with kennedy and settle the berlin problem. i have always felt this may be a bit of what they call special

interest that perhaps the missiles in cuba had as one of their missions, they had a lot of missions, but as one of their missions to begin putting pressure on kennedy very directly about berlin. that and the soviet forces on the west german border to tell others to shut up this time and perhaps to impress de gaulle would be the kinds of things which khrushchev would do to exert pressure on the allies to get them out of berlin. khrushchev later told his son that he had expected kennedy quote, to protest, to protest a little more and then to accept the missiles. he thought that kennedy would back down. kennedy by 1962 was a different man from what he had been in 1961. the evolution of young presidents is something that for those of you who enjoy writing

dissertations and thinking of topics, should look at. because it's a fascinating topic with respect to kennedy. kennedy was many things but one of them was enormously quick learner. and by 1962, by the fall of 1962 he had gone through the berlin crisis. he had known what worked. he had known what didn't work and he was ready to take the kind of action which you know. i'm not going to go through the details. you know the story of what happened in cuba. interestingly enough, the day that kennedy made his speech or the next day about the missiles, the soviet forces began withdrawing from east germany. and they began quickly to pick up the pipelines. which re-enforced our sense that there was a connection there. in november 1962, after the end of the berlin crisis, i happened

to be in new york. i met with general clay as i often did in new york at the lings club. we had a drink together. he said he believed that khrushchev would never have dared to try the cuban venture if kennedy had acted more firmly in berlin. that's a bit of special pleading, i recognize. but i still think that it's something that might be worthwhile for you to think about. pushing back hard on every occasion when khrushchev would try anything was in clay's mind the thing to do in order to discourage the soviets from trying something else. clay liked kennedy. >> kennedy liked him. they sent messages. kennedy sent several messages to clay saying everything that clay wrote kennedy had given instructions that he wanted to see. he did not want the general to be out of touch.

clay at least would do one thing which kennedy liked, which is that he could contradict everybody else. a person who's dheef chief executive wants one thing above all else, and that's a variety of decisions when there's a decision to be made. finally, kennedy's visit to berlin. june 26th, 196 3rk i was still there. it was one of the most incredible experiences of my life. i was not obviously in the lead car or caravan. but i was in one of the lead buses carrying white house people. at first they rather snickered at the berliners. people always like a parade. germans especially. i didn't say anything because it wasn't my function to say anything. but within about half an hour. they just sat there aghast.

they had never, never seen anything like this. you know, these were people who had done the campaigns and all this stuff in the united states where you drive around and there's crowds and so on. this was something unlike anything that they had ever seen before. kennedy, kennedy. it still rings in my head. any case, kennedy came to city hall. had a room to himself for a while to rest. two people were with him bob lock ner then the head of usia, a german interpreter, and another interpreter. kennedy looked at his speech. i've seen that speech in the kennedy library i've seen about four or five drafts and i can tell you that they are god awful. it was the kind of speech that he wouldn't even make to an

american crowd. yes, things are tough, but sooner or later one day the wall will fall and this kind of stuff. kennedy looked at it and he said i can't give the kind of speech to people who have talked to me this way. he decided to go back to his ole latin where he learned and to say -- there was a discussion of course, which all of you know, did he said, i am a jelly doughnut. no, he did not say i am a jelly doughnut. he said, i'm a berliner. i talked to vaber about this. very extraordinary. and i asked him what he had recommended. he said, i'd recommended i'm a berliner. nobody would have thought that kennedy was saying that he was a jelly doughnut. if he had said that, it would have implied that he had been

born in berlin, but when he said it, what he was really saying is i'm with you. so both vaber and lock ner agreed with that. vaber translated it and then kennedy said it twice and we all know the rest of the story. kennedy's widow jackie, used to complain. perhaps half in jest, that the most famous words kennedy ever spoke were in a foreign language. thank you. [ applause ] this year c-span's local content vehicles are traveling the country exploring american history. next, a look at our recent visit to wichita, kansas. you're watching american history tv. all weekend, every weekend on

c-span3. >> decided to start on a saturday. the strategy we was to scatter our seating. we would show up individually one by one, we did not go as a group because we went as paying customers, and i happened to be the first one to show up. i sat in the center of the lunch counter and the waitress came over to me and took my order, what would you like to have. i said well, i was surprised, i said to have a coke. and she brought the coke over to me. and i started drinking it. when peggy came in and she sat down and the waitress looked at peggy and looked at me and she came over to me and said you're not colored, are you, dear? i said yes, i am. and right away, her attitude

changed. she pulled away and she looked the other way, she no longer had any contact with me or any of the others. we just sat there and that was the beginning of the sit-in. >> dockum drugstore itself was a chain of drug stores nationally known, part of the rexall corporation, and there was a number of them throughout kansas and on the east coast. we thought we could evoke change through the rexall corporation, there would be a good chance that single standing drugstores and even other business establishments would not have any reason to continue, you know, to resist or have segregated seating. >> dockum's drugstore was a major drugstore located in the center of wichita. it was a main place for people to go during the lunch hour, for teenagers to go for a hamburger and a coke.

