to determine the value of the u.s. continental shelf. as such, if the u.s. concedes to the convention, it will be making an open-ended commitment to transfer incalcuable sum. we know the following fact. exceeding could expose the united states to baseless lawsuits. they are full-time, not subject to appeal and are enforceable in the united states. finally, in regard to u.s. rights to mine the deep seabed we know the following facts. pursuant to u.s. law, long standing u.s. policy and

customary international law, u.s. persons and corporations have the right to explore and exploit the deep seabed regardless of whether or not the united states is a part. these are the facts. collectively they indicate there are real costs and foreseeable risks that the u.s. will undertake if it joins the convention. proponents claim there are no costs whatsoever. the u.s. will only enjoy benefits for membership. if only the u.s. would join the convention, everything would work out just fine. in light of the facts, i believe it's the proponents claims that are based in methodology and blind faith. thank you again for inviting me to testify today. i look forward to any questions that you have. >> thank you very much. i really appreciate it.

that's a good articulate position of the summary. i'm thrilled to be able to tell you i am very happy it's between republicans. i'm going to look to you to thrash it through. it's interesting to me that they are working hard to get

something done which president nixon concede of and president reagan support and pushed president george herbert walker bush refined. i don't think that's inconsequential. let's explore it. i want to explore it. i'm going to ask you to engage in a lat of this dialogue. let me follow through a bit, if i can. if your testimony, your written testimony said there's no legal barrier. i think you repeated at the end of your testimony now. there's no legal barrier to prevent u.s. access exploration and exploitation and resources

of the deep seabed. we can go out there and dig. nay have the right to go out and develop the resources of the deep seabed. you believe that? >> yes. >> if that's true, is it your general point that under international law there's no legal right except by treaty to exclude another nation from mining in the deep seabed because it's out in the high seas? >> correct. another country couldn't unreasonably interfere. >> they can't inter fear? >> yes. >> they can't with us. >> yes. >> if the united states without

joining the treaty decides to do some deep seabed mining, under international law we couldn't prevent the chinese or russians from piggybacking, could we? >> no. as long as it didn't unreasonably interfere with our own claim. >> what would be the legal recourse for that? what's to back up our claim? we're out in the deep sea without any legal because we're not a part of the treaty. where would the claim be? >> those heldly lockheed martin. >> i'm talking broader here. what would, by what mechanism would the, particularlily, let's say russia and china get legal claim, 100 yards from where we are and we're not party to it.

if you can find a company that's dumb enough to drill without being a party to treaty. let's presume for the purposes of your argument, you say go dig. what's the mechanism by which they will assert any right? >> if your hype theet cal. >> it's not a hypothetical. it's real under your rej min you said go out and dig. you just agreed. >> it's within 100 yards. >> let's say it's on the right spot. they are the members, and we're not. they say screw you, u.s. these guys are part of it and they're giving you the claim. >> two things would happen. if russia or china or any other country sger fears with the claim that's made under the

offices of u.s. law, then this would be a bilateral problem between the united states and which other country was doing that. they would be infringing on our claim. >> we don't have a claim. there's no claim. are you claiming into the thin air? claiming to god? who are you claiming to? >> there's u.s. statute that allows u.s. companies to apply from licenses from the administrator of noa to make a claim in the deep seabed and countries can move under those statutes to make claims and engage in deep seabed mining. there is a claim. >> the only way as lawyer you could say to lockheed martin or another company, go drill, is to know that you have certainty with respect to the claim and you wouldn't have certainty, would you not, under the

structure that mr. groves has described? >> thanks. we were not quick to sign up to obligations that would tie us down. looking at the best way for u.s. business particularly as new technologies became available that would allow us to mine in the deep seabed or with the melting arctic ice to exploit oil, gas resource in the arctic, the best way to allow companies to do that was to have the legal certainty provided under the convention. we did look at customer international law, which the nae does rely on successfully for their naval activities.

we say the only way u.s. business could engage in deep seabed mining or oil and gas exple exexemployeeation was through the treaty. that's the agreed upon mechanism for legitimizing claim, would the united states be advantaged or disadvantaged in staking its claim outside of that regime. >> these companies would want to invest literally billions of dollars out in the deep seabed. they would not want to invest that kind of money based on a ri risky claim. >> i'd like to ask both you

have, if you would, i thought that mr. groves did an excellent job of kind of laying out the case, so to speak. i think we need to examine that now. i want to try to do that. he suggested there would be an invitation to adverse judgments. there are three big reasons. adverse judgments. secondly the transfer of unbelievable amount of royalty, and thirdly we'd have to request permission to mine from sudan. can both you have speak to that and give us a sense of what the committee ought to think about that. >> maybe we can share these. if you look at the original part

