because then when you have an actual runoff, not just dropping down the list, you know, whoever gets your vote, you have an actual runoff between two people so that the voters can look at them, size them up, listen to them, head to head, instead of divided up among a lot of other candidates, often, it's the one who won the first round, loses the second. so, you know, i think it has to be much more fundamental. i think it has to be opening it up to democracy. let every candidate who qualifies whether by filing fee or petition, signatures, whatever the state requires, be on the ballot, and let the voters choose among all of them. >> dr. fields. >> i wanted to ask you -- oh, sorry. i wanted to ask you if you could comment on the relationship between the extent of social crises in our country and on the

economic crises that we see in many areas? and i work as a medical doctor in health care, in education, in housing, transportation, energy. i mean, everything, the country is really -- enticed us in all these areas, and people live this every day. and it seems like there's a strong relationship between that and what you're talking about partisanship, people can't talk about really issues, about what's really going on. and i just wanted to ask you if you could comment on this and how to express that relationship to the person people. and to people in a way that is not just sort of playing partisan games which democrats and republicans do all the time but to talk about it in the way it has to do with fund mental need for political restructuring and for nonpartisanship in all areas. >> i can't give an answer as good as your question. that was a very good question. but i will say that one of the

things that happens is, when you have the kinds of crises that we have, you know, whether it's the banking system or the health care system, or whatever it is, you have so many problems, in a way, it works against fundamental reform because people become so focused on policy that they want. that trying to get them focused on systemic changes is much more difficult and they don't realize. well, if we elect the person who thinks the way i think, we're going to be better off. but then just as you saw with obama or we see with anybody, then they are part of the same system, and nothing gets changed. also, when you have problems as deep -- they're not just broad. but deep, as the ones that you talk about. the only way to deal with them is to get people of goodwill whose focus is not on the next

election, but on solving the problem, to sit down together. and that's not the crisis makes it harder to do that. but you've got to. you've got to. if you're starting out -- i mean, look. one of the things talking about obama, there were conservatives, after obama's election, yeah, there were conservatives who thought obama was a kenyan socialist. and there were liberals who were mad that he wasn't. you know, so it was all people laid out these extreme positions, and nobody started talking about -- well, how do you just get together and deal with the problem at hand. you know, so, there's no good answer to it. it's a real problem, but you put your finger on a very, very important problem we have right now. >> i would just add that i think what you're describing here how

do you create environments where problem-solving is the priority. and is possible. and i mean, this comes up a lot in various kinds of real politic situations, i'm sure you've dealt with this when you were in congress, mickey. but there's a lot of creative, innovative, new ways at looking at issues. whether it's in science or medicine or youth development, education, economic development. but the vested interests have to protect the constituencies, the special interests that they represent. and to go to the point you made earlier, mickey, about incentives. the incentive for innovation and bringing new ideas and new approaches to bear on sorm problems is very, very minimal. and in some ways, i think that's

the point of pressure. that's where we have to tackle the problem. we've got to create a new set of incentives so that innovation and development and new approaches to these issues can be brought in and experimented with and tried and examined and vested and you know, discussed, and all of that. but we just don't have that kind of system right now. >> that's what's so great about you bringing together law enforcement and innercity youth. bringing people together to talk. that's what's such a great thing about what you were talking about before. whether your group's on the left or the right, you resist the change because you have your constituency. you have your office. >> yeah. >> you have your title. so you want to hold on to that and real progress can't happen. >> yeah. >> exactly. >> ellie. >> i want to thank you for inviting me to this event.

it's very special. but you had mentioned earlier about, you know, the president really isn't in charge, it's the congress. and we learn those lessons in school. however, with the media, they make so much of the presidential election that really takes the focus away that congress is really running the country. is there any way that we could bring that back to the front for people to be made more aware of this? >> you know, first of all, don't get me started on the media. with the exception of c-span. but i've had the opportunity to do several things with sandra day o'connor. and if she were sitting here, she would say the problem is a failure in education. it's a failure in not only teaching critical thinking, which is not done very well

anymore, but a failure in teaching civics, teaching about our system of government. so people don't understand that. they don't know. a lot more people would worry about who they would vote for for congress than for president if, you know, if they understood the system and how it is supposed to work. but, you know, that's long-term. i don't know how you turn around an education system that doesn't work. a big media where being nasty gets rewards. you know, i'm sure jackie has done the same thing. i've been on many, many radio and tv shows. and if you're invited to be on, first, they do a pre-enter view, to make sure that you're going to be confrontational or not before they'll let you on the air. and so we're talking about a lot of basic reforms that need to be made. it's not just -- i mean, i want to change the election system,

the primary system, redistricting. but these problems are a lot deeper than that. we need some reawakening in america of what a true democracy requires. >> we actually have to stop, i'm sorry to say, but before we do, i want to put in a plug here. both jackie and mickey have books that are coming out this summer. but you don't have to wait, you can preorder them tonight at your favorite online book seller. so i want to give you the titles and make sure you go home and preorder their books. jackie's book is "independents rising: outsider movements, third parties and post partisan america." mickey's book "how to turn republicans and democrats into americans." both hit the bookshelves in

august, but i know you're going to want them in hand that very first day or in your kindle so preorder them tonight. i want to thank everyone for coming. i want to share with you my biggest take-away, and i can't thank you both enough for spending time with us. the most important thing about this event is all of you and everyone watching on c-span. what i hear you both saying is that it's up to us to continue to build a movement of very ordinary americans that can restructure the process, that can create a new cultural. that can create a new space for innovation and make some new demands. and i feel very energized by our dialogue tonight. i can't thank you both enough for being here. we'll see all you at the next politics for people. thank you so much. [ applause ] >> thank you.

