always been set by the market. it's supply and demand equation quite frankly. appraisers, indeed, deserve a reasonable customary fee to be paid for the services they provide. the notion that amcs are somehow driving down fees for appraisers i think is really mistaken. we don't -- we don't set fees for appraisers. we -- we work for lenders. we're the agents of the lender. we're doing the risk assessment pieces of what lenders have traditionally done. we provide, as i indicated in our testimony, services for lenders and for appraisers.rs. one of the things that i've been told, in all the years i was with the appraisal institute, that one of the largest costs for appraisers was marketing.

that, in addition to the risk, you know insurance and warranties and those types of things are real costs for appraisers, say, doing retail assignments. much, if not all of that, has been offloaded to the amcs and so there is a sharing of that compensation. that risk and those duties are no longer done by that traditional appraiser. and the consequent fee that they get is one that they agree to and had been negotiated with to say, will you do this assignment on 123 maple, 104, et cetera, et cetera. what is your fee? they say it's $300 or whatever it may by, and you strike an agreement. so there may be anomalies on that, just like we talked about anomalies on traveling. but those are truly anomalies as far as i can tell. haven't seen any evidence of that to -- >> thank you. would anybody else like to comment on that? >> thank you very much.

i think it's very important to distinguish the importance of what has happened over the past eight years. at the height of the market, 60% of mortgages were originated by mortgage brokers. the majority of whom were professional lenders. however, we all know that we saw many problematic nontraditional subprime loans. we also saw issues where appraisers were working exclusively with companies such as ameriquest or brokers and overvaluing properties. the intent of the home valuation code of conduct was to ensure that arm's length transaction which was part of the path. we agree it should be changed. the reality today, jumping forward to today, is some of the unintended consequences of efforts to improve performance in the marketplace. appraisers tell us when we ask them about valuations given to consumers, with regard to accuracy issues, in the past they would have a day to produce, or more, to produce an appraisal for a lender. today, amcs expect them to do

two to three in the same time period. the fact of the matter is, appraisers are leaving the practice, the profession in droves because they can't make ends meet. that's not a product of quality. these appraisers are committed to providing quality products, but it is a product, unfortunately, of a changing marketplace, and what we are not seeing, and i hope we do see, back to the purpose of this hearing, is that we do see, in fact, the subcommittee working with the cfpb, working with the provincial regulators and to ensure safety and soundness and the return of robust lending. thank you. >> thank you. i'd like to thank all of the witnesses today. and before i dismiss you, i just have to add into the record, i ask unanimous consent to insert the following material into the record. june 28th, 2012, statement from the national association of home builders. june 28th, 2012, statement from the american enterprise institute.

june 28th, 2012, statement from the american guild of appraisers. june 28th, 2012, statement from the mortgage bankers association. june 28th, 2012, statement from the dallas-ft. worth association of mortgage brokers. june 28th, 2012, statement from the leading builders of america. and with that, the chair notes that some members may have additional questions for this panel which they may wish to submit in writing. that objection, the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for members to submit written questions to the witnesses and to place their responses in the record. with that, i really like to thank you and thank you for your expertise that you brought in this panel, and to help us as we move forward and so i thank you all for being here. and with that, this hearing is adjourned.

here's a look at what's coming up today on c-span 3. up next, remarks from ellen ochoa, deputy director at nasa's johnson space flight center. that's followed by a panel discussion with recent female recipients of the nobel peace prize. later, a look at history and use of executive power. and then journalists from the new yorker and the "new york times" at an awards ceremony for

investigative journalism. and with congress on break this week, we're featuring some of american history tv's weekend programs in primetime on c-span 3. tonight, join us as we look at women's history starting at 8 p.m. eastern. former congresswoman pat schroeder of colorado reflects on women in politics in the 1970s. at 9:00, remembering first lady pat nixon, who traveled to over 75 countries during her time in the white house as an ambassador of goodwill. at 10:30 p.m., a professor explores harvard's relationship with women since the university's founding 375 years ago. american history tv in primetime all week on c-span 3. and on c-span 2, watch some of book tv's weekend programs in primetime. tonight, a look at american journalism starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern. christopher daly in his book "covering america" captures

major news events. at 9:55, timothy gay tells the story of the war against hitler through the cr eyes of reporter. book tv in primetime all week on c-span 2. this weekend, head to the state capitol named in honor of thomas jefferson with book tv and american history tv in jefferson city, missouri. saturday at noon eastern, literary life with book tv on c-span 2. former senator and missouri first lady on family life inside the the governor's mansion from her book "if walls could talk." also, a butcher's bill, a business contract, a provisions list from ancient times to the university of missouri's special collections. the stories behind eight miniature babylonian clay

