that starts to play here. >> can i add a little bit on that? one of the problems any alliance has is that some people on the front line and some people are more in the rear, that was the decrumbing issue in the cold war but very much an issue in nato today. the countries in eastern europe, turkey and nordic countries that are closest to the potential threat leaving missiles aside, the potential threat of conventional invasion are relying on the support -- not only of the united states but of other more distant countries. leaving the politics aside for the moment, the problem is, one of the reasons there is such interest in retaining at least the option of using nuclear weapons in response to a massive conventional attack is that

those countries underably are not keen on being liberated after six months of heavy fighted. they are interested in the attack not happening or at least being stopped. i think one of the issues that the alliance has to face, one that we face in connection with korea, that there's sort of two models of how you address an invasion. one is the kind of at some point you will decide that war is inevitable and mobilize and start flowing stuff and everything goes at once. and you talk about we used to fight in divisions the idea was we would move ten divisions to europe in ten days. it's a major of the way it was planned. first day was spent filling out paperwork. but that was what we were going to do, damn it. one of things we have to bear in

mind to think realistically about this scenario, this is extremely unlikely to be an absolute bolt from the blue. there's lots of history of tactical surprise. to my knowledge no history in the last couple of hundred years at least of strategic surprise, that is of an attack that you had no reason to believe could possibly happen. and i think that -- it will be difficult politically but critical operationally that nato have a plan for reacting to strategic warning in ways that are not move everything forward, mobilize everybody and so on. we've actually developed for the korean case, a matter of public report, we've developed a much more sophisticated concept of how you begin -- which is the classic example. a long way away, america far enemy close, bad people.

how you deal with that, a graduated set of responses. that will be tricky in the nato context because we have the luxury in the korean case of having essentially two and a half players on our side, us, the south koreans and japanese and you have 28 plus many others in the european case. people will make the argument oh, you must not do anything because it will make it worse. which is not crazy, but one of the doctrinal things that has to be worked on for the unlikely contingency of a conventional invasion, how do you take advantage of strategic warning and make effective responses? i like to recommend articles that i've read that sound interesting, because there are not that many. a brilliant article on of all things, the french operation in

mali in survival. and one of the things that he points out is that the french were able to operate with lightning speed, literally in a couple of days they managed to turn the military situation in the country around. one reason for this was they very small but very effective, very skilled and very ready forces deployed already not too far away. now, they needed help to get the big forces from the united states and it took a while. but they were able to get meaningful capability on the ground very quickly which had a big impact. it's not that mali sets the example for everything, but it sets the principle if you need to figure outweighs to be ready to respond quickly and not to wait as the french did in this case for reasons of the circumstance but to wait until its inevitable until you get ready.

>> before we turn the floor over our participants in the audience, i want to ask curt one last political question about die tdeterrence, it strikes me the most contingencies that will be challenged, not invasion by an eastern party. those days are gone. it's more lightning unexpected strike by terrorist organization or some radical regime well outside the north atlantic area in the case of unstable russia that trend continues, a limited territorial inkurgs. if we go back stef no's quoting, he emphasized the word punishment. it requires your aggressor to believe that there's going to be an immediate reprisal, punishing reprisal. does nato have the capacity to do such a repiesal to punish?

i understand nato responding to a major inkurgs because it's unambiguous, but a more limited strike, does anyone have a political will to really strike back and demonstrate its willingness to strike back in a way that will deter that from happening? >> you put your finger on the question. do we have the capacity? yes. do we have the will? no. do we have a track record? no. have we messaged that this is what will happen if you do this? no. so that's where we kind of fall down. again, laying on a spectrum of nuclear deterrence, not worried about at the moment. conventional deterrence of an attack you're talking about, no worries there, conventional attack on nato territory. the other things, i'm concerned we're not in a position to deter them and that's eroding and the trend line is the wrong way. i would love for us to be in a

position to deter syria from doing what it's done, because they know what we'll do if they don't do what we warn them about. that's not just the case today. and if it's a terrorist group as well, the capacity to go and identify through intelligence means and then to have precision guided munitions on a training base or government that may have provided support today, we could do that. but more likely be the u.s. that would do it. i don't think they have the will to agree to such a thing. it takes the consensus of nato among the allies and define the operation roles. i don't see that. i think that means as nato, we really don't have that deterrent capability. if i could add one more point, i don't see -- maybe it's just me and i'm a little thick -- i don't see missile defense as having a deterrent capability, other than making sure we are not deterred in our efforts to

