this is one of the reasons we're here today, is there were lots of reforms after watergate. lots of reforms. the senate watergate committee, they recommended the creation of an independent counsel law. there were new finance campaign laws, very extensive. a creation of a federal elections commission. investigative journalism got a lot of money and it was suddenly out in the vogue. there were changes in everything from presidential papers and what a president could retain and what he could not retain and how long he could retain it. make a long story short, all these watergate reforms have vanished for one reason or another. campaign finance got affected by citizens united. the independent counsel law got affected by the fact that both sides got sufficiently gored by the law they decided not to revive it. the federal elections commission is literally something of a

joke. it's 6-6 and they can't even always agree on what time of day it is if they even want to meet. so citizens united opened up money the likes of which wife only begun to see in the process. so all those things that were designed to hopefully prevent another watergate have vanished, bar one. and that's the professional bar. it was striking to me to see that the reforms that came directly out of some testimony that i gave before the senate committee have stayed in place, and they are as important today as they were in the years immediately after watergate when the bar said, we're going to do something to give sensitivity training, to give information training so that the kind of mistakes that were made during watergate will never be repeated. i happen to be on a conversation with the american bar as having a session on this in june, and i

was talking with a couple of my predecessors who i have talked to on a number of occasions about other situations, and all of them talk about how watergate affected how they operated as white house counsel. but let's go back to the basic theme of my dialogue today with just those general opening remarks and really just open this up for anywhere anybody wants to go because there's so many avenues that might be interesting to explore. so if you don't stions, i'll just keep talking, but if you do have questions, i'd love to answer them. so let's have a show of hands who has got a question. all right. right here. >> please wait for the microphone. >> in watching some of the senate hearings, it strikes me that very few people are taking the fifth amendment.

why do you think that was? >> well, actually everybody -- a lot of things happened. different witnesses, different situations. those who were immunized technically had to take the fifth amendment before they could be immunized, but they did it privately. i think there was a definite desire by the committee not to have a repetition of what had happened during the mccarthy era where people were brought up and intentionally embarrassed just by taking the fifth amendment. so when it was necessary, it was done privately in executive session, and so that's why you would never see it publicly. other people didn't take it at all because they had their own version and they thought they could get away with it and didn't feel they were incriminating themselves. rather, there were really concocted versions. it's quite striking to me the perjury that was committed before the committee. how bob halderman as professor

rotunda mentioned when he got up here, could review the tapes, more than once he went through several of my conversations, made notes on them, and got up and told the senate exactly the opposite of what those conversations said. i mean, that's chutzpah. he really thought that, you know, these people have to be awfully dumb, they'll never get this information and i can get away with this. it was extremely dangerous. i read a passage just the other day in nixon's memoir where he truly believed he was not going to be forced to turn over the tapes. he thought he could successfully win and would not be forced on that issue. in fact, interestingly, he writes on april 10th in his diary of 1973 before they had been revealed, he has told

halderman he thinks we should destroy everything but the national security information. and then he later after alex reveals them remorses that they hadn't destroyed them. and the reason he didn't destroy them, i think i have a more complete answer than alex does, is it got too late. there were multiple subpoenas on them. technically the senate never successfully gets the tapes. only the prosecutors and the house impeachment committee is given without their subpoena not a lot of tapes but a handful, and then they get no more because what they do is they compare white house transcripts with the actual -- what the transcripts prepared by house judicial committee where they used people who had sight impairment, and so they had greatly sensitized ears to listen to these things. and it was pretty striking. i'm not -- i don't know how

intentional this was. it's one of the things that you talk about unanswered questions. one of the questions i had, see, you don't raise your hand, you're going to get a talk. one of the questions i had in working on this project is i went to the archives and i noticed that sealed in the archives, the last trip i happened to make there in march of last year was one of the more extended trips to gather material. i have visited my papers before and stuff in the watergate prosecutor's office before, but i just noticed this time in some of the early papers there was nixon's grand jury testimony that i thought that could raise some really interesting questions. he was brought before the grand jury after he had been pardoned. he had one risk in life, which was to falsely testify, to commit perjury. he's a bright enough man not to do that, and there was no reason

to not tell the truth in the -- and the areas interested me because they involved the used money, questions about falsifying the material that was supplied to the house judiciary committee, and giving them bowous tapes, the use of irs to attack his enemies. some interesting subjects. it makes no sense -- it's a sad thing that this information has never been put out, and i happened that afternoon to go down to gw to visit with a friend of mine down there who is now the dean -- one of the deans there, talking about allen morrison. i was telling allen, this would really help my research to have this, but, god, i don't know how i'd get it. you know, grand jury, that's sealed for life. that's out of reach. and allen shook his head, said, not so. i said what are you talking

