>> you see, i was always very vocal performance of creating our own tech nolgss which would at least go pair to pair with international peers and regularly replace them, same thing as -- >> as an import substitution or global competition. >> as a global competition and of course domestically to use our internal markets to boost the demand and to make money for our high tech companies and a great example of such technology. >> do you believe that without competition in russia from foreign competitors -- >> exactly my point. if you're shutting down competition, you have no drive to increase your service and to increase quality. and quality is not yet there. it's being gradually improving but it's not yet there. it had all of the chances to

become a global competitor with gps but we need to add like five years of stable work to achieve that. same thing with see, our domestic payment systems, russia, you know -- like, i was one of the programs i was supervising was a transition to services. governments services and -- >> is it e government or like e government? >> like government stuff. >> we wanted to develop our own visa type car cards to pay for the services and then we had sufficient market for them. but -- >> this is your work with ministry of communication. >> yes, that is right. but at that time, our ruling party voted against because they were affiliated with several banks which were against them

more profitable to work with visa and mastercard. now because of the national security concerns, they are trying to shut down visa and mastercard. there is no replacement. by shutting down visa and master card, it would disrupt your payment services for your clients and the whole system. >> the russians are still sometimes using the abacus -- >> you're outdated. >> so is abacus. the administration of credit cards in russia, 83%. >> 83%. >> okay. let's get back to issues that you as a legislator, you are concerned. in the legislative process, bringing back the issue of ukraine, do you think the russian legislative system, the russian system of government that according to my opinion,

that i wrote about and published as one of the first things i've done here at the heritage foundation in '92, when russia was considering -- 93, considering different constitutional drafts, i said the drafts that later became the constitution are extremely centralizing. this is a super presidential republic. and with the russian tradition going back to general secretaries and czars, this is going to backfire and going to create too much centralization of the executive branch and not enough balance of power of legislative and of the judiciary. do you see ukraine demonstrating that yes, how and if yes, also, what would be the solutions? >> at the heritage foundation i'm not supposed to argue about that. but i really agree with what you

just said. i think that indeed our problems have started from the constitution of 1993. it was undemocratic. it was adopted in undemocratic circumstances. and the majority of russians didn't vote for the constitution. in the public referendum that took part in december of '93, even according to official numbers, it was very narrow margin of the constitution administration when majority of voters actually on stained. and this really is a fundamental problem for the -- for russian political and social and economic system. >> what are the problems? >> the problem is that the constitution was quoted from the

french constitution, but the role of president was disbalanced and it was actually given more powers than to the french president. in french system the president is part of the executive branch. in the russian system, the president is above all three branches. so the idea of checks and balances is ruined. and during the yetsin period of time that was at least balanced by personality and had ideas about democracy -- but even with those ideas in 1996, the elections were how do you say polite and powerful. and i think that actually it was not mr. yeltsin but the leader of the communist party was

one -- i'm very much -- i very much believe in the idea that if at that time he would be allowed to win and claim his victory, being a very weak person, by himself, that would be very healthy for the political system because that would create an example of transition -- >> democratic transition of power. >> like it happened for example in poland where he was replaced. >> knowing both, i don't think he is exactly a democrat. >> as i said, it is just pretty weak. and he also has certain business groups which were begging him at the time and i think he would be bound by his obligations and he would not be able to change the system dramatically. of course there would be several steps back in certain areas but they were not so drastic as many

people believed. >> as i say in russian, history cannot suffer conditionality. we don't know what would have happened but looking at the system today, do you think it's working? do you think changes are needed? if so, what kind of changes that would better serve the russian society and russian political life. >> that one of the biggest disputes in the ranks of russia, the position about the role of constitution and about the constitutional reform, right now the majority of the opposition leaders lean towards deep and profound constitution and transitioning from parliamentary republic. and i think that we have the perfect example of four years under president medvedev, that

what happens if the country lives without a president. >> there was a president, de facto. >> it was a prime minister, he was leader of parliamentary majority so that's exactly how the parliamentary should work, no. the president was pretty weak. so i think that it is a proven example that the country would not collapse and -- >> or you could have a constitutional monarchy like some people suggest. >> that's also by the way very possible. very possible. >> would you support that? >> i actually would, yeah, because i think that according to russian tradition, we have such archtypes in our fairy tales, that the monarch, the father czar is the person who judge, not the person who rules.

and to have ultimate judge at the top who is not supposed to give any executive decision but who is supposed to be the ultimate ruler between the -- in the complex of different business and political groups, that's i think very stabilizing idea for the system. >> we have that too. it's called the supreme court. >> yes. yes. that's -- you know, we had this discussion before, i really think that the judicial system should be the main system, the real spinal cord of the political system in russia. should not be neither executive nor legislation. it should be judicial system. >> okay, so just to -- by -- >> to finish, not everybody in opposition shares these because

some of our colleagues, many -- especially new liberal type positions, they say -- >> can you give us an example? >> say like people like satar a, they say let's just restore the constitution, the constitution is good. just a little enforcement. let's just restore the constitution. >> mr. conner was a part of the circle that pushed through the yeltsin. >> that's true. and other people like, our famous -- and the opposition leader says, no, the system is good, but putin is bad. so. >> he would be better. >> yes. >> let me step in his position and you know, i will fight the corruption and the system will start to work, which i don't agree. >> you said something very interesting, that the organizing

narrative, the organizing miff of russia today is a fight against fashism of nazis in world war ii. in coalition with the west, i would stress and everybody knows even school children who will learn -- >> don't tell me that. i know. >> i'm not telling you, i'm telling our audience, c-span audience, even the kids who will learn russian history from the unified history book that is already published and has been prepared. >> has been prepared. >> so there will be one narrative of history, know that the british and french and americans and chinese fought against the nazis and the japanese imperialism in world war ii. and you have people who are part of the establishment like the political scientist who planted in new york as a representative of the institute for democracy and something else, the russian government funded operation,

says oh, but hit letter was good until 1939, until 1939 that included the nuremberg laws and partition of check slovakia. you have the grandson saying oh, the arian descended -- becoming more and more racist and nazi like and justifying even hit letter, which is inconceivable in this miff of fighting german fasism. >> what's going on with that. >> the people whom you mentioned can justify whatever they have been told -- >> who is telling them to justify that?

>> i think their instance, they want to please the chief. and they actually like when the chief says no, no, you are going too much and please relax, you know. >> this is like alexander of the old soviet propaganda saying all the time how wonderful stalin was. >> that's his position all the time. he is a very well imperialist and trying to portray stalin as the emperor even during soviet times of the even during soviet times he seen as a dissident. >> but he would not be doing that if he did not expect a pat on the back or maybe a spot on national television, maybe some adviser positions -- >> a different story because pro hanna was doing this during

soviet times and his position is firm and he's dedicate d to this idea. he never flips sides and when he was in the position he was with zu gan off and fighting in the russian white house when it was short with attacks, so -- >> in '93. >> in '93 by yeltsin, it's putin's position starts to match putin's position. it's not -- >> they don't have any position at all, you know, they have the position is the power. >> but what worries me is that sympathy even with caveats toward the third reich, is something that was inconceivable in russia until maybe three or four years ago. only people like alexander dugan, another kremlin ideaologist particular lating the idea of a russian empire

where in the 1980s, members of secret pro nazi societies and secret orders that had ss background, are you concerned that the sympathy towards naziism is penetrating from the very margins of the russian political life or russian march where people were raising their arms in nazi salute to establish figures. >> let me explain here. i really do believe and i'm very much concerned about the fascist threat in russia. and that was seen as a trend for a pretty long period of time. and even without all of those public speeches. just by talking to your