deal with the regional challenge. so the example walt gave, if iran is doing something in the middle east and they have a missile capacity, the fact that we know we can blunt that missile capacity, would therefore mean we're not deterred from dealing with that iranian challenge for that reason. there will be a dozen other reasons that we might be deterred from dealing with that, how complicated and how long it will be, what we get ourselves sucked into and that's what we're seeing with iran and syria today. i don't think missile defense gives us an ability to deter someone else like iran from doing it. it just means we're not deterred from intervening for that reason. >> i'll open it up. i'll ask you keep your questions -- first identify yourself and affiliation and keep your questions and points brief. let's start with larry. >> thanks to the panelists for a really does discussion so far. i thought he raised a lot of

right issues. i did want to focus on the question of will. i hear a lot from administration officials sort of off the record as well as in some cases on, that we're war weary, which is true and parts of our military are war weary, but the question of use of military force is essentially off the table for almost any type of contingency that you could imagine. i do think that sends the wrong deterrent signals as curt has said. i wonder how true that is. can -- i would love the panel to talk about the american public, are they convincible for a certain contingencies and not others are or is it completely off the table forever, only the middle east. what are the dynamics at play that makes the american public now different from other times in our recent history? >> madlyn, want to take a shot

at that. >> okay. i think -- i think you have to balance what -- i think you have to maybe balance a little bit what the american public is tired of. and not what the will to do if it arose. i think tler two different things. i think that the american public is just very tired of intervening in places where they may not see a definite threat to the u.s. that said, i don't think that there's anybody that would say that if there were definite threat to the u.s., the u.s. wouldn't be there or there was a definite threat to a close ally, the u.s. wouldn't be there. i think they are two different things. the way we train and everything we're doing at dod is certainly supportive of the fact that we would respond if there were a definite threat to the u.s. or close allies. >> i have to go in a few

minutes. i think that one's attitude toward -- the demonstration of this problem is supposed to be syria, that's the argument. that depends an awful lot on whether you think it was in fact a good idea or is still a good idea to intervene in the syrian civil war. if you think intervening in the syrian civil war is a good idea for variety of reasons you find compelling, then the fact that the united states is not going to do it, diminishes our capability. since i believe there is not a good argument for the united states intervening in the syrian civil war and the american public and congress and administration are pretty reluctant to do it is a good thing. and indeed, i would argue that what public will be convinced of which is exactly what madlny just said, when it is generally in our interest to do something because the situation presents a serious challenge to our allies

and security interest and world stability and so on, then the american public is quite capable of being convinced and it takes leadership and effort. not 100% of the people will be convinced. we will get to some degree the scenario we had in kosovo, where on the same day the republican controlled house of representatives voted against expanding our intervention against terminating our intervention and tied, literally tied, on whether we should continue to do what we were doing, it's not going to be easy to get congress to act if congress has to act or get the political support. but i think the demonstrated restraint in not rushing in to another middle eastern adventure actually helps the credibility of a future administration in a situation in which there was a much more clear cut -- much more clear cut challenge.

with that, i -- since i don't think the airplane -- the days have passed when airplanes wait for me. >> you can't deter the departure. >> just to comment, because it glosses over a lot -- [ applause ] >> i think i owe curt the courtesy of hearing his rebuttal. >> you can rebut me later. >> it crosses over a lot. we had a red line and secretary kerry saying we would be responding to the use of chemical weapons and president saying so and we didn't do so. then we got off in a different direction. i think it has had an impact on u.s. credibility. the point i was making earlier, wasn't about u.s. but nato, what is nato's credibility in having the will to respond to any of these number of scenarios and that's where we really have a problem. i don't see the nato that we have today willing to even

contemplate a new expeditionary mission to increases in defense spending. even when we talk about exercises and what scenarios, no one wants to talk what scenarios they are. i think there's just a real concern that if nato were confronted with a situation as nato, that it would need to respond to it. unless it is that attack on the conventional normal attack and i would see it very difficult to get an agreement on nato on that. >> madlyn. >> i'm not sure that nato responding always has to be in the context of nato responding in a military way. right now because of the way the syria situation has evolved, which one would argue has actually been or will be much more successful in getting rid of the chemical if we initiated

