one vote. general scowcroft, please proceed. >> thank you, mr. chairman. carper, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it's a pleasure to be before you today to discuss the final recommendations of the blue ribbon commission on america's nuclear future. before we begin, i would like to pass along co-chairman lee hamilton's deep regrets for not being able to be with you today, but i'm very pleased that fellow commissioner pierre peterson was able to join me. i would like to note that congressman hamilton and i were delighted to work with with such a talented gro eed and dedicate of fellow commissioners. we had a wide difference of perspective on the issues, but

the professionalism of the commissioners led to our final report being unanimous. a fact which we believe speaks to the strength of our recommendations. as you are aware, the blue ribbon commission was formed by the secretary of energy at the direction of the president. our charge was to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and to recommend a new strategy. we came away from our review frustrated by decades of unmet commitments to the american people. yet confident we can turn this record around. mr. chairman, as we are all too well aware, america's nuclear waste management program is at an impasse. the administration's decision to halt work on a repository at yucca mountain is but the latest indicator of a policy that has been trouble for decades and has now all but completely broken

down. the approach laid out under the 1987 amendments to the nuclear waste policy act has simply not worked to produce a timely solution for dealing with the nation's most hazardous radioactive materials. the united states has traveled nearly 25 years down the current path only to come to a point where we're continuing to rely on the same approach seems destined to bring further controversy, litigation, and protracted delay. what we've found is that our nation's fail wrure to come to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly. it will be even more damaging and more costly the longer it continues. damaging due prospects for maintaining a potentially important energy supply option for the future. damaging to state federal relations and public confidence in the federal government's competence, and damaging to

america's standing in the world as a source of nuclear expertise and as a leader on global issues of nuclear safety, nonproliferation, and national security. the national interest demands that our nuclear waste program be fixed. complacency with a failed nuclear waste management system is not an option. with a 65,000 metric ton inventory of spent nuclear fuel spread across the country and growing at over 2,000 metric tons a year, the status quo cannot be accepted. the need for a new strategy is urgent. mr. chairman, the strategy we recommend in our final report has eight key elements. we are certain they are all necessary to establish a truly integrated national nuclear waste management system, to create the institutional leadership and the wherewithal to get the job done and to

ensure that the united states remains at the forefront of technology development and international responses to evolving nuclear safety nonproliferation and security concerns. we will now discuss those in detail. i will cover the first four and commissioner peterson the last. our first recommendation is a new consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste management facilities. experience in the united states and in other nations suggest that any attempt to force a top-down federally mandated solution over the objections of a state or community far from being more efficient will take longer, cost more and have lower odds of ultimate success. by contrast, the approach we recommend is explicitly adaptive, staged, and

consent-based. based on activities in the united states and abroad, including most noticeably the siting of a disposal facility for trans-atlantic waste, the waste isolation project pilot plan in new mexico. and recent positive outcomes in spain, finland, and sweden. we believe this type of approach can provide the flexibility and sustain the public trust and confidence needed to see controversial facilities through to completion. i might just add that i had the opportunity to speak to the prime minister of finland last evening, and he announced that he was very pleased with the progress that they're making and he thinks that it will be very successful. >> did he -- general, did he also mention the first fins came to america through wilmington, delaware? >> no, we didn't get to that.

our second recommendation, a new organization committed solely to implementing the waste management program and empowered with the authority and resources to succeed. the overall record of d.o.e. and the federal government as a whole has not inspired confidence or trust in our nation's nuclear waste management program. for this and other reasons, the commission concludes that new institutional leadership is needed. specifically, we believe a single purpose congressionally chartered federal corporation is best suited to provide the stability, focus, and credibility needed to get the waste program back on track. for the new organization to succeed, a substantial degree of implementing authority and

assured access to funds must be paired with rigorous financial, technical and regulatory oversight by congress and the appropriate government agencies. our third recommendation is that access to the funds nuclear utility rate payers are providing for the purpose of nuclear waste management. nuclear facilities are assessed a fee on every kilowatt hour of nuclear generated electricity. in exchange for the federal government's contractual commitment to begin accepting commercial spent fuel beginning by january 31st, 1998. fee revenues go to the government's nuclear waste fund which was established for the sole purpose of covering the cost of disposing of sieve vici nuclear waste and ensuring the waste program would not have to compete with other funding priorities. the fund does not work as intended.

