demand-driven by what the risks are and how we proceed. i think we also go ahead with that. and then finally, i think the only way we're going to incentivize europe is for their own sense of threat perceptions to change. and i think a sense that perhaps the u.s. is moving ahead and that we're funding ourselves and that we're go to be closed in a world of growing wmd and missile proliferation might be the only thing that would cause that. then i think as the united states and as an alliance, we should be as open as possible on how to integrate. i take that that point of sharing but it's got to be on the basis of europe being in. so i will stop there. >> thank you, kurt, thank you for the excellent remarks. before turn to get audience for some questions, let me exercise the moderator's privilege and ask a couple for a fire-starter

for the discussion. everyone was positive in general about the progress made at nato. and some of the challenges we face externally. but, of course, some of the challenges internal to the alliance were not discussed as much. and i thought, perhaps, bob can put you on the spot a bit and talk about one of those which is in turkey, was a surprise that the turkish government decided to open negotiations with a chinese firm to provide missile capabilities. could you comment on where you see that going, what's the latest status is and the u.s. government perspective is on that. >> well, the u.s. government perspective is quite clear and that is our good allies, the turks, should acquire a system that's nato and operable. if that were true before ukraine, i think it's true in

space given the ukraine. so here's a case where the turkish government had a set of metrics to influence a cooperation, a competition. and somehow nato operatability wasn't on that list. and i have a feeling that even the capability of the system, as between its air defense ability and its missile defense ability, wasn't a driver. the real drivers had to do with coproduction and technology transfer. but in the wake of what's been a very robust dialogue, and i think some morning avenue realization that perhaps the chinese offer wasn't as rich as they might have thought in terms coproduction or technology transfer, there's clearly a reassessment going on with the tender period extended. we certainly hope that this

comes to a conclusion soon. and that the summit would be a good forcing mechanism for a welcome announcement out of anchor on this subject. and very briefly, alexis, kurt volker talked about the different perspective in europe on missile defense. and you spoke of the entire for european nations to contribute more to defense. how do you see it bridging that as kurt talked about it and the obvious point you were making for the obvious desire for burden sharing? >> yeah, well, i mean, one needs to sort out what the differences are, and they are not necessarily in the same place for all europeans. coming from a country with a nuclear deterrence, the issue of military defense is looked at it

from the perspective of its potential impact on nuclear capabilities. and here, the perception is that missile defense is -- is only a complement, deterrence in dispose of a situation of crisis. and this brings, obviously, a considerable defense, because we can't see missile defense as only missile defense, as kurt was saying. missile defense is intertwined in any deterrence relation. and the decision and the perception is that the deterrence to which strategic action will remain first and foremost, when it comes to real major players. so that's the first difference. the second difference is that, as kurt was saying, the europeans are simply not willing

to commit any significant resources because it's paid for by the united states. and let's be frank on this. and i would just agree with bob's perspective here, i think it has a negative impact on the europeans spending. and that's one of the long effects of missile defense in europe. if politically, it provides a rationale for european leaders to say, well -- i mean, to take a second dividend at the extent of the u.s. taxpayers, then that's not -- that's not a good thing. and so, the russia asking more from those europeans who are not spending enough. it's a critical thing and it should be framed as, okay. and those nations who want to be part of the club have to contribute real assets.

here, the willingness of certain countries like poland, to deal with their theater missile defense activity through defense system is a very positive development. but you don't see many countries taking that way. maybe the situation with russia will change things and precisely help to bridge the gap by creating a sense of strategic threats in europe. thank you. >> one last question before we turn to the audience for ambassador volker. you talked about the need for a different approach to russia given, if you will, a cyclical change of events here in crimea. how does defense play into that? alexi talked about how for better part of a decade nato has

pursued cooperation. as a veteran of hundreds of hours of discussion on that topic, i can tell you alexi is right. and we aunable to achieve our level. and certainly, a very keep understanding of why, frankly, privately, i thought it was very unlikely we would ever see that kind of cooperation with russia as a result. but what then should the alliance do with respect to missile defense, discussion with russia, and secondly, press reports talk about possible violations. while alexi points to the obvious issue to the alliance. and the united states saying the missile defense systems are not directed at russia, have them deal with the problem of intermediate range russia missiles. >> well, i think the framework for answering that that i would give is we need to know what we want. so we've got to have a clear -- what are we trying to accomplish

in europe, with our allies for the benefit of hundreds of millions of people that live there. what's the u.s. security interest. what's the u.s. political and the based interest. got to have a proactive and positive agenda. not be driven by reacting to russian bad behavior. we do have to react to russian behavior, but that has to be in the context, what is it we're trying to achieve. i hate to make the comparisons to the cold war, but in the cold war, we kind of knew what we were doing. we were protecting europe. we were keeping the soviet union contained. we were creating a space for democracies and market economies to flourish in europe. and lay the basis for a fundamentally, healthy, democratic market secured. so we had a strategy here. we need that strategy in dealing with russia now.

it needs to be it a little bit more of firm pushback. we have to be connected to defense. russia never had an interest in cooperation with nato. its purpose in engaging with nato was to thwart nato. and so i don't see a need to restart any of those things anytime soon. i don't agree with those in nato who argue that the whole focus is dialogue. and why would you shut down the dialogue? nato's organization is about threats. and we should separate the two and say, no, we're not going have cooperative programs with russia where russia's purpose is to screw up russia's programs. i think we should shut that down, have a different way of looking at russia. then we're going to get to the missile defense systems. we're never going to be able to buy and deploy all the missile

defense systems that russia could potentially throw at europe or the united states. so let's not try to do that. i think you might want to have a little bit of missile defense in order to handle a limited, perhaps even accidental engagement. or engagement that can be joined and de-escalated again. you might want to have some limited amount of miff defense as part of your strategy in europe. but you're not going to rely on that. i think you really have to be thinking, when we talk about defense in russia, about what we've always talked about is sufficient levels of defense spending. sufficient deployable forces to get from france or italy to other parts of the alliance. sustainability while there and architecture so we're operating at a very high level of intelligence and integration systems. that's where we need to go on the defense side of nato. we've been at it since bob was assistant secretary and we still

need to go farther on that. i think that's how i would frame russia towards missile defense. >> thank you very much. at this point, let's turn to the audience for some questions. just as a reminder, when you receive the microphone, please identify yourself and state your question. yes, sir, let's start with you. >> thank you, i'm carl holman from the atlantic council. in observation in questions from both bob and kurt, russian convention military power is not particularly good. in a way they're relying more on nuclear weapons to boltle sister up their inferiority which is an interesting turn to the eisenhower years. and i mark that interception between nato and russia which may not be affordable. let me pose a question in terms of two heroic assumptions. suppose, and there's evidence to

suggest this will not happen we reach an agreement with iran, in which they will not build weapons of mass destruction. second, suppose in syria, weapons of mass destruction are eliminated so question, they will have weapons with conventional warheads. obviously, the europeans would like to spend far less. one of our particular exit strategies might be to keep the infrastructure in place so if things change we could bring back missile defense? how do you both gain? should negotiations succeed, what does that mean for missile defense in europe. >> bob, do you want to start. >> well, the word ironclad is a pretty ironclad if the secretary of defense and everyone else says our commitment through phase 3 and provide full coverage of nato-europe is

ironclad, it means it's ironclad. but it's important, as you appreciate, harlan, to appreciate that the missile defense system is not picket duty 24/7 it's not putting a shield up 24/7. it's a system based on indications, warnings and threat situation. to be sure the tippy 2 operation is operationable but the ships including immediate reassurance, cruises to the black sea in the context of the ukraine crisis. it's only if the indications and warning system of nato run by sack ewer, that triggers even a transfer authority of the nato

c-2. i can easily imagine a situation if your hypotheticals were realized and we have to hope for success in all of these efforts that we reach a nuclear weapons agreement with iran and some sort of resolution in syria. that having made this subcost investment in the two ags to shore sites which are important to the host countries, for lots of reasons. maybe even more so now in the ukraine crisis, context. but given that nato's done the hard work to define the roe and the delegated authority and the threat levels and define the picket locations the ships will go to if that transfer of authority is required, given that nato has now spent the $1 billion in common funding to upgrade the c-2 core and the bmd, we've got it. and we've got that baseline capacity, i don't want to say on

the cheap because it's a significant amount of money. but if that cost is there, why would you take it down? so my analysis is not only because this administration's been clear in its policy commitment to this, but because the whole operational underpinning of the system is sort of based on a surge in a crisis to get the end result that you would leave that in place, even if you have the two breakthroughs that you mentioned. >> next question? we have the lady in white. raise your hand. >> hi, lee hudson with inside defense. in the house fy-15 mark of the defense bill, it was ready to require the deployment of ags to shore site to poland, it would

accelerate by two years. is this a way to assess nato with the epa, could you comment on that? >> the administration's letter is addressed in the statement administration policy, s.a.p. and the administration has been clear in this, that we would see this as a diversion of money that's going to impact other important navy programs. so there's a constellation of issues here. one is that the missile that's intended to go ags to shore in poland, in phase 3 is in development. and there's already a point of view out there, resident in the gao, that the degree of conc concurrency between that development and the deployment time line is already too tight.

