jihadis will not be a troubling factor. in fact, they are. that's exactly why we should consider the intervention even more strongly. without the possibility of influence and processes on the ground through intervention. giving them more leeway on the ground than they should. jihadis aren't independent actors at this stage. especially in syria and the middle east. the assad regime was a main sponsor of jihadi movements. you have seen what it did in iraq and in lebanon. until recently they have been very much infiltrating and sort of playing on the jihad movement like marionettes, having them do their bidding. i doubt very much that it's a creation of the assad.

but why they have created them, this is something that a couple of days ago, in fact, there was an interview on syrian tv with a jihadist that was actually in prison, we were told. and that before he carried out a suicide attack. but what was the target of the attack? was it an allouite neighborhood? a church? it was not. it was a mosque. it was a mosque that was the center of the protest movement in the neighborhood called kapasuse. it was a thorny place because the mosque was at the center of the security complex of the assad regime. yet the locals dared hold daily and weekly protests. that basically jihadists said i

want to blow blou myself up in that mosque. these are strange jihadists. they blow up themselves and kill the people they are supporting. so i think the idea is to create problems for the protest communities and protest and sunni leaders in their own communities. what they are doing when they look at the partition plan. they are not only interested in creating their own areas but they are interested in making sure the other areas are destabilized. they are not under one government, not congealing into one united hall, but they have a series of challenges they have to surmount. there are problems, the inability to create political leadership. on the other hand, they are going to give them jihadi problems as well. it doesn't matter to assad whether the jihadis are infiltrated or not. they are encouraging them, using them. if they lost control at one point, who cares? they are not going to create trouble for the assads.

they are going to create trouble for the government that will emerge in the rest of syria. that's something we need to take a considerably part of. also to train the fsa and help the fsa. it's exact. yet we have thousands of people who can be recruited and trained and be transformed into a police force that can later on move into areas and make sure they are tackling these challenges because they have been trained to do so more intensively than the local fighters. they can actually go ahead and make sure these kind of challenges are under control from the very beginning. >> brian? >> i agree. if we were going to train folks, i think, the description that david gave of how to do it makes

sense. and i think in my mind there is a stronger argument for that course of action than there is for trying to carve out a safe zone in syria using international air power simply because i don't think that mission can be sustained as that mission. it will become a mission to remove the assad regime. we should just say so and get on with it. i'm skeptical that will work and produce a good outcome. i think clarity about goals, as lee was saying, is important. in terms -- i agree that i think the presence of jihadi groups in syria benefits the assad regime. i don't think that necessarily means those jihadi groups are a product of the assad regime or working for the assad regime. i think it's possible at times the assad regime will manipulate those to cause trouble for the opposition. i think it's clear that the

assad regime is using as propaganda the existence of small groups to discredit the opposition. that's something we should all push back against because it isn't true. i do thinking that we shouldn't also overstate the connection between the assad regime and jihadi organizations. though elements certainly tolerated and enables jihadi groups on the way to iraq. we have documentary evidence of that. very clear evidence of that. those groups, there is no love lost there. the assad regime, i would argue, as much as there were jihadis traveling via syria to iraq. we also have good testimony from captur captureds is hia militants they were flown to damascus for training by hezbollah. the regime was playing both sides. that's what they do. look out for number one.

and so this is not a regime in bed with the jihadis. they will try to cause trouble for the opposition. at the end of the day, in my mind, in my judgment there is an independent jihadi movement, certainly the wider jihad community regionally believes this is an independent e jihad grouchlt they are supporting the group. they feel it is one of their own. frankly, i'm not in a great position to that i can that judgment independently. i do think they are in a better position and they have made the judgment. i think though the existence of the jihad group helps assad politically and perhaps operationally, it really helps assad keep control of the alloite dominated military. it doesn't have to be a dominant group. it can be a small group. it scares them but allows assad

to say, you defect on me and those are the people you have to deal with. that's what's dangerous about this. >> let's take more questions from the floor. i want to extend an offer to ask questions if any of you would like to make yourself known. are there questions toward the back? yes, sir. with the glasses. second to that, the gentleman in front of him. >> i think most of the speakers have been pretty much in favor of what senator mccain said earlier today with the exception of mr. fishman who used the word skeptical. i was wondering if you could just delineate your plan for what happened in syria and how that separates yourself from everyone else. >> you've got me. touche.

