the sub comment thank you for the invitation to appear here today. as a former executive i can attest to the commitment to the agency's men and women who do their utmost 24/7 to keep america functioning freely. as this committee weighs the future of tsa it is important to consider steps in supporting tsa in enhancing it's consistency, credibility and currency. in the year following the creation with the signing of the aviation and transportation security act. the congress act to change the act's original provisions. as the third ranking position in the u.s. department of transportation and court of the post the same rank as the d.o.t.

deputy secretary. created the post with the stated term of five years. the five-year term position was removed and the executive rank of the administrator was reduced. i suggest that at least the five year term stipulation be reinstituted because it will help make management of the agency more predictable and permit the organization to focus more in tentatively on mission execution. since tsa was created years ago, there have been six administrators and the same number of deputy administrators and the most current appointee who just assumed his post. with changes at the top juiusuae a reorganization of

responsibility. such buy in remains critical to the homeland security mission success, the five year term provision mirrors that for the faa administrator for many of the same reasons. second credibility, by taking steps to reduce passenger experiences at the check sthcch. the path to achieving this is the empowerment of the workforce supervisors to diffuse those situations that often intrigue the news media:tsa has 3,000 personal designated at the largest airports. these personal should be authorized to intervene in special situations and to pass them through.

in a recent appearance before this subcommittee tsa administrator noted that the agency is moving to provide the necessary training to the supervisors. third, having the most advanced security technology will require the congress to provide tsa with the innovative financing and facilitate the use of the third party testing to bring technologies to use by the agency. the subcommittee should give use and consideration to a bond program underway airports would issue debt to pay for security equipment to support tsa operations. i would subject thggest that th

spend that go is not avoidable. it is also private sector dollars that would be leveraged by federal action. for instance, tsa is required bias et to screen checked baggage using explosive detection systems. across the system, this is headed toward the end of its useful life and will soon have to be replaced. that will be a budget buster if it needs replaced which could easily happen. the full benefits of rbs will not be realized swiftly if tsa is left to advocate year after year for budget resources to support it.

once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify. i would be pleased to answer any questions. >> thank you. which equipment did you talk about being at the end of its life? >> the bag igage screening equipment. it is not across tspectrum. some of the largest airports are being taken care of. when we look at 450 airports, we don't have eds at all 450 today. >> you shook me up there for a minute. all right we have saved the best for last. know pressure. our final witness is miss

colby-alonzo. the largest union, this alonzo has 16 years of experience as a flight attendant. she was working on flight 787 when she responded to a woman's claim that she had a device implanted inside her. fortunately the claim turned out to be false. >> thank you for allowing me to speak. as i said, i am a member of the association of flight attendants. and it is the world's largest flight attendant union. we are required to be onboard commercial aircraft to fight fires, provide first aid, handle

emergency situations and our responsibilities for ensuring the responsibility for passengers make us an integral part of security. as a 16 year flight attendant i take pride in my role as a professional and appreciate the opportunity to recount my experience from may 2012. on that day i was working following our initial in-flight service a female passenger called me over and handed me a note written in french. the note stated that she had been surgically implaimplanted h a see vice that was out of her control. i proceeded to the gally with the note, her boarding pass and passport and briefly explained

the situation to the cabin service provider and entered the cockpit to brief the captain. it took two announcements before any doctors responded. we escorted her to the back alley and requested her permission to be exam inned. it was decided that out of caution we would divert to bangor, maine. once on the ground in maine, federal officers came aboard and removed the passenger. at which time the captain came onboard and revealed the actual situation to the passengers. at that time i gave my statement. fortuna fortunately the threat we faced did not end tragically. i am required to attend training

at my air leline yearly in in or to remain qualified. this training gave me the module to respond to the situation that happened that day. when i was hired, my initial training was based on a 1970s high jacking scenario of a disdent who wanted to go to cue b cuba. today's security tragedies were designed to respond to the ever present aggressive threat. it is time for an independent panel to review flight attendant security training otherwise we run the risk prior to years prior to 9/11. it esaensential to the strategy.

i took the court on my only time and at my own expense. flight attendants are not asking to become martial arts experts but our level of preparedness is inconsistent. as a flight attendant i'm subject to the same level of screening and background checks. our advocacy is all the more important and relevant for screening. alternative screening initiatives for frequent travelers as well as active duty service members should be further expanded into the program still has no concrete dates or milestones set. lastly regarding flight 787. the only way for me to relay

information accurately was through entering the flight deck and using the pilot headset. the hands free concept will allow crew members the ability to communicate from anywhere at any time under any circumstances. afa recommends a robust layered security approach that includes self defense modules. a risk based approach to security screening that incorporates flight attendants into known crew members. chairperson rogers and ranking member jackson-lee. thank you for allowing me to talk about this. i will be happy to answer any question. >> i thank you for your service.

