earps clearly lost -- yes. >> sir, you mentioned it was not the way the south wanted to fight because they were all -- part of them were from west point, but wouldn't it have just been an advantage since the northern generals were also from west point and they would have had to make the decision to split between their state loyalties? so i don't see where the argument comes that it's not the way they wanted to fight if they have, like, basically inside knowledge of how the north would be fighting strategically, as well. >> the west point significance is that because it is the only way, using organized armies for both sides, it's the only way they can imagine how to fight a war. so because they think it's unethical to some degree to use a guerrilla strategy for both sides. for both sides, it's -- no matter which section you go with, you go to west point, yes, you have a sectional loyalty but you end up in a military institution that says this is the way soldiers appropriately

fight. and that's a different issue than what your political allegiance is going to be. so that to some degree imprisons them. that's part of the reason, but part of the reason is that guerrilla warfare is a lot more problematic and has all sorts of problems and complications that probably would not have made it a viable solution anyways even if these guys did do that, even though some confederates talked about it. that doesn't mean it would have worked. >> sir, i believe there's actually quite a definitive book on that exact subject right there called "west pointers in the civil war" which discusses that same -- >> yeah. it does talk about some of those things. mr. swain. >> is there an honor or integrity question with guerrilla warfare? >> yes, precisely. it's not that the regular army folks have no experience with it. they do, because who do they fight before the war? >> the indians. >> the indians, all right.

they're all veterans of the indian wars, and they deal with guerrillas in mexico so they think it's completely inappropriate. they're on the receiving end of all this. they don't see this is fighting dirty for this em. all right, for the sioux it's just the way you fight. you have a culture clash here. but -- yes. >> with it being so close to the union line wouldn't it mean they had to sacrifice that? >> that would have been a problem, is that the capital -- the capital is still of great political importance. it's also related to the issue of what do the confederates want. all right. they want to be recognized as a they want to be recognized as a legitimate nation state and losing your capital does not help your cause. mr. conners. >> philadelphia fell.

>> fair enough. during what war? the united states loses the capital. they lose new york and it's -- and the americans still win. that's a fair reprice. all right. >> that's different. they were trying -- the confederates were trying to keep their capital so that great britain would support them also and rk recognize them as their own sovereign state. i think it's different because in one mind in the revolution we're trying to become free of like oppression and though the north sees the south as like a rebel group, the south sees themselves as breaking free of oppressions and want to be recognized as a sovereign state. it's just different mind-sets much the south wants to holed their capital because like i said they want to be recognized so if they let their capital fall like the revolution did with the americans and philadelphia, they feel like they're not going to have the support of great britain. america wasn't trying to have the support of anyone else. they just wanted great britain to get out of their land. >> yes. >> i don't think it's all that different. i think in the american revolution the americans were looking for support from the french. i think that was a vital aspect

was holding on to showing the french that they could beat the british. was it nathaniel green at ft. saratoga? ticonderoga? >> saratoga is the crucial battle. that's the crucial bat that will -- >> wasn't it sort of kind of like a partisan battle? if wasn't fought -- >> yes, you're right. there are -- >> they were able to garner support in a partisan battle from the french so i think that's not a strong argument. >> yeah. if you have partisans working with regulars, right. that's the pattern that works. >> i think to contradict that, back in the american revolution, the french were, in slang, they were kind of itching to get at the brisht, so the united states or america at that point didn't readily need decisive victories as much as the confederates did, because the french and english needed their support, but they weren't as dedicate towards defeating another power as the french were in 1776. >> then i got to move. >> they have one thing working against them, the fact in 1776,

83 that the british and the french were fresh off a war with each other and they really hated each other but in 1861 the concert of europe is in full effect in the middle of that century, and the europeans want to do everything to not go to war with each other. so they don't want to pick a battle with north america when they're trying to avoid battles at all costs. >> and also fundamentally, the british and the french -- and it's really the french who follow the british lead on this. the french have ambitions in mexico and things like that. and partly because of the rapprochement you talk about the in 19th century. really the british will come -- make the decision to come in when it seems to them that the decision has already been made. all right. because the british are really -- because what does britain have as a problem in terms of intervening against the united states? where has it been exposed? north. canada.

