the cat out of the bag, you don't want to see the cat of nine tails coming out of the bag for a flogging. >> also this weekend, more from the contenders, our key political figure who is ran for president and lost, but changed political history. 1920 democratic candidate former new york governor al smith. >> and we continue now with the oral history of bernard us in balm. he served in the house on the house judiciary -- this second portion is just over an hour. >> 1988. >> 1988. hillary came into -- i think she had other business in new york though she wanted to see me. she comes into new york, we had dinner together. she says bill's thinking of running for president.

now, this is 1988. this was 14 years after that conversation we had in the car. and bill clinton at this point i think is 43 years old. 1988, he was born in '46. how old is he in 1988. >> he's -- he's 42. >> 42. he's 42 years old in 1988. 42. she tells me that -- she's the same age, no, a year younger. she was born in '47. he's thinking of running for president and she doesn't want me to commit to support anybody else. as if my support for anybody makes any difference which although i've been a contributor to political campaigns, it makes no difference. i say to her very tentatively.

so i say the to her, hillary, i know we discussed this in the past, something like that, but he may be tentative now, he may be kind of young, 42 years old. to run for president. though john kennedy ran when he was 42, 43. she says well, he's deciding. just don't support anybody else. okay. i'm not supporting anybody else. and a week later i get a call from her, i believe, yeah i did, saying he's not running. so i said well. i ended up supporting michael dukakis in 1988 to great effect as you can tell. actually i went to the convention in 1988, and i was on the floor of the convention and when bill clinton spoke, made what turned out to be a disastrous speech which i was there when he made -- i didn't know he was going to speak. and then in 1992, or 1991, 1991, october 1991, 20 years ago, from not today but from this month, i get a call from a partner in

goldman-sachs saying we have to have -- i get a call saying there's going to be a meeting, we're going to have to have a meeting shortly -- i know this partner -- to see if we can raise money for bill clinton who is going to run for president. hillary says you're on board. hillary never called me, never asked me anything. it's 1991. i had not heard from her 18 while. she hasn't called me. ken brodie, the partner of goldman sacs called me. he says you're on board, let's have this meeting and see if we can raise some money for clinton. so i go down to this meeting. this meeting is in tom tisch's office who is a republican. wasn't at the meeting. in his office. there's six people sitting around in this meeting. and -- and brodie's there and i'm there and four other people. i don't remember, they were investment bankers, maybe one lawyer.

there's very few people. they say well, we could have -- you know, we're here to discuss the governor of arkansas bill clinton to raise some money and one of the guys says who is bill clinton? at this meeting. governor of arkansas. he's -- may run for president. he said i'm a republican. he's a democrat? and then somebody says, this is like five or six weeks -- somebody says i'm listening to this, somebody says what, this is crazy he says. nobody ever heard of this guy. i mean, how are we going to raise money for this guy. this is nuts. only because the goldman partner asked him to come. some governor from arkansas. and i get agitated at this point. i say, this is what you're going to tell people. this is how you're going to raise money for the governor of arkansas. go out and tell people when they see him, and when they meet him

and when they hear him speak and when they see the quality of his mind, charisma n tell against, his good looks even, you are going to tell people this guy is going to be president of the united states. they are contributing early to somebody as president of the united states. all they have to do is see it and come into contact and he's going to win. i said that to rouse him up. all right. so then we had a party, and a fancy apartment on sutton place and clinton showed up and hillary who i had not seen in a while. and we started raising money at that party. and the rest is history. okay. you want to go back to the tapes? >> i'll go back to the tapes. >> you heard these tapes, the special prosecutor hands them over in a satchel.

