liberations than job creation. energy, security and the needs of our military. the law of the sea convention is the rare initiative that would contribute to all three objectives. i welcome as you have, mr. chairman, our distinguished witnesses and look forward to their testimony. >> thank you very much. so we will proceed if you would lead off, sir. we would appreciate it. and secretary negroponte and mr. groves. >> mr. chairman and members of the committee, thank you for your invitation. i submitted brief remarks and i will adjust them down to five minutes. >> all of the testimony will be placed in full. >> it's a pleasure to appear with these experts on this subject. i am 30 years away from it.

i'm pleased to be here. it was 30 years ago that the president asked me to represent the united states in opposition to the law of the sea treaty. our efforts found a supporter in british prime minister margaret thatcher. today as the senate approves this agreement, the reasons for their opposition, i believe remain as persuasive. when i met with mrs. thatcher, she grasps the issues at stake. her conclusion on the treaty was unforgettable. she said what this treaty proposes is nothing less than the international nationalization of roughly 2/3 of the earth's surface and referring to her battles dismantling the state-owned mining and utility companies, shedded you know how i feel about nationalization. the nashl idea underlying the law of the sea treaty is that the riches of the oceans beyond

national boundaries are the common heritage of mankind. thus supposedly owned by all people and actually means they are unowned. this idea of ownership should which is encompassed requires that anyone who finds a way to make use of such riches by applying labor or technology or risk taking are required to pay royalties of unknown amounts. potentially billions, possibly tens of billions. over an extended period, ill-defined period of time to the new international sea bed authority for distributions to less developed countries. this in my view is a new idea of enormous consequence. it establishes a way of looking

at industry investment and talent, risk, and good fortune that argues in favor of distributing a significant portion of the minerals in the deep sea beds to developing countries. i suppose it's also conceivable that it could be a precedent for the resources of outer space. the principal that advanced countries when they make use that belonged to no one owe royalties to less developed countries is a novel principal that has no clear limits. i know of no other treaty that follows that pattern. the idea is fundamental and integral. the major reason i believe we should not so that treaty ratified. i don't argue against developed countries providing financial and other forms of aid to poor countries. there moral and practical arguments in favor of such aid, but the decision to provide such aid is, has been, and probably

should be a sovereign choice for each nation. in the case of our country, it's a choice of our citizens and you, their elected representatives. i do not believe the united states should endorse a treaty that makes it a legal obligation for productive countries to pay royalties to less productive countries based on rhetoric on common teritage of mankind. the wealth idea incorporated in the law of the sea treaty is objectionable because the mechanism for the redistribution is poorly designed. it uses a newly created multinational sea bed authority which is effectively a un agency instead of the u.s. congress through our foreign aid or the world bank of which we are members. if a treaty were to be ratified, they would receive a permanent seat on the council of the authority. it would not be accountable to

the american people more than any other un agency is accountable. it must be akaged that the united nations has a poor record in administering the programs. the un oil for food program was a multibillion dollar scandal. businesses as the chairman and the ranking member have indicated have expressed support for the treaty. it would provide greater certainty which i agree could be helpful. i was in business for 20 years and there is no question that they make that argument and it's a valid one. it needs to be consider and weighed. the most persuasive argument for the law in my view is the u.s. navy's desire to lock in navigation rights and it's correct that the treaty would provide benefits and principals and making it easier to resolve certain disputes. the navy has done quite well for the past 200 years and certainly during the 20 or so years since

it has been in effect. relying often on customary international law to assert navigation rights. in my view, the law of the sea treaty would not make a large enough additional contribution regarding navigation rights or certainty to counter balance the problems it would create. as members of the senate, carefully read each of the 208 pijs of this document. the 320 articles and also the 1994 agreement. i think they will appreciate the basis for those concerns and uncertainties. i respect the concerns raised by the navy and by the military and by elements in the business community. but the fundamental objections raised by mrs. thatcher in her 1982 objection to effectively nationalizing the world's oceans through a new multinational but rockacy outweigh the advantages