constituency, back in rural areas of russia, you would see that this national dignity which has been o pressed during 20 years, plus the government associated with the west and particular with the actions of united states in building democracy in russia and privatization or whatever -- >> is it a perception through propaganda or do you think this was mistakes were made? >> mistakes that were made. because the way it was carried out -- >> privatization. >> is actually programmed that there is no small business in the country. and that those oligarchs exist and the position of real entrepreneurs there is uprest and high technology sector and very well developed natural

resources secretary -- et cetera also, that all went from the democratization and pristization was carried out with the political regiment. that was admitted many times by his friends that mostly live in boston. >> but the political intention was as they said at the time, and i was part of those debates, to break the back of the communist establishment and move on to a whole new elite. if you can compare -- >> you know, with good intentions you go to hell. >> it's in america. >> i'm saying that -- >> very good. >> but coming back to the issues of fashism. if you look at those guerilla fighters active in the eastern parts of ukraine. >> pro-russian. >> pro-russian which are being

seen as a military arm of putin's administration, if you just come at their pages on social networks, you will see groups they are part of. russian without putin, russian 2.0. they all are opposition groups. >> they are nationalists but they are against putin. >> you also had people from the russian national unity. >> yes but he is against putin. >> is he? >> dugan was always oppositioned to putin. >> now he's not. >> now he's not not that's not because they have changed their position, it's because putin has changed his position. putin started to match expectations of those guys. that's the problem. they don't want putin at the top of the government. they want -- >> he was already getting up there. probably one last question before we open for discussion,

you had a fascinating presentation, i'm sure there are a lot of questions here and there's also cameras and people can send questions for the internet. if there is a political change there's always a political change -- >> when there is a political change, a lot of people think that in this town, some of them russian democratic immigrants think that, oh, he'll just be a beautiful liberal democracy in russia and you know, all the evil will be punished and they will be in charge. i'll tell you the name of the person i'm quoting after this. and they are saying, up next year, next we're we're going to have a change. in your estimate, if there is --

when there is a change, it just maekz it longer -- when there is change, is it violent? is it peaceful? is it college revolution like mr. putin is afraid, something else? what are the powers that are capable of not just overthrowing the regime, we saw the tragic results in the october 1917. what are the powers that can really build russia that you wish the russia that is open to the world that attracts investment and fosters innovation and that's entrepreneurs and other people have freedom in such russia? >> i would start from the second part of your question because my russia is russia entrepreneurship. and my russia is russia of personal initiative. my russia is russia with a weak

government and very strong grass roots self-governing institutions, with a network ed community and part of the global christian civilization and do believe in like global union of former krush chef nations of russia, europe and united states -- >> jokes aside, you sound like pe pete. >> in russia, there is such a concept of third room. and initially before that, the second room is a big business on the right and third room is

moscow. i believe it should be as europe, u.s. and russia. this is this is like -- tech no logically when you were saying about how the changes might occur. the liberal idea is extremely unpopular because it's been associated with -- and with the corruption and i don't expect that in any circumstances when the changes would occur that the liberals, if it would be a fair process, would be able to come to power. but without the participation and changes, because we have revolution happening in the capital. and russian capital moscow is relatively pro liberal city.

so without the participation, the changes would not be possible because you cannot win moscow without participation of liberal -- >> but if they are in charge, the rest of the regions would not fall. and we would see more violent scenario than in ukraine. most likely we will see split in the country and -- >> geographic split. >> succession of many regions and it would be way more violent and disruptive than what happened in ukraine. it might work as the coalition between leftist and liberals. and as the coalition between nationalists and liberals. so far our liberals despite the steps that internationalism,

they are leaning more towards alliance with nations with right wing people. because they believe that nags i willists don't have solid economic agenda. and they do believe that in case of such coalition it would be something like -- as the political power and then there would be a new liberal people like -- >> as the top of the government. >> for the sake of the audience, economically liberal in russia meaning -- it's not socialist, social democrat, u.s. style left wing of democratic party, for example. that's not that kind of liberalism. >> no, it's in u.s. terms more like neoconservative. >> yeah. and of course my position and what i'm trying to achieve and

by the way, this coalition between new liberals nationalists happens in ukraine and that's why you see what's going on there. >> absolutely. >> and my position is to achieve the coalition between leftist. >> and the liberals. >> and then that isolates nationalists. >> and isolate nationalists, yeah. that's what i'm trying to do as much as i can. that's what by the way even kremlin thinks it would be safer for them if it would be a coalition with nationalists, that's why they put in jail all of the aides as member of parliament here under prosecution. and ten are either in jail already or asked for political asylum in other countries. >> what about yourself? this personal threat to you? >> i'm immune --

>> but your status -- >> they are now trying to revoke my status and there is such a law which is personally targeted on myself already. it was introduced dum ma and the day before yesterday as i was flying in the airplane, mr. miron, my former party was meeting mr. putin about the personal sanction. to put this law into force. we'll see. >> well, as i said in the beginning, you're taking tremendous political risks. we respect them and admire your stance on the a number of these issues and at this point we have 11 minutes for q and a. maybe i'll extend it a little bit. when you are asking a question, please introduce yourself and keep it to a question of keep it short so other people can also ask questions. what would like to start?

>> my question -- >> wait for the mike. and your affiliation. >> hello i am from -- interning this summer here in washington, d.c. and my question is, as we know, we know that the west did some sanctions on russia but still recently russia signed a very big oil deal with china. gas deal with china. sean certainly many political economists are saying this is kind of the challenge, the dollar and pet tro dollar in particular. do you think it can still sustain itself given it has a natural gas and oil base? do you think using this oil, having using natural gas stock pile, the dollar and sustain its

economy even with the western sanctions? >> first the initial sanctions in the 90s, we have such a saying in russia about the west and u.s. you pretend you're helping us and we pretend we're doing reforms. so you pretend that you're sanctioning us and we pretend we are free. and those are sanctions against very narrow circle of people, most of them don't care about them at all. and even taking the original sanctions that have been taken, sanctions about certain personalities and it would be at least meaningful if they would be targeted not to the very top layer of people but more to the middle layer of management, to disrupt that loyalty. and they actually -- russian

parliament even voted you know, putin wanted to tie everybody and russian parliament voted asking for the sanctions to be enforced on the members of russian parliament, but it never happened. and i actually think that the sanctions generally, they are not productive, what is productive is to enforce your own legislation against money laundering. what's happening is that people are stealing from russian federal budget and then moving these capital into -- investing them in western economies, mainly in european but in u.s. also. so to enforce that part of legislation against money laundering against corruption, that would be very helpful. and i was asking many times to

put a special prosecutor in europe and special prosecutor in u.s., maybe not exceptionally against russia but generally most soviet states, for kazic stan and russia and russia. >> it's all over the emerging markets, it's in africa and asia, not just russia or eastern europe. >> i agree, but for many emerging markets, west zbt perceive them as part of the worst in the world as in russia. so if you are trying to help us create new democracy in the country, then this type of help would be appreciated because it's not -- you know, doing harm to russian people. and from the west don't make west seem as our enemy. but vice-versa, is positioning west as our ally and life of our

prosecutors. search for those fallen. in reregards to a gas deal, you know, it was very much advertised. i think that the price that was negotiated is a good price. it matches the advice. but the issue is that they are buying gas from the eastern parts of the country, which are infrastructurally disconnected from the western siberian and central russia. so that means that you cannot redistribute the production which goes now to europe and directs that to china. it's totally a new gas -- which developed in that part of the country. that's good we're developing them with jobs and taxes, you

know, it's okay. the question is what we're supposed to do with those who are working for the western companies? and i think how we behave in ukraine, will result -- it will be a political issue for europe. to become independent from russian natural resources. during soviet union times, soviet union was an extremely reliable supplier of energy resources and we never used that as a weapon, as a political tool. right now we're doing every single year. and the result is that we will just lose the market and that is very bad and that will result in many losses for russian economy. >> thank you. >> if you want to read more on that, i have a blog in the wall street journal on this particular issue. you're welcome to google china pipeline russia china gas deal. i'm more pessimistic about it. the price may be a good price