so to accelerate it two more years really does fly in the face of the gao position. the department of defense is clear they don't believe the gao's vision of this is reality but it really stresses that. but there's also a question of you're the cooperative arrangement with japan in developing the missile, we're not just doing it ourselves, we have a partner that has to be taken into account. and finally, there's the whole thought that ags is not the solution but literally taking the infrastructure off of an aegis ship and setting it up offshore. you want the configuration to be aligned with the fleet structure that you expect to have when aegis ashore goes to poland in

2015 to. pull it out, change that configuration so it's not in conformity with the baseline you expect to have with your sea-based assets is going to cost money -- as i understand the administration's s.a.p. letter that's going to impinge adversely on other navy programs that have to do with missile defense. so for all those three reasons, there doesn't seem to me to be a prudent step. >> go ahead, kurt. >> the point i was making in my opening remarks, the impetus to do this is pushing back on russia leaving ukraine. but this has nothing to do with russia needing ukraine. and it ought to deal with russia leaving ukraine and not moving around missile defense. >> i wanted bob to expand on his

very insightful remarks about turkey, ukraine and the mediterranean and u.s. navy and air forces. and we have a case that could perhaps express some of the theoretical points. go back to a few flash points to last year, syria and the u.s. and french threat to strike syria. alexis, perhaps you'd like to chime in on this as well, that provoked a substantial russian maritime defense, an operation in the mediterranean, at the time the u.s. forces and defense forces were prepared to attack syria. did we learn anything from that exercise that tells us about the role of nato in air defense today. and how significantly protected

are u.s. navy forces in the event of having to repeat something like this? >> those are really good questions. of course, after the events that you cited, we had the whole chapter in the story of syria that had to do with the elimination of chemical weapons. and nato's reaction and the administration's action in time was to see an opportunity to work with russia and its navy in the eastern med, to put together a joint mission under auspices of the nato-russia council to provide first. that -- that was pre-ukraine. that very much reflected the

basic assumption of the 2010 lisbon summit. that we have a mission, a key mission in nato, to try to build a strategic partnership with russia. notwithstanding sort of what the local tensions were when they deployed naval units as we are preparing for a hostile air strike. quickly, after that, we were in a mind-set that said maybe there's an opportunity here for a join mission, would be the first like that going back to when we both had troops on the ground in bosnia. in fact, we were trying to use the bosnia commander and control arrangements as a template for putting together this naval mission on the cape gray. ukraine was a game-changer. but the point i made earlier is this process by which nato x-28 tries to come to consensus about possible strategic adjustments is very far reaching. i mean, the list of questions

that you really have to address in terms of the status of the founding act. stationing the forces to the east. and what amount, with what permanency of the responsiveness of the nato response force, the question of whether you need standing defense plans or contingency plans. a few years ago, we decided we didn't need. the extent that you orient the whole nato process and the capability to target the prioritization mechanisms that may go to focus on high intensity army warfare components. these are big ticket issues, setting aside the missile defense argument. so that discussion i think is going to be far reaching and very challenging to this alliance. and very challenging to bring it to some preliminary conclusions

by the 4th of september. >> alexi, did you want to comment on that? >> yes, just to say that -- a focus on the reality which is that the threat from iranian and syrian missile alliance is not going away. and the fantasy that if a nuclear deal was reached with iran then we would no longer need to take care of that problem. that's a pure fantasy. first, the missile element is not included in the agreement. and this is, by the way, one thing that might undermine it in the mid to -- if an agreement is concluded. and this remains a very long problem for iran's neighbor and for nato. as far as russia's presence in the eastern mediterranean is concerned, i mean, this raises one thought.

is that although nato should not consider russia as a partner when it comes to missile defense cooperation, it is not in nato's interest to push the russians into forming a strong pact with the syrians. i think collectively, our security will not be better as a result of the situation. we're not there yet. but nato allies should be careful in not to anchor such, but rather, to weaken it, try to weaken it to keep russia on the sides of those who want to prevent wmd proliferation to regional potential adversities. >> the russians don't need to be pushed. they're doing it anyway. >> they're -- how to put this --

there's a record of the russians not transferring certain systems needed to iran and syria as a result of western engagement. and i think there's a balance to be struck on this. it's a sensitive and it's a very good point. but we need to be careful about that. not to -- the result is the russians transferring some cruise, missile technology, to either of those countries, would be -- would come at a cost for security. very significant cost. given how unstable syria is. given the risk of -- and this is an issue where we need to make a very different, do draw anything from what i said earlier the

shouldn't be any on the mission defense. but at the same time, the russians has global security interests which remain shared with them. again, saying this doesn't mean we should -- the russians and so on. there's a host of common interests still. >> well, with that, let me draw this portion of the agenda to a close. let me thank my friends at the atlantic council for allowing me to moderate such a distinguished panel. and thank the panelists for taking the time to give insights to the group. so please join me in thanking our panelists. more now from the atlantic council forum on missile defense. this next panel discusses the threat that north korea poses in the asia pacific. it's an hour.

i think the missile defense in asia are very real and are real sets of questions for our posturing going forward if you look at the nature of the threat and how it's evolving. and we have an excellent panel here to help us explore these issues. on my immediate left is david

gompert. he currently serves at the u.s. naval academy where he's a graduate. he's an adjunct senior fellow at rand. he's served in a number of other other important government positions. he was the deputy director of national intelligence from 2009 and for a short period was the acting director for national intelligence. as i mentioned he holds a bachelor of science degree from the u.s. naval academy and a bachelor degree from winston. dr. william cranston. he serves for c-net for the american security. he served in a number of research organizations and think tanks at senior levels to include ins. and he's also good with the u.s.

institute of peace. in government, dr. cronin served at the u.s. agency for international development. he was the number three ranking official there. and he also played a very important role in the establishment and design of the challenge corporation. he's also been a professor and taught at a number of universities including georgetown and johns hopkins. he read international relations at st. anthony's college at oxford. i got to get this straight. when you go to oxford, you read for things, don't just study things. and he is a graduate from the university of florida. as i mentioned, this, i think, is a very important panel including a number of important panels and sessions throughout the day. but at my institute, we do a lot of work on the security challenges on asia. so far as the eye can see,

particularly in china, these types of offensive systems are really the back bones and pillars of these militaries even though that china while the modernization is full spectrum in a lot of areas, really it's interesting to seat fundamental changing and how they plan for their own possible contingencies in the asia pacific. so very much looking forward to the comments of our panelists and the discussions that will follow with the audience here. david, why don't you kick us off. >> thank you, let me suggest a very simple model, even simplistic model for thinking about missile defense in east asia. and it's simply to observe that we've got a big threat and a small threat. and we've bought some combination of deterrents, based on missile defense to would with. and the interesting thing about

the big threat, small threat, way of looking at things, some somewhat pair doxparadoxicsal, small thread -- with the large threat, i think it's going to work and always in place and working so with the small threat, if we have doubts about deterrents and we worry a lot about that particular regime, then the defense becomes not only important but deterrent. i'm going to return to that. whereas with the big threat we have a lot more deterrents and it happens that the defense is extremely problematic. in the next 10 or 15 years we'll still have enormous technical challenges and enormous economic challenges. so let me start with the small which in a way is the most

critical. i think it's a mistake that the north koreans might reserve for some suicidal use of a nuclear weapon, some demonstrative way in the end days? okay, i don't think they would view it as suicidal but the best remaining option but this is a regime, don't forget that uses not only the possession of nuclear weapons but the dead nation of nuclear weapons as a policy instrument. and has done so more than any regime in the last ten years or so. moreover, it's a regime in the way even an organism that is conditioned to respond by striking out under duress. these are reflexes that are built into the way this regime perceived the world and would perceive its own survival. so that raises enough doubt, maybe not in deterrence theory,

but east in terms about the state of the mind of the regime when under severe pressure. to the point where i don't think we can have adequate confidence in the deterrence. so missile defense, and this is no news to the people here, i think that you have a stronger case from north korea with missile defense as you do anywhere. but the important point is, i think, if you're going have missile defense against north korea, you better make it as good as money can buy. and i'm not sure currently we're able to do that, more for alliance reasons than u.s. reasons. this is a threat potentially against three targets, south korea, japan and the united states. i worry less in the immediate sense about the icbm threat than the expansion of short or the medium range program.