i think there is a program as some of the questions indicated of stepped up sanctions. i think that we need to work -- reach out to as many factions as possible in lebanon and iraq to limit the spread of what's going on there. i think we need to establish programs now and plans now to try to secure as many of syria's dangerous weapons as possible. i think in those cases that could involve buyback programs, direct strikes against those particular sites. none of those are perfect answers. uh think we should explore, as lee said, a really dedicated program to try to understand the syrian opposition such that we can make good decisions if we do

want to support some of them in a program like david was talking about. i suspect lee is right, that we do have -- have developed that kind of knowledge today. and i don't want to make the argument that that's not -- that there isn't a place we want to do that. but what i really am wary of is the notion of safe zones and trying to carve out direct action against the syrian regime because i think this is a regime that is reacting from a position of fear internationally. and a position -- a position where they could lash out in really unpredictable ways. we need to think about that. the other thing is we need to consider, as lee said, the interest with iran. this is a huge opportunity. if we can pull this off this is the biggest blow against iran in 25 years, no doubt. but iran will push back. if they lose assad they will

push back in iraq and afghanistan in a big way. if anything in my mind, the loss will entrench their desire for a nuclear weapon. some might argue they couldn't desire it more. all of that is a repercussion here and we should consider it. >> i'm going to repeat the question. so the microphones will pick it up. what about the slaughter? how does one deal with the concept, if i can broaden it to responsibility to protect and the humanitarian crisis. that's directed to the whole panel, not necessarily just brian. >> i will speak briefly. i have been talking a lot. we have an obvious responsibility to do what we can to stop the slaughter. not just in syria but other

places. look, we are talking about this particular instance of a humanitarian crisis because there is a nexus with our strategic interests in the united states. i mean, we have seen terrible slaughter in somalia, in sudan. we are not having this conversation about those situations. and those people's lives are worth ju as much as syrians. but -- so we are having this conversation because of the strategic dynamic. the issue is not that i think we shouldn't do things about the slaughter. the issue is i think military action in this context is likely to be very violent. there is likely to be collateral damage. it's a denser society than libya. we can strike these places but most of the killing is being done by men with ak-47s. those are hard people to bomb. it's hard to stop a slaughter in a small village with an airplane when killing is being done with knives, power tools and an

ak-47. >> i believe the responsibility to protect was coined for humanitarian reasons, more than for interest reasons. i think that the fact that we have not had a discussion when it's the sudan or somalia reflects negatively on us, not necessarily on whether we shouldn't be having this conversation. i think we should have had this conversation. there are a lot of legitimate reasons on the humanitarian level why there should be something serious done about the slaughter that's taken place in sudan and somalia. and so the issue for me is of intervention is definitely a complex one. i really believe we have reached a stage if our consciousness as

people begin to say some things should not happen ever. children being killed, that should not happen. on the other hand, when we are talking about the dynamism, intervention and the military aspect and collateral damage we are all aware of that. for months in syria, we have not even wanted for intervention. we have not asked for it until the slaughter became too much. until we realize assad isn't going to go away through peaceful means. until enough of our people got tired really and began picking up guns, trying to fight back. at that moment you realize there was not a solution without some kind of military intervention. no one is asking to take away soldiers with ak-47s in residential neighborhoods. by arming the rebels they can

take care of that themselves. a few days ago i put on my blog a youtube video of the howitzers, the cannons, the m-260, think, that was positioned around homs. they were pounding homs. the area was empty, plain. it was intentionally away from residential neighborhoods because they didn't want it to be attacked by local fighters. it was easy to pick off. it's this kind of weapons that should be targeted by airplanes. tanks moving between cities that can be targed by air strikes. we are aware of collateral damage. there are places where air strikes can be carried out with minimal collateral damage. the rest is by arming rebels they can defend and fight the wrong community. it's a combination of things that need to be tried. i believe the case right now

about intervention. the discussion is not about intervention or not intervention. it's more intervention or intervention light. i think this is what senator mccain pointed out when he said we are moving beyond -- they have moved a little bit forward. you need to realize time isn't on our side. the partitioning is taking place. for this reason we should speed up the scenarios. we do have a couple of people that actually could help shed light on this. there are -- they don't come here often. i think their presence is very important because it also shows something about the syrian opposition. for all the talk about the divisions and problems within the snc and so forth, actually there is a lot of coordination. also that happens between the