>> thank you, mickey. in a few moments, a discussion of executive power. in an hour and 40 minutes a forum on the effects of climate change. now, a discussion of executive power. part of a conference on the federal government and the constitution, hosted by the federalist society at stanford university law school. panelists include former justice department officials from the clinton, bush, and obama

administrations. this is a little more than an hour and a half. testing. >> okay. welcome back. thank you for joining us for our panel. you'll be happy to note that professor u. did get his photo shoot. it turns out that vice president cheney did not recognize him. so we'll still have that for posterity. this panel -- first, an announcement. two of our panelists, professor yu and professor levinson will be selling their new books during the lunch hour. there will be tables set up. so that will be happening at lunch. this panel is moderated by judge thomas griffith. he needs no introduction.

you have this bio in packages. judge griffith was appointed to the united states court of appeals by the united states district circuit by george w. bush. he has a b.a. from brigham young university and his j.d. is from the university of virginia school of law. he and his wife are the proud parents of six children and the grandparents of four. we're particularly proud to have the judge here. we were glad something could entice him to come back. >> thank you very much. a pleasure to be here. my congratulations to the conference organizers and thanks to michael, yvonne and barbara. although, eli, i wish you hadn't just remarked i was out here two weeks ago in light of mr. grey's comment, the last panelist at the d.c. circuit is woefully underworked.

so, good morning. for those of us who are familiar with gatherings of the federalist society, this is obligatory panel on the part of the constitution that seems to be of the greatest interests to federalist society event organizers everywhere. at least on a conservative administration is in power. those three enigmatic and inviting words in the constitution, "the executive power." as the moderator of this distinguished panel, i plan on being seen more than heard, but i do feel obliged to answer a question i know that my colleague and friend judge silberman would want me to answer before going further. what are you doing on a panel about the executive power? you know, my colleagues on the d.c. circuit, for whom i have boundless admiration make two assumptions about me, neither of which is correct. first, that my time as senate

legal counsel predisposes me to side with the congress in disputes between the political branches. and second, that my association with byu and its sponsoring church means i must know mitt romney. [ laughter ] about that first assumption, the fact that i once had a statutory obligation to defend the powers of the senate when they were called into question, and to advise the senate leadership how best to use those powers did not mean that i don't have an appreciation for the importance of executive power in the constitutional scheme. you may think that the impeachment trial of the president of the united states an odd place to display such appreciation, but as those of us who are involved in the clinton impeachment will recall, the senate leadership was committed to showing more respect to the office of president than mr. clinton had. for judge silberman and like-minded skeptics, i assure you i have no bias here. although i do note that the

powers of congress come first in the constitution, but we can talk about that. as you've seen from your materials, we have assembled a distinguished panel today. departing from the pattern used by judge baye last evening, i will provide brief introductions to all the panelists at once. and then turn the time over to them. in the order in which they'll be speaking today, we first have professor sanford levinson from the university of texas law school. he has written literally hundreds of articles and book reviews. and if i can add something personal here, his scholarship on the second amendment was of special interest to this member of the panel that first considered the case that was to become heller. but we're not here to talk about that. professor levinson is the author of five books, including one framed "america's 51 constitutions" in the crisis of governance which is coming up this month which was referred to

before. among the most recent publications, the 2010 article in the article of law review entitled constitutional dictatorships, its dangers and designs." next would be my friend professor john yu from law school. the professor's name is virtually synonymous with the robust powers. he's published on national constitution law and has served on three branches of government. assistant and a law clerk. professor tina cuellar is stanford local. glad to have stanford faculty

here. his research focus on administrative law, executive power and how organizations complement regulatory responsibilities involving public health, safety migration and international security in a changing world. in 2010 president obama appointed professor cuellar to the council of the administrative conference of the united states. last but certainly not least, professor john c. harrison who is the james madison distinguished professor of law at the university of virginia. waho wahoo-wah, that's a virginia thing. professor harrison's teaching subjects include constitutional history and federal courts. professor harrison also served as deputy in legal counsel. professor harrison was on leave

from law sochool to serve as officer in 2008. today's panel is titled "czars, libya and recent developments, perspectives on executive power." but we, after discussing the matter among ourselves, we took the prerogative to settle on a slightly narrower theme of the relationship between constitutional design and executive power. and we've broken down this issue into three questions. first, how does our constitution distribute power that is executive in nature among congress, the president and the bureaucracy? second, what are the benefits and problems of such a constitutional design? and third, what might an ideal constitutional design look like? to give each panelist sufficient time, i will vigorously monitor the time limits. we're going to ask each panelist to speak for ten minutes.

