>> on tuesday, subcommittee looked at airport screenings and w ways the tsa can improve the current system. tom blanks testified along with aviation experts. this is 90 minutes. i would like to welcome everyone to the hearing. i do want to give you a heads up. we are skell you'cheduled to be for just one vote any minute. i thought we would go ahead and

start with the staff and ranking member jackson lee is on her way. we will try to get as many of yours as we can. we will make the vote and come back. i apologize for the in c connecticcoissue, but we don't know about that. >> for all it's faults the reason tsa was set up was to deploy and enhance security hesures to prevent another attack on aviation. that security mission is just as important today if not more important than it was 11 years ago. it is equally not an option. tsa's poor conduct is sending a strong message to the american

taxpayors. tsa doesn't care or no how to best serve the professionaling public. this is going to command a collective thought and english newity. it is a great first tep. it is not clear where the program will go from here. it is a chance for meaningful reformat tsa. building upon the success of spp program and others. i remain to holding accountable the job that it was meant to do in the first place.

>> i will now suspend ranking member and we will go to the opening statement of our first witness. there is our beeper. let's try to get at least two of these opening statements in and then i'll recess. >> our first witness is dr. richard bloom. prior to his current position dr. bloom served as president of the american psychological association. dr. bloom carries out the policy

analysis and aviation security threat analysis. covert action and psychology of information and warfare. the chair recognizes dr. bloom for your five minute opening statement. >> thank you mr. chairman and ranks members of the subcommittee. >> one, i think we need qual taytive analyses of how effective tsa is at the moment and has been in terms of how it is prevented, deterred, successfully resolved any incidentses of terrorism and other crime as well. especially because terrorism and other kinds of crime are becoming more and more interrelated. as to the effective news of

public and private approaches, that is not really the right question. the right question should be what principles do we need to have the right people doing the right things based on risk. number two, if we keep tsa, we need to ensure firewalls between whatever regulatory they might have. we need to decide whether it is too focused on aviation and we also have to make a decision on whether u.s. government securities in general are too focused on transportation given the infinite number of the latter. we have to have a greater perspective that transportation per spspectives including that between transportation and custom authorities and what kind

of resources are enough and focus more on how do we get the most security on whatever resources are available. we have to move away from the vulnerability impact approach towards an optimal risk estimate approach but there are many complexities in doing that. risk estimates have to change. we have to field various players of eqiual integration. i'm talking about perception management. also intelligence collection and analysis so that we can identify

the threat and detail them whatever and then of course the defensive approach which is what the general public is more familiar and so on. they need to be offensive together. do they have the right stuff? do we know what the right stuff is? are they treated right? salaries benefits awards recognition day-to-day respect. this is the case given the terrorists are publicly stated is a priority. transportation security initiatives continue to be too focused on technology and fixes not on the thought process

involved on a tacks. terrorism is psychological while consequences, all mate ultimate questions are to create and maintain surviving terrorist acts. too many people in the u.s. expect total safevfety or secur. both objective success and failure qualify as subjective success. finally, our transportation security programs and their costs including the existence

and functioning of tsa are wins or terrorists. thank you. thank you for your opening stateme statement. we are now joined by ms. jackson-lee. >> for the record, i will indicate that many times as usual, judiciary committee is engaged in a markup so i thank you for your courtesies. i'm happier to be able to welcome mr. barber as a new member of the committee. and it is important to note that he comes from the state of arizona and has had an important predecessor miss giffords and

brings to this committee a commitment and concern about securitying the homeland and i think it is efl extremely important to add to our western presence and mr. barber you are welcomed and thank you so very much for your service to this country. >> thank you. >> let me indicate i always start by indicating that on 9/11 tso officers were not in place. we lost thousands of lives. it i is as i listen to our witnesses today, many of you may have taken some mode of transportation and many of you may have flown. and all of the critiquie ining

not take away the value of the officers. i will be listening on solutions it is the key of what we must proceed on. we must match their determination with our vi vigilence. he established legislation and i think we have done quite well. yes, there have been a number of threats. those that have not been made public. but the combined labor of tso officers and others on the frontlines. intelligence collaboration we are not what we were pre9/11. we must remember that in the

wake of 9/11 was the creation of tsa and guards at this nation's airport checkpoints. i travel throughout this nation and i stop and talk to former police officers. they are serving their nation. i will have great quar rel with any testimony that offers to suggest that we need to change them out. i will say i'm always prepared to ensure a move efficient effective experienced group of public servants and i welcome in collaboration with the chairman to do so. the american public needed to know that each bag would be screened. i welcome our efforts to improve

our nation's skies. there are many changed. these threats can only be resolved if they are not afraid to answer difficult questions but not take a widespread view and not throw out the tr transportation. it is appropriate for us to hear and consider ideas. in particular, i look forward to hearing from miss alonzo a flight attendant. as we know, they do not serve -- do not just serve beverages, they are often the first crew members to recognize safety

problems. this just took place. crew members foiled those planning to break into the cockpit door. to further reiterate the threats, we must remember the sdi incidents that frame our discussions today. december 22nd, flight 63 american airlines from miami to paris intended to detonate an explosive device. des cember 25th, the bomber who intended to ignite his underwear. all of these incidents took place on flights inbound to the

united states. i look forward to hearing her testimo testimony. it will offer the kind of insight that should be done when all other layers should be compromised. we should be efficient and effective. but i will be continuously committed to the sprur thtructu we put in place. let's look for solutions and answers. i yield back. >> i thank the gentle lady and the chair will recess the committee. we should be about 15 minutes.