a series of executive branch and congressional actions has made annual fee revenues, approximately $750 million a year, and the unspent $27 billion balance in the budget effectively in accessible to the waste program. instead the waste program is subject to exactly the budget constraints and uncertainties the fund was created to avoid. this situation must be remedied immediately to allow the program to succeed. the commission sent a letter to the president on december 11th of 2011 discussing this particular recommendation in detail and we will submit it as a part of this hearing's recommendation. our fourth recommendation is prompt efforts to develop one or more geoligic disposal

facilities. the conclusion that dispose l is needed has been reached by every expert panel and has looked at the issue and by every other country that is pursuing a nuclear waste program. moreover, all spent fuel reprocessing or recycle options either already available or under active development at the time still generate waste streams that require permanent disposal solution. we simply note that regardless of what happens with yucca mountain, the u.s. inventory of spent fuel exceeds that the amount that can be legally in place at that site until a second repository is in operation. the statutory limit for yucca mountain is 70,000 metric tons and d.o.e. has set aside 10% of that limit for defense spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, leaving only 63,000

metric tons for civilian waste. so under current law, the united states will need to find a new disposal site even if yucca mountain goes forward. we believe the approach set forth here provides the best strategy for assuring continued progress regardless of the fate of yucca mountain. >> dr. peterson? >> thank you, thank you, general scowcroft. the vote started at 10:30. we're about five minutes into the vote, but i would like for you to be able to complete your testimony then we'll take a short recess. >> so continuing with the disposal, as a key element of consent-based siting, disposal facilities, the commission believes before any new disposal site is selected, a new site independent safety standard should be developed so the commission has recommended the environmental protection agency and the nuclear regulatory

commission which this committee has jurisdiction over should begin working together to define an appropriate process for developing a generic disposal facility safety standard and associate the implementing regulations. the fifth recommendation relates to prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities. developing consolidated storage capacity would allow the federal government to begin the orderly transfer of spent fuel from reactor sites to safe and secured centralized facilities independent of the schedule for operating a permanent repository. the arguments in favor of consolidated storage are strongest for stranded spent fuel, shut down plant sites of which there are ten across the country. stranded fuel should be first in line for the transfer to consolidate a facility so the plant sites can be completely decommissioned and put to other beneficial uses. the availability of consolidated storage will also provide valuable flexibility in the nuclear waste management system that could achieve meaningful cost savings, can provide backup storage in event that spent fuel

needs to be moved quickly from a reactor site and would provide an excellent platform for ongoing rnd to better understand how storage systems currently in use at both commercial and d.o.e. sites perform over time. we support the efforts of senator feinstein and alexander with their proposed legislation regarding the pilot storage program for high-level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel as it incorporates several key recommendations of the blue ribbon commission and is a positive step toward the goal of creating integrated waste management program in the united states. our letter of support dated april 23rd, 2012, will be submitted for the record. sixth is prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport of spent fuel and high-level waste to consolidated storage and dispose l facilities when such facilities become available. the current system of standards of regulations governing the transport of spent fuel and other nuclear materials appears to have functioned well and the safety record of past shipments

of these types of materials is excellent, particularly with respect to the whp transportation system. greater transport demands nuclear materials are likely to raise new public concerns. the commission believes state, tribal and local officials should be extensively involved in the transportation planning and should be given the resources necessary to discharge roles and obligations h this area. historically, some programs have treated transportation as an afterthought. no successful programs have done so. seventh is support for advances in nuclear energy technology and workforce development. advances in nuclear energy technology have the potential to deliver an array of benefits across a wide range of energy policy goals. the commission believes these benefits in light of environmental and energy security challenges the united states and the world will confront in this century justifies sustained public and private sector support for rdnd on both existing lightwater