tablets. >> at one time in 1967 this was called the bloodiest 47 acres in america. >> a former warden takes you through the historic missouri state penitentiary. also, walk back through history in the halls of the missouri state capitol and governor's mansion. once a month, c-span's local content vehicles explore the history and literary life of cities across america. this weekend from jefferson city, saturday at noon and sunday at 5:00 eastern on c-span 2 and 3. up next, remarks from ellen ochoa, deputy director at nasa's johnson space flight center. she gave the keynote address earlier this year at the u.s. air force academy's national character and leadership symposium in colorado springs. ms. ochoa was the first hispanic woman to go into space, and her missions included assembly of the international space station.

>> ladies and gentlemen, my name is cadet second class amanda mcclain. it is my privilege to welcome you to this session of the 19th annual national character and leadership symposium. it's my pleasure to introduce today's speaker. today's speaker was selected by nasa in 1990 and became an astronaut in july of 1991. she became the first hispanic woman to go into space with a nine-day mission aboard the shuttle discovery in 1993. a veteran of four space flights, she's logged nearly 1,000 hours in space. along with her nasa career, she is also an accomplished pioneer of spacecraft technology. as the chief of intelligent systems at the nasa research center, she supervised 35 engineer scientists and the research and development of computational systems for aerospace missions while laying claim to three patents herself.

currently, she's servings a the deputy director of the johnson space center. ladies and gentlemen, it's an honor to present you dr. ellen ochoa. [ applause ] >> thank you very much. well, thank you. it's my pleasure to be here this morning and to be speaking with you. i've been real fortunate in my career. i was selected as an astronaut at a time when the space shuttle was flying quite regularly during the 1990s and had the opportunity to be on four different space shuttle missions. two of them were atmospheric research flights where we took experiments and were studying the problem of the ozone hole and ozone creation and depletion in our atmosphere. then the second two flights were part of the assembly of the international space station. my last flight was almost exactly ten years ago. it was in april 2002, and as i mentioned, it was part of the assembly of the space station.

we took up the very first piece of the truss structure, which is now about 350 feet long. of course, that's the structure that the huge solar rays hang off of. after i talk, i'm going to show you some video both from that flight as well as some of the current views of the international had space station and some of the things going on there today. but what i wanted to talk to you a little bit about today was some of the leadership things that i have done since transitioning out of the astronaut corps. i knew going into that last flight, sts-110, that it would probably be my last space flight, or at least the last for several years. i was a veteran. it was my fourth flight. we had a lot of people in the astronaut office who had not had the chance to fly in space at all. one of our goals was to make sure we got those folks flight experience. so i was offering and accepted the position of deputy director of flight crew operations at

johnson space center. the flight crew operations director is the organization there that manages both the astronaut corps and our aircraft ops division. at that time, we had about 41 aircraft in our aircraft ops division. most of them, about 30 of them, were the t-38 aircraft that astronauts fly in as part of our training. we also had four shuttle training aircraft, which are modified gulf stream 2 aircraft that shuttle commanders and pilots use to learn how to land the shuttle. of course, we had a couple of 747s that have been modified to care carry the shuttle on top. then we also had a few other aircraft like some wb-57 high altitude aircraft. this organization flight crew ops that i was now deputy director of, in addition to, you know, developing policies for our organization and managing the people and the budget, we

also had a technical operational role in terms of representing the flight crew at the various program and agency level meetings where they need a flight crew representative. so some of those meetings, of course, we were at that time flying the shuttle in the middle of assembling the international space station. so when the shuttle would have their weekly control boards and they would make decisions about, you know, fixing software or doing inspections or just the day-to-day decisions for the shuttle, we always had a flight crew representative there to provide the position of the flight crew. during an actual mission, we had mission management team meetings where the shuttle management as well as representatives from the various areas like flight crew or mission operations would gather and make decisions during the flight, depending on how things were going, reviewing the

objectives of the flight, if there were failures that were happening in various pieces of equipment, understanding whether we could go in and do the next big milestone, whether it's rendezvousing with the station. so one of the very first meetings i attended in my new position was december of 2002. i had just been named in this position that month. the space shuttle program, about once a quarter, had meetings called council meetings, again, where sort of the management of the whole shuttle program as well as people like me representing flight crew or people representing mission control, people representing the safety and engineering organizations would meet and talk over issues. so the program manager stood up at this meeting, and his basic theme was that the nasa administrator was focused on getting to a particular launch by february 2004.