>> we turn now to our second witness. currently serve d as ceo and ha written hundreds of articles on

transportation issues and currently writes a monthly column. i have been studying competitive contracting since i wrote the first book on the company. that eggsy is in charge of aviation. tsa regulates transit at arm's length. oh when screeners perform

poorly, tsa defends itself and minimizes the problem. having tsa operate the screening conflicted with unified airport security. the u.s. model that combines regulation and screening is out of step with regulations. i did a report in 2008 i compared the way it is done in canada and the eu in the united states. in canada and the eu security is done like it is here but screening is done either by the airport or by security companies. it is called for by security regulations. member states are supposed to notify iko and the united states has never notified iko that we were in noncompliance.

following 9/11, the house version which passed by a large margin removed airport screening from the airlines whether it should never have been but many officials in correctly believed that flawed screening enabled the 9/11 attacks to have taken place. that is proech passed the senate in a conference committee, the senate version prevailed for opt out and the promise that all over other airports could opt out. when tsa created the opt-out program it designed a highly centralized version of the contract. they issue an rfp select a contract and manage the relationship. you would expect that as in

europe, the airport would select the best proposal from among those companies and contract with that company and tsa would regulate it. instead, the airport asks tsa if it may opt out. if tsa approves, they assign the contract to manage the contract leaving the airport out of the loop. tsa spells out in detail the procedures and the equipment that the company must use. tsa mandates that the company pay the same benefits as tsa. contract that as in europe. tsa would certify qualified companies and the companies could design their own procedures and achieve the required outcomes. this would allow screening

companies to do other security tasks there by strengthening other airport security. with all the constraints on today's contractors, the private sector is delivering more screening. the house in 2011 compared tsa screening at lax with that of sfo. they found that the screening at sfo model is more productive. this -- the reasons for this, higher productivity much higher turn over of tsa screeners recruitment and training costs are higher. and security companies do a better job of using part-time screeners instead of having

almost all full time people. first, reduce the centralized nature of svp. and let the airport manage the contract under tsa's overall oversight at the airport. second and probably longer term, congress should revise the legislation to remove the conflict of interest de-involving all screening at the airport as many airports in europe do. in either case current tsa screeners would have and should have current screenings for the job. this would bring the united states into conformity with iko regulations. thank you for this time. and i will be happy to answer questions later. >> thank you. our third witness mr. ozzie

nelson. i like that. i grew up in that era. some of these youngsters back here don't know who that is, but i think that is pretty cool. mr. nelson joined csis in september 2009 after retiring from the u.s. navy where he served in a variety of senior policy positions. in 2005 he was selected to serve as a inaugural member of counterterrorism centers. prior to his assignment he served as associate director on the staff of the white house where he led the development of the maritime security. >> good afternoon. thank you. thank you for the opportunity to

testify today. i would like to discuss how congress and the american people can work together to enhance nation at security in the coming years. it has lead to a flawed system. the tsa was not carefully designed and stood up in a middle of a crisis in a few short months after 9/11. in doing so, we have created a unworkable construct in which no risk was acceptable. the model has fueled bad policy and bad practice. if tsa is to become the agency that we want it to be. we must give it the freedom that it needs to evolve. while al qaeda has been reduced, the affiliates continue to pose

a threat to the aviation system. risk based strategies, science and technology and communications. while significant progress has been made under administrator pistol, the system treats every passenger as a potential alterist. adopting a model of security based on risk would increase the effectiveness of our overall security efforts and increase the cost of screening individuals every day. the keys while significant progress has been made, we need to given the international nature of the system, we must improve with our partners.

thankfully tsa has already moved in this direction however, we must seek to expand these programs. as we move forward, these efforts do not involve in an inherent degree of risk. we cannot revert to a zero failure model. but we must commit ourselves to making a risk-based model work. in today's atmosphere, technology is essential to the department of -- congress must think of the long-term savings that the technology represents. s and t created technology that is ten times more powerful than existing systems, yet still

costed the same. an important step would be for dhs to provide multiyear funding guidance. it also would be worthwhile to investigate the feasibility of the firm and develop cutting edge technology and developing such a model, yet even if the technologies are improved, tsa will continue to face challenges. few agencies interact in such a consistent and personal level with the public as does tsa. it will be impossible for tsa to improve it's image significantly if government officials continue to use the agency as rhetoric.

tsa also need to communicate with travelers for a greater degree for everyone's mutual benefit. tsa should explore benefits by educating travelers and trusting them to do this. tsa can utilize travelers in a constructtive manner. tsa's mission that transcends a political cycle. the administrative mission -- tsa has had five admin stristro while the fbi has had one. in conclusion, there are a variety of means in which we can meet these challenges.

i want to recognize that tsa is already on the right path to meet these challenges. i look forward to your questions, thank you for the opportunity to testify. >> thank you, mr. nelson, those are some very intriguing thoughts. our next witness mr. tom blank is from the gephardt group. he served at the tsa as the acting deputy administrator. mr. blank created the first ever office of trans policy and served in charge of federal screener workforce and the agencywide reform function. >> chairman roger s