which is hard to defend, which is far away. so recognition is an important thing. but the thought was really the confederates are going win enough victories to prove that. either win enough victories or prolong it long enough, whatever that means. also what is not mentioned in your readings, i should tell you too, there is a big problem for slavery is a,n issue for them. all right. slavery is anish slew for them. the british abolished slavery. through -- not violently but through a program of gradual emancipation but at tremendous cost because of this incredibly important humanitarian -- i think there was a movie made about this, "amazing grace." and the british, they are a little bit on the fence about some of these issues. but the british don't like slavery for the most part, and this did going to be a big problem for them, a big hurdle for them to advance beyond in terms of recognizing the confederacy. but there is another group of people that we have not talked about and that's one of gallagher's arguments. one of gallagher's argument is

that -- actually, it has been mentioned. one of you said that. gallagher says that lee chooses a strategy partly to attack northern public opinion and break its will. but what does it also feed into which is very important? >> southern desire for larger victories. >> yes. what's the problem with the fabian strategy in gallagher's view? we'll talk about maybe some of the operational issues. but it also doesn't recognize -- mr. roth. >> johnston, he got fired because he didn't win battles with sherman so, if lee would have done the same thing, lee would have been sacked, too, probably. >> yes. and why is this important? >> he wanted to win it. >> yes, it's cultural -- mr. conners. >> that's why you fight spoiling battles. that's why you -- like washington, too, was dependent on public opinion, which is why he did raids and he attacked small detachments when he could pick up a win and say look at all of these guys i beat. >> that's a good point. and this is something --

>> it has to do with their relationship with davis because to say that he would have been sacked just because he wasn't doing anything is kind of a far stretch. for example, up north lincoln didn't fire half of his generals simply because of political reasons who were not doing as well. >> he had to wait a while. sometimes he does. mcclellan is a good example of that. lyndon doesn't like mcclelland early on, and eventually he gets rid of him. it takes a while. what's different about american political culture between the confederacy -- now i'm expecting you to remember a little about the american history and the jacksonian period -- what do we call it? democracy. in washington's era, public opinion is not as important. remember, in the early american public, you had to have property to vote. by the time of the civil war, it's well established. only white men vote, but the franchise has extended. all right. you have things like newspapers.

you have a lot more -- public opinion -- it's not that public opinion didn't matter in the american revolution, but the reply i think to mr. conners' strong argument there is that confederate public opinion matters more and that perhaps spoiling fights wouldn't be enough, all right? and i'll point out that sherman, for example -- remember that poem i had you guys read? right. that's during the atlanta campaign. that's where sherman attempts a big charge, fails, suffers a lot of casualties. johnston in theory can point to local successes like that and what happens to johnston? you guys have already said. he gets fired, right? partly because he's perceived as being too passive and therefore -- insufficiently aggressive in that the broad spectrum of confederate public opinion of which davis is by necessity responding to wants a more

aggressive strategy and lee gives it to them. all right. mr. conners. >> at the same time the gallagher reading is full of this talk about how the confederacy was willing to fight all the way until after and onwards. you can't say, okay, we're going to be willing to fight all the way like this if we're not willing to take a strategy that is a little more cautious. >> okay, and this is a good example where strategies can collide with public opinion. right? this is why sometimes we call it -- sometimes that's why there's a division. this is purely military. right, but that has to serve larger political goals which are sometimes really rooted not so

much in what's more militarily effective but what is values for lack of a better term. ideals, right? and are the two -- is the most militarily effective goal always in perfect concert and always completely compatible with values and ideals? no. and there's always a process of negotiation that occurs between the two, right. if you go too far, i mean, i know this is not necessarily something that your ethics class wants -- if you go -- what happens when they clash and one puts too much weight on the ideals? what's the cost then? >> you lose. >> yeah, you lose. all right. on the other hand, a lot of times even military organizations don't want to do any -- it's not anything goes, right, because there's a sense that you've compromised what you wanted so much that you've now -- what's the point of this

