all could reflect on that. who wants to start? >> maybe, if i could start. >> sure. >> representative coffman. first of all, thank you for your concern and interest in this area. the situation you mentioned at the military hospital is one that as we became aware of it we began investigating and began working with the afghans to take corrective action. there are currently investigations and corrective action under way with that hospital. let me just go back to the words you used, culture of corruption. there is, to be frank, not just hundreds but thousands of years of history in afghanistan and surrounding regions where corruption has been part of the fabric of life. it's not something that the afghan people, however, want. it's not something that the majority of the afghan military officers and the leaders of the afghan military want themselves from the ministers on down.

i've seen a lot of both leaders at the top, leaders in the middle and ordinary soldiers who are committed to not allowing corruption to destroy the structures that the afghans need and that we are financing. but, yes, there is corruption, as i mentioned in my prepared statement, corruption continues to be a problem. we have to work with the afghans to give them the capability to get rid of that corruption. that's a challenge. because not only do you need to have the laws in place, you have to have the effective structures in place. you have to have a judicial system, prosecutors, courts, a system of incarceration, all of these things the afghans are building or in some cases rebuilding, so it's a huge challenge. but while recognizing that corruption is a problem, i would not agree that it's endemic to the point where our investments

are not going to pay off. we have some really good partners in the afghans. we have some problematic ones. we have some ones that are corrupt and we need to work with the afghans to get rid of those. but i appreciate very much the points you are making. the things that happen in that hospital are the kinds of things that should never happen to any human being anywhere, and we are working with the afghans to correct them. >> thank you, mr. chairman. last point, i'm just concerned that that issue at the hospital is something that very well could be representative throughout the afghan security forces. and i think we in congress certainly need to get down to the bottom of it. thank you so much. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. coffman. we'll move to mr. johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for allowing me as a nonmember of this subcommittee to ask questions today. i appreciate it. and greetings, gentlemen. mr. sedney, you've -- can you characterize for us the

evolution of the afghan security forces, readiness, over the last decade and basically tell me when did they start turning the corner to become a force to be reckoned with in afghanistan. >> i can. i actually was on the ground in afghanistan, deputy chief of mission at our embassy on may 1st, 2002, when the first u.s. special forces arrived to begin training the afghan army a little over ten years ago. from that very, very i will have to say discouraging start when we had not enough money, not enough trainers, not enough trainees in windowless, bombed-out buildings to what we have today, we've made incredible progress. i would also say that for too long the effort in afghanistan

was underresourced, both in terms of money but also in terms of level of training and support that we were able to give the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, admiral mullen. described that very graphically when he said in afghanistan, we do what we can? don't wa >> don't want you to go too far. >> the turning point was i would say three years ago following the strategic review by president obama and members of this administration which recognized what we had not been doing in afghanistan, where we put additional resources both personnel and money, and we really began to build the afghan security forces to a size and capability that they are now showing. >> all right. >> we made the strategic decisions and the impacts are -- >> let me interrupt you, because i've got a few other questions. i'm sorry, i'd love to listen. so, how many taliban are we

fighting now in afghanistan? >> there are estimates from the intelligence community, and i'll defer to them on that, but i'd say it's a very hard figure to come up with how many, because many of the people that fight with the taliban are part-time taliban, there are people that fight for a day, and part-timers and taliban in pakistan. >> in fact, i think probably most of them would be part-timers. but approximately how many, 20,000? >> again, deferring, the last estimate released publicly was 15,000 to 20,000. i don't know if you have a better or different figure, steve. >> okay. now, the commitment to withdrawing our forces by the end of 2014, does that include special operations forces? >> we have committed to drawing

down our forces by the end of 2014 and ending a lead combat role. but we are -- have committed to continuing a presence in afghanistan after 2014. in the strategic partnership agreement we signed with afghanistan last month, we agreed to begin negotiations on a bilateral security agreement, which will set the parameters for what that force is including the participation of special forces after 2014. so, we are about to begin those negotiations to come up with how many special forces there will be in afghanistan after 2014. >> all right. thank you. we're talking about 230,000 afghan national security forces by 2017. we'd be drawing down about 120,000 from the force at its maximum height. that's going to produce 120,000 jobless individuals who