and make the treaty inbalance and a net loss for u.s. interest. thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. secretary. i appreciate it. >> thank you, mr. chairman. members of the committee for this opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the law of the sea convention. let e let me say at the out set and as unequivocally as possible i believe the united states should exceed to this treaty as you have heard recently from the secretaries of state and defense the chairman of the jcs and our maritime service chiefs, there real costs to remaining outside the treaty. for the benefit of our country i hope this is the year that we finally become party to the law of the sea. my involvement with this treaty dates back to 1970 when i was a

member of the national security council staff. i was given the assignment of helping coordinate the preparation of president nixon's first directive on the law of the sea. i have worked on this issue on and off in the ensuing years. i would not claim to be an expert. in the reagan administration, i served as an assistant secretary of state for oceans and specific affairs at the state department and then as president reagan's deputy national security adviser and in the george w. bush administration as director of national intelligence and finally as deputy secretary of states. these experiences have only strengthened my support for the treaty and as you will recall, i was the lead administration witness in the last administration when we appeared before the committee in 2007.

the u.s. consistently sought to balance the interest in controlling activities off their coasts and the interest of all countries in protecting freedom of navigation. the united states joined a group of law and the sea treaties in 1958 by which it is still bound. those treaties left open important issues. for example, they did not set forth the maximum breath of the territorial sea. an issue of critical importance to freedom of navigation. they did not elaborate a procedure for the continental shelf. under president nixon, the united states proposed the concept of a treaty that would address these concerns and it was president nixon who first introduced the notion of a u.s.

policy supporting this concept of the common heritage of mankind. what we have been debating in the ensuing years is exactly how you define that in ways with which we can live. formal negotiations were launched over three years later and the convention was finalized this 1982. the united states supported the 1982 convention with the exception of the deep sea bed provisions. in 1983 president reagan issued a statement explaining that because of certain concerns with the provisions, the u.s. would not sign the convention. he affirm and i think this is important that the united states would voluntarily follow the bulk of the treaty. negotiations began during the george perbert walker bush administration to rewrite the mining provisions. implementing agreement was signed in 1994 which dealt with

each of the problems identified by president reagan. the clinton administration submitted the convention in the agreement to the senate in july of 1994. president george w. bush urged approval of the convention, both in 2004 and in 2007 arguing that, and the quote, joining will serve the national security interest of the united states and secure u.s. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas including the valuable natural resources they contain, kwent quote. why is it important for the united states to join the convention now? to begin, the united states would gain legal protection for sovereignty. sovereign rights and jurisdiction in offshore zones. the freedom of maneuvering action for military forces and protection for economic and marine research interests at sea. u.s. firms would be able to

obtain essential internationally recognized and exclusive rights to explore and exploit deposits of minerals on the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction and secure recognized title to the recovered resources. the convention as revised by the 1994 agreement on implementation provides the commercial regime needed for private sdprea it fully satisfies the criteria articulated in 1982 by president reagan. allow me to site a few specific practical reasons of how remaining outside the convention damages the united states's national interest. these are not ak emic or philosophical points, but examples of how we are under cutting our national interest by failing to join. first, the convention is now open for amendment and could be

changed in ways that adversely impact the navigational rights in high seas freedoms on which the military depends for global mobility. if we join now, our rights are protected in two ways. first, it allows us to shape the interpretation, application, and development of specific amendments to the non-sea bed parts of the convention. if we delay joining until after an amendment is adopted, we could choose only to accept or reject another party's amended version. once the united states takes a permanent seat at the international sea bed authority, it will have a veto over any amendments related to the sea bed parts of the convention. second, as tensions flair in critical regions like the persian gulf and south shina sea, it is important that the