but given the multiplicity on potential targets given the geography, given the geometry, this cries missile defense that we've all advocated for so long. it's land-based and sea-based interceptors. and really the only solution that's going to be adequate given this is a real potential problem of possible nuclear use in a crisis that may welcome. it's got to be trial lateral, and it really is not. i think the united states should be very impatient with its northeast asian allies about the need for adequate and therefore integrated and collateral integration. i think the japanese are moving in the right direction. and the japanese, we have our

own cooperation with the japanese involving interceptors as well as cent as well as sensors. and i think the united states ho hammer home that there is really little room for error in the adequacy of missile defense with all due respect for the korean friends i think they have a problem in the state of affairs in relying upon japanese-based systems, sensors, because there's a political problem with the two. but they also have a problem with china, that they're concerned. china is a very important country for south korea. south korea is concerned how the

countries would perceive a integrated north korean missile system. would this be also against north korea but also china? i think that's an adequate concern but it's a concern nevertheless but let me turn briefly to china, the big problem. i mean, if the russians have reason to be concerned about missile defense, so should china. the chinese have at least as much reason to worry about where defense is going to do because they basically believe in medium deterrence. i think they need to do what they need to do to make sure they have deterrence but it gets tougher for them as on missile defense capability, particularly if we cooperate with others, expand. so understand chinese nervousness about this. but on the same -- but on the other hand, i think their doubts are really unwarranted because

the united states has made it pretty clear. i think we should make it clearer, but we've made it pretty clear, that we have entered into and are comfortable with the relationship of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence with the chinese. we're not going to attempt them through any offensive or combination of offensive capabilities to deny them the capability. now just to conclude, i don't know that's going to at fight chinese but whether it satisfies the chinese or not the imperative, once again is the problem we face with nuclear weapons, or significant number of them and a significantly growing number of potential delivery systems in the possession of the last regime in the world we would want to have these weapons. so for all the ambiguities we

face in our missile defense programs and politics, i think the one that is abundantly clear, at least to me, is the requirement for the bilateral cooperation in integrated cooperation for northeast asia. >> thank you. >> patrick. >> thank you very much. i certainly subscribe to everything david said with a few nuances. i have four points. the first one is the asia pacific problem is a longstanding and enduring and pressing issue as we move forward. it's a question for the united states, listening to the president's speech at west point today. whether a leader is capable of taking preventive action and investing in the future rather than waiting for crisis management because that's really where we're heading right now. we're basically on the risk of getting behind the brackthrough of capabilities. tactical num weapons, the icbm

and also missiles that could be a game-changer in the region. deterrence as david suggested could fail. my only quibble it is small relative to china, but that's a very big issue in and of itself. i'm sure he would agree with that. so this is the first point. the second point, as we look at the allied trilateral relationship that david talked about studied first with south korea. the good news is that park geun-hye has having very vocal about the need for defense. she's pressing against her own defense establishment and also public sentiment for a number of reasons but the good news is last october, the official alliance management mechanism, both agreed on this 4-d

strategy. something like global hawk, very important to provide the intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance. the defense, the upgrade finally long overdue from patriot 2 to patriot 3 upgrades, also sea to missile is very important capability. disruption, trying to buy it for the long time, and disruption means as a focus or controlled assets. longer term dependent on the united states ally for this capability. their missing something and i'll come back to that. let me turn to japan prime minister abe has dealt with the environment from his perspective. and the perspective of his

party. he's also seeking to essentially normalize japan's defense posture and identity for japan as a normal power and the issue of self-defense is the latest in a series of moves he's making. that has included loosening up on exports and shifting to a much stronger posture of proactive contribution to peace. he appreciates the vulnerability of north korean missile and nuclear programs as most japanese have, when it flew over japan was a wake-up call. japan is extraordinarily vulnerable and remains vulnerable today. that's one reason why japan is going from four to eight aegis equipped to destroyers. they had six aegis, four were equipped. adding two more while fitting two others. and those destroyers were

deployed, as you may recall, in december of 2012, during the missile launch from three-stage rocket launched from north korea was successful, as well as in the spring to the sea of japan last year. they're increasing demand awareness, fwlobl hawk is part of that but the e-2-c. they're improving air defenses although japan may be missing in on the opportunity. they've had a whole series of f-15 series they have been upgrading. they're procuring and already have procured the state of missile 3 and pack-3s, for the 20 kilometer range. very important defense positions. but ultimately, they need a network, everybody does. the only way you can make defenses cost effective as david implied is through some

leveraging of national programs by integration. this is the only thing that works, and you can only do it, as he says, the small threat, the north korean, the finite threat of north korea. and here, japan has, because of its china focus principally, and because of its fatigue about the history questions, we could use different words on this issue. it's hampered of the ability to have an intelligence agreement with south korea. it's hampered the ability do other planning. fourth and final steps, for the regional network building. i would argue that deploying and integrating the missile ballistic system between united states and japan that is inoperable should be an overriding capability. i use that phraseology deliberately to create public sentiment. they don't want something considered to be integrated with even the united states. this is an issue coming up in

the realtime operational control issue but also as david suggested between japan and south korea. but it's interactable enough, it's basically integrated. i think we can finesse this in public and privately have our teams thread and finesse this differently. clearly our allies need missile batteries to handle a wide missile threat. thy has got three times the defense of pack defenses. we are already have guam and hawaii. this coupled with the radars in japan for china, again, david already suggested, china gets upset when there's any

improvement around the region around its periphery. sometimes, it's worth a d dialogue, or sometimes, it's purely venting. there are reasons for china to be concerned about missile defenses, again using david's nomenclature, the small threat to north korea, then you have, really, this can be sold to the chinese, and they can under the difference because i agree with david gompert, that the difference between china and the strategic level is more stable than that. steps clearly need to be taken to improve the south korea and japan relationship beyond what has now started in the past six months after since the president put his arm around president park and the president at the hague. i expect it to be at the summit

meeting next year if things don't go offtrack. but even with that, president park still faces obstacles at home. thad is defensive and that is where she's going to have to convince her national security team this is indeed the priority that she i believe thinks it is. regionally, more broadly, beyond korea, japan and the united states, we do need a much broader common operating picture. this is sort of a different subject. it's not just hm-370 and the missing aircraft but it is part of integrating a wider pacific network. but we need a wider network of making sure we have the kind of information that allows national governments and national security elite to make decisions in advance of crisis occurring to respond when they do occur. i think i'll stop there. >> thank you. thank you both. you put a lot on the table.

and certainly enough for us to generate a lot of discussion. i might just kick it off and then do it with microphones? that how this works with audience questions. maybe i'll start with a question. david, if i can paraphrase and correct me if i'm wrong, you described a smaller threat, a bigger threat in size but a bigger threat of especially deterrence and higher confidence in it. i think you're speaking almost exclusively of the nuclear route. when in fact the china missile challenge, or missile defense challenge, the bulk of it is conventional. short range and missile cruise. some examples of ballistic missiles. some charteristics of a cruise missile. does your view on this change are you saying something differently if you bring in the

conventional or how would that impact your view? >> it would reinforce my view. in the sense we feel it's difficult it's going to be even more difficult to pose the strategic against the targeted force, the thought that we're able to defend our forces and all paces throughout the western pacific against the chinese short and medium-range ballistic missile arsenal which can grow to virtually whatever size they want it to grow, it becomes even more mind-boggling. so, put, the theater problem, if you will -- i'm not saying that we shouldn't detect this ship or that air base or whatever. but the on whole, the technologies and the economics are clearly against us in the future. even more so than at the theater continental level. how would that change with new technology, if we moved to use

of drones and/or directed energy? i don't think, i think they just have too many options that they haven't pursued. they've responded their short to medium-range forces but they have options to what they have some pursuit, including putting more on submarines and and so o. nevertheless, so i'm not too concerned about the technologies that pat o'reilly and his colleagues talked about are going to really disturb the emerging deterrence relationship with china. but those technologies could be very important, vis-a-vis north korea. because again with north korea, the small problem is not necessarily going to be remain so small because as i said earlier, i learned less about the icbm than i do about the expansion of the short and