>> yes. that's right. >> and that's in march? >> march of 1974. >> and then in april, somebody decides to enhance them, right, because it's hard to hear them. >> yes. correct. it's hard to hear certain parts. yes, it was hard to hear but we -- the special prosecutor, did he send up transcripts? i don't remember. but the white house did release the transcripts and this became an issue because the white house transcripts weren't accurate in certain key portions. whether it was deliberately inaccurate or what, i don't know. people like buzz hart and others they were under tremendous pleasure. 18 years later i was in the white house. you might think the white house is an efficient place.

it's not true. poor fred. a handful at the white house. >> if for whatever reason, the transcripts they released were inaccurate, then we made it our business to put together accurate transcripts, then presented that to the committee, obviously. >> to demonstrate that what we were given was not accurate. when they can draw whatever they want to draw from that. obviously we weren't in the face of drawing favorite conclusions. >> it was after the white house. >> that you start the process. >> correct. >> and what kinds of checks and balances did you put into that

practice to make sure they're accurate? >> we just devoted -- we just devoted a lot of time, people really made an effort to get it right. once we realized the others were wrong, the way i remember it, this is somewhat vague so i don't want to over state this. but we really wanted to get it right. also we wanted to be fair. i mean, it's not -- look. we were good people. but we had a committee to deal with. we had republicans as well as democrats. this is not special prosecutor's office, independent council, things like that, you have stew answer to no one. we had to answer to a committee and the committee, while it was the democrats won a majority. there were conservative democrats. jim mann, walter flowers, people like that. key members of the committee. these are democrats, by no means who is constituency, south carolina and alabama, would by no means certain to vote for impeachment putting aside the

republicans so. what we were trying to do was get it right. make sure it was as accurate as possible. when they make a decision they can make it in a coherent factual accurate fashion. that's big -- even i didn't think of that till recently. we really were working for both the republicans and the -- sure, it was a republican staff that worked for jenner, then sam guerinson. we had a republican staff working with us, that's one of the great things is meld the staffs together. we wanted -- we were being questioned all the time whether

this should be done or that should be done or what the consequences of this is and of that, how do you analyze this and that. this is a very important concept to understand during that impeachment. this is a real joint effort but also an effort where we were subject to checks and balances. as we had to be. so we try to get it right. i think we did get it right. >> some people have remembered the tapes having a major impact on burt jenner. on his thinking. >> yeah, i think that incident with my recollection. jenner also, look. bert jenner, he was the way i remember him, a wonderful man, a wonderful guy, a prominent and well known lawyer. created a great firm, jenner and

block. he wanted to do the right thing. he wasn't out to get the president as some republicans accused him of and pushed him aside. he was out to do sort of an independent fair investigation. and wherever the facts lead the facts lead. that's the way i felt and i think that's the way daal felt also. but he did feel like that. once we got the tapes, talked to some of the people yeah, we did conclude that impeachment wasn't appropriate. it took a while and for jenna to get there too. and i think the tapes had a big influence on all of us. that's why the irony is if the tapes wouldn't have been there, who knows what would have happened. >> when you put together the subpoenas were you hopeful or optimistic or just felt you had to do it but you didn't think the white house was going to give you anything. >> well, i was -- the way i remember it, one of the key

people, not the only, no person was totally in charge of anything other than dole in charge of doors. i was one of the key figures in putting together the subpoenas and led to article three which i was deeply involved in. we felt we had to do it and felt we were entitled to the material. and knowing the way the white house was reacting, we felt they would stone wall us. they wanted to turn this into a political process. this was a huge battle. this is a political fight. and when the democrats are trying to do is impeach the process, really just to reverse the last election. and we were resisting that so we were trying to get the facts. and we were trying to keep the republicans -- tried to satisfy them that we were try to do it in a fair way. but the white house was

stonewalled the committee. and did stonewall the committee to a large extent. the mistake the president made was having an independent counsel and special prosecutor who then took him to court and secures the tapes. in effect. although it's my view as i expressed to you on another occasion, that the supreme court and the united states supreme, nixon probably made the wrong decision in ordering the tapes. that the president's executive privilege, except in impeachment. that's the right way. it probably wouldn't have come out but the way it came out what i considered a right was what followed. the president did decide to turn over the tapes. which in retrospect was probably an historic mistake from his point of view.