victory, the victory becomes hollow from a moral, political and ethical stance. and the two are frequently in collision and the two frequently collide, and this may be an example -- i mean if weigley is right -- and this is a way of maybe saying that in a sense both weigley and gallagher are right. gallagher is right when he talks about what confederate public opinion wants, when he talks about the imperatives of southern white culture, all right. weigley may be correct from a strategic perspective, a military strategic perspective that the more plausible military strategy is the fabian strategy, all right. they may be both right, but that's arguably perhaps the confederacy's biggest problem is making those two compatible, right? okay. so then now we circle back, right, to lee. do we think of lee as someone

whose strategy -- well, here's this. do you think lee's strategy was plausible? say why. >> the south never had enough men or enough industry to compete with the north. the north was too big of a power. i forget who -- i think it was a gallagher reading. i forget who he was quoting saying the north tied with a hand tied behind their back. >> shelby. >> yeah. and the juggernaut of northern industrialization and manpower would have overwhelmed the south regardless plus lee's biggest problems is he was too oriented on virginia, his home state, and that caused had him to completely neglect the west when he could have perhaps shifted troops out there to thwart some of the southern defeats there. he did well for himself for the most part in virginia, but the -- he sacrificed the west. i think that really hurt the south. >> that is an argument that hasn't come up. that is another criticism of lee. let me let you to two get in.

>> wasn't it [ inaudible ] thought it was going to be a short war? all the aggressive campaign wouldn't have mattered so much down the line when in the late '60s they're running out of men. if the aggressive paid off early in the washgs it wouldn't have mattered early on. >> yes, and you know what, that is lee's reply -- lee would acknowledge everything you said about northern superiority but turned that to support his strategy. i need to win the war early because eventually it will be a matter of time. then we'll definitely lose, precisely for the reasons you just said. the only chance for victory is to gamble early, and he gambled and he lost. all right? but that -- but that -- you can still say that's the only viable strategy. although -- well, okay, both of you want to -- >> yeah, i was going to go back to the grand versus military strategy thing. i think it was a plausible strategy if they had won a few more key -- if they had defeated the north at antietam and not

given the platform for the emancipation proclamation. if they had won gettysburg and hipderred lincoln's chances for re-election in 18964. 1864. things like that would have worn down northern will and kept out them long enough to -- or kept them out long enough. i think they could have won. but -- >> my big thought is my criticism of lee comes when he finally does switch to the defensive, which he's forced to because his offensives plans before the wilderness, which are kind of -- i would call them fever dreams almost because he thinks he can still move with the kind of speed and achieve the kind of depth that he did when he still had a functioning -- or well functioning offensive army. he makes all kinds of failures in these initial kind of defensive battles especially at the angle at sharpsburg, which i guess is a tactical failure

less than it is a strategic failure. >> yeah, although i mean i think consensus is lee does pretty well during the overlying campaign but he does it too late and that his army has bled white by that time and at that point it's -- he's already wasted so many men. that's part of the argument against his generalship in that case. but it's -- okay, so let's -- how many do you think lee was plausible? let's show hands. >> what? >> plausible, that his strategy was plausible. okay, so most of you think it was plausible. all right. what did people think about the argument -- weigley makes this about lee's victory being hollow? >> because he'd suffer massive casualties to achieve them. >> as with gettysburg he'd win the battle and hold the land but the next day he would have to

leave anyway because logistics couldn't keep up with -- >> yeah, or even better example, gettysburg is just a loss. where -- the big battles he won, remind us. chancellorsville, second manassas. does the federal army completely dissolve? >> no. >> no. all right. it's at times -- especially in the case of second manassas it's in terrible shape, but it's not like he walks into washington unopposed. all right. he mauls the federalists tremendously, but he still -- that's why he always needs the follow-on victory. that's why you have the antietam campaign. that's why you have the gettysburg. he wants the follow-on. you need the three, all right. but let's say he wins at gettysburg, all right. what does he do? i mean so what, right? he wins at gettysburg. and he loses a third of his men in the process. he still has the logistical problem. he still has all these sorts of