about? he said, well, recently in the second circuit they have released the grand jury testimony of no less than richard nixon in the hiss case back from the mccarthy era. they have also released in the second circuit the grand jury testimony of julius and ethel ros rosenberg, that famous case. they have done so with hoffa in tennessee, and they're doing it on the basis of historical importance where the judge -- the district judge of the federal district court where the grand jury is sitting has the authority when he thinks necessary and appropriate for appropriate reasons can do it, and allen said historical reasons are justification. i said, well, this strikes me as a pretty good historical reason. well, not wanting to front this myself, i'm somewhat controversial, i got stanley

cutler, who had done this successfully with the tapes, and he got several other historical societies, i would file a declaration, but the best news allen gave me is that i think that public citizen, the group that nader started, the litigation group years ago, my be interested in this case and sure enough, they were. long story short, the case was filed, a petition was filed, went to a very conservative judge in the district of columb columbia, lambbreth. he looked at it and released the papers, so we now have this nixon grand jury stuff and it's fascinating. it's more insight into the man. and so these are -- you know, there's very little in many regards if you actually want to dig for it, it surprises me that after all these years we really don't know what's on the tapes. i want to tell you something else about the tapes that's very interesting. you can think of your next question while i'm doing this. i was surprised to find --

theoretically all of the private information is removed from the tapes. anything that's personal to the family, his conversations with private friend like b.b. on something totally unrelated to government. scott, you and i might discuss one day i think abuse of government power would be included, and that would have to be amongst the release. if it's b.b. and nixon discussing where they're going to go out on b.b.'s yacht. that's one thing. if they're talking about taking used money, that's another thing. that would certainly fall under the abuse of power. anyway, what i have discovered is that the -- in the process to prepare these tapes for public release, not everything got removed, and particularly with his wife and with his daughters. now, i had the very real public impression and given the fact

that some of the things i was doing for the president caused me to deal with not tricia as much as julie and her husband and with the first lady, state matters i was the liaison for that for these properties. i had to talk to his other lawyers and collect information. stuff that confused me as to who my client was as to being the office of the president or the president and it really i know now today we talk about this in our cle a great deal about representing the office of the president is what the white house counsel does. if he wants these other things done, he hires private counsel. but anyway, listening to these tapes, i was struck by this man has very different relationships with different people. different relationship with me than, say, halderman and ehrlichman and colson, but particularly different relationship with his wife and his daughters. a lovely relationship with his

wife and his daughters. everyone thought he was very cold towards pat, that he would never hold her hand or show any display of affection publicly. he obviously was shy publicly. but it's not true privately. he was very warm to his wife. the conversations that struck me is after he thinks he's got a peace accord with the vietnamese, with north vietnam, in january of '72, he doesn't call henry kissinger first, he calls pat nixon and says, pat, listen to this, and recites it. she says, oh, dick, i'm so thrilled. it's a lovely husband/wife conversation, like coming home from the off and here is what they talk about but he's calling from the office. same thing with the daughters, it's a lovely father/daughter relationship. it's a shame because we have a view of nixon that some of this stuff changes my views of him

that -- this is a much more multidimensional character than who i thought was just simply a corrupt man that i had finally discovered, so i'm trying to take that assessment as i go through this process as well. question? now we got one. >> i just want to make something clear, the senate watergate committee never called anyone publicly who took the fifth. if they took the fifth we gave them immunity and called them or we did not give them immunity and did not call them. >> did not embarrass them. >> you have the right to take the fifth. you don't have to take it publicly. we never took anyone who took the fifth. >> question over here, yes. >> i have often wondered how mark felt was able to get so much information and leak it. >> the question is how can mark felt get so much information in

detail. i'll tell you who stuns me more is how much information he would get wrong in detail. one of the things we learned and one of the reasons that -- i happened to just read a manuscript on what motivated felt by somebody who went back and talked to his colleagues in great detail. it will be out by the university of kansas i think next month. it's well done, and it's well documented what his role was. it explains why the investigation of watergate exceeded, if you will, the enthusiasm and the effort to investigate, say, the jfk assassination. it explains why the nixon white house couldn't get them to investigate leaks of national security, that they didn't care to bother with.