medium-range arsenals and the possibility that those are going to have weapons of mass destruction or news or otherwise. but i think for that smaller or getting a larger problem, the new technologies here with dean and jim miller and what colleagues have to say about the new technologies. i think those will be extremely important, rather than rely on hit to kill even for a growing north korean probe. i jumped around but i hope that's clear. >> and, patrick, you certainly know how to work on the japan/south korea relationship, and what we might be able to do to bridge the gaps. you talked about it being a high priority for the u.s. to try to compel or persuade cooperation. you had sort of an elegant phrasing of air-graded u.s. japan and interoperable with south korea, and if you're

interoperable enough, you're virtually integrated. in a practical sense, what are the two or three steps we should be taking to get toward that outcome of integrated, u.s./japan interoperable? what should be on the table, very concrete things to move in that direction? >> sure. and i've already kind of hinted at them. one of them is the intelligence sharing agreements. the shared that you saw in the agreement was the acronym. something that was going to happen president park which created the whole crisis which they haven't fully recovered. from the candidates i've spoken to and i've spoken to hundreds in the last year. alone in japan or korea, even when they aren't together, they agree in general for the need on

this but politically, they can't sell it, there's more risk being taken for president park. you cannot spend enough political captain on a limb for this with other priorities. we need to get over that hurdle. the next missile launch, the next provocation and make it happen. that, in terms of covering much wi wider, it's great that the pack-3s are being included. and we could for japan, i think that would be huge if you could cooperate with the radars we now have deployed, that would be be even better. and then finally, you knee a tri level contingency planning. agree with david, we should be

patient, but we should be patient publicly rather than privately. we need to overcome the political hurdles. >> i just want to make a point there was no controversy in the previous panel. at least a little bit of controversy in this one. i spent a lot of years so i'm all into wordsmithing and words. integrating means things happen in seconds. they happen at speeds that are required for, you know, sensors and shooters to work as part of a single system. that's not what interoperable means. it may be with everybody doing a wink, wink and a nudge, nudge, interoperable means integrated. but i'm skeptical that we're all talking about the same thing. >> are you talking about sort of

an interim step forward to deal with the political issue? >> i'm talking about the world we're in and not the world we want to be in. this is the world we're actually in. this is what i can sell and this is what the u.s. government can sell today to south korea. and we can built it with a step. i want to go where david is, but i'm telling you, this is what's possible. >> let me ask a question of both of you. i was surprised when the country wasn't mentioned given the bulk of missiles in asia, neither of you mentioned taiwan. does taiwan figure at all into a regional strategy? does taiwan figure into u.s. priorities in this area? >> i mean, i think i probably picked up on david gompert's point that you can't solve to the technology alone.

and you can't certainly solve it given the restraints on the u.s u.s./tehran relationship. taiwan needs to gain a metric strategy that allows taiwan to continue to have enough confident to deal with the differences and that's not a missile defense system. it's really a host of diplomatic, political, as well as anti-access technologies that deal with minds, deal with submarines, perhaps, but not missile defenses in my view. >> agreed. >> okay. we can turn to the audience. >> lawrence larimore national lab. another country that i haven't heard you talk about is australia.

and i'm wondering if you have thoughts about the political will, the economic feasibility or the strategic value in having australia participate in the architecture in the asia pacific region? >> i may not be current, dean, but let me just give you my take. the australians resemble a european nato member, as much as they do an up-and-coming east asian power. you know, 2% of gdp on the fence. certain view that australia's a pretty safe place. a view that things can be worked out with china not in any sort of an accommodationist sense but australia has done a lot of business with china. so, on the other hand, we have all kinds of sensibly sensitive and sophisticated cooperation

with australia. virtually as much as with any country in the world, in terms of the level of sophistication. so in that sense, it's a natural. they'd had a lot to contribute. whether this would be a priority for the australians to make a significant contribution, i kind of doubt whether this is the chr contribution we would like the australians to make. i have to wonder about that, too. for most of the southeast asia, and i include australia in that regard. we would like to see them developing systems that can deal with the south china sea problem. that can overcome interaccess problems, submarines, australia developing their submarine defense. it's one thing to explain to the chinese that an architecture

that is optimized to deal with a north korean threat need not concern them, it certainly would be that much tougher to complain how australia plays an indispensable control in the architecture. >> and i generally would agree. i would say, though, in terms of space, cyberspace, in the common operating picture that i talked about for the region there is overlap, obviously between those dimensions of security cooperation and missile defense. it's not the same as. but they are the building blocks. in that sense, given our very close relationship with australia, one of the five country really so close with asia on these issues, is this an issue they're interested in in those dimensions and i think we should be working with them. but they're not going to be buying pac-3s and countries in

the growing lines of growing capabilities. >> yeah. bad situational awareness. >> i'm a europeanist, so i'm going to reflect my views. >> i'm a recovering europeanist. >> mission defense has become a more animated interest. poland, for example, is buying an air to missile defense system. i think it's growing in the nordic countries. i don't believe they're drivens by the catastrophic ecliptic scenario of coming in with a ballistic warhead. i think they're more focused on conventional warheads being deployed through ballistic missiles because they're fast, they're quick, they're accurate. if targeted correctly, they can shut down a command control center, they can ground aircraft

and such. to what degree is concern about the ballistic missile threat in asia driven by -- driven by conventional scenarios, or scenarios involving conventional warheads on ballistic missiles versus the nuclear option? >> i think where the south koreans are concerned and where we are concerned, vis-a-vis security, the north koreans do not need ballistic missiles to deliver high explosives on south korea. there are lots of alternatives for starters and lots of rockets and so on, thousands. where ballistic missiles could make a difference for south korea, certainly, the reach into south korea, well into south korea beyond artillery and rocket range, so that's a problem. and i think it's the weapons of mass destruction aspect where ballistic missiles -- north

korean ballistic missiles could be a game-changer security on the peninsula. but that's not only nuclear, but that could well be chemical, it could be biological for that matter. that's the way i would see it. and that's the way i would think the south koreans would see it. >> i agree with that. and as in a written report earlier this year, based on discussions in korea, as well as u.s. planners, i mean, the fear that north korea's kim jong-un's new year's message was created to include tactical weapons, it's specifically to intimidate south korea. and this is how it's treated within south korea's planning circles i think that's a driving fear this would be a game-changer. i think the united states starts to think about, more distant, second, island change places like guam, where it still has to make pivotal investments in moving forces. in that it will be moving 5,000

marines in theory in the coming years. that's where even conventional missiles could make a difference from a u.s. perspective. and thereafter as part of the u.s./japan alliance in training and in theory, in morano, northern morano islands, even defense could be a big issue. so it carries depending where you are next to north korea. but i think it's the wmd issue that seizes the mind that could make a bad day tomorrow. >> i'm not sure i'm allowed to pitch in here or not, ian, but you both for understandable reasons chose to focus on north korea. but from the china perspective, it is the china and north korea issues that are driving that. every known contingency that china might be involved in would involve the use of those systems because that's the back bone of china's military. and that's their only means of

contribution at the periphery of at this juncture. when we talk about anti-air access denial, we're talking about air to ballistic missiles in the ability to target u.s. bases and its assets. so from the china perspective, it's really the conventional and having a major impact on the way people are thinking. again, as far as i can see, i don't see this changing. >> it doesn't necessarily follow, mr. chairman because the chinese have a growing range of cruise missiles that missile defense the better way to counter that. >> well, are you talking about accuracy missile defenses or the full spectrum? >> i'm talking about accurate missile defenses. >> i think the integrated approach, and the whole spectrum of missile defense of which -- >> even then, it's not the only way of dealing with the problem. >> correct.

but if you took all the tools of national power, your diplomacy, your everything, at some point, you've got to deal with the fact this is the pillar and the back bone of a military that you may end up confronts, on a range of contingencies. you've got to deal with those missiles. there's no way -- >> in a way of dealing with missiles, other than shooting them out of the air. >> or hardening your air bases. >> or equipping your aircraft carriers. >> or before they're launched or -- which i'm not -- when i'm talking about missile defense, i'm talking broad spectrum of defense against missiles in this case but, in the back. okay. that back. sure.