reactor technology and advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies. the eighth recommendation relates to the key conflict of active u.s. leadership in international efforts to address safety, nonproliferation and security concerns. as more nations consider putting nuclear energy or expanding -- consider pursuing nuclear energy or expanding their nuclear programs, u.s. leadership is urgently needed on issues of safety, nonproliferation, and security and counterterrorism. from the u.s. perspective, two points are particularly important. first, with so many players in the international nuclear technology and policy arena, the united states will increasingly have to lead by engagement and by example. second, the united states cannot exercise effective leadership on issues related to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle so long as our own program is in complete disarray. effective domestic policies are needed to support america's international agenda. in conclusion, the problem of

nuclear waste may be unique in the sense that there is a wide agreement about the outlines of a solution. simply put, we know what we have to do. we know we have to do it and we even know how to do it. we believe the conditions for progress are arguably more promising than they have been in some time, but we will only know -- we will only know if we start which is what we urge the administration and congress to do without further delay. thank you for having us here today and we look forward to your questions. thank you very much. >> i want to thank you both for that joint testimony. we're going to recess here for a brief period of time. we should be back in about ten minutes and we'll start right back up. thanks. and we'll get right into questions. >> thank you.

>> we are having a lot of fun while we're gone. i hate to bring that to a close. finishing up the vote. and our colleagues are making their way back over here in the

next couple of minutes. let me start with the first question. this is really a question for both of you. feel free to take turns answering it or whatever you're comfortable with. it's my understanding previous mechanisms for finding voluntary sites for nuclear waste facilities have been successful in this country. one of those is in new mexico. i think it's called the waste isolation pilot plant. however, there was a different type of facility than the one we're talking about here, not for high-level waste as i understand it. i believe the new mexico facility takes mid-level defense waste and, in fact, it's my understanding the state and the community there agreed to a facility with the understanding that it would not accept high-level waste in the future. can you all provide any takeaways from the new mexico experience on what we can replicate in a consent-based approach for a high-level

repositories? or any cautions on what cannot be replicated? really, what can be exported from that experience in new mexico, our experience in new mexico, and what cannot? >> thank you, senator carper. there's -- we've found a number of very important lessons in examining the success of the development of the wipp facility. i can list just a couple. one was that the federal government in the end was willing to negotiate legal lly binding agreements with the state government that clearly defined a set of regulatory authorities that the state held. and in essence gave state leadership hands on a steering wheel, or at least ability to put their foot on a brake. and i think that that was a key element of creating confidence

that the facility -- that the facility could be operated safely and they could assure the citizens that, indeed, it would be operated safely. >> so instead of a my way or the highway federal government calling the shots, you've got the state in the car -- >> yep. >> in one of the front seats of the car. >> that's correct. >> and with the ability to put a foot on the brake. it's almost like in driver's ed when i was in high school, you'd have, like, the student driver on the one side then the instructor on the other side, both with a steering wheel and the pedals and everything. >> i believe the next panel, jeff and others are likely to comment on the value of this. it does mean that whatever new entity is created by amendment to the nuclear policy act that it will be very important that it have the authority to negotiate and enter into these sorts of agreements on behalf of the federal government. another key thing that was done was that the federal government

funded an independent scientific and technical evaluation group called the environment evaluation group in new mexico. i think the state government made a tremendous decision by locating that scientific review panel within their university system their university system so that it was given in essence the type of independence that one associates with an academic institution and therefore had tremendous credibility. it also didn't hurt to have two very capable national laboratories in the same state as well. but to have -- but to have independent source of scientific advice separate from the federal government i think was another key ingredient. another key element was that this repository was cited and developed and licensed to a safety standard that was established in advance to the citing of the repository not

during or after the selection of the repository. and this relates to the commission's recommendation that a new cite independent safety standard be developed by the epa and the nlc. i think a final element that was critical in my judgment was the fact that, that this program had assured funding in the sense that the senator -- the senior senator from the state of new mexico served on both the appropriate and authorizing committees. that gave some assurance that adequate funding would be available to operate the facility safely after it had been built. we can't rely on that good luck happening again because the statistical probability of that happening is low. this is a key reason why the commission has recommended that we need to change at a minimum

