events, but we haven't time for that now. instead i'm going to give the final word to charles sumner. perhaps the greatest figure of that tumultuous congress speaking of misunderstood individuals. our session has been busy, sumner wrote understatedly to a friend after congress adjourned. but then he added with justified pride, i doubt if any legislative body ever acted on so many important questions. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you. we do have some time for questions.

i would ask you to come up to this microphone if you have a question you'd like to ask. anyone? others of you if you have questions, if you'll come up and be ready to ask your question. >> i was wondering, thomas crowell and several other authors wrote about the problem of counterfeiting operations throughout the united states during the civil war. and i was wondering if during the process where the united states government was drafting the moral brand act and the homestead act of 1862, if they ever thought about the possibility of counterfeit operations being established in

the midwest and in the northern great plains. and, if so, what were their plans in preventing such an event? >> i found no record of that being a concern for the treasury department, which particularly in 1862 was, if you read samson chase's, the secretary treasury's diary, it becomes clear that he was running an endless effort simply to fund the next day's operations. or arguably the past week's operations. day after day he comes in to his office to find million of dollars of unpaid bills on his desk and he'll complain about the fact that he has no idea how

to pay them. and if they had been paid in counterfeit money, i think that would have been fine with him. [ laughter ] most of the republican party was strongly opposed to the idea of fiat money, greenback money, to begin with. chase and lincoln were really driven to the wall by the fact that they had no alternative way of funding the war. it's literally mind boggling to me at least when i see what happened to the federal budget from 1860 to the end of 1862. the entire federal budget of 1860 was $80 million. in 1862, they were spending

roughly $50 million per week. another way to put this explosive growth of the federal government into terms that we can understand, the presidential staff, i'm not talking about the residential white house staff, the buckler, the cooks and so forth. the president's executive staff when lincoln arrived in washington in 1861, was one. his budgeted staff was one secretary. that had been good enough for all the previous presidents. why wouldn't it be good enough for him? john nicolai had a place on his federal budget. his colleague john haye had to be put on the interior department budget.

until lincoln could persuade the congress that he needed another person on his staff. eventually he got a third secretary by hiding him at the patent office. so while the issue you're raising is real and the devaluation of money was a huge problem for the north through the war, although infinitely larger problem for the south where inflation by 1863 was running at vimar republic rates, it was an issue that just didn't rise to the top of their agenda that i can determine. the other story i like about the money is chase did not want to go to fiat money.

he tried everything he could not to. but when he finally did, he never got over the fact that the republican party had made such a terrible mistake in 1860 in chicago by nominating abraham lincoln instead of himself to be president. and as doris kerns goodwin has said in team of rivals so nicely, a lot of people in the cabinet felt that way, but most of them got over it. chase never got over it and he was running for president constantly even as he was treasury secretary. so it dawned on him in january after the currency law had been passed that there were going to be millions and millions of pieces of paper circulating across the united states into

every wallet, symbols of prosperity and the future of the country and there ought to be a picture on there. so every denomination, every greenback printed during the civil war had chase's picture on it until he left as treasury secretary. so any other questions? >> one quick question. i'm very encouraged by the 37th congress' accomplishments, but i'm also troubled by the prescription for their success and i was curious if there was anything that we could do other than asking our good friends from south of the mason dixon to kind of leave the session, which governor perry has indicated some desire to do, if there's any other success for relieving gridlock today? >> yes, that's an excellent question.

hopefully we will not have such an extreme solution, but i think in the second of my points where i it talked about a compelling agenda this is where i tend to see a way forward. i would argue that part of the fact that we are at such a 50/50 in our country right now, election after election being decided by a handful of votes, and even the nearly unprecedented example in 2000 of the loser winning it in the popular vote, that one of the explanations for this is that neither of the parties really

has a vision of the american future for the 21st century that a majority of americans find compelling. and so they work on wedge issues, they turn up the volume on this, turn down the heat on that, they're very personal campaigns, so on and so forth, because net of them will look at what's going on in the republican party right now. they don't even have an agenda that they are galvanized around themselves. the democrats have arguably clearer agenda, but frequently they find that it doesn't speak to the middle of the country. so where i think the gridlock is ultimately going to be broken is when one of the two parties becomes a majority party. and if you look at the

republican party, certainly not a majority party in 1860, you know, abraham lincoln received a smaller percentage of the vote in 1860 than any president in american history. he used to say when people asked him why he hadn't fired george mcclellan, he'd say i'm a minority president and he's a majority general. but by the end of that war, the republican party was definitely a majority party and was for the next 30 years because in large part they had articulated an agenda that americans were ready to get behind. >> you raised spectrum of corruption. it was legal to bribe congressmen until 1853, after