today, taking into account dollar inflation -- >> with no other conditions, yeah. >> the chinese paid for the infrastructure. so the price is not to the -- infrastukt tour expenditure -- >> but they also are giving a long term loan to run the pipeline. >> but it's complicated and i'm not sure that because the terrain is so difficult, i'm not sure it will be a good price actually. >> yes, please. >> hi, i'm ike cruz with representative sessions. if i understood you correctly, part of the problem with the structure of the russian government is a strong personality in the place of the president being putin right now. i also believe he has a lot of support from the russian people currently. so what needs to happen for the russian people to see that either the constitution needs to be changed so that the president doesn't have that much power or

someone weaker is put in his place? >> oh, indeed president putin has a lot of populist support these days and enjoys the highest approval ratings during his all 15 years in power. but the nature of the regime is very well described by carl marx in his book about the marxist regime in front,. >> i a.m. going to make a fairly short statement here and turn it to dr. coburn and senator tester, if you'd like to make a statement as well, that would be great. i understand that senator mccain is tie the up, in are is it transportation? is he going to come in at all do you think?

do you expect him at all snl. >> fair enough. my thanks to our colleagues and witnesses for working with our staffs to enable us to put this hearing together fairly quickly. the purpose as you know this hearing is to examine the merits of s-1691 the border patrol agent reform act of 2014 introduced by senators tester and mccain. co-sponsored by high camp and ayotte. and quo make badly needed reform of the border patrol, too complicated and too difficult to manage. before we get into the bill, i want to briefly talk about what's happening currently along our borders over the past few years, we've seen a surge in unauthorized migration from central america, which is nearing record highs. and unprecedented number of people we are apprehending at the border are unaccompanied children. some as young as 10 years of age. the law appropriately require that these children be treated

differently than other migrabts and transferred to the department of health and human services and there are strict rules about their care. secretary johnson announced he is creating an inner agency task force to coordinate the care and resettling of these children. since i became chairman of this committee some 18 months ago, i visited the southern border with mexico in arizona and texas on a number of occasions and i've seen firsthand the crowded conditions of border patrol stations in the rio grande and visited mexico and guatemala and el salvador. what i've come to understand, what happens along the borders is only a symptom of the problem, not the underlying cause. we'll focus on inkreetsing enforcement and the bill we're examining today will save taxpayers money, hopefully a good deal of it and the ability

to secure and patrol our borders. this bill would add the equivalent of 1400 agents to the border. that's a lot. given the challenges we face which have only been underscored by recent events, moving this bill would seem like on its service to be a no brainer. i fully support moving forward with the bill as soon as possible. while we need to do all we can to treat symptoms, we can't stop there. it's critical we understand and address the root cause of why all of the people are willing to put life and limb at risk to get here. based on what i've seen in my trip to these countries, those root causes are lack of economic opportunity and hope and deteriorating security situations in el salvador and hon dur ras. i describe it as squeezing a balloon and bad guys go south and creating not just mischief but may hem. nearly a one year ago the senate passed by a partisan kprens

irveg immigration reform measure that addresses many of the root causes of undocumented immigration. while the bill isn't perfect, it's a significant improvement over the status quo and provides the nation with an important opportunity to fix the system and grow the nation's economy by almost $1 trillion. in order for this solution to become law, we need our colleagues in the house to act. we also need to do a better job of helping central american countries improve the prospects for their young people and those not so young by helping provide them with jobs and secure and safe and secure communities and a future so they stay and build their own countries instead of trying to get to ours. on june 19th, i'll be convening a round table of experts from across the u.s. government to multilateral banks as well as private institutions to discuss how we continue to improve the prospects of young people and not so young people and i would urge and invite all of the colleagues in this committee to

join us for this round table. dr. coburn, please. >> well, first of all, thank you mr. chairman. thanks so senator tester and senator mccain as well as senator portman. senator port marn and tester held an important hearing on this in january. i'm the one that asked for this hearing because two points i would make. one with the auo, my goal is not to take anything from our border patr patrol agents. and we have 900 or so that auo is no longer authorized for. the goal should be to adequate pay for the risk and effort that they put in. but i'm really concerned about what we're doing here in terms of setting up a system that could become governmentwide and the question i ask is both accountant as former business

manager is if in fact we need to have about $28,000 above our $29,000 above a gs-12 maxed out the way we're going to do this, why wouldn't we change the base pay? why wouldn't we just change the base pay system rather than have this overtime system? the other questions that i have associated with what we're doing is things change. and what we're doing is we're talking about putting a payment system into statute that guarantees a certain amount of overtime every pay period that's not a part of contractual obligations. this is statute. so i'm a little concerned about that as well because if in fact the border becomes more difficult, requiring greater

risk, requiring greater expertise, we're going to be somewhat limited of how we've done this. so i'm looking -- i'm looking forward to asking the questions to try to get settled in night mind. how do we compensate our border patrol agents at the level of which they had been being compensated and make sure they are secure in the future. i don't want to take 25% of anybody's pay away. that's not our intent. our intent is the to make sure it doesn't go away. the other point i would make is there are a lot of positions within the border patrol that don't have to do a write-up at the end of the day and don't have to travel back from a position assignment. and yet we're including all of those in this that we're doing that shouldn't have an auo payment. their job shouldn't require it. so the characteristics of the mix is important to me as well.

so what i want to do is get answers to critical questions today. i have a statement that's written for the record and again, my hat is off. i want to fix this. i'm not trying to stop it from get being fixed. my understanding is very limited number of people no longer have auo as a comparison of the total workforce. and i want to make sure when we fix it we fix it right. we also fix it in a way that the house is going to aseed too so we solve the problem. i appreciate senator tester's aak quiescence and pledge my support to get this solved when i get my questions answered. >> good enough. senator tester. >> thank you. i think i could answer your questions now but i think it would be better left to the expert panels to answer the questions about things changing because i think you're right, things do change. that's really why we're here

today. things have changed. senator mccain and i introduced this legislation a little over a year ago and did have a hearing back in january. since our initial introduction we've worked closely with the cbp and border patrol union and opm and others to make this bill even stronger. we've worked together. something that is fairly uncommon in the senate these days. it is co-sponsored by height camp and ayotte and companion bill is in the house sponsored by representative chaffetz and host of others, both democrats and republicans. the bill is supported by both the cbp and the border patrol union, which represents 16,500 agents in the field. it saves money. it creates more stability for border agents and their families

and increases manpower along the border so the security is increased and agents are better equipped to do jobs that are so very important to all of us. the reform of the border patrol system is long overdue. the operational from eight years ago are different from the criminal operations we see on border today. things have changed. we waited long enough. we need to move forward with this bill because it ensures stability for our border patrol agents. and makes sure that our borders are properly manned. in the end, i appreciate the opportunity to have a full committee hearing on this bill. i can tell you that as i look at this bill, it increases enforcement and saves money. and i think it makes -- allows for our borders to be as secure as they possibly can to meet the

dangers of terrorism, drugs and illegal immigration that is so common on both northern and southern borders. with that, mr. chairman, ranking member coburn, i appreciate the opportunity to hear from our witnesses and be able to ask them questions about this important issue and hopefully end up being able to get this bill out of this committee and off the floor of the senate own over to the house. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> you bet. thank you very much, senator tester. let me just take a minute to welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses and very, very brief introductions. first witness is ron bat vitello, u.s. border patrol and responsible for daily operation of border patrol and routinely assists in planning and protecting nationwide enforcement and administrative