several air strikes. you have right now as a result of the diplomatic solution, u.n., our efforts in syria, you've seen quite a bit of response from both nato and nato countries wanting to know what can they do to help? what offers can be made of assistance to make sure that syria gets those weapons and gets the chemical capabilities outside? that the outside of syria, that me meet their deadlines under the opcw and framework? they really are responding, almost to the point you can't use everybody. nato is responding in many ways, and there is a will to respond, not just militarily. >> harlan, my question is for general cartright, you've opened up the eye quifl lent of a fine

bottle of wine and given us just a sniff. i want a better taste. how do you deal with the strategic reality when we're i am peled by the fact that sometime before the end of 2020, and probable i much sooner, buying power defense will be half of what it is right now. how would you answer your own question, what we ought to be doing in a few crisp sentences to give us that taste? >> i would proffer an alternative triad, strategic capabilities, general purpose force capabilities and then to get at this issue of the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, special operations capabilities. and the special operations capabilities are the ones that would be forward deployed and out and about. and they would be the -- the int intermediary between border and

police and general purpose forces. as an example that walt used, they would be there in areas where we had worry about having strategic surprise or tactical surprise. so then at that end of capability, that's counter fro liver race, nonproliferation, movement around, understanding what's going on of the at the high end on the strategic side, it is the missile defenses. it is the last resort of nuclear, but last resort and credible capabilities of far reaching effects, not all necessarily kinetic and military in nature that allow us to have the time to have what appears to be one of the good -- i hate to use that word, things that have happened in syria, which is the ridding of the region particularly syria, of those chemical weapons and all of them surrounding nations that have lived under that threat. i do disagree on the missile

defense side of this. i do believe very clearly and very passionately that missile defense is in fact a deterrent. that when you remove, whether you're adversary is a rational thinking state or irrational undeterrable, that you can't r can deter people by removing objectives. if you remove the objective of a quick strike like that in the middle of the night, what we used to worry about, is now scuds or whatever, if you put that threat in question, you are adding a deterrent capability. i believe, to the equation. i don't think we disagree on how it would be used. but i call that a deterrent. it is that triad and rebalancing of your strategic forces and general purpose forces and special operations. >> that's an interesting point you make about the third triad

using special operation forces, i'm wondering if there's a way the alliance could bind its chemical nuclear biological weapons brigade with the nato response force, citing almost a wmd way to secure wmd when necessary. >> the likelihood -- the most important thing is to bring your border and internal police into close coordination and understanding, common picture, with your special operators and have special operators trained and equipped to handle nonproliferation, counter proliferation, wmd type scenarios. that for each nation state is critical but then for the region and alliance is going to become critical activity. >> stepano -- >> thank you, my question will

be -- a more general question, an issue with this panel has been circling around. the remark about iran, what we could expect from iran is not -- from iran missile ability, not so much an aggression toward nato, but a regional a regional crisis. i think we've seen a number of scenario would be confronted recently has been as they start they do not affect nato or europe security. but say syria and libya, but as they go on, they can create situations, i mentioned before, that becomes a threat to our own security. we have -- my question is do we

have the tools the mindset really, to deter or at least prevent or contain crisis are f? >> kurt? >> obviously, these kinds of tools have to be wider than just military. >> again, i think madeline makes a good point, not all nato responses have to be military responses. but it's hard to find ones that nato have actually done that have not involved some military response. the one thing i can think of that nato has done with syria is to reassure turkey that any response to turkey would be met with military response. that gets right to the heart of this article 5 territorial

defense. i have a hard time thinking of other things nato has done with respect to syria. when you talk about crisis management and a broad set of tools, a lot of european allies have prevented nato from developing that set of tools. i remember whafghanistan fighti very hard just to get police training, because the eu said they would do police training, but really did not do police training -- some, but not much -- and we had to find a way around to help nato create the training for paramilitary police forces so we could bring them in in another capacity. then when you get beyond that, which is still a security-oriented one, the only things i can think of that nato has been really successful at have been disaster relief and negotiations where, say, secretary general robertson or solano before him would get involved in a situation to