issues. and this is an argument against lee and one that should be considered. and part of it relates to -- part of it also relates to how plausible, though, you think that gettysburg and that -- whether or not he really could have won in gettysburg or antietam. >> i think the problem is is strategy -- i personally don't think his strategy was flauled. i think it was fine. but what was needed for the south to win, but i think the problem goes back to his positive trait was also another one of his weaknesses was aggressiveness because he became way too reckless with his men and when he saw the tide of certain battles starting to change he would throw more men into the battle and they'd just get mowed down, but it would work to wear down the north. >> all right. and that's -- mr. steinberg? >> i have issue with sort of his strategy going into gettysburg because the point of his campaign was obviously he wanted to win a big battle in the north as a moral victory and reduce the will, but wasn't the

military objective to get to harrisburg? because there was a rail hub there. gettysburg happened to be where the army ended up meeting. >> he doesn't intend to fight in gettysburg but somewhere in the north. >> if he's going after a transportation hub like harrisburg or an industrial center, so what? you make it, and even if he wants to take over a rail hub or factories, so what? >> his goal is really to bring -- to force the federal army to a battle and to defeat it decisively. and that by itself should crush the northern public opinion. all right. that's the -- it's not completely -- let me throw this out. what happens in new york city around that time? >> the draft. >> the draft riots. the north is deeply, deeply divided in some respects about the war. so imagine draft riots plus the prospect of -- but, you know, the reality is, though, this is all terribly complicated.

for example, you guys got the traditional explanation historians use why sherman's atlanta campaign so important to lincoln? the capture. >> because it it turns public opinion in 1864 -- >> we have a famous letter from lincoln where he says, i'm going to lose this election. all right. who is lincoln's opponent? this is actually not in any of your readings. >> mcclelland. >> mcclelland is on a platform that -- the democratic party platform. i mean they've -- parts of the democratic party which wanted to declare an armistice. if you do one, the confederate is basically won -- a lot these northerners -- so-called peace democrats don't realize that the confederates really want their independence. they think if you do a cease-fire you can renegotiate this and the confederates sometimes talk openly how they want to encourage this misconception. these knuckleheads think this. we want our own country at this point. but if you stop you're not going to be able to start the machine back up again.

this would become a fait accompli. but mcclelland's own position is somewhat different. we don't completely know in all honesty what mcclelland would have done. for all -- yes, he was not in favor of emancipation but he was a union man still and mcclelland would have been president, so that dynamic might have -- is that counterfactual is problematic and that's another -- and this is related to a larger question, all right. that's not -- this is not just about lee. this is about how much chance does the confederacy as a whole have at victory? if you come up with so many barriers to the confederate victory anything lee does would be impossible. whether or not you buy that but that's -- you see the questions are related. if you say a confederate victory is too many things are against it this is almost a stupid question. we shouldn't have this class. we should have a class about -- then i should be writing out

tables of manpower and industrial capacity and things like that. all right. >> just on like lee's -- confederate strategy, this is in retrospect obviously. we see how good he is at the defensive strategy when he's forced to do. wouldn't it made more sense, they would have been in the confederacy, the size of europe, closer to their supply lines and more logistics and could have given up land and broken northern public opinion and will and giving up small amounts -- not losing the massive amount of casualties in the aggressive northern campaigns he embarked on. >> didn't he go to the north because the south was losing all the supplies and had the food stock and all that so went to pennsylvania they just took advantage of all the fields there. >> a lot is -- remember, a lot

of the supply system is sort of legalized theft, right. and that's -- the federals do the same thing and the confederates partly -- northern virginia is completely devastated. sort of opposite of what you think of virginia being now, gallows row with funny street names, but -- and that's part -- there is a supply imperative there, all right. but, of course, lee is -- lee does well in the overlining campaign. what's interesting he's doing exactly what he doesn't want to do and then the interesting question then becomes, you know, is he just personality-wise unsuited to fighting that? also, gallagher makes this point, let me point this out too. lee fights a masterful if delaying action in the overlying campaign. johnston, if weigley is right, but what happens at the end of all these things? >> you still lose. >> you still lose, why, you're pushed back and what happens? what kind of operation occurs that plays to all the federal advantages?