understand how to fight, and what do we do with those? and also, 230,000 on 20,000, how do we get to that 230,000 manpower figure for 2017? >> that was exactly one of the subjects secretary pineta discussed with the afghan minister of defense and minister of interior in their security consultive forum in april, and they agreed to have a regular six-month review of where the afghan security forces stand and what our future plans are and the security situation in afghanistan to see what pace that would allow for the drawdown of afghan security forces to a long-term, sustainable level. and the goal of something in the

neighborhood of 230,000 by 2017 is one we broadly agreed to, but the actual pace and the character, the way we get there, is something we'll be doing in these six-month reviews. in terms of the -- what happens to those that might be demobilized, there's a certainly level of natural attrition. afghan security forces, army and police, sign on to three-, four-, and five-year contracts and a lot of them leave, 30% to 40% of them leave after their contracts, that's normal in forces. there's a certain level of normal reduction in forces. there's a possibility of such things as a reserve force. and we have had experience in afghanistan -- >> who would pay? >> pardon? >> who would pay for those, well, i guess -- >> in terms of payment we've worked on a future plan of a -- a future plan of funding for afghanistan that would come from

the united states, would come from other -- our international partners, but more and more from afghanistan itself with a goal of afghanistan paying for its own security forces by the year 2024. >> and how did we arrive at the 230,000 mark for 2017? and is that still a reasonable guesstimate of the number of afghan security forces on the ground at that time, given the fact that it's 20,000 taliban? >> well, that figure certainly depends on the degrading of the taliban. as i said, our campaign plan has been to degrade the taliban, push the taliban down, build up the afghan security forces. in our reviews, we're going to check to see if that's actually happening. but a much diminished taliban and much hess effective taliban will require less forces, and

that's what that calculation id at that every six months. >> thank you, chairman. >> general townsend, i'll follow-up on mr. johnson's question and that is looking at the underlying assumptions on where we're going and transition with ansf as we spoke of 352,000 force structure by the end of 2012 and transitioning to 230,000 by the end of 2017, i guess my question is, what are the assumptions and analysis that went in to that to determine that that was a proper force structure at that time? how does that coincide with the coincidence of the drawdown of american troops or isaf troops during that time period? you can just lay out where the thought process has gone, where it's been, where we are today with how we came to that number

of 230,000. i know there's obviously a resource element associated with that, but also strategic element associated with that, so i'd like to get your reflection on that. >> first of all, the 352,000 was a result of a lot of analysis to include war gaming and that kind of thing to allow us to defeat, allow the ansf to defeat the taliban, so that's how we get to 352,000. and there's been a decision here in our government to sustain that through 2015, as you know. and that is to get them through a year or more after our drawdown and through elections, some sensitive time frames that will happen in the future there. so, then, how you get to some number in the future, and why 230,000. actually, the isaf and mtma ran

a number of planning excursions and 230,000 one -- quite honest i had, it's one we would probably pick for ourself that is a smaller force that is pretty well equipped and capable. there were other course of action, some larger with less capability, to have more troops, you'd have to have, you know, fewer trucks and ohelicopters ad things like that. the approximately 232,000 course of action is one that we agreed to with the afghans and our international partners. and as you said, there's a resource, you know, that's the $4.1 billion course of action. but these six-month reviews that mr. sednen talked about, every six months we'll re-evaluate, is that still good based on the threat and what's going on in the world. the afghans quite honestly would like to have a larger force and

the capability, but the world community will fund most of that, so, you know, there's a trade-off there. so, i think that as we go down the road, we'll make the six-month reviews and determine if 230,000 makes sense or when maybe something else makes sense. at some point in the near future here we'll ask the afghans, okay, give us your preferred course of action, because we've done a lot of that planning and then brought them into it. >> gotcha. mr. sedney in speaking about those six-month reviews, i'm assuming they'll also include isaf forces, you're looking at drawdown obviously after 2014 the ansf forces but also isaf forces to the end of 2014, where will be theoretically out. will those six-month evaluations also consider if we haven't reached an acceptable security condition with that transition, with isaf force presence after december 2014?