operations. deputy chief vitello was one of the contributors to the unification of u.s. customs and border protection and creation of the department of homeland security. is that true? -- okay, good. thank you. good to see you. second witness is brandon judd. mr. judd has more than 15 years of experience as a border patrol agent. currently serves as president of the national border patrol counsel representing sagts and support staff. spent much of his career in the elle sen trow california areas and k-9 officer at one of the busiest border crossings in naco, arizona and from 2001 to 2002 was an instructor at the border patrol academy. welcome, nice to see you. next witness is mr. hamrick, the

deputy assistant commissioner of the office of internal affairs for u.s. customs and border protection and since 2012. i understand he just became our witness this morning. due to some leadership changes announced by the commissioner today. it's not much warning but thanks for joining us. we very much appreciate him accepting to serve as the witness given his extensive knowledge of the issue we're going to discuss today. joined the customs service in 1986, is that right? 1986 as a special agent and been with the office of internal affairs since 2007. thank you, again, for joining us on such short notice. final witness is adam miles, mr. miles is the director of policy and congressional affairs at the u.s. offices special council. prior to joining, he was on the staff of the house committee on oversight and government of reform and we thank you for your

service and thank all of you for your service and for your testimony today. if you want to give us your testimony and roughly five minutes that will be fine. if you go a little over, that's fine. we'll have to reign you in and we'll ask some questions. we're glad you're hear. thank you all for joining us. why don't you go first. >> thank you chairman carper and ranking member coburn and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the need for border patrol agent pay reform. this is a matter of concern to the department of homeland security and u.s. customs and u.s. border patrol. we welcome the opportunity to work with you in finding solutions at an o fordable cost. dhs and border patrol missions properly require paying personnel and properly managing their pay system. our application of overtime specifically administratively uncontrollable overtime stretches back of years but they

no longer meet the needs of a modern border patrol. the pay reform act would replace auo with a system that controls costs fairly compensates certain agents for necessary work and maximizes agent capability for critical law enforcement and border security responsibilities. if enacted would ensure that the entire border patrol workforce is scheduled to complete work and meet mission requirements while providing predictable rotations around the clock. agents would receive compensation for any work over 8 hours per day and remain eligible for other types of schedule overtime when emergencies occur or special mission sets require it. in addition to increasing patrol hour capacity by over 2.5 million hours, the act would reduce overall costs. it would eliminate fair labor standard act pay compensation for most agent assignments which

totalled $10 million in 2013. based on the cost estimates briefed by cdp, they would save 38 to 67 million annually. border patrol a business practice and leadership development requires a requirement rotating agents in and out of headquarters in the training requirement. this maintains up to date field experience in those positions. it prepares leaders as they advance. like other federal law enforcement agencies this bill compensates portable pay for those employees who cycle lieu those and back out of the field. to cost to maintain skills is considerable and scheduling overtime is emergency more cost effective in getting the number of hours to agent. cbp increases ability and continues to do so. the bill also ensures cost savings and mission capability. without relief, legislatively, effectiveness will suffer and morale is very likely to take a

downward turn. we commend the committee's commitment to modernizing the pay structure for boater patrol and for proposing legislation that would provide cbp flexibility to administer an equitable compensation mission that would meet the needs of border patrol. we look forward to meeting with congress on this endeavor. chairman carper, mr. coburn and members of the committee i look forward to answers questions. >> okay. please proceed. >> chairman carper, ranking member coburn, senator tester. on behalf of the 1600 border patrol agents who i represent i'd like to thank you for having this hearing today to discuss s-1691. i'ds especially like to thank senator tester and if senator mccain were here, rooid like to thank them. instead of reading a prepared taillight that i gave you last thursday, i'd like to speak with

you. i'm looking forward to answering more your questions than giving you a prepared state that you already have. but there are a couple of key issues that i'd like to point out. the first issue is we are no longer dealing with mom and pop smuggling organizations on the border. we are dealing with sophisticated criminal cartels. they control all traffic that is happening that comes into the united states and that goes into mexico. they also control the illegal activity that happens on the northern border and on the coastal border. approximately, a years ago, all boater patrol agents were notified that their hours for a two-week pay period would be cut from 100-plus to down to approximately 95. since that time, we've seen almost immediate increase of smuggling across the border. in fact, on the map up here, not only are we seeing an increase in the rgv sector, we know about

that tidal wave that's currently happening. but we've seen an increase in important corridors like el paso, texas, san diego, california, these were considered operationally controlled area. they have continues in the last year since we've cut the hours by 15%. we've also seen, senator tester, in your neck of the woods in montana, we've seen arrests since these hours were cut by nearly 15%. that's a huge increase. we've also seen an increase on the coastal border in miami, florida. we've seen an increase by almost 30% on the coastal border. these cartels know what we do. how we do it. and when we do it. they know when we're vulnerable, and right now, due to the hours that are cut, we are vulnerable.

15% in montana, the second thing i'd like to address is the retention. in senator mccain's neck of the woods, the busiest sector in the nation, i believe, it currently seizes more drugs than any border patrol station in the nation. we've seen a 5% -- we've seen 5% of the workforce leave in the last year. due to the number of hours that have been cut. and the pay reduction that we're experiencing. we also have another 15% at this station alone who have pending applications in for other agencies. we can't afford to lose 20% of a station, especially a station that's so important to the tucson sector. but that's what's happening under the economic climate. the last point i would like to make and i'd like to read the

last statement. four years ago when i came into the border -- i'm sorry, back in 1997, when i came into border patrol, the recruitment that i was offered was 25% administrative uncontrolled overtime for the rest of my career. that's what we were told we were going to get. that's now been cut, we no longer have that. and there's two reasons, budgetary issues and legal issues. we approached congress four years ago, and we tried to get the powers that be to amend the aou laws to allow us to continue to do what we need to do to control the border. unfortunately, because it's an expensive system, we couldn't get any traction. because of that, we have worked diligently with the agency to come up with a plan that will satisfy all parties, it will satisfy the taxpayers in a huge cost savings. it will satisfy the agency, as it will give the number of hours that are needed on the border to

secure the border. and it will satisfy the border patrol agents, as we will have a consistent and constant paycheck that we will know what it is year to year. i want to make it clear that no border patrol agent is happy about the prospect of losing $6400 per year. we recently made another push to keep fsla, but we were again unsuccessful. we're sacrificing a lot, but in the end, it will provide to be a boon for border security, the american public and the agency and agents whom i represent. it's very, very rare that congress has an opportunity to consider a piece of lechgs that saves money and enhances the agency's capability. and that's exactly what this does. i look forward to answering your questions. thank you. >> thank you for your testimony. mr. hammond. >> chairman carper, ranking member coburn, senator tester, it's a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the

ongoing review of customs and border protections overtime compensation systems specifically those used bill the border patrol. proper paying our border security personnel and appropriately managing our pay systems are essential to the cbp mission. cbp's application of overtime, specifically, auo, the primary compensation system used by the border patrol stretches back many years. established more than 40 years ago, auo is the payment mechanism that allows for the compensation of certain employees for irregular, unscheduled but necessary overtime. approximately 77% of auo paid at dhs goes to employees of cbp, including more than 20,000 border patrol agents. in order to be eligible for auo, an employee must number a position in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively and which requires substantial amounts of

irregular or occasional overtime work. cbp takes seriously its responsibility to ensure the use of taxpayer funds. while many front line officers and agents across the department require work hour flexibility, often through the use of auo, misuse of these funds is not tolerated. allegations of misconduct that are raised by employee, typically provided to and handled by component internal affairs offices and/or the dhs office of inspector general, in conjunction with the component's human resources office. if merited, employees found to engage in misconduct are subject to disciplinary action. cbp's office of internal affairs conducted a series of investigati investigative inquiries. internal affairs field office in washington, d.c., houston, texas, san diego, california, and seattle washington,

