the electoral register. as you can see, there are no big biases and no bias in the raids or the expected participation of the difference socioeconomic groups. what we have here is that -- and this is surprising. usually the younger people go to the polls in the lower proportion than the rest of the population. here we find more or less the same proportion. what this tells us is that unlike other elections and this is a hypothesis that will have to wait for the official results that will be delivered, but unlike other elections, younger voters did not abstain as they have done in the past. they federal voted at the same rate than the other groups.

this is a profile of support for each of the major candidates. they are very important patterns. first even among female voters, they did a little bit better or as well as josephina. the female voters, this is a pattern that we have registered for many, many years. the male voters are more left mexico than female voters. they have more conservative and they think not to vote that much for the left as this is an important result.

people between the ages of 18 and 29, hay represent more or less 1/3 of the electorate. the fact that they did quite well within this group and the fact that this segment voted at a good rate, it is very, very important to explain why the race was closer than expected. look at the other age groups. the advantage is higher. 9 percentage points. . >> you can see it's much better among people with primary and secondary education.

he lost among those with high school or college education. this is also very important. another thing is that this group and he tended to be more independent and they suggested that the vote went for that candidacy. the mexican voter in 2012. this is the same pattern that the pri had. they wanted more the pri and the more educated people are.

we have gone back to this very old pattern. the mexicans supported the position to the pri and why the people who are know less what to do and less educated than to support the pri. this is a very old pattern that is coming back with a vengeance. i will show you some other graphs. the presidential approval. as you can see, those who disapprove the performance of president caledron, 18% of voters tended to vote more for the officer. those who approve were more likely to vote. it's really important.

you can see that he was capturing all the votes. he was identified more as an opposition candidate. this also explains one of the very important dynamics of the campaign. how can the candidate become a candidate of the establishment? the mexican voters didn't perceive him as an opposition candidate, but rather in some cases it seemed that he was if you were to look at the tv ads and sometimes there was a lot of criticism about his records while in the state of mexico. everybody was talking about his record and no one was talking about felipe caledron's record. it was one of the various strange things of this election.

he became the candidate and this didn't work well for him because he was saving to get the support of the people who were more unsatisfied with presidential performance. also if you look at the people who thought that they were going in their own track. also as things get the situation of how mexico is going and getting worse, the support for them increases and it's a clear thing. pena doesn't have that -- doesn't benefit that much. the candidate at the end and didn't work out. that he won't almost 7% points. we don't see in terms of

priorities either economic road of tackling the security and that there is an advantage for any of the candidates and the percentages that change the pending of the priority. in general, the percentage of votes for each of the candidates depended on the reason that it was a sincere vote or a vote to avoid another candidate to get no major difference. i'm going to close with this social networks. probably the most important thing that happened in this election was embodiment of young people and facebook and twitter. as you can see, he lost among

the users of social media. among facebook users and twitter users and in general among the people that use more heavily this kind of instruments that the young people and the college educated people. thank you. . >> going to try to get the presentation up here. give me a second.

>> hello, everyone and thanks for coming. i am finishing a book to adapt to the new realities of electrocompetition. in 2000 when they lost the presidential mansion, people started joking with me that i was no longer a political scientist and i would have to be a historian. i said just wait. 12 years later, i can be a political scientist. now, eric asked me to present to you all something that explained why the pre won these elections. i think there two basic causes. structure and conjukt ral factors. jorge spoke about the factors and i am going to concentrate more on the structure of power that the pre had from 2000 to

2012. why it was able to come back with a bang. it's strong in all regions. this is not a regional party. that's the center right national action party and the prd is the center left party of the democratic revolution. those two we will see as regional parties and have bases of power. electoral power. the innocent is a national party. electoral power in all regions of the nation. second, there were no major party splits or decisions. they did not fracture over the selection of the candidate as they almost did in 2006. this is more of a factor. they had a strong candidate. you can complain and make fun of him, but he was an extraordinarily strong

candidate. it wasn't just because he was -- there other reasons i would explain. the two people i have up here, this is mario who will probably be the next pre leader in the lower house. an extremely powerful politician and he is not closely linked. we will talk about that a little bit at the end. it was an extremely powerful and very large teacher's union and somewhat connected to the pre. she is not an enemy of pena. most people expect her party to be able to be fairly easily convinced to support the pre bills in congress. let's talk about why the pre is