united states provide men and women in uniform with every means available to protect the navigational rights in the treaty. right now the united states has two ways to defend its maritime interests. we could initiate the process to lodge a complaint with the state that denies us free passage or assert our right to passage by putting the vessel in harm's way. the freedom of navigation program is an important tool in our military's arsenal. it does carry a risk of escalation. the law of the sea is an additional tool we can use and it is one the navy and the coast guard asked us repeatedly to provide them. by not joining the treaty, the united states is limited in its leadership ability to resolve maritime disputes between allies such as japan and korea and the

strategically important region such as the gulf or the south china sea. fourth, biremaining on the outside, we created self imposed obstacles to securing the most widespread possible cooperation in our counter proliferation and counter narcotics operations at sea. the united states's refusal to undermine and they do bring this up in our willingness to provide by the accepted rules of the road when conducting the activities. it is negatively impacting the businesses. at least one u.s. company is prepared to harvest earthquake minerals on the deep sea bed and i spoke to representatives of lockheed about this.

minerals that are used in our weapons system, cell phones and automobiles, but as a nonparty to the treaty, the united states cannot sponsor lock heat to go out and get these minerals from the sea bed. the u.s. watches and 17 have approved exploration for deep sea bed mining. five new applications will be considered at the annual session at the sea bed authority. the united singdom and lelg yum are joining china and seven other nations and exploration of strategic minerals while the united states watches from ashore. similarly the energy companies are less likely to invest the billions necessary to exploit oil and gas reserves in the arctic and elsewhere because of

the legal uncertainties surrounding the outer limit of the united states continental shelf. the only way to give the companies the clear internationally recognized title they need before investing this type of money is to join the treaty and work through its continental shelf process. lastly with the aspect of this question, one which i think is important as a person as a practitioner for more than 40 years, that was the unprecedented nature i felt of the concession by the rest of the international community in willingness to reopen this convention because of the objections that the united states raised when president reagan said he would not sign the treaty. after learning of our objections, they came to us and invited us and said we are

prepared to reopen this part 11 of the law of the sea treat to try and meet your objections so that you will feel more comfortable coming on board. we did that and held these talks 12 years later and reached agreement on a revised part 11 and i think as a matter of diplomatic practice and in terms of credibility with relationships with the countries with which we deal, the idea that they accommodated concerns and reopened the treaty and modified the chapter and for us again to reject this convention, now that those concerns have been met, i would say would be to a diplomatic slap in the face if not more. mr. chairman, i'm confident that the committee will agree to the united states succession to the

treaty that is the best way to secure essential navigational and economic rights related to the ocean. thank you. >> thank you, mr. secretary. >> thank you, chairman. i don't go back quite as far although i spend a lot of time with both of them inside the white house. as you mentioned, i served for all eight years in the bush administration as the legal adviser for the national security council in the white house for the first term and the legal adviser for the state department in the second term. what i can do is explain why during those eight years, the bush administration decided to support the law of the sea convention because i started from the beginning there. i do appreciate very much the concerns that have been raised about the convention including by senators on this committee.

the bush administrational carefully looked at almost all of the same issues before we ultimately decided to support s. let me say, president bush did not decide to support the treaty out of a blind commitment to multilateralism. i don't think anyone has ever accused the bush administration of an over abundance of enthusiasm for treaties. when we came into office in 2001, we decided not to support several of the treaties that had been supported by the clinton administration. bush administration officials were similarly skeptical about the law of the sea treaty. we remembered president reagan's concerns. after a yearlong interagency review, we concluded that the conclusion strongly advanced u.s. security, economic and

environmental interests and the administration's first priority list in 2002, we told this committee there was an urgent need for senate approval of the convention. we reviewed the concerns in 1982. we concluded the concerns had been addressed by the amendments to the convention in 1994. the other western countries that president reagan and secretary rumsfeld had successly purr sue persuaded not to sign the treaty had all joined the treaty after the treaty was amended. between 2003 and 2009, senior bush administration political appointees from the department of defense, state, commerce, interi interior, homeland security testified and sent letter to this committee and other committees strongly endorsing the convention.