>> well, the isaf mandates, the nato heads of state have agreed on, runs out at the end of 2014. it was a decision made at lisbon in 2010 that the afghan security forces would be fully in the lead by the end of 2014. in terms of moving towards that very definitely, the size of -- both the size, but more importantly, the capabilities and the actions that will be carried out by the isaf forces had be will be considered. but as nato stated in chicago, in defining essentially an interim milestone in 2013, that that will be the point at which afghan forces are in the lead with our support. so, there will be a year and a half with the afghan forces in the lead and isaf support, and as they become more and more in

the lead, they will -- they will need less and less isaf support. so, we will be evaluating in those six-month reviews, looking primarily at the performance of the afghan security forces and if there are areas where the afghan security forces need additional training, advising, assisting areas where they're facing challenges, then the commander in the field i'm sure will recommend methods to do that. but, so, yes, it's very much a joint -- it's very much a unitary process looking at the entire spectrum in the whole country of afghanistan. >> very good. thank you, mr. sedney. mr. coffman? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i understand that president karzai, why the constitution can't run again, and there's not been a credible election yet in afghanistan, and i know in iraq under general casey, coalition

forces actively supported the independent electoral commission of iraq to make sure that there were credible elections. what efforts will be made next time to make sure or to assist the afghan people to make sure there's a credible election so there's a smooth -- a peaceful transition of power? >> thank you very much, mr. coffman. you've hit on a key issue, which is the successful elections and a successful transition of power, something that does not happen in that region of the world in general. so, it will be an historic achievement and one that the afghan people are very much aware of. as you said president karzai has pledged publicly and privately to the u.s. government that he plans to step down and to facilitate a transfer of power. in terms of the department of defense, in terms of the military role, in terms of the role that nato and isaf will play, in both of the last two

elections in 2004 and 2009, the actual security protection that was available in areas where security had been achieved was led by the afghan forces, particularly in 2009. i know it's the judgment of our commanders in the field that that's going to be able to be the case in 2014 as well. so, in terms of the military's role, we'll be supporting the afghan security forces to the degree necessary in 2014 for those elections in order to carry out the security. the biggest challenge, of course, is having a credible and legitimate process that results in a transfer of power that the afghan people, international community see as legitimate, that there is a very active political dialogue in afghanistan already, and our colleagues at the state department and elsewhere are working to that end. but i would say on the security side, all the indications are and, steve, you can correct me if i'm wrong, we think the

afghan security forces will be in very good shape to take the lead and be very effective at it in maintaining security during the election period. >> sure. going forward, president karzai has come down on these night raids, which i -- in terms of my understanding are very effective in terms of capturing key insurgents. where are we at right now with night raids in terms of working with the karzai administration? >> quite honestly, the night raids question has pretty much dropped in pressure. it was highly pressurized a few months ago, but it's dropped significant because we've made this agreement on night raids or special operations with the government of afghanistan. and essentially we're turning over night raids at an accelerated pace to them.

they have now four of their own strike forces that are doing these raids side by side. they're partnered with americans. they're enabled by americans. but they are completely in the lead for four of these strike forces. this are coalition forces that are still operating each night. they are partnered also with afghans. but it's the discussion we had earlier about who's in the lead and who's participating. but because of that agreement and because of the continuing success of these operations, the pressure on that topic has dropped significantly with the government of afghanistan. >> in terms of our ability to phase down our forces, being able to redeploy them out of afghanistan, utilizing pakistan has become an issue in working with the pakistani government. i wonder if you could reflect on where we are right now in that negotiation process. >> we are -- we have been

talking with the pakistanis about reopening the ground lines communication, and we continue those discussions continue those discussions. i think people from my office have been involved in those discussions. my deputy was in islamabad for about the last six, seven weeks carrying them out. we've not -- we do find a great deal of willingness on the pakistan side to re-open those and we'll report back to the committee when that happens. but what i would stress is pry marlly due to our partnership with a number of other countries to the north of afghanistan, we have been able to continue operations without any interruption or any hindrance and the level of supplies for our troops in afghanistan, for our nato partners' troops in afghanistan is higher now than before the pakistani ground lines of communications were