so strong. there tremendous power of the pregovernors. since the loss in 2000. i will argue before 2000, the governors were the base of the party. why are governors so powerful, governors win elections. they avoided fragmentations and it was important because the presidential election and the northern governors said no to roberto who was the presidential candidate. in saying no, this is important. something that nobody has spoken about. within the pre, there will be extremely ambitious people who want the candidacy. one way to avoid splits is to have one candidate who is so popular and so -- everyone has

this idea that he is going to win. it does not make sense for other ambitious preleaders to split. this is again the case of fabio who is basically the other contender for the internal nomination to the presidency. he was so far behind that he knew he could never beat pena or b, perhaps not even win the presidency. therefore it made no sense to split off. she about to be rewarded with an excellent job. being head of the pre in the congress. here's the pre governor ships. this was before the elections. in the worst moments of the party between 2000 and 2003, the pre still hailed the governorships. here they held roughly 20 to 21.

and most of the reasons why the pre and if you see here, here's sinaloa and a very important state because the pre lost it for the first time. here in tabasco it's red. it just lost it in 2012. why did they lose it? a split within the pre. mostly one can say that except for certain states within the traditional stronghold, the pre loses elections because of internal splits. unless you have a split, the pre will continue to govern. if it manages to overcome, they can retake that was in many states many years ago. what you have here are really powerful national support for the party. why do you care about having

governors? why should they be worried about not having more governors? they help you win elections. both local and federal elections. governors can use a wide range of instruments both legal and illegal or somewhat legal or slightly less than legal to help copartisans and other precandidates win elections. this is extremely important when you talk about federal deputy elections. the money you get as a party depends on how many seats you win in the lower house. this is important not only that, that will help determine the power you have in the legislature. even if you don't have the executive, you don't control the executive branch. if you almost always did have a strong cent rift caucus in the lower house, that means you can always make the executive negotiate with you.

he is politically important from the years out of power. this is going to make the pri a central part of the branch in the 2012 and 2018 period. they not only help you win the presidency, but senate seats and federal deputy seats. these numbers, this means a regional district. remember the mexico has a mixed system. you have 300 single member districts as well as 200 proportional representation seats. they are 1-5 regional districts. this is a nice way of looking at -- still in spanish. this said regional weaknesses. single member districts by region. these are the single member districts won by the pan, prd

and the pri green party. if the first, this is the northwest. this is sonora, sin loa, baja, california. they managed to win only 13 seats. a traditional stronghold. the prd won zero seats in this area. in the entire region of the northwest, the prd did not win a single member district. not one. this speaks to a terrible weakness in the north. look at the pri. this can be either 59 or 61. take it from 60. the pri won 47 of the 60 single member districts. here we go. this is cirque um description. the states in the far northeast where by the way they have been extremely powerful.

this is something interesting that one saw in this vote count for the presidential election. they did well in the northeast. however they did extremely well in this region and again, look at the prd. not a single won. now we go to the southeast and they drop tremendously and wins only 6 of the 60. they do far better and they continue it do very well. now you see the weaknesses. in the states, the pan only wins five and the prd wins 41. this is the federal district. what are they? 21 districts? mexico city. the weakest showing is as strong

as this second highest showing. this is the state of mexico and the preagain comes roaring back. it's a national party and the center national action party and they are not national parties. it is no surprise that the prewith a good candidate would be able to come back to power. here are the electoral results for state and municipal elections. they start in 1980. they used to win in terms of percentage of votes. they used to win almost 90%. this is called not the dominant party. then it drops. really dramatically. only until 1995. then the support at the municipal and governor level

levels off around 40 or 42%. it does not drop after 2000. it does not go down. it stays steady. why? the pri is a popular party at the municipal and the state level. party id, very quickly. i am i'm running out of time. here is the pre, and you would think in late 1980s it would still be a popular party. it is. this is how many percentage of the voting population that identifies with the party, it's over 30%, it spikes, and then it goes down and it's still 30%. look at the bp.a.n. and this is the tragedy for the p.a.n. here's the 2000 p.a.n. number. look, it catches the pre, and then it starts going down again and what we're going to see in the next slide is look at this, even after the pre's debacle in the 2006 elections, when magrasso came in third base the pre still had a higher