so that was a little over a year away. and that launch was going to bring up a piece of a module called node 2. at that point, we were going to be at a situation with the iss where it was called core complete. it wasn't the complete assembly of the international space station, but it was a point where you could have three crew members on board and support them, have enough power and have some laboratories that they could work in. we, of course, were going for six or seven crew members total, but this was sort of a phase that was ending before you sort of built up to the six-person crew. so let me just give you a little bit of background on why they were so interested in this particular flight that was going to happen about 14 months away. about a year or two earlier, it turned out the space station was determined to be about $4 billion over its projected

budget. and the administration declared that they were going to limit it to this core complete configuration. again, a reduced design that would have only accommodated three crew members. the deputy director of the office of management and budget in the white house, omb, presented a plan at a congressional hearing that would help bring these costs under control and basically it cut out some of the flights that were going to originally be part of that core complete, cancelled some of the elements that were already in development, including a habitation module that was being built and also a crew rescue vehicle that the u.s. was providing. and then there was a task force that was formed at om b's request that recommended a reduced flight rate about four shut the flights per year, which would require longer station crews on orbit. so we already had crews living in orbit at that time.

in general, we were trying to rotate crews out about every three months. this task force recommended increasing that to six month stays. at that time in 2001 with this reduced flight rate, they felt we could get to this core complete again by february 2004. and they recommended a performance gate. so they were going to see how nasa did over the next couple years, and in the fall of 2003, an assessment would be made looking at the iss program performance and nasa's credibility. if it was satisfactory, they were going to look at what resources would be needed to get to the full assembly complete and see if they would provide those or not. if they didn't feel nasa's progress had been satisfactory, then they were going to end the assembly of the station at this core complete. so this was the approach that was adopted by the administration. the deputy director of omb, who as i mentioned, was kind of right in the middle of this,

became the new nasa administrator. you can imagine because he was so involved in this cost controlling situation and had helped propose some of the steps that we were going to be taking that he was very focused knowing that in fall of 2003 they were going to make this decision and really trying to get to this node 2 launch in february 2004. in fact, from nasa headquarters, there was a screen saver that was sent around to all the human space flight centers, at least for all the managers to use. essentially, it was a countdown to february of 2004. well, this made a lot of people at johnson space center very nervous. many of the people who were working on the shuttle program at this year, 2002, had actually been working on the shuttle program in 1986 when the challenger accident occurred. although there were certainly technical reasons that were the root cause of that accident, there were a lot of organizational causes that contributed to that, and one of

them was felt to be schedule pressure. so back to this council meeting. again, the first one i'd attended in a management role. we did spend the majority of this all day meeting talking about the schedule. there was a person that stood up who's kind of in charge of the m m manifest. he talked about how we've lost 90 days of schedule in the last six months of 2002. been able to mitigate about 30 days of that, but we're still down 60 days. we were working a technical issue with some of our main engines at the time and were delaying a little bit even then. talked about how many days of margin we had to the next assembly flight and directed the main contractor, who works in florida processing the shuttles, to actually work over the christmas holidays only giving folks christmas eve, christmas,

and new year's off the only other topic, really, that was discussed much at all was one that fortunately had more to do on the technical or operations side. the person who was in charge of the orbiter, the orbiter project manager, said, you know, he was concerned that the way that we were operating the shuttle was quite different than the way equipment was actually originally certified. you may remember that when the shuttle was developed they were planning to fly it many times per year. they thought at that time they could turn around shuttles much quicker than we ended up being able to turn them around. so they were talking about flying shuttles, you know, every couple of weeks. and they designed it for a certain number of missions. we were not anywhere near the number of missions that a lot of the equipment was certified to, but they assumed they would get to that number of missions maybe in a handful of years. here we were, you know, 20 years

later not anywhere near that number of missions, but with the overall a calendar lifetime on this equipment much longer than we expected, they also talked about the way we ended up processing things at the cape was just different than originally anticipated. we had some oxygen lines we had recently had trouble with. they had originally been certified only to be moved like thousandths of an inch. that was probably why we were having some leaks in these lines. he wanted to start up a program to sort of validate the way we were operating compared to the way we had originally certified equipment. so that was an example of looking at a technical operational issue that was bothering one of our top managers, but as i say, most of the meeting was really focused on the schedule. so that kind of sets the stage.