defense department appointees twice testified in favor of the treaty. president bush himself issued statements in 2007 and 2009 urging the senate to approve the convention. let me end by addressing some of the concerns that have been raised because we did address some of those same concerns. first, reliance on customary international law alone does not give the united states important rights that are available only to parties of the convention. most important, u.s. companies would not have the legal certainty that they need before they are willing to invest billions in development in the architect or the deep seabed. by not joining the convention, the u.s. government is preventing u.s. oil, gas and mining companies from making invest ms that could produce enormous wealth and jobs for the u.s. economy. moreover, the u.s. would not be able to take its permanent seat

on the seabed, which is making decisions that affect u.s. interests. second, the u.s. would only be required to pay royalties to the deep seabed authority if it were actually developing resources on the continental shelf. they would be able to keep 100% of the value of the protection at any sight for the first five years and then between 99 and 93% of the value for the remaining years. this would be an enormous net benefit, not a loss for the u.s. treasury. if these fees would cause the economic problems that are claimed by critics then our other major industrial countries would not have agreed to pay them. third, the seabed authority only has limited authority to address mining activities on the deep seabed beyond to jurisdiction of any country. it has no authority to regulate activities in the world's oceans

are on the u.s. extended continental shelf. if critics are concerned about the potential actions of the i.s.a. then the most effect i have way to restrict its activities would be for the u.s. to become party for the convention and takes its permanent seat and effective veto power on the i.s.a. council. finally, joining the convention does not, in my view, subject the united states to significant new environmental litigation risks. in fact, the litigation risks to the u.s. and u.s. companies would be much greater if u.s. companies were to try to exploit the resources on the u.s. extended continental shelf or the deep seabed contrary to the terms convention. mr. chairman, through determined diplomacy including by secretru, the united states has been able

to see all the laws. after careful review the bush administration says the amended convention serves u.s. military, economic and environmental interests. we concluded that important u.s. objectives especially our goals to exploit the valuable resources on our exthe ended contin continental shelf and participate in the convention's decision making bodies could not be made through these means. mr. chairman, a members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear today. >> thank you. >> thank you for inviting me to testify this afternoon regarding u.s. opposition to enclose is based

on idealology. allow you to ensure you my concerns are not based in methodology without regard for facts or evidence. to the extent the treaty and skeptics base their opposition on ideology over the advancement of narrow commercial interests and over a misplaced desire to please the international community. joining would affect our national sovereignty in several ways. it would obligate the united states to have an incal cue label amount of revenue to an international organization for redistribution to the developing world. it would require the united states to seek permission to mine the deep seabed from a sown

sill of foreign countries that include sudan. seeking american sovereignty should not be done lightly. they stated their reasons for do so. among those reasons were the imposition of taxes from a far. more than 230 years later the senate is considering a treaty that would siphon off royalty revenue that belonged to the american people but will be remitted to kingston, jamaica to be spent in other countries. the funders had a deep respect for the law of nations and the opinions of man kind. i doubt they could fathom that

the united states would subject itself to such an arrangement. opposition s based on more than ideology. our september schism is based on the available evidence. long standing u.s. policy customary international law, u.s. experiences in other international organizations, u.s. experiences in international tribunals. the provisions itself and of course, the facts. first, in regard to navigational rights and freedoms we know the following facts. for more than 230 years the u.s. navy has successfully protected our maritime interests regardless of the fact that the u.s. has not joined the convention. the navy has never been deanini any access to at the hearing on may 23rd, the chairman of the joint chefs of staff admitted that failure to join would not

compromise our ability to project force around the world. in regard to developing the resources, we know the following facts. the u.s. exercises full jurisdiction and control over its extended continental shelf. the u.s. has development for u.s. companies such as chevron as well as companies from brazil, denmark, france, italy, norway and united kingdom. regarding the transfer of royalties to the international seabed authority under article 82, we know the following facts. this committee cannot know the amount of royalty revenue that the u.s. treasury will forgo because no