>> i'll admit i find it intriguing, i think everybody is pretty much acknowledged that tsa has at a minimum perception problems and organizational problem that is need to be addressed. if you are familiar with what we are doing here, i talked about as did our witnesses the bloated size that we are starting to see in tsa and how that is hindering it's public image. one of the things that i have heard from the public is their complaint that they seem to not

be doing anything. over my tenure of chairman of this committee. we have about one third of the tsa that could be reduced as far as personal size and still do the job as effectively and current. i know there is nothing magic about that. but i would like to frame the question this way. would you agree that the tsa is bloated in it's personnel structure or size, whether that bloat is 10%, too many or 40% and somewhere within that spectrum would you agree there is excess that we can afford to trim and reform and reorganize the tsa? that is a yes or no question. we'll start with dr. bloom. >> i'm sorry? >> i'm sorry.

i do agree. just two basic points if i could. ji want to come back to that. i will i promise. >> i agree certainly as far as the screening workforce is concerned. >> that is all i'm talking about. >> mr. nelson? >> yes. >> i agree. >> miss alonzo. >> i would have to defer to afa international i don't have that expertise. >> let's go back i want to hear your two point. >> first of all, there is nothing magical about aviation and transportation, from a terrorist's per spspective you e targets you are trying to kill people and whether you use an airport an aircraft or whatever, the world is your ois ster. >> i'm going to go down that tr industri trail with you in a minute. i would ask you to keep your

response to ten seconds or so, because my time is going to run out. if you were king for a day, what is the one thing that you would change about tsa? >> i would take 20 or 30% of the resources and put it into intelligence analysis and train the u.s. government. >> i would remove tsa from delivering service as opposed to regulating. >> excellent mr. nelson. >> make a term limit for the administrator for 5-10 years. >> i do agree. and my change would be to get rid of the checkpoint supervisors. >> i'm sorry. >> she wanted to hear what you said again. >> in my testimony i suggested that the checkpoint supervisor,

3000 at the checkpoints be empowered to intervene to avoid problems of young people and special population. >> and we have had that at previous hearings. >> i would immediately add the flight asttendant component to the program. >> you restated again in your opening statement, you said that you would like to see tsa approve a group or pool of contract tors who could do the private screening that once they were approved that the airport could contract with anybody in that group. tell me how that would work. >> it would work like other contracts that are out there with the federal, state and local level. >> would the contract amount, or

set of parameters be included? >> ideally, yes, true performance contracting, the companies would submit proposals that might differ in price. they would put it together and might also use the people in different way. >> my next set of questions, i think that is intriguing. the chairman recognizes ranking member for her opening set of question. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. thank you for your service. you are aware of the legislation i have had i hope trying to increase the security training of flight attendants? >> yes, ma'am. >> do you all support that? >> yes, we do. >> legislation that would make it a requirement because i want

to thank you and i should thank all of the flight attendants who have voluntarily gone to the training. >> that is correct. >> would it be more helpful if it was required training for flight attendants? >> absolutely and the reason there is a need for it is we have to develop cognitive recognition forterist acts based on previous attempts. and it is not reinforced enough to maintain a basic level across the board. >> i think it is very important to make note of your intervention even though you have reported it by your statement what is important is that we are aware that this was a dangerous commentary that this particular commentary was saying. it jgenerated great possibilitis

of danger did it not? yes, ma'am. >> and one could not rely on a men stal hetal health issue and to take it seriously and you did. >> yes, ma'am. >> i appreciate what mr. blank said about giving supervisors the authority to intervene. i welcome corrective measures. tell me, mr. nelson how you would handle the present population in terms of training, to duty assignment, so that we have a full complement of individuals on the frontlines securitying the homeland. >> thank you, ranking member for that question. my perspective of saying no comes from a military background

trusting the person on the ground. and if he says we need this many agents for screening officers then what it becomes is your question. how do you train them pr appropriately and how we zero failure construct. we have to create a career force. after 9/11, there were not a bunch of dhs officials sitting on the sidelines. we've only been creating that workforce for ten years now. we have to continue to do that. homeland security training is different than dod training. even though the individuals may be from military or law enforcement backgrounds, it doesn't make them necessarily a great fit for what they're doing with tsa. we need to expand this program as far as training it concerned. we need to have rotations and promote by doing rotation assignments and things of that nature. being creative. i think they're moving in that direction. but it will take an investment.

any time you take someone off the frontline to do training or education, they're not doing their job. that's an investment we have to make if we want the tso, the organization to be the entity we want it to be. >> mr. nelson, developing a team that is professionally trained using their previous experience but is professionally geared to the service of their responsibility, which in some instances is aviation. i've been arguing for using these officers on our mass transit. that's obviously more difficult. but it certainly is important. is that what you're saying today, developing that professional team that fits into the matrix that's needed to secure the homeland? >> absolutely. again, look at the homeland security intelligence model as well. just because it works with the cia or dod doesn't mean it works at dhs. that's a very specific requirement and requires a specific background, requires specific training. so leverage the skills that they already have, whether it be law enforcement, aviation or military.