>> a siege. >> a siege, all right. and lee says that very early on. he says this very early on. if this becomes a siege, we're done, all right, because and he says this as early as the seven days because if mcclelland can bring up his heavy artillery, all the northern logistics and material is just gradually going to overwhelm the confederacy and therefore siege -- what happens after a siege? what happens after things like donaldson, henry, vicksburg? you lose an entire army so that's one of gallagher's arguments against this, the stuff doesn't actually work because -- mr. conners? >> i'm going to say i think there's definitely something to do with the opposing generals. he -- >> explain. >> he has a really good read on people like mcclelland or even burnside. burnside has this problem where he'll freeze up when he's given too much. it's shown -- kind of

burnside -- it takes him a long time to get across that bridge. burnside can be taken advantage of and exploited as can mcclelland obviously. mcclelland will break if pushed right, but he doesn't get that good a read when it comes to grant. >> yes, i think and while -- also what should be added good read on the army of the potomac. there's something deeply wrong about the army of the potomac. i don't know if historians have done a great job -- even bruce cannon talks about this. they fight really hard, its rank and file are pretty effective but its generals -- kind of an organizational problem. partly because of mcclelland because a lot of the officers he selects and the culture he creates is a very defensive passive-minded one and the sports team that gets beaten by the same team too often, right? there seems to be a sense that they get the culture of losers, all right, and what is the

opposite thing in northern virginia? they think they're always going to win. and what's interesting about it is, one, it's not just the army thinks that. who else thinks that and gallagher has a lot of that. >> norman thinks that the army -- >> that's part of it. what other important group of people? >> confederates. >> average confederate. so when you look at things like gettysburg, what's interesting is how gettysburg is a defeat for lee, but the public reaction is not that negative. it's sort of, well, yeah, we wish it went better but the first day went for the confederacy and where did it happen? in pennsylvania, so, okay, we didn't get a huge victory there but we fought the federals to a draw, we survived. the first day went better for us. vicksburg is seen as a complete disaster in contrast. no one says vicksburg is good. the same thing occurs to some degree after antietam which is -- lee's army is mauled but he stays an extra day and is

able to kind of say this is a draw and mcclelland doesn't attack him. that's partly mcclelland. lee almost dares him to attack the day after the battle and mcclelland makes the mistake and refuses. possibly could have destroyed lee's army on the spot, but there is -- and this is the importance of psychological factors and if you're going to defend lee the way gallagher does you'll put a heavier premium on these things that lee is able to build this culture of winning so he has to take risks and there are positive effects to this. as late as '64 the army of northern virginia will be an effective fighting force. but you wouldn't have built that culture of winning if you had done the fabian strategy that washington would have done, all right. because men aren't going -- yes, you can rationally explain it. mr. conners, you want to push back on that. >> culture of winning is as useful as it is, but even the army of the potomac, i think, the description of them is like

a bulldog was's been whipped a lot, is used to getting whipped but will keep fighting and fight pretty hard. >> and will eventually win. >> and will eventually win so there's a culture of tenacity that i think develops in the army of the potomac whereas, the army in northern virginia, when they lose, yes, they still have a culture of always winning, but that loss somehow will stick with them. i think. >> well, stick with them because they might have a culture of winning but so many of them will be killed, it won't matter. >> essentially. >> by the way, arguably that is what happens to the army of northern virginia. at the end of the day, the best troops in the world if they're half starved because their supply lines are cut, they're running low on ammunition and there aren't that many of them left. by '65, what has happened to many of your best officers? they're all dead or wounded or

lame. this happens on the federal side too, especially after the overland campaign. you know, eventually that preponderance of military -- but, again, this is an argument for why confederate independence is very hard to get in the first place. so the question is, is this even a good discussion to have, all right, so i'm just throwing that out there, okay. i think most military historians, though, and perhaps it's just because we're military historians don't think that the confederacy's victory or confederate defeat is automatic, all right. i think most of us come to the agreement that lee came close enough to changing the tide of the war by winning -- came close enough to the hat trick we have to take this seriously, all right. that being said, you can still make the argument like weigley that that was one way of getting victory but there's another way of getting victory and that way would have been something more like washington, something more a