politically dissolve a crisis. largely, again, because of the way nato has solved things, we've never separated them from military laws. >> how far do you want nato to go beyond their core military missions, beyond collective defense? you are going to sap up much political will getting into realms that are not nato's strong points. i'm struck by general cartwright's idea where ensuring integration with their efforts in non-military realms. >> i think we had a good formula for which, which was you do your planning and exercising for a credible collected defense. and then as crises arise, if there is a consensus among nato that we have to do something

about this as there was in bosnia, as there was in kosovo, you have the capacity to do it. you can't in advance pre-agree with nato, we're going to be ready to go to afghanistan. can you imagine in 2000 if anyone had brought that up in nato, it would be nonsense. of course, we're not going to afghanistan. but you have to have the capacity that as ooernevents ar you choose to deal with. what we said in 2002 was that we have to address challenges from wherever they may arise, threats from where they may arise, as opposed to military country. i don't think nato would say that again today and mean it. and i do think that's something we have to think about, because it is gullible, these challenges can exist from anywhere. but i don't think we are thinking much about that. but the core is to restore the credibility, strengthen the

credibility would be a better word, strengthen the credibility of our basic ability to do our basic job of collective defense, which is expeditionary for most countries getting to where they're needed. then you have the capacity on a case by case basis to respond to crises as they arise. >> we have a question in the back. >> two questions. the first one sort of concerns the presence of u.s. nuclear weapons in europe and the future of the debate within nato and hld and pg. as walter slocum talked about the need to keep europeans involved and educate them in the use and aspects of nuclear weapons, yet is it possible to imagine that debate being at the same level without u.s. nuclear weapons committed to nato? and i ask because brad roberts

once said, and i think it was on record, that japanese suffered relations with europeans because of these weapons. and the second question is somewhat brief concerning general cartwright, and it picks up on your point of special forces. there has been a lot of attention in europe that we draw all the troop brigade comeback teams, but there has been little information that europe is abusing its military presence in europe. are we seeing a more relevant u.s. presence in europe rather than just a small one? thank you. >> on the second, on the special operations, i mean, i don't know exactly the intent inside. madeline can probably address that better. but from the standpoint of relevance, i think the special operations versus a heavy brigade today for the reality we live in is going to be a lot more relevant to the defense

capabilities of nato and europe. >> i may dodge that one and go after the other one. but i think the nato dpr clearly put together nato as a nuclear alliance, and the fact they clearly are nuclear weapons that the u.s. has assigned to nato is something that both the hlg, the mpg, the nak, all the bodies need to continue to look at and with a great deal of seriousness. on the one hand, there has been a lot more serious in the last six months, control over the armed committee, adc, as well as the fcg, how do we look at

measures in a way that will inspire some reciprocal actions on the part of russia to begin to have this discussion about what would a foundation look like for reductions? so that's out there, but the commitment on the part of the allies, which i think is also part of this, it has -- it's really been very strong, and it's a commitment that is really respected in this notion of burden sharing. so the -- at least in the context of the hlg, burden sharing has been a very important element of this, and we see good, strong consensus on that. and also in the context of the whole u.s. nuclear commitment to nato, there really is burden sharing. it isn't obvious on its face, but it is. sharing funding, you have the independent deterrent of the

u.k. also provided to nato. it is a strong alliance. that said, the ppd that was just issued also made it very clear that the u.s. really is committed to extend a deterrence. and that was not only a reassurance to nato, but it was also the reassurance to the middle east and, most importantly, to japan and korea. even though there aren't weapons there anymore, we've taken some actions like the recent flyover of the b-2 to make it very clear we are committed to this extended deterrence. >> if we went down to zero in terms of nuclear weapons in europe, would we have to change our conventional force structure in any way? >> that's a very interesting question. i have to say -- i mean, i live in my world of strategic deterrence. i don't venture out much into the conventional side, so that

would probably be a conversation for a larger group. but it depends on how strong one would believe the deterrence is in the absence of those. in other words, would the extended deterrence still be strong enough if everything were pulled back to the u.s., that that would be equivalent. if it were not seen as equivalent of the forward deployed deterrence, then you probably would have to do something on the conventional side. but if it were still seen as equivalent, then probably no. >> general cartwright? >> my sense is it's in the eyes of the beholder. so it may be true one way in one country and different in another, but from a purely military standpoint, my opinion -- and i've said this multiple times, as has ivo -- any capability that is on the soil in europe today can be replicated in kind and in availability from a standoff