which time it was legal to pay them consulting fees to do things. which is interesting. so i wondered in relation to the money you were talking about, was it consulting fees some i know it's stocks. you mentioned that. if you could comment a bit more. >> a huge amount -- question if anyone could not hear is what was the legal status of the money the lp&w was throwing around in congress. a huge amount of what they were doing is offering land which they had not yet fully stolen from the indians but were going to and that land was of questionable value, but if it had the transcontinental value going through it, it would be of

great value. it was certainly scandalous. the reason we know so much about the extent of their bribery is that in 1876, how did this thing get done in the first place. scandal which was the biggest shington scandal of the late 19th century. went all the way up to the speaker of the house, the aforementioned james blaine, ewing's cousin who lied his way through the process by saying that he didn't get any money. but the lp&w had been kind enough to future historians to keep detailed records of all the

bribing they had done because they were throwing so much money around that they were losing track of who they had bribed, who they still had to bribe, how much they had promised here and there. since this is a room full of scholars and historians, i will say it got cut from my book, but i did find the smoking gun in the course of my research. for this book, there is actually a letter from james blaine to thomas in the using family papers written just after congress adjourned in which he said, oh, by the way, at the last minute i had to promise this guy at the navy department who is a friend of william thesenden some money so he would keep his mouth shut. a complicated deal.

but he then says so i'll pay him out of my share unless you want me to -- unless you're willing to do it. so blaine, who claimed not to have been involved at all was up to his hips. and it was hugely scandalous, but problem for grant at the end of his second term. >> i was wondering what convinced the europeans to stop moving for a negotiated settlement. >> yes. the europeans were right at the door and ultimately what happened -- i would say it was threefold, their decision to stay out. number one, france very much wanted to interview because the emperor of france louis napoleon was trying to reestablish a

french empire in north america. he had troops in mexico. he was about to install a puppet ruler of mexico. and the confederacy was promising we could do a lot of nice things together. we can make beautiful music together here in the southern half of north america. but he didn't want to get in unless the british were going to get in, too, and make it a joint project. you probably know what the prospects historically have been for successful joint operations by france and england. that one was kind of starting out under a doomed ill fated start.

so those tensions first. and the idea of an even larger pan european intervention was being knocked down primarily by russia. rush yabthose days saw the united states as its best friend of the world. they were the two rising new powers. they had europe bracketed on each side and russia very much wanted to see the power of the united states sustained. then there was an arc of the war and 1862 kind of runs like this. it starts at a very low point. lincoln on january 2nd actually talks to his friend, john dahlgren, about what dahlgren talks about the bare possibility of our being two nations. first time lincoln had ever entertained the possibility that he might not be able to save the

union. that's his mood on the first day. in february, the store clerk from illinois, ulysses grant, with 12,000 men, goes into tennessee and strikes the fastest most efficient, most dramatic blow against the south of the entire war. he captures the cumberland and tennessee rivers in the space of a week and the entire western line of the confederate army is shattered. so the mood goes clear up here. and by the end of april, they've captured new orleans which was according to the great winfield scott, that was the key to winning the war was to capture

new orleans. and at that point, lincoln is having william seward write letters proposing the exact opposite kind of solution, where the europeans withdraw their recognition of belligerent rights from the south because they're about to lose anyway and that will get the cotton moving. so they're up at this height. and then, bam, right back into the depths symbolized by the second battle at manassas where the union military leadership actually turns on each other to lose a battle within ear shot of the white house and the confederates invade kentucky and maryland and at that point both in paris and in england the leaders of both countries are talking about this is the time to intervene.

fortunately europeans love their summer vacations. this is a key point of american history. they all went on vacation and said we'll deal with this when we get back in october. by october, the united states had won the battle of antietam and the confederates had been pushed out of kentucky and maryland, lincoln had issued the preliminary emancipation proclamation and the whole face of the war changed. the anti-slavery movement in england particularly was a very important political force. and as long as lincoln seemed to be shilly-shallowing about slavery, the pro confederate forces could say slavery's not an issue here, but now lincoln had put it front and center and now england would be intervening on behalf of the slave power

against freedom and that was unsustainable. so that political calculation second. and then the third one which was more important than some of the histories suggest is that palmerston was a very old man by this time and he loved to fight wars.time. and he loved to fight wars. he had sent the british navy all around the world intervening all over the place. he was happy to intervene in little wars. but he had learned some things about war and when he saw what had happened first at shiloh, where in two days more americans were killed than in all the battles ever fought in north america prior to that weekend, in one battle. and then what happened at