>> two different questions. why is -- we have this hub and spoke arrangement in east asia for so well. is it possible that integration where the koreans don't have to talk data and we can launder their information from the system, do that technically fast after making a de facto integration with us as the relay ween them? second, looking at the problem, a lot of interest there not with anti-missile missiles because of the scale of the problem but with direct energy, with lasers, with rail guns? in the near future, 10 to 15 years, is there a possibility of actually changing that game of the big problem being a problem simply unaddressable by any technological means? >> i'll answer the first

question and turn to patrick for the second one. i think it's an important idea what you suggested. i like that idea better than i like the idea of saying inner operability but meaning integration. i mean after all, if we are the hub, i mean we fuse, we are the brain center, i mean, we should get data from everywhere we can, presumably we would get data from all sorts of places. u.s. owned platforms, sea based, land based, allied, japanese, australian, i mean, who knows where the data comes from. it comes from us basically because we occupy that position. so my advice to the south koreans, don't get too worked up trying to trace each photon to

its source just participate in a system in which the united states gathers data and provides that data instantaneously to folks who are able to intercept missiles and they also intercept data. whether that overcomes the south korean problems of reliance on radars that are based on japan, i don't know. i think it's the right way to think about it. thank you for that. >> sure. we have to understand it's not just the south korean and japan problem. there's a u.s./korea difference on this as well called national sovereignty. it's real. when we get back from a presidential summit and i hear the top level officials briefing at the white house that we have agreed on this, it's sealed, we're fully integrated, u.s. and south korea, well that means the presidents of the two countries agreed. that doesn't follow that gets implemented all the way down. one of the questions i worry about -- i like in general your

concept of sort of the relay of information, that's essentially how we worked around the problems to date, is that as you get further from the central headquarters of intelligence fusion, out to the tactical operators, you know, that's when you find that there are problems potentially. both with systems and with operational training and the lack thereof. so, you know, it doesn't necessarily follow that that's sufficient. it's a good way to start, keep working on the problem. ultimately i do support the idea of the integration. i'm just working with what i see as the very, very oppositional public stance in south korea on these issues and i'm trying to work practically around them. i forgotten your second question. i'm not sure i'm qualified to answer it on rail, guns and so on. what about energy? >> [ inaudible ] thank you. a different mike. sampling everything like the ice

cream store. the shift from i shoot with a bullet to i shoot a bullet with a laser or with a hyper velocity rail gun slug, where i'm not firing $10 million worth of a missile and $1 million worth of missile and running out of ammo, does that change the way we can approach the chinese part of the problem with current technology in the category too big to deal with? >> yeah. i think that we -- first of all you don't need china threat to justify investment in these technologies. the intercept technologies, i think you can just based on the north korean threat, just the short and medium range threat. so part of me says let's develop it for that reason and see what the world looks like in 10 or 15 years.

second, i'm not sangwin about the particular technologies delivering sort of operational capabilities within ten years, maybe 15 years. i defer to my friend pat o'reilly on this. but i mean that's -- even that's a stretch because it's not just solving the technical problem. it's the industrial and financial incentives and capabilities to actually create, you know, create such systems. and that's what takes the long, long time. and even then, i believe there are still questions about the efficacy of lasers against ballistic missiles. lasers against a lot of things look pretty cool. that's probably not the right metaph metaphor. ballistic missiles gets a little sportier i would say. first of all, i'm not interested in a game changer with china

when it comes to deterrence. i don't think this is the most cost-effective way to deal with the growing conventional missile problem that china poses. and i certainly think we cannot count on this. i think there are other things we can and should do like move to more survivable forces then to sink enormous hope and resources into building new technology missile defenses aimed at denying china strategic retaliatory capability. >> i guess two points i would make on this. i don't disagree with anything david said. but i would say we need to look out to the middle of the century, that's what china is looking out in much of its strategic strategy, they're biding their time thinking they will be able to take on this formidable military the united

states is able to field. that's new technologies we don't know their capabilities and impact when we think out 35 years. so we need to be investing more. which is one reason why we have this 20 y project looking out at the longer term because i think this is where we do need to keep shifting into our research and development, keep prototyping and figuring out what utility they may have. while i don't disagree with anything david said i'm more agnostic as i move to the future technologies. >> all the way in the back. >> hi. >> i'm going to get to you in the back one of these times. the way, way back. go ahead. >> seems like north korea will get nuclear and ballistic missiles at all costs because it will ensure their regime survival. how long can we wait until we figure out this is no longer acceptable and we don't want that kind of technology? should we be looking at preemptive and preventative measures instead of interception

and integrated missile defense? >> well, it depends on your confidence in your missile defense system. i have enough confidence or at least enough hope that with american ingenuity and diplomacy, with the movement the japanese are making toward acceptance of responsibility for collective defense, and i hope progress on the part of the south koreans in recognition of the fact that they're dealing with all they know a very, very dangerous regime, dangerous weapons, that missile defense in northeast asia, vis-a-vis north korea, will be adequate to cover that uncertainty we have about deterrence. particularly deterring a sort of final stage nuclear demonstration of some kind. so that being the case, that to me argues against some sort of

preemptive war against north korea to take out north korea's nuclear installations. >> i've dealt at some length on this issue on my report if deterrence fails that came out in april but, you know, it's a very important question. it's the question of moving toward what i call minute war, instant war. it's a matter of the counter provocation planning and policy and strategy we have in place with our south korean ally to respond. things could change quickly that the difference between preemption and reaction is almost negligible in terms of minutes. >> sure. >> so we do have to be better prepared for instant counter provocation policies which could include having to take out systems that could in the future launch wmd at south korea, u.s. forces and even japan. >> yeah. i think that's a very important clarification and i certainly

agree with that. i thought you meant by your questions as to sort of a flat-footed standing start. we've decided it's unacceptable so let's take it out. but certainly in a spiraling crisis where we thought that there was some heightened prospect those systems could be used then all bets are off. >> against the wall all the way in the back. >> thanks, randy. lee bolly, voice of america, reporter doubling as a cameraman. thank you. top united states military officials have testified on capitol hill that china is continuing supply technological assistance to pyongyang in developing its military capabilities. i'm wondering why the united states cannot pressure china enough to stop beijing from doing that in exchange for perhaps delaying a deployment of a northeast asia missile defense

system? thanks. >> yeah. until you provided your quid pro quo i was sort of with you. but i mean i don't think we should make our response -- just as we advise the south koreans and japanese, not to make their posture on vis-a-vis the north korean threat contingent on chinese wishes, chinese attitudes. well, you know, it's a mystery to me why neither we nor for that matter the south koreans, who have got a very important relationship with china, why neither of us can get the chinese to do more of the right things and to stop doing some of the wrong things vis-a-vis the northern regime. after all, chinese statements, public statements, and what we know about chinese attitudes, suggests that they are really kind of fed up with the north

korean regime and while they might talk about the possibility of reform and a more moderate approach, that's not what they're seeing. why that does not translate into stronger chinese pressure, given the leverage that they have, over north korea, why it doesn't translate in having more impact on north korean behavior, whether it's nuclear testing or a variety of other belligerent activities, i don't fully understand. the chinese and china watchers say well, it's because they treat the north korean regime with kid gloves, fearful that if they push it too hard, they might create even greater instability in the regime and on the peninsula which the chinese don't want. i'm not convinced by that argument. i think the chinese still have a surplus of unused leverage with

north korea and we and the south koreans, should continue to lean on the chinese to use every bit of that leverage. >> i think those are good points. when you think about a different question, under what circumstances might china intervene in north korea? in north korean contingencies. one of the scenarios that is mentioned and that is plausible is to clamp down on the wmd, partly because china has been assisting north korea and partly to cover their own tracks. it's a very interesting idea to contemplate and certainly has been discussed in bylateral channels among others. >> i think we have time, we can maybe get in two quick, i'll take them dean and ian. >> two people who haven't asked a question though. >> you could collect them. >> the two ladies. >> mine wasn't going to be a question. to add a footnote to the discussion. i believe we have put significant pressure on the

chinese and has had some payoff. it's not as though the chinese haven't responded to u.s. pressure to restrict some of that on north korea. just hasn't gone far enough. >> that's true. >> want to try to get in -- we can try a couple more. our host has some prerogative, but let's try to collect -- >> the last word. >> hi. joan juddson with inside the army. you talked ate the usefulness offed that in the region and elaborate on why we don't have plans to deployed that in south korea or japan, we have radar in japan, one maybe two by the end of the year. can you elaborate on maybe is it cost prohibitive or other reasons we don't have plans? >> well, we only deployed theed that battery, for instance, to guam last year, i believe. when i was there. and i think we're in discussions with both korea and japan about the possibility. japan and korea, if you listen to the president's speech today