different political factions. today we have a group of syrian opposition members. one is mohamed ruby. he represents the muslim brotherhood and is from the international council, as you know. my colleague from the syrian national council representing the group of liberal independents there. we have my colleague from the national council for -- national assembly for syria and we also have my colleague radjuan badini who is from the first opposition conference formed. he's a kurdish academic as well. all of these people from different backgrounds and we have also a representative of the federal foundation and a group of activists on the ground. all of these people have been

working together for months trying to create coordination between the different opposition groups and trying to create unity. it's important to realize it's not the story that's only division. there is coordination taking place. this can be leveraged into things being said. >> there is a group of other questions. there are questions but i offered this gentleman up here the opportunity. moving in the back and we saw the question over to the right. >> i work at special operations command. my question for you is does u.s. involvement even in a limited scope being the no-fly zone or turkish safe havens have the potential to galvanize the situation increasing the

likelihood that foreign fighter and international terrorists would want to go into syria? is that an acceptable risk to take considering it would likely lead to scope creep as mr. fishman mentioned? >> david. >> i don't think we have to encourage -- that we have to look at what we do as encouraging foreign fighters. i think we are going to see foreign fighters the longer it goes on. we are helping it end as quickly as possible in favor of the opposition. that will limit foreign fighters. with the no-fly zone, i don't think that would energize the jihadis. the boots on the ground in syria is a problem. here we are talking about helping syrians, primarily muslim sunni syrians to fight the regime. i think you will get foreign fighters as well. i don't think this is going to be, let's say -- i don't think it's going to change the dynamic

entirely by having u.s. involvement if it's not on the ground. >> thank you. i saw a question all the way in the back corner. please wait for the microphone and reintroduce yourself. >> hello. my name is basam from syrian national council. syrian government has chemical, biological weapons which you have mentioned and the u.s. will have to intervene at one point to control that stockpile. is it cheaper or better to interfere now and save people at the same time? >> well, this again is the kind of thing our friend just mentioned. u.s. boots on the ground going into 40 separate sites, giving a lot of collateral damage and suffering u.s. casualties. this is going to be a big risk to do that.

it will create a whole host of operational challenges for us. these things are going to have to be to be secured. better that they're secured by syrians. and once you go in there, by the way, you're in for the long haul. you can't just go and preserve them. you have to go and figure out a way to destroy them as well. this is a long-term operation, the kind that i think is going to be the least kind of popular operation for americans to try and sell this type of involvement. and it's going to have high casualties potentially. nonetheless, yeah, i mean wmd is going to be a driving factor. i think the opposition has been very effective in raising this as an issue to pique the attention of u.s. policymakers, and it's working. but all the more reason to create areas that are not lawless, but are under control of the well disciplined syrian opposition, free syrian fighting force that can guard these

facilities. >> the gentleman in the back? please wait for the microphone. >> thank you. i'm a policy analyst from united to end genocide. my question is essentially, obviously looking back at history, i think senator mccain pointed out to kosovo example. but i see kosovo as being an example whereby the u.s. intervened. and after was clear that mass atrocities were happening. but i'm also looking at it from the experience of rwanda, where the international community did not intervene when mass atrocities were happening. as a matter of fact, the genocide happened. and we've seen hula happen. we've seen hama happen. i'm just skeptical. what would it take for the

international community or the u.s. to have a leadership position to do something what is happening in syria? or are we going to wait until it's reached a scale of rwanda? thank you. >> lee? >> well, i think as most people in the room know, unfortunately, just talking in terms of raw numbers, the numbers aren't the same. as brutal and vicious as it is, the numbers aren't the same. i came back from lebanon a month ago, and people all assumed that the -- that what is holding up u.s. action are the -- is the presidential campaign. and i'm not convinced of that. and i don't know about anyone else on the panel. i tend to think that the administration is going to avoid doing anything about it for as long as possible. and i believe that also in the romney campaign, it's not just that there are republicans who look at this very differently. there are lots of republicans who don't want to act on this either. so what will change it? will it just be raw numbers?