percentage of the voting population that just identified with it. people liked the pre. and then here you see it, this is during calderon's presidency and as we saw from jorge's number calderon was not a reviled president. people liked him. even during this presidency, the p.a.n. did not manage to communicate with voters and the pre did. and that i think, let me just go back here, so just to sort of end up this talk is that the pre has enormous power because voters at the municipal and state levels always liked the pre. they never gave up on the pre. they never switched to identifying with either the p.a.n. or the prd. they have very good governors. the governors, once they get in office, tend to stay in office, the party does, because remember, there's no consecutive re-election in mexico at any level of government. this is a party that knows how

to govern and thanks to these governors, it is able to win elections at the federal level. now what happens is, what was so good for the pre in this case was, it had been extremely good candidate. it ran a very good campaign, and there were no splits among the different pre forces, thanks to just enormous popularity of pena nieto. in 2007 i went to one of these big pre lunches that they have, and it was a pre lunch that was hosted by the state of mexico and it was sort of brought in the governor, he was still the governor of the state of mexico at this time, and even then it was obvious to everyone he was going to be the pre's candidate and he was going to win. they literally carried him aloft like a roman emperor sort of through the streets. even then. so what that tells you was the pre had been planning this for years, they knew it had the right candidate and he was able to maintain splits to a minimum. thank you very much. [ applause ]

>> thank you. francisco? >> good morning, everyone. thank you to andrew seely and eric coleson for the kind invitation. it's good to see everyone this morning. i want to share with you a few reflections regarding the elections last week, and i've divided them into three issues, first, some surprises, then realities, what the new political configuration in mexico will look like, and what the dynamics might look like, and then some of the challenges. so regarding surprises, i think, you know, post factum it's easy to say things were meant to be all right, things were meant to be peaceful.

in fact, up until a few days before, there was significant uncertainty throughout society regarding the potential for violence during the elections. many of you have seen not only increasing amounts of intensity of violence. we see it also not just targeted among drug traffickers and state official, state officials among themselves. you also see it in public places, plazas, schools, and this is where many of the ballot boxes, polling stations were located. so that was a positive surprise. at first, around, what was it, maybe 8:30, 9:00 p.m. of that sunday, sunday the 1st, after the president of the federal elect recall to institute declared after a short statistically significant

simulation that pena nieto was ahead by around 6.5%, 7% points, i think many breathed a sigh of relief we're not back to 2006 where less than a quarter of a million votes, 0.5% of the total voting separated the prd, the left, from today's president, felipe calderon, p.a.n., on the right. so i think again uncertainty and, how could we call it, a wave of scrutiny, which in fact had been taking place at least since january-february, and were both particularly the prd but also the p.a.n. had been crying wolf time and time again, the pri is using more resources than it reports, the pri has strategic alliance, in fact, not

the pri, governor pena nieto since before he became governor of mexico had a strategic alliance with the largest media congrom glom rat in the country, televisione, it's been exposed with original animals. i think that many of us made the mistake after the president of the electoral institute came out and said don't worry, it's not as close as last time.

immediately you get national television. of the republic congratulating enpeek pena nieto and minutes later pena nieto making of what all appearances was basically an acceptance speech. all of this happened before there was a president-elect in mexico. we were reminded at the beginning just yesterday, a week after the election, and congratulations started pouring in, colombia, chile, president obama, everyone congratulates pena. i understand probably that there was a strong conscience about the potential for conflict, given what had happened in 2006. i think these shows of enthusiasm were premature, and most of us were caught in them. i, myself, was writing a little blog for my students at johns

hopkins, real time, telling them what i saw. i said yeah, july the 1st, this is an election that yielded credibility and wide legitimacy. three days later i was biting my tongue, big mouth strikes again. i had spoken too soon. because even i think now, this was not an equal election. the evidence of systemic vote buying continues to reign in mexico. bank monex, one of the largest retail markets, soriana, in some states where observers were asked not to go, given conditions on the ground with the war on drugs places like

veracruz, parts of guerrero, there were no observers so we don't know what happened there. there might have been coercion. we don't know. i retracted that saying "great credibility and legitimacy" and resorted to the conventional wisdom which is the elections were legal because it is important, once you start opening ballot boxes to distinguish bought from non-bought votes, sincere from non-sincere, you just can't do it. the point is it's out there, and legitimacy is an issue which, like the pulse varies. it's a matter of public opinion. today probably one, one and a half in every three or four mexicans think these elections were not equal, think, as joy told us, as jorge