at west point, the united states can't do everything. but it's still willing to lead and provide collective defense with our aloose who can afford to take a bigger role for their own defense. these are issues that affect primarily korean and japanese security first and foremost and the u.s. interests, so it's important for these g-20 countries, these large economies, like korea and japan, to procure their own battery to be quite honest. from my point of view. and in many ways japan is moving -- is faster than south koreans would like to buy more hardware and the south koreans are moving to procure more but they have some tough tradeoffs to make as do a lot of countries in terms of the right balance. i think president pak is interested inned that but getting pushed back. i think her chairman is getting pushed back from some of the other forces who see other priorities. these are just part of the

defense debate and budget debate within our allied countries. i think as north korea improves its capabilities, thad is an essential part of the multilayer defense that will reassure all of us that we can continue to deter and dissuade north korea or at least be able to defend if they do something that would be so reckless. >> all right. we'll try to move quickly. the woman in the back. should be right in front of you there. did she -- she left? sorry. okay. ian, you get the last word. >> the defense cooperation. >> sorry. >> defense cooperation in china. i mean, we've tried few tally with russia. and perhaps that's lessons learned. why haven't we tried missile defense cooperation in china and

should we? >> i think it's easier to make the case that iran could pose a threat to russia than it is to make the case north korea could pose a threat to china. you do have the problem of finding a sort of a common reason to do this. second, if i had the opportunity to push military cooperation, push the frontier of military cooperation with the chinese, probably wouldn't be in this area, it would be in maritime security, maritime cooperation. so i think i would not place a high priority on it and i'm not sure i would understand what the underlying rationale would be for it. unless the world changes to the point where the chinese would view the north koreans as dangerous even to them. >> i agree with that. a reason why maritime issues as well as cyber issues have made

the strategic cut already in the chinese. these are a concern to both of these countries. going forward thinking about a road map for managing the strategic differences between china and the united states, this ultimately could be part of a larger discussion of reassurance. it is an issue obviously if you have japan, korea and u.s. integrated in missile defense china will squawk a lot more about this threat that it poses and the lack of security they have for their minimum deterrence. we will have to bring it up and already do i'm sure, but it's just not central to the agenda for the reason that david rightly underscored. >> probably just add very quickly there are some legal constraints as well. being heavily sanctioned and technology heavily controlled and that would quickly get into an area that may be prohibited. i mean, of course, we have a relationship with the pla but even that is constrained by 2000 and i think to explore this area, you likely find yourself arriving at a point that we may be restricted from engaging.

>> philosophically you could engage in this discussion. >> philosophically i have an issue with the missile defense cooperation with china. build less missiles and deploy less missiles. philosophically china is the major driver of the problem. but yeah, theoretically, philosophically sure we could engage in this. >> not as long as we have any concern about the chinese/north korean relationship. >> and that's a major issue as well. >> and the leakage of anything we would tell the chinese to the north koreans. >> so i think we've come to the end of this session. >> good. >> thank you very much. david, patrick, thank you ian. >> thank you. >> final panel. >> the veteran affairs department today released an

internal audit of its health care system revealing as many as is 100,000 veterans have mad long wait times when seeking medical treatment through the va and indicated that 13% of va schedulers said they received instructions to falsify appointment dates in order to meet performance goals. the audit was conducted within a one-month span and included a review of 731 va facilities and nearly 4,000 employees. republican congressman jeff miller of california is the chair of the house veterans affairs committee and released a statement following the report's release, part of is rates, today's report is more disturbing proof that corruption is engrained in many parts of the va health care system. the only way to rid the department of this widespread dishonesty and duplicity is to pull it out by the roots. that again from veterans affairs committee chair congressman jeff miller. his committee will be holding a hearing later this evening to examine the issue of veterans

access to health care and reported manipulation of waiting lists. gets under way at 7:30 p.m. eastern. watch it live here on c-span 3 and also comment as the hearing happens through our facebook page, or on twitter, using the #cspanchat. c-span's book "sundays at eight" includes kenneth feinberg who oversaw the 9/11 victim compensation fundp. >> from the perspective of the victims i don't see any distinction. if you try and justify my program, on the basis of the victims lost, i can't convincingly explain why 9/11 yes, 93 world trade center no. i think the only way you justify this program as a special is from the perspective of the nation. a recognition that 9/11 was,

along with the american civil war, pearl harbor, maybe the assassination of president kennedy, and 9/11, its impact on the american people was such that this was really a response from america to demonstrate the solidarity and cothesiveness of the american people towards these victims. >> read more of our conversation with kenneth fine burg and other featured interviews from our book notes and q&a programs in c-span's "sundays at eight" from public affairs books now available for a father's day gift at your favorite book seller. next, a heritage foundation discussion on supreme court rulings dealing with campaign contribution limits and how they relate to the first amendment right of free speech. the senate is currently considering a constitutional amendment aimed at overturning those rulings.

the speakers at this event include a former chair of the federal election commission, and an attorney who successfully argued against campaign donor spending limits in a recent supreme court case. this is an hour. >> all set. >> good afternoon. welcome to the heritage foundation in our auditorium. welcome those who join us on our heritage.org website. several will be joining us on c-span today. those who are watching on-line are welcome to send questions or comments e-mailing us at speaker @heritage.org. those in-house are asked to make the last courtesy check that cell phones have been turned off

as we prepare to begin. and our internet and on-line viewers are welcome to send questions or comments to speaker @heritage.org. hosting our discussion today is elizabeth slatterry. mrs. slatterry is our senior legal policy analyst in the edwin mees center for legal and judicial studies. her research focuses on issues such as the scope of the constitution's commerce clause, federal exemption and election laws. she studies and writes about the supreme court, judicial confirmations, the proper role of the courts and methods of judicial interpretation. in addition to her research work, she is regularly contributes to the rule of law posts on heritage policy blog, her work has appeared in such venues as the daily caller and "u.s. news & world report." please join me in welcoming my colleague elizabeth slatterry. [ applause ]

>> thank you, john. tomorrow morning, the senate judiciary committee will hold a hearing on a proposed constitutional amendment that would give congress the power to regulate raising and spending of money in elections. supporters of this proposal such as harry reid and chuck snum schumer and 40 others senators say amending the constitution is necessary to get so-called dark money out of politics and stop illen airs like the koch brothers from allegedly buying elections. they say money is not speech but the supreme court has disagreed and it's determined that bans on money are indeed bands on speech. anyone with practical experience and public advocacy and running campaigns knows money is necessary to engage in effective political speech and activity. here today we have a package of campaign finance experts to talk about this proposed constitutional amendment and its problems. in order to get to it they have to say i'll keep their introductions brief. first from bobby burchfield a partner at mcdermott will and

emory, experienced trial and appellate lawyer with expertise in complex litigation and first amendment policegation. on behalf of the republican national committee he argued the change before the supreme court. he also argued on behalf of senate minority leader mitch mcconnell in the challenge to aggregate countntribution in mccutchen versus fec decided this past april. bobby has argued almost 2 dozen appellate cases. bobby is a graduate of wake forest university and the george washington university law school where he was editor in chief of the law review and clerjed for a judge of the u.s. court of appeals for the third sirc ket. next donald mcgahn, the former chairman of the federal election commission. during his time at the fec, don led what has been called a revolution in campaign finance. rewriting virtually all of the fec's procedures for audits and enforcement matters and advisory

opinions. he's worked in private practice at mcgahn and associates patent boggs and today joined jones day government regulation practice. served as general counsel of the national republican congressional committee for ten years. featured in the "wall street journal" and "new york times" and his writings have appeared in national publications including politico, roll call, the hill and the washington examiner. he's addressed members of congress at several retreats regarding ethics and appeared numerous times on television including fox news, pbs and c-span. don is a graduate of the university of notre dame and he received his jd from widener university school of law and last but not least hear from hans von spakovsky a veener legal fellow here at heritage and the manager of heritage's election law reform initiative. hans writes on a wide range of issues including civil rights, first amendment, immigration and election integrity and known within heritage as the unofficial inspector general of the department of justice having written numerous articles about

attorney general eric holder and various divisions at doj. his book "obama's enforcer" about the holder justice department comes out this month. before joining heritage hans served as a member of the federal election commission and before that was counsel to the assistant attorney general for civil rights at the department of justice. his writings have appeared in the "wall street journal," "washington times," politico and human events to name a few and regularly appears on fox news and other national and regional tv and radio outlets, a graduate of the massachusetts institute of it technology and received his jd from vanderbilt university school of law. i will turn it over to bob. is. >> thank you, elizabeth. we are here today to declare victory. at long last, the advocates of campaign finance restrictions are conceding that the restrictions on campaign speech that they want, simply cannot be

squared with the first amendment. although there is no chance that the proposed constitutional amendment will be approved and ratified, defenders of free and robust political debate should not let the significance of this moment pass. the self-styled reform community has conceded that their restrictions cannot be squared with the first amendment. victory. i wish it were so. this afternoon, i would like to make three basic points. first, the mccutchen decision is plainly correct. as you know, the campaign finance regime contains two types of countrybution limits. base limits impose a dollar cap on the amount of money a contributor may give to a candidate per election or a political committee per year. for example, congress has determined that the noncorrupting amount an individual may give to a federal candidate is $2600 per election.