conducted auo-related investigations at specific border patrol sector headquarters, stations, training entities and the cbp's commissioner situation room. although the office of special counsel received complaints that compensated hours were not being worked allegations if proven could constitute criminal or administrative violations, our investigation did is not start any that employees received compensation for hours not worked. they did in fact explore aspects to question more auo was the appropriate mechanism for specific overtime compensation. in short, the investigations determined that work was conducted. and importantly, even where auo was not the proper overtime mechanism, cbp had an obligation, and cbp employees

had an entitlement to be appropriately compensated for the overtime hours worked. dhs and cbp have taken steps to address the situation. on january 27th, secretary johnson issued a memorandum directing component leadership to take immediate action to suspend auo for certain categories of employees on an interim basis. as a result, approximately 600 cbp headquarters personnel, full-time trainers and employees found to have misused auo in completed investigations were suspended from receiving auo. after additional review, on may 23, dispute connect mallorcas issued a memo developing a comprehensive agency plan within 30 days to address auo compliance issues. the components will also work with the dhs management directive in developing a department wide directive in formalizes these efforts and new

reforms.directive will include audits of independent audits of auo records and disciplinary records for those who violate policies in the future. including supervisors and managers who permit employees to misuse auo. until such time as the cbp can address all of the auo compliance issues, cbp has directed additional measures such as the comprehensive review of auo eligibility to eliminate cp's use of auo. thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. i look forward to answering your questions. >> mr. chairman, thanks again. for showing up on such short notice and testifying. the next and final witness is mr. miles, adam miles, please proceed. >> chairman carper, ranking member coburn and senator tester. thanks very much for inviting me

to testify on behalf the united states office of special counsel. i'm pleased to have the opportunity to discuss osc's cases and ongoing work to address widespread misuse of overtime payments to dhs employees. i want to acknowledge quickly dhc's team. many sitting kathryn, joanne, natia and mason gayle. together, their work with wist blowers has helped to identify and address over $37 million of annual use of overtime pay. special counsel caroline learner's april 21st communication to the president outlined longstanding terms of uncontrolled over time with auo. this an issue first addressed in 2007. the communication in october 2013 prompted significant debate on the legitimacy and legality

of to aou employees. in with discussion with the goal of rooting out waste and achieving form is at the heart of osc's mission. as stated in the letter, abuse is a violation of public trust and gross waste of government funds. it's incumbent on the government to curb abuse. and up to the administration and congress to develop an advised pay tim that ensures a pay system for employees legitimately working overtime. in particular in response to the senate subcommittee hearing in january 2014, dhs has taken steps to place better controls on auo use. this includes decertifying some of the position where is employees should not be collecting auo payments. while it's taken many years and more needs to be done, we're encouraged by the steps that dhs is now taking.

in addition as sc told senator tester in january, we're also impressed with find wages to solve the longstanding problem, including through legislative reform while osc does not have a position on the payroll act of 2013, our update today on pending cases will provide some context for the committee as it considers the legislation. in particular, i want to compare and contrast two recent reports that were prepared by oia and sort of the legal and factual framework for this discussion. these were in response to whistle-blower disclosures at an asset forfeiture office in san diego, california krargs and cbp's station in loredo, texas. the whistle-blowers in these cases and 14 others that came to osc around the country have basically the identical disclosures. border patrol agents or i.c.e.

enforcement officers claimed two hours each day but the extra two hours of overtime work are unlawful because they don't meet the requirements by auo. it substantiated the core las vegases. the reports confirm that the agents basically extend their shift by two hours routinely and that's in violation of auo rules that provide irregular or uncompelling reasons to stay on duty. in addition to the across-the-board auo misuse there are key differences that i think are worth going through. these are based on the duties of the agents. i want to start with addressing the border patrol agents in laredo, texas. the report noted that the agents completed auo in order to complete the post shift work necessary to travel back and forth to the station. they call it routine post-shift

activities. the agents interviewed by aia indicated that the post shift simply cannot be completed in eight hours. border patrol insisted that employs ten-hour shifts is the most cost effective for the border even if that means misusing auo as it's currently used. as congress considers legislative proposals to address aou misuse, it may want to consider arguments in support of a ten-hour shift and demands in areas like laredo, texas. the report on san diego, california, at a similar report addressing auo use at a training facility in georgia present different issues. they understand how broadly. for example, the report states that border patrol agents in san diego work as paralegals. the border patrol agents assigned to paralegal duties work a scheduled ten-hour shift and claim two hours of auo daily

just like agents in the field. the report notes that border patrol agents in the parallel section have the same duties as nonborder patrol in the section who are referred to as civilians. for example, border patrol agents they send out notices on seized property. and they draw up correspondence and do other tasks in support of law enforcement efforts, but they're basically in an office setting. the nonborder patrol agents with the same duties are not eligible for auo. and do not work ten-hour shifts, yet, they sit side by side with the border patrol agents who are working the ten-hour shift. so again, as congress considered pay reform it may want to consider whether and to what extent pay reform should cover border patrol agents assigned to paralegal or other nonoffice roles where others have the same duties but not eligible for auo. and the same issue is present for instructors at the glennco

training academy. i hope this information is useful to the committee's regulations. and would be pleased to answer your questions. thanks so much for having me. >> thank you for your testimony. thanks to all of you. i have a couple of -- maybe not even here on this committee, somebody might be stumbling into the room, but to actually understand what is the problem we're trying fix. all right. and don't use acronyms, just use regular language. and just explain, what are we trying to fix here? what is the problem we're trying to fix? >> we're trying to get ourselves

in a situation where border patrol agents are sufficiently ready and capable and authorized, in whatever format, to engage in post shift activities. and so, all agents are scheduled for eight hours a day. and if you are were on, and your boss came in at the end of the shift and said i need to you stay, someone is not coming for the next shift. they could ask you to stay for subsequent hours. in most factory settings that would be considered overtime. the doughnut isn't different in the sense that it requires people to stay on their shift or to do things at the end of their shift. but prepare the rest of team to do -- to be better informed as they deploy. so there needs to be an overlap in exchange for information so the government calls that over time. in the current configuration that's controllable overtime.

the statute allows for individual individuals -- [ standby ] >> the hearing on u.s. border security with senate homeland security and government affairs committee, experiencing some technical difficulties with that signal. we're working to correct it. and hope to continue our live coverage shortly here on c-span3.

[ standby ] [ stand by ]

[ stand by ] we're continuing to experience technical problems with the hearing by the senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee. they're looking into u.s. border security today. and focusing as well on pay structures for officers. we're continuing to record this hearing, and we'll hope to bring it to you later in our program schedule. later today today, here on c-span3, join us for a rare congressional hearing taking

place in the evening. the house veterans' affairs committee will discuss veterans' access to health care and reported mention of waiting lists. it get it's under way at 7:30 p.m. eastern time here on c-span3. you can join the observation about the v.a. on facebook and on twitter using the #cspanchat. coming up wednesday, defense secretary chuck hagel headed to capitol hill to testify for the bitter on the sergeant bowe bergdahl prison exchange. also, general counsel steven preston. the house services committees holding that hearing which they're titling the may 21st, 2014 transfer of five guantanamo bay detainees. that's coming up wednesday here on c-span3. we live coverage of the house and the senate on c-span 2, here on c-span3, we

complement that by showing you the most recent public affairs events. and then on saturday, american history tv, the programs that show our nation's stories. the civil war's 150th anniversary visiting battlefields. >> american artifacts touring museums and sites to discover what america feels about the past. history bookshelf with the best known history writers. the presidency looking at the legacy of our commanders in chief. lectures in history with top college professors delving into the past. and reel america featuring educational films from the 1930s through the '70s. watch us in hd, like us on facebook. and follow us on twitter. the former u.s. ambassador to nato, kurt volker says he doesn't have much faith on