11 that was negotiated, the fees were very high and very costly. that was one of things that threw people off. in the amended version it says those do not apply and it leaves it to subsequent determination on a counsel, by a counsel, of which if we exceeded to the treaty, we would be a member and if we ratified this amendment to the treaty. we would be a member of that council and the procedure for making decisions on that kind of issue would be by consensus. i think farce distribution of

fees, decision making process and these new arrangement, i think our interest would be very well protected. the other point was already made about from how zero to year five there would be no royalties in the case of oil and then up to 7% beyond that. >> i think this is important because the companies will tell you this. one of the reasons everybody got happy about this is it's 1% for the first five years. it's an additional percent for the next year and additional percent each year up. you're looking at 6%, 7%, 8% up until you get to 12 years. the top amount is 7%. many companies believe with modern technology they have an ability to exploit well within that period. they're not looking at these

enormous amounts of royalty. would you come back to the adverse judgments. there's a fear here. >> i think it's much more likely that there would be an adverse judgment or certainly litigation against a company that tried to engage in deep seabed mining or mining on the u.s. extended continental u.s. shelf outside the treaty. i think anybody can see that. for exxon mobile or lockheed to spend billions of dollars relying on an academic theory suggested by a think tank, i think that's something that

would create great legal risks. it's not surprising their ceos have written to say our preference is to rely on the terms of the treaty. there are lot offense major industrial country, including japan and the u.k. and others who are potential targets for environmental litigation. they've not been sued for climate change. i suffered as the legal advisor for the bush administration. there were lots of unfounded claims related to terrorism. i just don't see that the joining the treaty is going to open us up to significant new claims. >> i resisted saying well, you

should have suffered. only joking. if i can come back for a minute. isn't it a fact that no environmental suit would be allowed unless we were party to an international agreement? >> that's exactly the point, mr. chair. >> i'm prepared to come after senator reich. >> i'd like to place a letter dated june 14th, 2012. it's by numerous former government officials including mr. rumsfeld and many, many others who reach very difference

conclusion. >> absolutely. without objection it's part of the record. >> it's going to pick up where you left off. i have your testimony in front of me. this caught my eye. you state some have argued that the convention might obligate the u.s. to comply with international environmental agreements to which the u.s. is not party. you stated that. i'm one of those people except you understated. i don't believe it might. i believe it will. the first sentence you state, the terms of convention do not require parties to comply with other international environmental treaties. that was your conclusion. you quote a real small portion

of one sentence to reach that conclusion. i know you're familiar with this but you take the treaty in front you have and open to article 212, subsection 1. it's on page 175. if you got that in front of you. the very first part of the sentence says, states shall adopt laws and regulations to reduce, prevent and control pollution. nothing wrong with that. the united states has done that. there's no side boards. doesn't say exactly wa we have to do. don't have any difficulty with that. when you turn to article 222 and if you will go town to the middle of the first paragraph, if you read what we just read, i'm sorry. page 180. it's about the middle of the

page. the csignators shall take other measures necessary to implement rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution. that is going to be the law of the land if we go to this treaty. how long do you think it will take a federal judge to fine the conventions which has set standards and rules, which by this language, we have exceeded to. you're going to find a gaggle of judges tripping over each other to force the epa and other

organizations in the united states, that say you shall adopt these rules and regulations. that doesn't trouble you at all. >> you will recall in our first year one of the treaties we rejected was the keoto protocol. >> that's good. we want to focus on this. it's black and white. >> i was to emphasize we were approaching this from a position that's sympathetic to you position. it says we shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution but only taking into account international agreed rules. we don't have to enact. >> nothing wrong with that.