or $5200 for primary and general election. the aggregate limits impose a cap on the total amount of money a contributor may contribute to all candidates and all political committees in a two-year election cycle. for contributions to candidate, the aggregate limit is $48,600 per election cycle. once a contributor gives $5200 to nine candidates, he is at $46,800. he may give only $1800 to all other candidates. if it is perfectly legal to give $5200 to the first nine c candidates why is it a felony to give $1801 to the tenth candidate? this makes no sense. put simply, you can't corrupt candidate smith, that tenth candidate, by having already

given a legal contribution to candidate jones, one of the first nine. the plain motivation for the aggregate limit is to equalize political speech. few people can give more than a few thousand dollars so the aggregate limit keeps more generous donors from giving too much. decades of supreme court precedent however make clear that the first amendment prohibits schemes to level the playing field by keeping certain people from speaking too much. defenders of the aggregate limit recognize precedent would not allow them to defend the limit as a speech equalization measure. so they defended it as a measure to prevent sirc comvengs of the base limits. unscrupulous contributors they said will try to channel contributions through candidates and political committees to preferred candidates. this led them to rely upon what justice alito referred to at oral argument as speculative

hypotheticals. even justice breyer's opinion relies on three hypotheticals to go to great lengths to evade the base limit if there is no aggregate limit. two quick responses. persons knowledgeable about the campaign finance laws and regulations, as many of you are, will quickly see that justice breyer's hypotheticals assume activity that is in violation of the federal election commission's regulations. moreover, even under the aggregate limits as they existed until they were struck down, contributors could give the maximum amount of money to nine candidates. if contributors were able to channel excessive countrybutions through our candidates to a preferred candidate there should be some evidence, one example in the last decades, one would think, of this channeling in prior election cycles, yet the government had no such evidence.

first amendment rights should not be restricted based upon so much speculation. the aggregate limits made no sense and the court correctly struck them down. my second point this afternoon, is that mccutchen, like citizens united, did not really break new first amendment ground. rather, those decisions returned to established first amendment principles after a decade of deviation. the mccutchen decision is grounded on two such principles. first, speech equalization or leveling the playing field, is offensive to the first amendment. this precip is a cornerstone of buckley versus vallejo. buckley relied on the land mark precedence of new york times versus sullivan and associated press versus united states in 1945. this desire to equalize speech, to limit the speech of the wealthy so they cannot dominate the debate, is, i believe, a major purpose of campaign

finance restrictions and a key motivation of the effort to change the first amendment. the second fundamental precept underlying mccutchen is that avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption, are the only governmental interests recognized under the first amendment for restricting political giving and spending. moreover, in this context, corruption means quid pro quo corruption, the giving of money for political favors. again, this presep dates back decades as the court wrote in 1985 in fec versus national conservative political action committee, quote, we held in buckley and confirmed in citizens against rent control, that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances. it continues, quote, the hallmark is the quid pro quo

dollars for political favors. the court began to deviate from these principles in the late 1990s in the second colorado republican decision. a court majority began to expand this anti-corruption rationale to encompass war chest corruption which means that an individual or a corporation had too much money. access corruption which means by giving money you might be able to shake a senator's hand in a receiving line, gratitude corruption if you gave money to an office holder they might be grateful for it. this deviation reached its peak in the mcconnell decision in 2003 which upheld the sweeping restrictions on political speech in the bipartisan campaign reform act. citizens united and mccutchen have reversed this trend and returned first amendment juris prudence to its basic principles. cries from the reform community about how the roberts' court has ignored rprecedent and rewritte

the first amendment are simply mistaken. my third and final point is that the self-styled reform community is trying to read into the first amendment their own view of what democratic government should be. by its language, intention and the precedent applying it, the first amendment protects the marketplace of ideas, promoting the most robust discussion possible, with the assumption that a free people can assess for themselves the strength of the arguments and make informed electoral decisions. this means the government does not silence anyone, does not limit anyone, an it does not referee the debate. in recent years the self-styled reformers have begun to suggest that free and robust debate does not promote democracy, but threatens it. they contend that allowing the wealthy to spend more -- speak more can drown out the voices of the less wealthy and the very volume of speech from certain quarters threatens to delegitimize, they would say corrupt, the democratic process.

justice prior brooier dissent in mccutchen appears to adopt this argument. this is a very troubling argument and those who cherish the first amendment must push back strongly and vigilantly. this notion that first amendment imposes a duty to limit speech to protect democracy, turns the free speech guarantee on its head. other constitutional provisions protect the integrity of the political process, but the free speech clause of the first amendment protects unfettered debate so those other provisions can work. this notion too much speech is underlying democracy is on so many levels. the rich do not advocate a single viewpoint. think of sheldon adelson and george soros. they don't agree on anything. not just in privately funded campaign advertisements but also in the broadcast and print media. only a small portion of those

with significant resources even bother to participate in the debate and among those of limited means, the portion is small indeed. in order to equalize debate among the haves and have nots, severe restrictions would be necessa necessary. the quantity and quality of discourse would certainly suffer. let's trust the public to listen carefully to the most robust debate possible, and to make decisions based on more information, more debate, not less. that has always been the premise of the first amendment and of american democracy. thank you very much. [ applause ] good afternoon. i would like to thank heritage for having me. i want it begin by echoing what bobby said by declaring victory. my reaction when i heard the

senate democrats were going to push an amendment to the constitution, changing the first amendment was at least now they're finally admitting what they want to do is unconstitutional. for over two centuries, we've agreed that the idea of robust political discussion is necessary in a representative democracy such as ours. when you elect representatives to go to washington or your state capital, you don't manage everything they do. you trust your judgment. the way to ensure their judgment remains pure and consistent with what the people want, is that the people can speak out and criticize those folks once they get in office. that's kind of how we do things in america. i'm not sure how they do things outside of america. but i know here, when you elect folks you have to be able to criticize them. if you can't, well then they lose touch with the people. but what we've seen recently is a real assault against this sort of approach.

the citizens united opinion came down, there was first shock and disbelief in some parts of town. other parts of town we were doing dances and high fives. but really, what came about after that was an amazing sight, from president obama during his state of the union address making what i think was probably an unprecedented remark about a supreme court opinion, claiming that the citizens united opinion would usher in foreign national money and all sorts of other things that was simply as justice alito mouthed at the time not true. we know who was right and wrong in that. second, we saw the irs do what the irs did, asking all sorts of bizarre questions of people from what sort of books they read to what prayer groups they went to and the like. third, this is one that sort of flashed on the scene and disappeared, the federal communications commission flirted with the idea of monitoring fuse rooms just to

check the balance. remember that one? that sort of disappeared once people figured out what that was about. let's not forget that. that seems to be the sort of thing that well, in america, we shouldn't be doing, and then now, the most recent is you have the majority leader of the senate democrat harry reid seeming to redefine the use of special order speeches and statements attacking various individuals, a couple in particular, for speaking their mind if nothing else. it's really a bizarre time in which we live and just when you think it couldn't get any more peculiar they are now pushing an amendment to the constitution to essentially change the first amendment. and they're doing it smiling and they seem to think that somehow the wind is at their back. frankly, i think it's political theater. there's no chance of this becoming law. senate democrats are in trouble. they know it.