ongoing negotiations to get iran to give up in its nuclear program. mr. volcker participated in a day-long atlantic council in washington, d.c. other topics discussed in the panel include russia's recent behavior in ukraine. and the threat difference of the u.s. versus europe. this is just over an hour and ten minutes. okay. if i could get everyone's attention, please. we're going to begin the next section of our discussion today on transatlantic missile defense architecture. my name is john rude, i currently serve as vice president of the united states

development at the ratheon company sponsoring this event. previously, i served in government as acting undersecretary in arms control committee which allen was kind enough to mention. as i look around the room, ian and barry, i've had the pleasure of serving with them in pentagon roles, it's a bit of a gathering of the old faithful, this time, not going quite as many miles, pat, as our trips. just coming downtown for this session. but we are very fortunate to have a great panel to discuss this topic with me. i'll introduce them in just a moment. what i thought i'd do is offer a couple of remarks to frame the panel. introduce these panelists and ask them to make their remarks. the events in crimea have really reminded a lot of us and focused attention on the security challenges facing nato. indeed, i may say, if nato

didn't exist today, i think we would be talking right now about inventing it to deal with this kind of challenge. and so it reminds us why we have this important alliance. why transatlantic security cooperation is so important to us. and occasionally, some of our -- the critics have decided if pointing to some of the short comings or challenges facing nato. but i really do think that current events have reminded us why this is so important. in fact, the alliance has been fairly adaptable over the years. one of the areas that i think it's been particularly adapt only is missile defense. when we look at the last decade of progress at nato and step back, it's really remarkable to me how much of an alliance that move this is incremental steps has persistently moved in incremental steps down the path on missile defense. a lot of the folks to my right have had a great deal to do with that as well as a number of

people in the audience. much of the progress at transatlantic missile defense at nato, of course, has been driven by heads of state government, summits and the summits that provide for government to go ahead and make enough progress in the intervening period. as i mentioned, nato has moved incrementally. and when i look back at some of the summit statements, for example, i worked on the negotiations for the 2008 buci r bucherist and options for a comprehensive missile defense structure for all territory and populations not otherwise covered by the united states system. end quote. the 2012 chicago summit declaration included language on achievement of an interim bmd capabilities and that continued to the next decade, really a key

achievement and really a turning point for the key debate about missile defense within nato. it was an achievement as it represents the culmination of many years of incremental but steady progress towards the alliance embracing missile defense as a key keeping ability area for the protection of all nato militaries, populations and forces against ballistic missile attack. the work that has already been done by nato on at latmb program, and the acts program or air command and control system along with u.s. contribution to nato of the face adaptive approach provides very good foundation for continued progress. as admiral winafield mentioned, u.s. defense is being deployed. of course, ground breaking in romania for a piaa site there. one is planned in poland.

other missile defense sensors have been deployed in turkey, on danish soil in greenland. and in the uk. of course to our right is a nice picture of the ratheon patriot system employed in germany, greece, netherlands. and i'm looking forward to the 2014 nato summit in wales and beyond. i hope we hear from today's panelists about innovative ideas on how nato will continue to progress. in addition, missile defense as a key area in the 2012 summit, at the chicago summit nato also embraced concepts like smartphones. that's another area in the future we can see naturo do mor. for example, the thought whether there will be pooling assets among station 3.

whether we might see development of naval vessel that can be equipped to care such ability. certainly, we see raytheon working together. very proud to serve on the board of directors of the talus ratheon structure. and we are the prime contractor on the nato-x program and the xtmd program. and certainly part of programs to lead nato systems engineering and integration effort. so in stepping back, the alliance really has come a long way. some substantial capabilities exist. and more are in the process of being put in place in the field. we had an interesting moment in the alliance where we're refocusing on large security threats. and i'll be interested to hear what our panels have to say. let me just turn to introductions of them. of course, to my right is bob bell who is the civilian

representative of the secretary of defense in europe. and defense adviser at the u.s. mission to nato. of course, mr. bell is well-known to many in the audience as an expert in this field. before assuming his current position, he was a senior vice president at science applications international corporation, or saic. prior to joining saic, he served as the nano defense secretary from 1999 to 2003. and from 1993 to 1999, bob worked at the white house as a security council as a special director for the president on arms control. that's where i had the pleasure to first meet bob. i'll introduce all the panelists and ask them to take their turn. to bob's right and my right is alexi morrow.

previously, alexis served as special adviser for strategic and defense issues in the french foreign ministry policy planning staff. prior to that, he was adviser to strategic and political affairs to nicolas sarkozy. and adviser to the u.s. state department for bureau for south and central asia. and he was lead officer for nato and european defense within the foreign ministry's division for strategic affairs. and last but certainly not least, is kurt volker. ambassador volu ambassador volcker is executive director of the mccain institute. my alma mater and i would point

out a fine academic institution. and he's also a senior fellow for the transatlantic relations for the johns hopkins schools international studies. let me turn to bob to kick off the discussion. >> thanks, john, i'm happy to go first. as you might expect, when you get an invitation from a prestigious institution like the atlantic council, you put a lot of work into preparing your remarks. and as often the case, you get an e-mail from the conference organizer, in this case, my friend, ian, saying, actually, bob, what i'd like you to do is answer four questions and do it in seven minutes. so i was trained as an air force traffic controller and used to be could be fronted with emergency situations, power failures, weather, diverts. i'm going to call an audible here, ian and try to do what you've asked me to do. so i'll take it on. your first question is what are the drivers behind missile defense as it's working out of

nato on a collaborative basis. and clearly, the answer to that question is wmd proliferation. nato, specifically in an act 28 consensus basis places that in the middle east. the united states made clear after the lisbon summit when we agreed to territorial defense of all of europe, that we would be clear in naming names. and we're not shy to name iran and syria as the threat. and that's still the case today. i don't mean to receipt what the admiral said, important plus one negotiations with iran. that the range of their missiles is growing and nato's missile defense architecture remains oriented and situated with that threat in mind. and the syrian piece of this is important, too, because in the case of syria we have actually deployed now, not only three

nations forced generating patriot batteries to the turkish frontier. but put this under the nato c-2 structure that we created at chicago. with nato personnel from the communications agency, deployed to be that linkage to the command system. so we are operating nato missile defense today out of turkey under the standing defense plan into aw into epa plugs. and there have been hundreds, and the batteries actually aren't sure whether it's coming to them. that's realistic training. your second question was, had you changed this perspective? >> i really can't add to what the admiral said, except to note, nato, of course, it's not

just how a nation assesses russia, what's changing, where that's heading, what conclusions to trial. but nato works with consensus and that means 28 points to view. at nato, we have acted quickly with foreign ministers on the 1st of february, agreeing a package of 18 immediate measures in response to russia's actions in ukraine and that's illegal annexation in crimea. most of the you are familiar with the main elements of that package because you've ban reading about adaptations and flotillas going into the black sea. there's not an element, though, to that 18-part pack avenue that relates widely to missile defense. now, in parallel, we're beginning a dialogue at 28, on the strategic implications of ukraine. that needs to be informed by a