because felt wanted to embarrass pat gray out of his job. wanted to show the nixon white house that they'd selected the wrong guy and they had to select a hoover crony to come back in and take this transition period, and it's pretty clear. now, why did he get so much information wrong i don't know. i actually -- this scholar happened to notice i posted -- i was taking a long trip one day, 17-hour flight, and so i happened to carry all the president's men with me and i plucked out everything that felt had said and i knew the historical record well enough to say this is right or wrong. and particular stuff that related to me and from the tapes and what have you. and felt is about 50% wrong in the information he gave bob woodward, and that's pretty striking for your source. now, i don't know if he's got an agenda. bob couldn't check this out for years and now it's irrelevant to

really check it. he doesn't want to impeach his source, so it sits there. it's still misquoted often as being source material although it's clear who it's from. so felt is a bad source, if you will. and he's a clearly motivated source to move his boss -- temporary boss, pat gray, out of the job. question. isn't this better than me lecturing just all the way? just getting your thoughts. >> thank you, mr. dean. on the subject of legal ethics, could you talk a little bit about the deliberative process that you had before you went before the congress. >> right. >> giving information that you learned during the course of your client -- >> when i -- when i went in and told -- i didn't have early dealings with the president. one of the things we talk about in our cle is in fact, we decided to use the first week of

watergate as an example of how, if you want to make mistakes, we started making them right from the get-go in the way we handled it. and one of the issues that particularly has been changed and influenced by the post-watergate reforms and the development of the model code are the lawyers, one, clarity that he represents the organization and not the head of the organization as well as the reporting requirements where you report up to the top of the organization when you learn information of fraud and misconduct in the organization, particularly if you're an investigator, and in certain jurisdictions that have adopted the model code, you can have the leverage of saying to the top of the organization that if you don't do this, i feel compelled to resign with noise is one situation or report out in some

various forms. we get into this in some detail in the cle we're doing. california as it happens has not adopted all of the model code, rather some parts of it, and the model code is created not to develop a new brand of whistle-blower in lawyers, but rather give the lawyers some tools to work with with their clients in these tough situations. my situation i don't get to nixon until -- the break-in and the arrest occur on june 17th of '72. i don't start dealing with him on this subject, i deal with him on other subjects, but i'm enjoying that my responsibility -- you were told what you would be dealing with the president about. until he started asking me questions in late february of '73 i have no dealings with him. and i early begin to try to figure out how much he knows about what's really going on. i discover, for example, by

march 17th he doesn't know what's driving ehrlichman and others to protect the white house, which is the ellsburg break-in to uncover what dan ellsburg was doing by entering his psychiatric office. this goes back not to the re-election committee. it goes back to john ehrlichman and the white house which is troublesome. and this -- but nixon hasn't been told about this and he's really very surprised about it when i tell him about it. he later would say to halderman that had i been told, i probably would have authorized it. had he authorized it, you would have followed a national security proceeding. there's a way if you want to deal with the restraints on the fourth amendment, there's a procedure that the attorney

general must follow even in place in those days, and that was not a mysterious or unique situation. there was a >> first realized he is not fully informed, and then when he is pushing me as i was talking earlier to write this bogus report, i realize i should tell him i'm not going to write a report that's bogus, but if i write a report, here's what's going to be some of the information in the report, and i don't think -- or it's your call if you want this information reported out. by march 21st when i get another demand that's first sent to the white house and the first time to me from howard hunt that he is going to in essence blow the whistle on ehrlichman if he isn't paid $122,000 he is owed for attorneys fees and living expenses as part of this hush

money that's being paid, that he is going to have some steamy things to say about ehrlichman and what he did for ehrlichman, this being pretty clear by my understand and hunt's later clarifying years later. he was talking about the elzburg break-in, that he was putting pressure on to settle the accounts up. so i tell nixon when that comes in i need to talk to him. i tell haldaman that i need to lay it out that the stuff we're doing is an obstruction of justice. by then i had -- there's no doubt in my mind i can't wincethis is the sort of thing my colleague john ehrlichman and others -- my predecessor's counsel, he doesn't want to hear it. >> this is the kind of problem i'm dealing with.

i earlier had a similar problem when this first broke saying, john, i don't understand. i'm not a criminal lawyer. i don't have any training. i wasn't in the prosecutor's office. we should bring somebody like one of the assistant u.s. attorneys over and have him detail to the white house to help us deal with these things so we don't make mistakes. didn't want to hear it. these people had very clear visions of what they wanted to do, and i -- the white house counsel is a middle level -- to this day remains a fairly middle level post. >> i did a program after he left the bench, the court of appeals and the district of columbia to come over and be bill clinton's white house counsel, and i don't think he thought he was taking a middle level post, but he was. he said he was somewhat disappointed to find himself in a middle level post. here's a former member of congress and a former judiciary who is he in essence stepping down to the counsel of the