and turning over the tapes resulted in the impeachment of the president. if he destroyed the tapes he probably would not have been impeached. maybe i'm wrong. actually i hope i'm wrong on that. who knows. he did turn them over, we did get them and presented them to the committee but he laid it all out. the tapes, combined with all the other facts we gathered, all collated, not only to take credit or have our staff take credit for sort of uncovering all of these facts. there is nothing i remember that we uncovered that wasn't obtained from somebody else. what dora understood, our process was to gather, to collate. >> you made the case before you had the smoking gun. >> yes. we made the case. i did actually. that's a very -- we described to the committee and i was involved in that along with others. what we thought happened.

on the basis of witnesses we had talked to or seen or heard, on the basis of documents we have seen. what probably happened at these meetings. in one committee session we were giving our analysis, based on other things. when you put these together this will probably happen. and the tapes confirmed it. it confirmed it. i remember feeling so proud. and i wasn't the only one doing this. others on the watergate task force, we were putting together. chronologies are very important. john dole was big on chronology, he's right. they are important. this fact, this event, this date. and it was a good way of doing it. and then there was certain gaps,

to use a famous word, then we had a show to use to fill in the guests. what the president probably did at this point. probably said here. a view of what was said before and we sort of provided that analysis of the committee even though we didn't have direct evidence of that and when the tapes came out, the tapes provided direct evidence. i mean, dean's testimony was very important. it was very important to study events that occurred. we used that to help us create this matrix of facts. ultimately it did work. it was a wonderful process. as i saw us convince, you know, i saw us convince the conservative democrats who were very important here. in fact, you mentioned the walter flowers from alabama whose conditions were very pro

and the jim manz of south carolina, people like that were important. and we reached them and would be desperate not to have a partisan committee vote. even reaching them i don't know, 17-14 or something. i think that would have been the figures, the democrat and republican split, that would have been a disaster. disaster is too strong a term. it was the wrong way to go about it. of course it happened the year the clinton impeachment in 1998. but we really, it works to be accepted by the country, by history, for the good of the country. we really felt we drilled so hard. to achieved bipartisanship in this thing. and i give a lot of credit. bill said two key figures. just handle it right.

it was useful to have me, aggressive. i wanted to you know, to go hard and once i was convince there had was a case to be made. but their balance, their judgment i think really kept this process going along the right direction. and i'm very proud. not only we reached southern democrats which were important, the conservative democrats, and also the republicans. all of a sudden we started reaching some of the republicans. bill cohen and tom rails back and people like that who then spoke really from the heart. it was a moving thing to see that. then of course after the smoking gun tape came out, the june 18th tape, that's when the president had to resign. the whole committee sort of, i mean, the whole committee

decided impeachment was appropriate. some of the key republicans, wiggins was very able advocate on the committee. well, on the republican side. he became a judge, wiggins. in the ninth circuit, i think. very able. different. >> you must have seen the emotions. >> there was. i do remember the emotion. particularly on the republican side. that's where the emotion was. the republicans voted for impeachment in the final analysis. we're very torn. they understood they were in the process of potentially bringing down a republican president and -- and there was agony in their faces. because many of them, this is true, i used to have these discussions.

even in your our staff, especially with the republican members of a staff. a very intelligent guy. he got into trouble after the impeachment. he was, bruce jenner pushed aside by the republicans because they felt he wasn't republican enough. partisan enough. garrison was quite intelligent guy. and garrison expressed the view that even if some of these things happened and even if there was abuse of power or the misuse of power by the fbi, the cia, the fact is he's a good president. isn't that a factor to be taken into account. he was a good president in foreign affairs, did very important things. he did the opening to china. he was hugely important in the arab-israeli war in 1973. don't you have to make a judgment about that as well?