but that training needs to be augmented for the dhs and tsa specific requirements. >> mr. bloom, why would you quarrel with what i think are very insightful instructive comments by mr. nelson, one, i agree with the idea of term limiting the administrator. i think ten years, i think five years would be completely undoable. what evidence do you have that it's too large other than to say we need to make it more efficient and more professionally trained? >> well, by no means do i want to quarrel. but based on the public discussion we're having, in my opinion from a terrorist's point of view with surveillance, reconnaissance, being able to find out the aspects of technology being used by transportation security administration personnel, by finding out the typical security procedures that are deployed and

employed, it's only a matter of time before these can either be exploited or folks can go around them. i don't think terrorists are impressed by organizational charts, by bureaucracies, by bureaucratic cultures. by studying terrorism in the last ten, 20, 30 years, they take what they -- what's in front of them. anything that's a security procedure can be exploited or gone around. whether it's technology or human practice. >> my time is out. i thank you for that. you've helped clarify for me your comment, which i think ties closely in to me, my perspective and mr. nelson and even ms. alonso. we must constantly alter the thinking, training and strategy because terrorists are constantly altering. that has nothing to do with size of the organization, which i believe we should adhere to the administrator in essence "the general." but it does adhere that we have

to be more sophisticated in not having charts and having leveraged individuals who have supervisor titles but other titles but we have to focus on making this an effective machine against a changing world of terrorism. on that we have no disagreement. but i don't think that we can call that a need for lessening the total population of those in the service. we need to use them in a more effective manner. so i thank you for your instructive testimony today and i yield back, mr. chairman. >> i thank the gentle lady and recognize the gentleman from new york for any questions he may have. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> i'm not sure, was it you, mr. bloom, who talked about the baggage equipment screening, its life cycle is coming near an end? >> that was me, sir. >> i'm sorry. and if we have to replace all of this, i guess most of this was

done in '02? >> december 31, 2002, is statutory deadline for installing it at all commercial airports. >> and just because of the arcane way we book keep here, we expense the entire item on the year that it's replaced. how big a number would this be? >> i don't have a precise number but it would certainly be many billions of dollars. >> all right. and is there a mechanism for some flexibility in this going to third party leasing over the life cycle of the equipment or -- >> during my tenure at tsa and subsequently in discussions with equipment manufacturers, i've never seen anything nor am i aware that the private sector has seen anything, a model that would say leasing makes sense. i advocated bonding authority to

airports that it would make more sense to do that on an airport by airport basis. >> but is there -- government regulations or bureaucratic stone wall? >> it is very difficult for an agency to effectively advocate to the congress for capital expenditures on equipment. they're more effective in advocating for expanded personnel. >> how true. >> and usually the capital expenditures get put off until there's a real emergency and they will come up to capitol hill and say we have no choice but to do this. what i'm advocating is planning a more efficient, common sense approach to how we invest our capital dollars. >> in view of the size of the one hr year expenditure, we're all terminating at about the same time, is there really a

practical way to do this outside of third-party leasing? >> let me clarify. the tsa does have a plan and is executing a plan bit by bit year over year. what i'm questioning is, are they going to get there fast enough under their current plan or are we going to have equipment that is out there and that is just not usable before the rate of replacement catches up with the need. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you, gentleman. the chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from minnesota, mr. quebec for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you for your panel. i appreciate. you flew the 860, huh? >> i was. >> i was at sack lant back then. i'm old. mr. poole, you mentioned in your testimony that tsa has a built-in conflict of interest.

that it was a rather interesting statement by both establishing policy and trying to implement the policies because of self-regulations inherently problematic. you then talk about how the tsa isn't as rigorous in dealing with its own performance problems as those that it actually does regulate. it's like the fox guarding the hen house if you pardon the expression. your proposal is to -- can you give me examples of the screening performance measures and what it would look like as a contractor who implements them. >> one would be certainly the kinds of measures now when red teams go in and try to get material past the screening. things that are prohibited. so the rate of successful interception of bogus material or dangerous material. another would be cost effectiveness measures, productivity, the number of passengers screened per hour in accordance with standards.

that kind of measure i don't see anywhere being used today. that's the kind of measure that the house committee uses when it compared the contract screening at san francisco with the tsa screening at lax and found enormous difference in actual productivity that suggests that the tsa staff are not being used anywhere near as efficiently as the contractors are able to do. that would be another useful measure. >> right now the tsa has, what, an $8 billion budget? how much savings do you see that occurring in you saw that throughout the system? >> i think you could probably save 20 to 25%. given that screening is about $5 billion of the $8 billion, you could probably save 20% at least of tsa's overall total budget from removing that, going to the performance contracting. >> you would have a pretty large savings associated with that and, of course,