38 assessment. a revised threat assessment that's being worked at here at 28. defense ministers will take this up next week and foreign ministers later in union. my point is the time line that we've drawn, in the longer text context beyond the immediate insurance package is probably from now to the summit, at best. and we will be challenged, given different views on that question, in western europe, i think, to come to the consensus of situation. meantime, the goal stands amid the policy, that we do not orient or aim the missile defense architecture at russia. the one exception i would note,

we did take a decision at 28 to break off military to military, in working group engagement with russia under auspices of the nato-russia council. therefore, the effort we were making to engage russia as a partner on missile defense has been suspended. your third question was, what dynamics inhibit nato's missile defense cooperation? what limits our ability to run instead of just walk, if i can put it that way. and the simple answer is two things. euros and dollars but with a twist. i can just develop that. when i say that, when i say euros, i mean, as europe still struggles to get a sustained recovery from the economic recession in their cash-starved defense ministries, they're simply not that disposable euro in terms of a new program to

invest in new capabilities upon incremental adjustments or new acquisitions at the team level. and we see as of yet no critical mass to invest in upper tier capabilities. there's certainly industry that's willing and able to do it. there are military points of view that are not to be part of it and understand the benefit of being part of it. but in tellers of having the disposable euros to put against it, it hasn't happened yet. and i say dollars, i mean, the proponderance of american dollars. this is a case where because we are leading on missile defense. and let's be clear, this is not leading from behind. as secretary rasmussen said, when we decided to deploy four

aegis capable, that's doubling down in terms of investments in nato in the missile defense era. so it's precisely the fact that we're so forward on leaning on defense that we're prioritizing our defense dollars on missile defense, extending it to europe. and that we are quite clear, as you've heard the president say, secretary hagel, jim miller who will join us later today, and admiral gwenifeld again this morning. we are ironclad in the full program in phase three that provides full protection for nato-europe. in a sense that gives nato the luxury of putting their protection on euros. that's not to say that they're not investing in many areas that are important and i'll conclude on that. it does mean that they're

letting us carry the preponderance of that mission. this gets you into the terrain of the gate speech from three years ago. and how you play that tactically, to what extent do you make it easy, if you will, for allies to choose to investmeinvest elsewhere. and to what extent do you tactically try to withhold something to encourage them to do more in that mission area. in terms of mission defense, we have not made that choice. we have said, we're there for you. we've got your back, we're going to lead on missile defense. and i personally think that's the right policy. now your next question is the summit, and john will lead into this going to be a missile defense benchmark. and i think it's somewhere in the middle. it's certainly not going to be a missile defense summit like lisbon was or chicago. we are sort of between the interim capability stage and the ioc stage of missile defense so

there's not an obvious hook, if you will. but that doesn't mean missile defense is not going to be part of the summit. we certainly intend to showcase our missile defense capabilities. and we hope that some allies will use the summit as the venue to make important announcements either on national acquisitions of tmd programs or joint efforts to begin using in some directions as john suggested. including pooling of im-3s. final little what will we do to further the collaboration. i will start by noting how much we are already do. the admiral hit those points very well. the only one that he didn't mention that we will refer to the collaboration of the maritime tmd forum. where we have 11 countries right now, norway just joined who are

actually sending their ships to interoperate at sea in live fire exercises to demonstrate the commonality. between the air defense mission and the missile defense mission. because the aegis ships need protection against other threats. and allies can contribute to missile defense, even if they don't have the euros yet to upgrade to sm-3, by spending the money and time to put in place the interoperability link, so these ships can operate together, air defense flotilla, there's going to be a huge one and we're encouraging them to buy into this program. what we're missing and my view is more allied contributions to nato missile defense, specifically in terms of upper level capability.

either sea or land-based. allies are contributing with post nation support for ships and radars. aegis ashore. they're buying tmd, we're be looking at major programs coming from poland, turkey just to name three. you have the italian interastro mission. recently, allies that are looking beyond their initial patriot capabilities. so the allies are in this game. but part of the game they're not in is the upper tier. in part, that's because we've viewed nato missile defense since lisbon as sort of a voluntary domain where countries self-initiate a desire to come into it. in a sense, everything we do with nato is voluntary in terms of capabilities. we don't have standing armies and navies, in form of awax.

i would hope that secretaries of state that we would see more allies contributions particularly in the upper tier for three quick reasons then i'll conclude. the first is to make the system more robust. more resill yentz. yes, the united states can and will fully protect europe. but as the admiral said, at the end of the day, it's a mathematical equation. the number of interceptors versus the number coming in. and even if you have full geographic coverage defense and depth with allied cricks would make the system more resilient. second, the more the allies are able to contribute in this field, the more you could simultaneously deploy to all corners of the nato-europe area in a generalized crisis and not be quite as dependent on reading your indications and warning and threat assessment to try to decide to optimize one sector.

obviously, the more resources you have the broader you can hedge in terms where where one might be wanting to shoot. and lastly, picking up the themes of secretary gate's speech, missile defense gets allies an important seat at the table. and it ensures the american government and congress and public as well that europe is all in. and this game is fun. >> thank you, bob. thanks for the remarks. i want to return to alexi. alexi, please proceed. >> thank you. thank you very much for opportunity to bring european perspective to this debate, and i will do so both as a representative of industry and as a former french official having dealt with those matters including with my distinguished colleagues on the left and on the right. here.

so just a few words about where we come from as a company on those issues. because we are rather in a ewe week position compared to other players in the sector. we can both -- obviously a a competitor, to the u.s. industry in the field of complex weapons. and even as competitors, we discovered that the method is -- can change deeply. and we discovered last year, that there can be changed competitors now in this area. and this, i think, comes as a shock this early to us. but to our u.s. co-competitors. but more importantly, that's what i want to stress today. we're also a partner, and in particular partner to ratheon through the joint venture that john mentioned, earlier, the

talus ratheon system which has been a success for more than ten years in raid dmars large and systemic command and control systems like nato's about, which we are providing together with ratheon. so as a company, we're committed to, first, obviously fulfilling nato's project to integrate into an unique c-3 architecture and air missile defense. and this is what we've been doing for more than a decade. adding functionalities, connections and layers. and more importantly, as companies contract after contracting. and lately, to address the tmd integration into the system. we're also committed to europe 19 national programs, i think

it's important to understand that on a wide range of systems from national command control early warning capability, relevant to miss defense assertion-based, space-based. and also very low-range radars. and last but not least, weapons systems, which bob already mentioned, the french with the astro-30 system. so it will not come as a surprise to you, as a company, we're one of the big believers of nato's air defense, missile defense, as the cornerstone of european. and the security. and we consider ourselves as one of the players in making the air and missile defense enterprise in nato more of a joint effort in the context where there is, as bob mentioned, an

overwhelming u.s. need, if only in terms of continuous funding into missile defense enterprise for now, almost two decades. now, when it comes to where missile defense efforts stand at nato, what is very striking is that against the backdrop of russian aggression and the annexation of crimea, and the acute sense of vulnerability of our eastern european allies, there's a rush to rediscover the collective and territorial defense. a sort of revival of article 5 in the search of more reassurance against threats by russia. and so my first remark would be that while nato may have lost

some focus on heavy armored divisions or dropped some critical programs or reduced like the ags, on the missile aerated defense, nato has done a good job over the last decade in providing a multilayer dual air and missile 38 approach. to address a continuum of threats. and so this is an existing tool that is directly relevant to 5. that said, russia's behavior poses a host of fresh questions on the issue, and i think we should confront them candidly. first, business as usual with russia is out of the question. and particularly, as far as missile defense is concerned.