and the answer is yes. you really sort of do. but on the other hand, he did do all of these things that he really did abuse his powers as president, and against his political opponent and is contrary to our system of government. the answer to that is others have done similar things. to some extent. you know. but the fact is he sort of put it all together in a way nobody did it before. and you can't do that any more. you know, that was a debate. garrison made interesting arguments and i think this was reflected in the agony of the republicans when i watched this. many of them thought he was a good overall good present. not only a president of their party but a good president. certainly? in foreign affairs and maybe even in domestic affairs. in some ways he was a good president. apparently didn't like me because i told you i mentioned a

smk that he spoke. this is years later after i was in the white house with bill clinton he made some comments about me and my deputy and said in my book, he thought i was a tough shit and maybe i drove my deputy, vince foster to suicide, which was of course not true. he was a wonderful man who unfortunately had a breakdown. president nixon was a very able guy. but he did what he did and we did what we had to do, and is the congress reaches a decision. >> sam garrison's office, was it close to yours? >> yeah, yeah. we were all -- we worked out of the congressional hotel. it was a very small space. we were constantly together. garrison was a good advocate.

you know, for i don't believe he's still alive. he died. he was not old. he was no older than i was at the time. you should really -- well, you did track down some of them. bill weld i guess. but you should try to track down some of those republican staff members and see. in the end we were mostly on the same page. which is an amazing feat. i know it was important at the time but i didn't understand how important. in this day and age impossible. i think it's impossible. >> what changed? >> the enormous partisanship. it even was when bill clinton was in the white house.

when i was council to the president. it became worse and worse. there is no middle. there is no moderate republicans, moderate democrats but no moderate republicans. and the notion of people coming together to make a joint decision. that's why the country has all of the problems it has now. the economic situation. it's a big problem. then maybe it was -- historians can look back, one of the last time that people can sort of come together. it's a tribute to i them keep saying we came together. and also what i'm proud of. i think i mentioned this before, if not in this interview. i thought there would be a historical backlash against the impeachment process, against the president nixon reservation because we forced him out of

office, this was a partisan gang that put it all together. there was never, that back lash never came. nobody ever writes that somehow -- no meaningful position, i'm sure some have written, that somehow error was committed. this shouldn't have happened. this was a president being driven out of office and he wouldn't. no respectable authorities have really said that. and that's another tribute to that process. i'm very proud of that too. i always thought history that's the way it will go. 20 years from now, in a moment of hysteria using the tapes we force the president out of office and shouldn't have done. nobody's ever said that. the decision is basically accepted by history.

yes, this is the correct judgment. under those circumstances and those times. that's something look how the people look back at the clinton and so called impeachment. he was impeached. he was, but the house of representatives he was acquitted sort of by the senate but he was impeached. everybody looks at that as a joke. >> it's a joke, a misuse of the impeachment process. no punishment of the party that did that but it's a joke. you look back at that as a joke, not as a legitimate process. but nobody looks back on -- most people don't. maybe some people do. but most people don't look back on watergate impeachment in 1974 and the ultimate resignation. the house judiciary committee voted on articles of impeachment and prior to he resigned because the senators went to him and said the articles can be voted out and the senate will probably vote to convict so he resigned. >> did you think that the

lessons you learned in 1974 were useful or not in 1993-94? or had the world changed so much by then? >> no. in 1993-94 when i was in the white house, i was affected by what happened in '73-'74. and this is of course also part of history right now and in various books. the office of the independent council is a very dangerous office. you know. it was conducted well in '73-'74, cox and jawarski did a good job, a fair job. it was the proper thing to do but it was a unique circumstance. at the time.

there was you know, clearly evidence of significant abuses of power, we had the tapes ultimately. but normally, that is a dangerous office to exist for a president to have to face. when you start appointing independent counsel, the dynamic is such that you want to make a case. when you only have one target and your representation sort of at stake you want to make a case. the impeachment process is the proper process. but the independent counsel is dangerous. you have to have a unique person to walk away. especially when the president's involved.

so i was very wary and when i came into the white house in '93-94 of the institution of special prosecutor, the independent counsel. and with this outcry arose, in late 1993, when i was counsel to the president, after my deputy vince foster committed suicide, this whitewater, so called investment that president clinton and hillary clinton had made a long time ago, which they lost money on, that somehow there was some sort of corruption involved or guarantee and then jim mcdougal and people -- had nothing to do with abuse of power, nothing, none of the same kind of stuff that happened in '73-74. and it was an outcry for independent counsel to investigate those arguments. ---acts. i was vehemently opposed to