malvern hill and the incredible slaughter at antietam, he said those people are crazy. and he said, he walked into the cabinet, his exact words were, the 30 years war in germany was a joke compared to this. if we think we're going to sail over there and break them up, you know, we're nuts. and lincoln and his secretary of state, william seward were very keen to this. right at that time seward sent a letter to the ambassador in london. he said, you let them know they are looking at a war of the world he called it, not a world war, that hadn't been coined. one of the earliest uses of this phrase, a war of the world if they try to come over here and

get in the middle of this. and so those were the three factors, i'd say. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. [ applause ] as these folks know, you don't, we have a little memento, you can tell, see. they lost all respect for this. anyway, a little memento of your being here. we hope you come back. >> thank you very much. awesome. >> thank you. >> this is c-span3 with politics and public affairs programming throughout the week and every weekend 48 hours of people and events telling the american story on american history tv. get our schedules and see past

programs at our websites. you can join in the conversation on social media sites. all weekend, american history tv is joining our media com cable partner in jefferson city to show case its rich history. to learn more about the 2012 tour, visit c-span.org/local content. we're standing in the very heart of the campus of lincoln university and jefferson city, missouri. this institution has a history that dates back to the civil war. indeed i think you could argue prior to the civil war. in missouri, as a consequence of an 1847 law, missouri blacks were not allowed to be taught to read or write. much less go to school. so as a consequence of that,

going into the civil war, most african-americans who were slaves, roughly 100,000 slaves in missouri on the eve of the civil war, almost all were i will literal. in the middle of the war, as the union was struggling to subdue the south and its rebel on, the president authorized the use of black soldiers to fight against the south. he referred to them as the sable arm. in mid to late 1863, recruiters from the union army began going up and down the missouri river valley recruiting black soldiers. these black soldiers, of course, fighting in the war, actually many of them served in what was called gars son duty, building trenches. digging ditches. really hard manual labor, primarily in texas and

louisiana. and the monument behind me is a monument to the soldiers of the 62nd and 65th united states colored infantry. in january of 1866, the war was over, these soldiers of the 62nd were about to be mustard out at fort mcintosh, texas and began talking around a campfire, how can we pass this legacy of learning onto the freed man back in missouri? they began to talk about raising money. they pledged money. they gave money. and it was an extraordinary sacrifice. some of these soldiers, privates in the united states, colored infantry were earning as little as a $113 a year. some of them gave $100. almost a year's wages to start this institute. they gave their money and pledges to a second lieutenant, named richard baxter foster, who

was a congregationalist minister, educated at dartmouth. in the summer of 1866 when it began to appear that lincoln institute might be established in jefferson city, a local newspaper ran an editorial opposing that move and expressed the fear if jefferson city became the place where lincoln institute was established, that it would -- the city would become a quote mecca for negros throughout the state and indeed throughout the country. there was hostility and difficulty. so he ended up opening a school for two students in september of 1866 on a site roughly a half mile from here on one of the highest points in jefferson city, just south of what was then the heart of the town on a hill called hobo hill. there was a log building that had once been a school and been abandoned because it was no longer fit for human occupation,

towards the late 1860s as it became clear that the 15th amendment was going to be enacted, the amendment that gave african-american men the right to vote, in missouri, the radical republicans were fearful they were losing power. they had come to power and stayeded in power by disenfranchising those who wouldn't take a loyalty only. as the election approached the radical republicans began to calculate, how can they get blacks to vote for them because they knew at some point these rebels who had been disenfranchised were going to be allowed to vote. they fixed upon this man, james milton turner, born a slave in 1839 but educated in otherland college in ohio. they began to go to turner and said to him, turner, we need the black vote. he responded, what will you give me for it? what do you want?

make lincoln institute a state school. in 1870 as this election approached, he was living here in jefferson county and orchestrated this deal whereby he delivered 20,000 black votes to the republican party, in exchange for which lincoln institute got its first state appropriation. seven or eight years later it would be taken over by the state. lincoln institute was the only place of higher education that african-americans -- only public institution of higher education that african-americans could attend well into the 20th century. during world war i, many black soldiers fought and died for freedom world war 1. after the war there was an increased clammering for access to the state's public institutions, particularly the university of missouri in columbia. the state of missouri was reluctant to open that institution to african-americans

and they offered a counter measure. and that counter measure was in 1921, they transformed lincoln institute from institute to university. they change the name. and said to african-americans, now you have a university. the lincoln university of the 21st century, really in many ways traces origins back 50 or 10 years to integration in the mid-1950s. there was serious talk about closing lincoln university down after the brown versus board of education, the argument was that black students could go to white institutions because of racial integration. instead the state and city closed down a white junior college in jefferson city, the jefferson city junior college and almost overnight, all of the white students came to lincoln university. the complexity and the complex gs of lincoln university changed almost overnight. when ieg