so the next month, january, we were scheduled to launch sts-107. that was one of only, maybe, three flights on the books for the entire foreseeable future that was not part of the assembly of the international space station. it was a science flight, so there were a number of microgravity experiments on board. as we looked at the manifest, it didn't initially really affect the assembly of the international space station as long as, you know, it didn't prevent other flights from launching beyond it. i actually got to be in florida for that launch in the part of the launch control center where the mission management team meets. so during a launch countdown, again, the managers associated with the shuttle program meet there, and if there are any issues that come up during the launch countdown that might hold off on the launch or cause one to talk about delaying a launch,

that's what you actually do. i was also happy to be there because the commander of that flight was rick husband, his first chance to command a mission, air force pilot i had flown with rick about three years earlier on another mission or two years earlier. so i was really happy to see him launching again and getting to command a mission. fortunately the launch went off very smoothly. during the mission, we had meetings every day. my boss, the director of flight crew operations, who was also new in his position, essentially said to me, well, i'll attend the mission management meetings and you do other things that are required to run flight crew ops. so i heard about a concern about a debris strike that had happened during launch but was not really in on any of the meetings where they talked about it during the mission management

team. i was in mission control for landing because, again, one of my duties, new duties in flight crew ops was to be the flight crew representative. not as one of the flight controllers or not as the cap co com, which is a job i had done earlier where you talk to crews, but essentially as a manager there and always within the back of people's minds of having a manager there in case there were any issues that happened. well, obviously that was february 1st, 2003. that was the day that we lost columbia. and, you know, that was probably the worst professional event you can imagine when you work in the human space flight program. so the next, you know -- that turned into a very long day, obviously, at johnson space center. and a very long next few months. we were very busy in flight crew ops immediately dealing with the

loss of life and the impacts to the families and the astronaut corps. we needed to assign crew reps within the next few days who would support a nasa team we were setting up to investigate as well as an independent team that was set up called the columbia accident investigation board or the cabe. so we had an astronaut representative who was an ex-official member of that board as well. and i think you probably know that, of course, they determined that the root cause was that there was a piece of foam that came off the external tank, a piece that became debris, ended up hitting the shuttle in the re-enforced carbon area of one of the wings. essentially put a fairly large hole in that, allowed all the hot gases during entry to essentially melt the shuttle from the inside and caused the accident. when they put out their report, though, they also noted, as with

challenger, that there were contributing organizational flaws. i'm going to quote from that report now. the organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the space shuttle program's history and culture, including the original compromises that we required to gain approval for the shuttle program, subsequent years of resource constraints, flux shating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterizations of the shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision. cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety and reliability were allowed to develop, including reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices, organizational barriers which prevented effective communication of critical safety information, and stifled professional differences of opinion, lack of integrated management elements and the

informal chain of command and decision making processes that operated outside the organization's rules. so over the next two to two and a half years we prepared for what we called return to flight. that involved a lot of technical and engineering work, but it involved a lot of organizational work too where we went through a lot of training and classes and emphasis on making sure that people realized they not only should speak up if they felt there was an issue that wasn't being addressed directly, but that they were actually required to speak up in those cases and how you can work more effectively as a team and particularly on the ground thinking of that mission management team that meets realtime during missions to make decisions, how you can take some of the things that, you know, i had learned as an astronaut and

many of you learn about crew resource management or cockpit resource management where you work together as a small team, taking that to the level of the mission management team and even beyond to make sure that you're listening to each of the people on your team. of course, we had weekly control board meetings. we were trying to decide, you know, what we needed to fix, what we needed to change, what we needed to add. these could actually be pretty emotional and contentious. a comment by a crew rep, and again many of the times i was the person in there representing the crew opinion, that, for example, questioned somebody's opinion could be interpreted by other people in the room as the flight crew really placing blame on that person or group for the accident. there was so much personal investment that people had that almost all the people in the room felt some amount of blame for what had happened. there were obviously lots of

different opinions on what needed to be done to actually get back to a point where you could say you were ready to go fly. there were a lot of people who felt we were never going to be able to inspect on orbit to the level of resolution that was needed in order to determine whether the shuttle was safe for re-entry and so felt we shouldn't even be trying. then there were a lot of people that felt we absolutely had to be doing these inspections and trying to do whatever was possible to make sure that we could do a good inspection and understand whether the shuttle was safe for re-entry on all the future flights that we flew. one of the things that we worked on as an organization during this time was nasa's core values. i would have to say i'm not even sure if we were just re-working or if we were developing. up to this point, i don't recall having heard someone talk to me about nasa's core values, but i certainly paid a lot of attention to it during