>> 222 says we shall enforce those laws that have been adopted in accordance with article 212, paragraph 1. it says we have to enforce our own laws. >> nothing wrong with that. the next word is and. and. with other provisions of this convention, and shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary to implement. >> the keyword there is applicable. applicable international rules and standards. if we haven't signed it, it's not applicable to us. >> i would greatly disagree with that reading of it. it doesn't say that at all. if it did say that he, you'd say that in plain english. what they mean by the word applicable is applicable rules to the situation at hand. >> i understand you're reading the plain text of it.

it's difficult to read as all of us have pointed out language like this. i agree with you. that's why it took us in the bush administration a considerable amount of time to work our way through these. all i can tell you is you raise a legitimate concern, but the long standing view the bush administration and of the new administration is to say applicable international rule means it has to apply to you. treaties that have been negotiated by other people to whom we are not matter don't apply with us. there are lots of international human rights rules that people said we ought to abide by that we were not party to. we would say those are not applicable to us because we have not become party to them. >> you're willing to take the chance that tortured interpretation will accepted by the united states district court? >> i'm with you on this.

you raise concerns, i have seen lots of law fair brought by groups, by other countries and people upset with the united states. i think it's fair to raise that as a concern. that is the view of the u.s. government about the meaning of those terms. i think then on balance, even if this is fair concern, you have to take into account the cost versus the benefit. if we don't join the treaty can still go ahead. we're denying the opportunity, even if you have a fair point, the benefits of the treaty to u.s. businesses and u.s. treasury and u.s. navy outweigh what may well be a fair concern to raise. >> appreciate your judgment in

that regard. thank you. >> senator, as you're taking off or going home, article 297, ill direct you to take a moment to read that in your travels. >> i've read 297. >> paragraph c, which is pretty clear that the only way in which anything regarding the environment would apply to us is where it is applicable to us because we seened up to it or we're part of it. in fact, within the four corners of this agreement is a dispensation against any state, united states or anybody else that hasn't signed up. there's no standing. there's no exposure. >> i don't read it that way, but thank you. >> that's the language. >> the language is more than

black white. >> if you only take one section, you can read it your way. if you apply the law, it's the same. >> i know you need to leave. i don't want that to be an argument between us. i think it's fair point reading that language and a fair question to ask. there's an argument on the other side. i've given you the view of the bush administration which looks to these things seriously and concerned about environmental litigation and felt that was the better interpretation of that provision and even counter balancing those risks still overall the benefits of the treaty would still counter balance against the risks you've raised. i understand and support those concerns. >> thank you. >> thank you for the opportunity to join you again on the law of the sea.

we had four, six star officers to testify that it would improve the flexibility and capability of the united states and their ability to fulfill their respective missions. they are not alone in doing so. those who oppose need to explain why the proponents that have proclaimed the treaty values are wrong. leaders of our military make their claim that it's harder and more dangerous. i want to be clear. i'm grateful they have come to testify about something on which they feel strongly. the questions they raise about the treaty are well worth considering and answering. i believe they have been answered. i hope we can answer them again today. i hope we can do it in way ta makes it everyone this treaty is not a threat to the american way

of life, but in these areas are a real benefit to the men and women who serve us in armed forces. we discussed what freedom of navigation operations mean, how they work and what opponents of the treaty would have us entirely rely on and what that means for the men and women who serve. we talked a lot about strategy. it's important to remember there are mothers and daughters and sons who serve. we put them in harms way because of our refusal to testify. yould elaborate on how men and women in uniform out there in

contested areas are put in unneeded jeopardy? >> i repeated that before you arrive. there's an element of risk. i think i'd go back quite a ways here because i recall a time at which i was working in the bureau of oceans environment and science, and we had this challenge program where we identify maritime claims that we think are not supported by international law and where we feel our navigational interests are affected. if i remember correctly and john will correct me if i'm wrong or perhaps secretary rumsfeld, the gulf of libya was one of those because they had a restrictive interpreation of freedom of the seas in that gulf there. we would deliberately sail into

what they considered waters over which they had greater jurisdiction than we recognized and that always, especially when dealing with a regime that's not predictable entailed a certain amount of risks for those forces that were undertaking those exercises. i don't think you can say the law of the sea is a substitute for the exercise of our navigational rights. we're always going to exercise them. i think it does reduce the level of risk. >> thank you. one of the things i welcome you expounding on further is some have seized upon comments made in a previous panel and some of the folks testified today who suggested the law of the treaty would not in any way help with force projection, that a failure to ratify doesn't put our nation at greater risk.

>> i think another area speaking as former director of national intelligence, i think the fact that you have an internationally recognized freedoms of navigation between the 12-mile outer limit of the territorial sea and the 200 mile resource zone and the fact that this convention now, if it's modified someday by somebody recognizes the right of freedom of navigation. that protects certainly intelligence equities that we have as well. >> mr. groves, if i might, in your testimony you referenced the policy of defense. it says the freedom of navigation preserve feenl