rather than passing notes as they approach that time, i will simply announce when one minute is left. and because i favor of the manner of chief justice roberts over his predecessor, i will not cut you off mid scillaable, but will allow you to finish. i turn it over to professor levinson. >> thank you. i do want to thank the organizers for inviting me here. i think the two panels so far have been outstanding. i've learned a lot. with regard to the title of the original panel because to go over that very quickly, and one of the reasons i think that this might not break down unusually predictable liberal conservative lines, with regard to czars, i tend to share the views of my very good friend bruce ackerman that it is very unfortunate development to have more and more czars appointed. i do think that the reason for more and more czars is the

failure of the senator actually to give timely hearings and bump people up and down. mike mcconnell averted to that in the last panel. but the rise of czars is something to be proud about. i disagree with the robust meeting of the war power and i therefore disagree with a number of the things that john has written. we could also talk about recent developments, things like that. but i do want to go to, you know, what we agreed on more was something to talk about because of my central interests these days and i want to tie this to both of the panels that we have had, the one last night on, among other things, line item

vito vitos -- vetoes and the last one. was the degree of radicalism shown by my good friend mike mcconnell is probably not usually described as a radical, but i think that john's professor michael did touch on some absolutely crucial issues that are similar to our particular topic. his debr that is to what degree the state, particularly if it is a modern state, and last night, i do think even richard epstein

waved the flag of surrender with regard to the existence of a very significant administrative state that will agree to a wide range of rule making, and as some of the speakers -- relevant mode of tradeoff between looking the experts or to look either at the demos, this is kind of the democratic approach to economic administration. and relevant to the chinese modality, it's not the demos with the correct political values and where politics is

seen as a choice of values rather than the articulation of rational means ends relationships where how you get there, where expert knowledge can be relevant, but there's one other way in which i appreciated michael's radicalism and think that actually didn't go far enough. there was two things, basic reform of congressional organization, which i strongly agree with. he has talked about the filibuster rules and other aspects of congressional organization and he also suggested and several other speakers suggested that it's time to return to the administrative procedure act, an act basically drafted in the mid '40s, still serves us well 60 years later. i am not a professor of law, i have no forms of -- what i

thoroughly applaud is michael's injunction that we actually look with a critical eye at whether the administrative procedure act really is fit for our present government and what has become my hobby horse in recent years is that i think we should have the same spirit of critical scrutiny toward the constitution of the united states. we could have an argument, though, frankly, it would not be very productive at this point with regard to the debates about, say john's view of his executive powers and those of his critics, it's a bit like a media convention and you can just shout out a number, you laugh or not, but everybody knows what the arguments are. i'm willing to stipulate, something i don't really believe, but i want to stipulate for the sake of argument that john gets it exactly right in

his reading what the constitution means, the fact that it was provide -- what i would ask us to think about, is even if, again, by stipulation, perhaps there was reason to do that in 1787, does it make much sense now? one thing about the kicks is they tend to be adults. there's no reason for the american revolution, other than george iii was one of the most inept kings of all time with regard to responding to the grievances of the colonists and if he had been more politically astute, if he accepted edmond burke's advice, for example, there's every reason to think that we would have ended up

like -- rather than a very destructive and bloody war, that got us or independence, not that i'm not glad we got our independence. in making the analogies, there's a lot of things wrong with monarchies, and one thing is that monarchies are not selected. something i think we should spend more time talking about is whatever you think the executive power means, and for purposes of this panel, i'm willing to defer to john, whether i agree with him or not. is the modern president likely to be somebody to whom we defer as much as we do across the spectrum of, say, commander in chief, chief economist, chief public health officer of the country, chief disaster specialist. and frankly, it seems to me that 20% true the answer is no.

that presidents of the united states are perhaps fairly extreme examples of amateurs versus experts. with regard to, say, the commander in chief power, i think the last president in whom i have genuine confidence was -- greatest military victory in history and a very important book that i read last year, called eisenhower 1956, frankly, in spite of my own politics, i ended that book relieved that i could beat stevenson for the presidency because i was able to stand up to the military. because he knew something about the military. since then, we have had a string of amateur presidents, some of

whom you might like, some of whom you don't. i'm not a fan of george w. bush, and therefore i was horrified by some of the things that john wrote about presidential power. i assumed that many of you in this room were no fans of bill clinton or barack obama in terms of their capacity to be kpas commander in chief, i think all of us are right, you wouldn't select out these people to make the decisions of peace and war, life and death. shift the financial crisis, one of the most interesting books on that was written by a reporter for "the wall street journal" whose name escapes me right now. one of the points he made, whether you like them or not, the decisions were made by the head of the fed, ben bernanke,

and who knows something about the economy. george w. bush is nowhere to be seen in this book and nobody in this review has suggested that he got it wrong. and frankly i am more reassured by bernanke, or other heads of the fed that i like more than bernanke, let's say busch or obama whom i supported with great pleasure. there are many -- one thing i found bizarre about last night's very, very interesting panel, is that the assumption of the line item vito.