the policy of the store was that they did not serve colored, as we were called at that time, so we wanted to get something to purchase to eat, we would have to take it out or stand at the end of the lunch counter and then we were served in styrofoam containers. >> it was degrading, dehumanizing. you felt like something was wrong, you know. but you learned to cope with it and to ignore it. and there were exceptions. on occasion you might have seen a black person even at dockum's and there was another drugstore around here called woolsworth and one on the corner called grants. it always stuck out like a sore thumb when i would come in those establishments and kress's across the street where i used to work. occasionally you might have seen a black person but it was almost like an unwritten code, just don't make a habit of it and don't too many of you come at

one time. so it wouldn't be totally accurate to say that blacks were not served. they were, but you couldn't count on it. it wasn't systematic. >> this was 1958, summer of 1958. most of us had graduated from high school, were either attending a university or preparing to attend a university, or working locally. my mother was very involved in the naacp and she had civil rights attorneys coming by. one of them was franklin williams from the bay area in san francisco, and he came by and he spoke to a group of us at our home, and the idea of sitting in was mentioned, after talking to it with my cousin, ron walters, he was the president of the chapter and i was the vice president. we agreed that this is something we wanted to do and we wanted to carry it off ourselves. >> and when we heard this idea, we thought it was interesting.

but there was a downside to that as well. this was the early part of the 1950s, up until about the midpart. we were aware of the bludgeoning in 1955. we were aware of the little rock 9, nine black youth who tried to e integrate central high school. we were aware of rosa parks' efforts to desegregate the buses in montgomery. so we had to be aware of the potential for some very negative dangerous things that could have happened. at the same time, it certainly seemed like something that was socially just, socially righteous and made sense. >> so we decided to use the nonviolent approach that dr. martin luther king used here in

the united states, so we did this role playing at st. peter claver church, the basement of the rectory. we went there and would sit on stools and practice how we would react if we were pushed or insulted some sort of way or called out a name and we did this over and over until we felt comfortable in using the nonviolent approach. >> this is the site of the dockum building, where the dockum drugstore was located. obviously it's under reconstruction right now. just point out at least there is one structure that's still located here, that's this row of elevators that always caught our attention. a lot of people would come in and would use those elevators to go upstairs. i point that out because these would have been some of the patrons who would have used the

drugstore. there was a revolving door about right here, so most of us might have, when we were involved in the sit-in, actual sit-in, would have come in this entrance, but we would have also come in that back entrance so that it wouldn't necessarily appear that we were all coming in for the same purpose at the same time. that became evident after we started to take seats along the counters that would have been on this back wall here. we came there for a purpose. that was to make a purchase and to challenge a 50-year-old custom. we had drawn up some placards and unfortunately, we don't have one of them left, but they probably would say dockum's discriminates, we would like to

have service, something like that, and we would have them up and down the counter behind us so they would be at eye level. i was feeling uncomfortable about it. we took them down. but i went back behind a petition where the local manager was, and i reinforced, you know, we didn't come to cause trouble. we just would like to make a purchase, receive service like anyone else that comes in, and he went on to say something, the effect he was not the owner, he's just enforcing the policy of the store, but that he would be willing to arrange a meeting for our attorney who was one of our mentors, talking about attorney chet lewis and shortly thereafter, he called the store, made arrangements to have an interview with the owner of the dockum drugstore and i'm not sure we ever came back to work after that. >> we were the first to start

this and the rexall stores all over our country integrated as a result of what we did here in wichita, and we didn't know this at first, but eventually it came out that this is what their policy was all over the nation. rexall stores would not segregate to customers. >> there was one article in the white newspaper and at some point, there was an article in the black newspaper. for the most part, it wasn't talked about. it was almost as though the proponents and the antagonists were working together to keep it as quiet as possible. but for different reasons. but in and of itself, it was a small piece of a mosaic puzzle that was necessary. it was a part, i don't want to belittle it, but it took greensboro, it took oklahoma city, it took st. louis as well as wichita to finally get

justice for all people. >> we didn't intend to be the first in anything. we were simply trying to change things locally. this is our hometown. and as a result, i think the fabric of wichita changed for the better and is continuing to change for the better. it was just a great achievement for all of us. i am happy that i was a part of it. >> just because there may not have been the extremities of violence, the lack of human dignity is a lack of human dignity. if there's no progress at all and that happens when good men and women choose to live with and tolerate the status quo, it's better to strive for change than to live with the present when we know that things could be better. >> the b-52, everyone thinks back to vietnam, they think linebacker operations, they think of the history of the