president post. anyway, to make a long story short, i -- on march 21st i told him there was a cancer growing on the presidency. that if he didn't deal with it, i thought it would consume the president. i really had hoped that in that conversation i would turn him. in many ways i think it's the first conversation i really meet richard nixon who richard nixon is. i raised one problem after another. i tell him, for example, that bud crow has come to me who had been another aide in the white house, and i said bud was confirmed as undersecretary of state. bud was one of the so-called plumbers investigating leaks involved in the elsburg break-in, and he tells me that he thinks he has purgered himself in his confirmation hearings or when he appeared before the watergate grand jury to introduce material in the original pursuit to understand what had happened in the

relationship of hunt and liddy to the white house. it's all fuzzy, but nixon's response was not fuzzy. he said, john, perjury is a tough rap. be difficult to prove. i go through a whole laundry list of things to try to turn him. i've listened the tape years later, and i just go silent. i'm stunned that i can't convince him of any of this, and at the end of it he still is suggesting i write a report or go visit with the cabinet and brief the cabinet, and, you know, i don't get that thinking, but one of the things that's emerging this time is he says, well, everybody should go to the grand jury. i think that's a great idea. the reason i thought it was a great idea, naively, i said if i go to the grand jury, first of all, it's sealed. it's quiet. we'll resolve this so the president can resolve it. everybody will come forward and explain their role, and be accountable. if we made a mistake, we pay the piper. that was my thought in breaking

ranks so i tell him -- everybody i have any respect for i'm going to the grand jury. i don't think they thought i would tell the truth, but i did. i go to the assistant u.s. attorneys who are in charge of the case. i realize very quickly this case is so far beyond their ability to handle. i'm not talking about incidentally initially what the president -- my conversation with the president. it's an evolving process. after i break rank and tell the president what i'm doing and what have you and my colleagues decide that he may want to go to the grand jury and talk, we think he would be a pretty good scapegoat. just lay it all off on him. we can say this is where it started. this is where it stopped. this is what will be their defense for a long time. nixon will draw his defense as the march 21st conversation, as the first time that anybody ever told him there was a cover-up, and that will be his fire wall. it won't hold as a firewall. i can tell you today after

listening to many, many tapes, he was fully aware of the payment of money all the way along. fully informed. and as i suspected when i had talked to him in a fleeting call -- or conversation on september 15th after the indictments came down, i told the senate at this time i was under the full expression that the president had been completely briefed about what was going on in the cover-up, and that's exactly true. you deal with somebody on a daily basis, a regular basis, you get a sense of how they're dealing with something. my break is slow. naive in thinking my colleagues will do as i do and come forward and this will protect the president, that he can get out in front of it. to the contrary. they decide we'll just lay it all off on john. this will be the firewall, and that's why it became my word against him -- his word. that's why the tapes became so important. that's how the tapes resolved

it. i would -- i would -- when i realized i was the target and was going to have to be the heavy and take the blame for all this, then i really decided, well, you know, they just picked the wrong guy. i'm willing to fight for what i believe and tell the truth as i understood it. that's how the break occurs. the waiver of privilege, where he. i actually my lawyer ask that they waive the attorney-clipt privilege, and for a political reason he did because he thought he couldn't risk trying to silence me with the attorney-client privilege. that was waived before i testified before the senate. got a mike or i can repeat it? here's a mike. john, there's a watergate staff

member. i remember we were making an investment in you as a whistle blower. we knew one of your motives had to be that you didn't want this to come out badly for you and this was your best strategy. we wanted to believe that you were telling the truth. you had a remarkable memory. i remember going -- we followed up before anything was public about what you said to us and we interviewed a fellow named richard moore, counsel to the president who had been playing a role in the coverup and talked to him about a meeting you told us about in la costa, i think, it was country club, and he said he was never attala costa. this couldn't have happened. we came back to you and told you that, and you remembered that he was wearing a plaid tie. one plaid and a different set of plaid pants. this is very odd for us because didn't grow up in country clubs that have people in plaid pants, but you were quite struck with the clashing plaids, and you remembered which plaids they were. mcgregor this and -- we went back to him, and the expression

on his face when we told him that was, like, oh, gee. i mean, he suddenly remembered things, and his attitude changed. probably because he thought, wait a minute, they must have more information than i realized. as good as your memory was, as a whistleblower, you had to calculate all the odds against this work. you had to -- the republicans cooperating with the white house, when you first had because you had been involved in it. you had a range of factors. i mean, there was really no one on your side except maybe the american public who wanted something to come out, and you gave us a box of materials that had come among few paper materials you had, which was a kind of -- i recall the box of horrors. it included a lot of things about the houston plan, the intelligence community, some intelligence abuses and what not. i just want you to put yourself back in the role of a whistleblower. you were the ultimate