closed. it costs more money. it's a much longer route. it goes through some more difficult areas in terms of development of the transportation networks. all that said, due to some tremendous work by our colleagues and trans-com, sen-com and a number of civilian carriers we're actually in very good shape and able to move forces and equipment in and out of afghanistan as is necessary. however, we don't want to be dependent upon the north any more than we want to be dependent on pakistan. we were very much interested in having both routes open. there's healthy competition there and diversity of supply lines we think is strategically important. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. we'll move back to mr. johnson. >> thank you. the $4 billion, mr. sidney, that

is projected to be necessary to support that smaller force of 230,000 ansf in 2017, that represents about 20% of the afghan current -- current afghan gdp. if we assume that afghanistan will experience economic growth and improvements in governance, maintaining that force, will, of course, require substantial international contributions. what steps are being taken to get commitments from international donors, and how much progress have we made? >> thank you, congressman. last year, former secretary of defense gates proposed in a publicly that our isaf and other

partners contribute 1 billion euros a year toward the future cost of the afghan security forces. since that time, we have been working very actively with our nato and other partners including countries in the middle east and asia that are also part of the isaf force. i would say we're very, very close to that goal right now because some of these discussions are still in diplomatic channels, not in position to give you the details now but very soon we'll be able to. we've gotten a very positive response. countries are willing to make multiyear commitments. each country has different budget processes, different political processes. but the commitments that were made in chicago have been very positive. at the same time as i mentioned before the goal by 2024 set out by president karzai and endorsed by every afghan i know is afghanistan will be able to become self-sustaining for its security forces. that's a very stretched goal. it's going to require a huge growth in the afghan economy.

there are other prospects in a number of areas. agriculture, transportation, mining, for that growth. in the end it all depends on security. if security is in place, the afghanistan has a lot of areas where its economy can grow and meet that goal and that, of course, comes back to the afghan security forces. as i say, we've been very pleased with the response from other countries and look forward to giving you more details on that once diplomatic questions are completed. >> i understand also that the poppy crop has been, or the level of production has declined dramatically this growing season. what is the reason for that? >> the full evaluation of that is still ongoing including by our intelligence agencies and we'll get a -- we should have their official reports in a few weeks. but from what we understand, there's a combination of factors involved. one of the largest is weather

and crops, other natural factors. we've also seen a decline in production, particularly in areas where we have been most effective thein our military counterinsir swrensy operations, particularly in the helmand area, where the combination of increased security and effective crop substitution effort, a whole government effort, with participation from our colleagues in the u.s. agency for national development, giving farmers an opportunity to grow something else, even though it might be less profitable in one sense is much less secure because they don't have the risk of having their crop destroyed. they have legitimate outlets, not being preyed upon by taliban and criminals. we've seen that happening. the largest reasons anecdotally we can report right now are natural. they're both natural and as a result of our policies. >> can you share a little bit with us about the afghan police

forces that we're also training and what will be our financial commitment, if any, for them after 2014? >> the financial commitment we talked about before was for the afghan security forces including the army and the police. both the uniform police, the border police, and the afghan local police that the chairman discussed before. the police, as a whole, in afghanistan, as in every other conflict and post-conflict societies does lag behind. the police in afghanistan, the representative mentioned before, casualty rates. the police bear a much higher casualty rate than the army. they tend to be in smaller groups, often isolated and are quite often the choice of targets for the insurgents. that combination has made it more challenging to build the

police. however, we see significant progress on the police. the attrition figures that i mentioned before show that the policemen are staying in, staying in longer, staying -- becoming part of their communities in an effective way. there are some continuing problems with corruption. as representative kauffman mentioned. it's a problem in the police forces, in many areas in afghanistan that needs to be addressed. i don't know if, steves if you have any comments about the police in your experience. >> my experience over the last year, whether the police continue to improve and this is most notable in the selection and promotion of police leadership. i had -- when i first got there i had an afghan police general who was my partner and when i heard word of his impending assignment, i was quite nervous because he was not very corrupt and i thought an honest guy trying to do right for his

country. i was very concerned and in every case, the incoming leader proved to be better than his predecessor. so that was my experience in rc east. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. johnson. i'd like to thank the members of the committee, and our witnesses today for your testimony. we appreciate the time. and with that, this hearing is adjou adjourned.

how do you approach book interviews differently than news reporting interviews? >> i think of the book interviews as gathering history. i think of interviewing when i'm