the way that we classify the fee receipts in such a way that when they're propered they don't have to compete against other discretionary spending priority. and the situation in terms of spending those moneys looks more like how we fund the nuclear regulatory commission. the fees offset appropriations and congress is not faced with the dilemma of needing to cut other programs in order to fund something that's being paid for by fees. this is really critical because i think that the community really wants to have confidence that the facility will receive adequate funding. the final element was that the office in its 30 year history never had a single director who served for more than two years. in other words, there was a lack of continuity of leadership that if you think about the process to have the leader of an

organization go into local community and them knowing that that person is not likely to bo around say in 18 months also would be a really serious problem. so this is another reason why we think some type of new organization does need to be created to take on these responsibilities to have the continuity of leadership that can give confidence to local communities that the federal government ultimately will live up to its obligations. >> okay. those are very helpful answers. thank you very much. let me yield to senator eudall. a jr. senator for now but not for long. soon to be senior senator from new mexico. i sad that sadly. we love our jeff bingham. >> we sure do. we're going to miss him very much and miss that ability as professor peterson has pointed out how he was serving on several committees that were

really key. >> we also know the interest of new mexico will be very well served. >> you're very kind. let me say to professor peterson you pulled out some good lessons on the waste isolation pilot project. i wanted to explore more of that with both of you. should the state as a whole have the right to accept or reject a nuclear waste site in its borders and how should that authority work? that's a very hard question for us to answer. >> that's why i ask it. you were given a lot of time to think about that one.

>> well, we looked a lot at the differences between new mexico and the upper mountain. and i think you put your finger on the principal difference. in new mexico, there's a general akwee essence that this is good for the state, good for the country. that is completely lacking in nevada. where look, local communities are are by and large very supportive. the state communities are very opposed. and i think that it's been described a number of the detail. but whip is what gives me the optimistic confidence that we can move ahead. because i think the attitude that we found down there, that

we found down there, i'm not an expert, was immensely re-assuring that this consent adaptive approach if really taken seriously by both sides can work. >> now, general skull kruf you still didn't answer. the question was very pointed here. should a state as a whole have the right to accept or reject a nuclear waste sites in its borders and how should the authority work? you're comparing nevada and new mexico as you know and i think the history you're talking about what happened in nevada was the high net level nuclear waste policy act which had a very scientific process, broad selection of sites was shortened by congress. and congress basically said it's going to nevada. and forced it down nevada's throat. i think at the time the governor

and local officials, there was a lot of objection. in new mexico it was different. the governor and local officials and i believe the leadership in the congress all had a very accepting attitude. so they came together and talked about what should this agreement be? as one of the parts of the agreement as i mentioned in my opening statement was the idea that no high level waste was going to come to new mexico. that this was going to be a transgentlemen rannic waste site. that's why i ask this question to you. it's one i know i think you've tried to finesse in your report. i'm trying to get to the real heart here of what, you know, should a state as a whole have the right to accept or reject a nuclear waste site in its borders and how should that authority work. you know, i realize it's a tough question.

but that's why we hired you to do this. >> i guess, i'm speaking now more as an individual because we didn't resolve that in detail. i'll be honest with you. >> but please, as an individual you've sat through all of these. you've seen the experiences. tell us what you think. >> i think to be successful we need to have state and local communities together. if you're not together, it's not going to work. so i think part of the whole consent process is working with the communities as a whole, state, local, tribal, whatever they are to make it work. >> dr. peterson, your thoughts on that question. >> in our report we essentially recognize that this is the major issue. the final report does address it

more specifically in the sense that it points out that in the end the ability to opt out and what the conditions would be and whether -- how long should it be unconditional is best left to be a matter of negotiating between the federal government and the states because, you know, for example, if you're going to enter into a mortgaged purchase a house, there's points in times where you make decisions and such, but in this case, by having that be one of the most important but key elements of negotiation, you can preserve an unconditional opt out and then of course, if any safety issues arise, associated with the site, there should be an immediate able t ability to put a brake on the whole thing. this is something in the phase of the active approach probably needs towo