any reputable political tracker will tell you this, whether charlie cook or stu rothenberg, will tell you the senate democrats are slowly losing their grip on power and i suppose desperate times call for desperate measures so now they are attempting to amend the constitution as part of their sort of grandstanding it try to silence their critics. and it's really a shame. but why do we have the first amendment? what gets lost it's not there just because we needed a placeholder in the bill of rights. there's some history there as to why we have it and it goes back to when we were under the rule of england and for about 100 years, england was and to a certain extent still does have be a entirely different view of free speech than we have here. the licensing order of 1643, for example, essentially banned all sorts of public speech. newspapers, pamphlets and the

like, they had to be licensed by the crown and then later parliament and the kind of speech they didn't like the most was the kind the people liked the most that critical of the crown of the government in england. what the government did was said you have to license it. effectively a band. you had to recommegister print materials and the like. draconian provisions. you could be arrested that sort of thing. then, you know, fast forward the stamp act, remember this from history class, that was in 1765, had nothing to do with the sort of stamps you you put on mail pieces but that the crown required a stamp be placed on all printed materials. in order to print anything one had to pay a tax. so you had to get permission to speak yet again. we fought a revolutionary war over this concept and as part of the deal adopted in the constitution we know there was a requirement that the bill of rights be adopted and the first of which contains the freedom of speech and freedom of press and

association among others. now here we are in the midst of an election battle where certain politicians are gripping to power as only politicians can, and want to change the rules of the game and prevent people from criticizing, not unlike england did long before a revolution, and which led to our revolution. so here we are and what are they actually trying do? i have a copy of the proposed amendment in front of me. it says to advance the fundamental principle of equality -- political equality for all and to protect the integrity of the legislative and electoral processes, congress shall have the power to regulate the raising and spending of money and in kind equivalence with respect to federal elections including through setting the limits on one, the amount of contributions to candidates for nomination for election or for election to federal office and two, the amount of funds that may be spent by in support of or in opposition to such candidates. section two extends this power to the states which is a more

radical change. talk about federalizing elections. it empowers -- regardless of what a state constitution says this would trump that. what does this mean? well, first it invokes the fundamental principle of political equality, whatever that means. for all. but yet there's an exception that later in the proposed amendment that exempts out the corporate press and says nothing in this article shall be construed to grant congress the power to abridge the freedom of the press and means if you are the incorporated media much like the mainstream media today it seems you are exempt from this. if you are a blogger or maybe on the cusp being the media, watch out this seems to empower congress to regulate you or otherwise potentially ban you from speaking. what some of this mean, who knows. and as one who has done nothing election law for most of my career i scratch my head and

wonder why they have to do this. when they want to pass an amendment that says they should raise and spend money, congress does have the power rightly or wrongly to regulate the raising of money. buckley versus vallejo upheld contribution limits and limits that are too low have been deemed an abridgement of speech but for the most part courts have already upheld the ability to limit contributions. the government has flirted with babbing certain kinds of speech, much of it is still speech if it is co-call coordination, subject to a murky test but they do have the power to do that says the courts. so the question is what are they doing? well, they're going to try to limit independent speech. now, what's interesting the courts have upheld some disclosure of independent speech which six months ago was supposed to be the answer, a year ago was supposed to be the answer. remember the disclose act part 1

and 2. that was supposed to cure all that ails us in our democracy but i guess they've given up on that and moved to the more radical change the constitutional amendment. so when you read this text, you think what the courts have already upheld. what are they really getting at? the kind of tv advertising we're seeing nowadays criticizing the senate democrats for what they've been doing. now, the question is, why can't we do this now under current law? well, what's amazing is that many of the ads that people are currently complaining of are not covered by current law nor have they ever been unless ads contain express words of advocacy this time of year you don't even have to file a disclosure report which is as it should be. near an election, mccain/feingold had an additional one for communications but the sort of ads we've seen for the past year and a half are not election ads, issue ads and speech designed to influence the official acts of politicians which is precisely the sort of speech that's at the heart of the first amendment.

so with that, i have a few questions for the sponsors of this. see if they can answer these question, maybe they'll answer them in the hearing tomorrow. chances are probably not. they have a hearing several weeks ago which was supposed to be sort of a campaign finance hearing and at the last minute they added retired justice john paul stevens to the witness list and they started talking about amending the constitution. i testified in the second panel and was talking about how really the party committees have been marginalized and had a million great examples if anyone would have bothered to ask me questions from the democratic side and could have told them all about it but didn't ask me a single question. instead more interested this talking about amending the constitution, but here are some questions. first, under this amendment regulating electoral processes, integrity of the legislative and electoral processes could congress prohibit a labor union from communicating with its members if that communication somehow affected the legislative or campaign process?

i would think the answer is, yes. what about other membership organizations? the nra, sierra club, that sort of thing? could congress ban communications between those groups and their members regarding politics? seems to be what this may permit congress to do. can it be speech selective? doesn't say anything about -- about -- it doesn't have the clarity of the current first amendment congress shall make no law but talks about political equality for all. well, when you read as bobby burchfield mentioned the dissent in mccutcheon it seems you can ban some speech and not other speech. it seems far-fetched that somehow speech equality to lead to come being banned and some not being banned. when the federal election committee considered fahrenheit 911, michael moore's movie the s.e.c. said it was fine because

it was a commercial movie for profit so that was not prohibited but when citizens united came in and asked about hilly the movie the s.e.c. said, no, sorry, that's banned. i cannot for the life of me tell the difference except one says bad things about george bush, a republican, the other says bad things about hillary the democrat. if you say bad things about the republican you are fine. if you say bad things about a democrat, perhaps you're going to be banned. what about pastors and churchs? this is an issue that comes up every so often. can the government get in there and tell a priest he can't talk to his congregation because it may have something to do with politics? this amendment would seem to permit the congress to do that. what if you're not the corporate media and citizens united trying to make movies and documentaries of the sort that the corporate mainstream media deem not to be part of the exclusive club they are already in. can congress regulate those

movies? we've seen it with citizens united. let's not forget the facts of that. it was about a film and whether it can be seen and bought on pay-per-view cable by adults in the privacy of their own home and later the solicitor general's office said no. mccain/feingold says you cannot on pay-per-view cable. that was the facts. that went to the supreme court. so this is not a situation where we're talking about, well, we're just going to ban campaign stuff. we're talking banning movies here. and then what about books and movies generally? what if a book is a 500-word book that talks about public policy but gets into election speech and says, therefore, you shouldn't elect so-and-so to be president? does this empower the government to ban that book? i'm afraid that does and this is why it needs to die a very sudden death so that we can continue to criticize our elected officials as we must in a representative democracy.

thank you. [ applause ] >> maybe i should sit down because they have said everything about this. i'll add a few words. the slide we put up is basically the constitutional amendment, the important parts of it and you'll notice that as don said, it not only would limit -- give congress the power to limit the contributions that can be give ton a candidate directly, and also the expenditures that a candidate could incur trying to run for office but you'll notice it also says that it would give them the power to limit the amount of funds spent by in support of or in opposition to candidates. what that means is that it would give congress the power to limit

independent spending by individual americans. now, if you think that congress would never do such a thing, i should tell you that, in fact, in the early 1970s when congress passed the modern version of the campaign finance laws that we've operated under now for 30 years, they actually passed a ban on independent expenditures by organizations and individual americans limiting them to only a thousand dollars. now, that meant that if you as an individual didn't like somebody running for congress in your particular state and you wanted to take out an ad in your local newspaper all on your own, no coordination with any other candidate, to say -- try to convince your neighbors not to vote for that particular candidate, you couldn't spend

more than a thousand dollars doing that. so congress already tried to do this in the early 1970s. fortunately in the buckley versus vallejo decision the seminal case on campaign finance law in 1976, that's the case in which the supreme court came up with a standard that uses in this area which is to say that laws that prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption will be considered acceptable and can be used to somewhat limit first -- otherwise accepted first amendment rights. the supreme court threw out that thousand dollar limitation on independent expenditures but shows you the kind of ideas congress had previously about this and if this amendment were to pass, it could impose a law like that immediately and there is nothing that anyone could do to stop it. and, in fact, if congress said, well, i really think a thousand dollars is too much, for anyone

to spend on independently on this kind of political speech, you know, they could crank that down to $500, to $100, to $5 and there is nothing that anyone could do to challenge it because they would have changed the first amendment to do that. now, the supporters of this amendment, all 41 of them and i have to tell you i find it absolutely shocking that almost half of the united states senate would for the first time in american history support something that would roll back part of the bill of rights, something unprecedented, has never happened in this country, they say that, well, you know, when you restrict the amount of money that individuals can spend, raise or spend, that's not the same as resouth africaing free speech. as the supreme court said in that decision 30 years ago virtually every mean