it might be. it might just be raw numbers. i mean 10,000 people are killed in one afternoon, that might do it. but obviously, the regime is avoiding a step like that. so in the end, i don't know what will change the equation. >> the gentleman over here? >> retired from the office of the secretary of defense. a point that you made, you talked about the petition that is in fact happening. look out into the future, any of you. would partition be so bad? i'm not arguing for it, but think it through. what's wrong with that? >> if it's cordial, if it's -- if it's not -- if it does not involve ethnic cleansing of so many hundreds of thousands of people. and if it's a partition into two states instead of god knows how

many feifdoms, perhaps the syrian people can come together and agree in a dialogue form to do it. but the problem is we don't have that scenario. it's not just we're coming together and discussing in a sort of a peaceful civilized manner whether we want to be together anymore or not. what is happening is one-sided. one regime for its own purposes, not even for the sake of the alawite community, but for the sake of remaining in power, for having the title of president, for having the privilege of rule, for being able to keep the billions of your stealing and to keep stealing more, wanting to do this. we're talking about their desire to help stabilize the rest of the country in order for them to feel secure in their feifdom that they are trying to create. we're talking about the scenario if it's allowed to continue to unfold in this way, you know,

dozens of, you know, or thousands, thousands and thousands of lives, more that will have to die. and 100,000 more that will have to be displaced. so the cost of it all is so draconian, i cannot even, you know, care to speculate about this. at this stage, i prefer to see -- but even the best case scenarios right now that i see calls for reintegration as much as possible of the rest of syria. i'm not even envisioning a scenario where we will go into the alawite stronghold in order to reincorporate them back into the country. if they don't want to, they don't want to. we're not going to do it by force. so i think at this stage, really, the entire strategy is about the borders of the -- of the entities that are emerging and trying to make them two viable entities that can still down the road perhaps reintegrate once assads leave, once the alawites realize how

much of a problem assad is and decide to rebel against him. so the partition is happening anyway. but i just don't want to see it be into 100 sort of fiefdoms that are at war with each other. unfortunately, the dithering of the international community have brought us to the point where i see no solution that can keep syria whole anymore, because assad has managed to really have been given enough time to -- and russian backing is very important. russia wants to have a -- on the mediterranean. it's as simple as that. and they've been given the opportunity to do it. >> i can't think of any more fitting way to end the presentation than to give the last question to the syrian national council. so if i could have moham ask the question, reintroduce yourself, and then i will thank the panelists.

>> thank you very much. my name is moham, i am an executive in the muslim brotherhood of syria, also a founder of the snc. what i have heard today is many reasons for not intervening. i would like to hear also if you have enough analysis of not taking an action and not intervening, what will be the results of taking a negative stand from america point of view and from the interest of the freedom fighters. thank you very much. >> so to paraphrase, what would be the cost of inaction if the americans continue to choose to sit on the sidelines, and the international community more broadly? >> well, we can start -- if you have a quick answer, and then we can move across the panel. >> and again, my focus, i think the cost of -- i mean bashar is,

he can survive a little while. and who knows how long he can survive. he will cause a great deal of damage during the time he will survive. i think it's going to affect the region. and for the united states, specifically, again, i hate to keep coming back on this. but i want people to focus on this, but they're not, and we know they're not. because this is why people keep saying it's the choice, well, who do we like better, al qaeda or iran. if iran is the problem, iran is the problem. and that's what is going on in syria. iran is the issue. so, again, i see iran, i see iran benefitting from this, and i see more regional turmoil. that's the cost. >> i'm going to flip the question a little bit for dave. what would be the american response? and do you believe that in the administration there is a hope that there could simply be an extra alawi coup that could replace bashar al assad with a military general, and will would that give american military policies makers an out, or are they looking for that?

>> i think that's absolutely the u.s. policy. secretary of state clinton said our policy is that we're waiting for a coup. and we'll continue to wait while people are massacred on the ground, and hopefully, you know, if things get bad enough for the al assad regime, that another alawite from the family or another family will put a bullet in the head of bashar al assad, and secretary of state clinton said that we think it's coming. >> ooh. >> well, this is the thing. a coup is essentially, you know, not a change of power. it's a change of power from the assad family to another alawite. and this is not going to be acceptable for the syrian opposition. and this is not going to be something that is qualitatively different for us. i don't think it's a reasonable alternative. and, in fact, some alawite general out there may find it at some point useful to be done with the assads, because there will be an end of international pressure, and there will be, you know, this nonplan implemented