from a european perspective, missile defense has always been framed as in a cooperative scheme with russia. that's, for instance, a contiguous french -- i could also say german position. that the deployment of missile defense upsets the offense/defense relation with russia and should not affect strategic deterrents which remains first and foremost nuclear. what is going to happen with this. for one, it never quite materialized. and neither nato/russia d dialogue, or any results as far as cooperation is concerned and

meaningful. and the russian vision back in 2010, as the lisbon summit already was a testimony as to the fundamental desire of the russians to upset european architecture. and i think european allies and the u.s. must realize that business as usual, in terms of cooperation will not be possible beyond the suspensions that bob mentioned. i'll add to this that russia is now purely more part of the problem than the solution as far as missile strikes is concerned. for instance, the practice of deployi ining 26 on the borders leningrad. not to mention the enduring questions of the ms compliance of systems, all that is not new. but in the context of the crisis

in ukraine in crimea, this obviously sends jitters into the eastern europe regions. now, let's face it, whether collective response of nato will include a component of missile defense, whether missile defense will be front and center in nato's collective response right up to the wales summit, frankly, i don't think so. i think it remains doubtful. one, because when -- as far as russia's concerned, again, strategic deterrents. and nuclear deterrents, in particular, is -- will remain the cornerstone of the relation to russia. and on this, with others, i must say i'm quite happy that we fought the battle of

strengthening deterrents by keeping nuclear deterrents central in the strategy both in the discussions three years ago, but also in nato's defense posture. the workforce at that time was to push for the lessening of nuclear deterrents, i think was a good decision, by nato heads of state to keep deterrents central in nato's strategy. second issue, after more than a decade of proclaiming that nato's missile defense was not directed at russia, is would definitely be foolish in proclaiming the country. and i think the admiral's comments were pretty clear from that standpoint. and thirdly, in order to effectively confront russia's destabilizing behavior, there are other more urgent priorities

in nato strategy, as far as cyberdefense is concerned which is an increasing worrying trend. or conventional systems like isr systems. or strengthening other aspects. that said, the continuum of air and missile defense that nato's been working on is -- continues to make sense in the context of that crisis. and the task of strengthening the defense of nato's northern and southern flanks will and probably shall include some measures of strengthening missile defense. by the way, i'd like, as far as european security is concerned to point a to tricky situation which is that neither finland nor sweden which are faced directly with the 38 from

russia's behavior are members are nato. and there's some creative thinking here, including missile defense funds to do with those countries who are important partners to nato. critical actors in security that are not members of nato per se. although russia is at the center of nato preoccupations, we should not get too much carried away by russia when we look at missile defense scenario. one, because if geographic terms, the threat comes from the middle east. in the shadow of crimea, arsenals in the middle east are still growing, and i'm thinking particularly of iran. and here, the important not not to limit the security of nato to the threat -- to threats that

would come from but really focus on what is happening in the middle east. second, another domain, cruise missiles should also be mentioned as a continuous and very real threat. and thirdly, sea lines of communication should also be addressed by nato because it poses a very real threat. against the military and civilian ships. turning finally, and it will be my last point as to what nato should do. well, again, from a political/military standpoint, transatlantic corporation should not be limited through the nato area. it should definitely tackle the

issue of threats coming from the middle east in particularly from iran. and nato should carry on with the concept of integrated air missile defense which will be tough in the budget situation that they are facing to continue a single shared situation of awareness for all air and missile threats that nato might be facing. a joint collaborative planning. and engagement capabilities across all layers. thirdly, nato and here i would strongly agree with bob needs to take a fresh look at the implementation. and particularly, the question of national crickontributions. obviously, epa has been central to making nuclear defense operational. france has committed its early warning capability to nato. but there is much more to do to

materialize a multisensor approach. a network, existing european assets which in fact are considerable when it comes to sensors and also maritime sensors. the difficulty here is the quid pro quo for countries. there might be incentives to plug in, to connect into assets together, the problem is what you get out of the c-3. and so, there is little incentives for countries having major assets to connect into the nato system if in the end, they don't get the total picture in return. here for the sake of operation, it's very clear it's not going

into a outbox in terms of situational awareness. and this remains a risk as long as europeans with nato not commit to real shared c-3 addressing air and missile threat. finally, regarding weapons systems, there are ongoing competitions. and i will not address them individually. here. but we've -- in programs, up for decision in countries like poland, like turkey, like germany, or even developments into maritime wmd in countries like the uk, there is a scope for more of the user's approach in the lower layers of air missile defense. where in fact there is considerable scope to retrieve and to it strengthen consisting

cooperative schemes from europe both from a political military standpoint. but also from a program and industrial standpoint. i'll stop here and look forward to discussion. >> thank you. thank you, alexis. you gave us a lot to work with in the question and answer period. our next panelist is ambassador kurt volker. >> i see we all got the memo from four questions. but only three of us got the memo about the red shirt and blue tie. we'll have to work on the atlantic council communications here. just a comment before diving into air missile defense. a little less than six years ago i was u.s. ambassador to nato. and we suspended the nato-russia council, after resets and everything else, russia gets

ukraine. and we need a fundamental issue here and that's a fundamental point if you look at the summit, we need to be much more ambitious, much more frank, much more open-eyed about what we need to be doing as an alliance. i don't think nato's there yet. despite what bob is doing, i don't think the alliance is there yet. that's a comment. now on missile defense, it's the classic thing of everything having been said, but not everyone having said it. i will try to restrain my position to a couple of key points that come out of some what we've already heard. this may be the most important thing, missile defense is about missile defense. every time this issue comes up there is a tendency to attach other baggage to it.

whether it's the u.s. relationship with central europe. or whether it's russia's efforts to divide the alliance. or whether it's efforts to reassure russia or accommodate russia. it's always attached to this conversation. and i think any of us who actually are interested in the issue need to vigorously argue against this and say, no, it's about missile defense. when the u.s. administration decided to reverse the bush administration's approach of long-range missile in the czech republic, first of all, the bush administration didn't want to put those in form to the czech republic as some bilateral gift. it was about missile defense. the czechs and poles didn't want them because of missile defense. they wanted them because of the relationship with the u.s. . and when the u.s. pulled that

out they weren't mad at us because losing missile defense, they were mad at us because they weren't part of that. all of this is baggage to be put aside. and so the second point, and this comes a lot in the media today, it doesn't make any sense to reverse course with the epa back to this approach with this because russia has the ukraine. as bob said, it's made good incremental progress. let's do that. there's a separate conversation that we should have with nato and a separate set of strategic thinking. what do we need to do to deal with the missile that we've got. that's designed to deal with the actual russia problem we've got. on that, just in terms of a

response of russia and ukraine. i think nato's done an excellent job in the reassurance to us, the united states, poland, it's done everything to reinforce that. the flip side of that is simple. which is i don't think nato's effort to project power and influence in the eastern part of europe to stabilize russia's aggression has been very impressive. i think that russia feels that it's got still a pretty free hand. and so i think that ought to be another topic as well. not only article 5 which needs to be there. but also projection of power and influence in the eastern part of europe. and where does that take you with nato enlargement and europe. where does that belong in that conversation? so that's the second part, don't change missile defense because of the invasion. deal with the invasion. the third part is, united states

and europe have fundamentally different perspectives on missile defense. we bridge these well. we try to bridge these well. but in terms of the threat perception, europeans don't share the same threat perception. in terms of short-range versus long range, europeans aren't interested in intracontinental. and then in terms of money it is much lower in the european money to spend compared to ours and this has ripple effects if you think about the congress here why would we be paying to provide missile defense for europeans when europeans aren't going to be paying for europe. that gets to the same to-do list that alexi mentioned. show what should we do? i think we will continue to see proliferation of wmd.

i don't have much faith in the land negotiations. that has ripple effects beyond land. i think we'll see a ripple effect of technology so we're going to face growing risks both locally in europe and intercontinentally over time. i think this needs to be an issue for nato. discussing control, spending money that we have perennially, but we've got to keep at it. we've got to keep chipping away at it. secondly, if i were the united states, i'd forge ahead ton intercontinental missile defense. i wouldn't link it to nato. i wouldn't count on nato. probably, if we tried to do that, we would get bogged down, and if it causes a little friction with our european allies that we're not sharing as alexis just mentioned, well, climb on board that because it ought to be, again,

demand-driven by what the risks are and how we proceed. i think we also go ahead with that. and then finally, i think the only way we're going to incentivize europe is for their own sense of threat perceptions to change. and i think a sense that perhaps the u.s. is moving ahead and that we're funding ourselves and that we're go to be closed in a world of growing wmd and missile proliferation might be the only thing that would cause that. then i think as the united states and as an alliance, we should be as open as possible on how to integrate. i take that that point of sharing but it's got to be on the basis of europe being in. so i will stop there. >> thank you, kurt, thank you for the excellent remarks. before turn to get audience for some questions, let me exercise the moderator's privilege and ask a couple