captioning performed by vitac what does it actually mean? as opposed to what everyone theorized it has meaning. in the grand sweep. does it mean a lot? and within that frame, are we looking at a dramatic event which fundamentally turns the

dial in the arrangements in which henry kissinger reached effectively in the early 1970s. which was a strategic accommodation between washington and beijing based on a common strategic between the soviet union. and the subsequent unfolding of what then become modernizing china, as well. have we reached a new point at which that fundamental access has changed. i think personally that the shanghai meeting represents the culmination of the forces which have been in work for quite some time in the china/russia relationship and the china/u.s. relationship which begin fundamentally to alter the premises of the 1972 strategic

concord. the second point i would seek to go to how then our analysis to one side is this reality viewed from beijing? and then finally, and though i am no russia file, russia expert and no sovietologist by training, how some of these realities have viewed from moscow, as well. on the china view of reality, i think it's always important to go back to the fundamental principles of what are china's national abiding interests and how it currently perceives those through the standing committee under xi jing ping's relationship. if you were standing around the table at present though it's

articulated or not, it's assumed that the number one interest is to preserve the communist part in power. it is not something we should something smile about and pass on from because when you look at the current dynamics of russian politics and the russian leadership, there is no critique coming from moscow, nor has there been for a long, long time. in terms of the viability, the credibility of a one-party state. and so in terms of regime fundamentals to state the obvious, we should restate it, you do not have a rolling critique of the fundamental nature of chinese political power under the communist position. that is a comfort to china given the volume of critique and sustaining its current political and politico economic model.

number two, from the chinese national interest point of view is this, the maintenance of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. well, there's nothing remarkable about that. that's the same discussions we have around any cabinet table in any capital in the world. but applying specifically to the russian question, this is of, i believe, profound significance. number one, the fact that in that period post '89, starting with that meeting between gorbachev and dunn in the middle of 1999 which began the settlement process of the soviet chinese, then russian/chinese border. that has provided the fundamental long-term security from a chinese perspective about the vast expanse of 4,300 kilometers of the land border across the north. any student of chinese history will tell you that the highest

levels of chinese strategic concern have existed in terms of what comes rolling across your frontiers from the north. from the later dynasties right to the invasions of the 17th century. and if you include japan within the wider north or, frankly, into the 20th century, as well. the strategic significance of effectively settling the russian/chinese border, which occurred in a process beginning in that meeting in '89 and concluding with the river negotiations and agreements most recently is of profound strategic significance. because the core point is this, china no longer regards russia as a threat. and this is a deep, deep question, which has been resolved from a long period in history. therefore, when we look at china's territorial integrity

and territorial claims, the focus now is no longer on this vast terrestrial border but on the maritime disputes and borders on the other with japan and southeast asia. the third national interest of china and where russia again fits into this is, of course, the paramount importance attached to the transformation of the chinese economic growth model. the number one, number two, and number three, national security of one side is how do you transform the model which has served modernization from 1978 to 2012-'13 into a new model, which is essentially based on domestic private consumption, replacing public investment as the primary drivers of economic growth. secondly, priority also attached to the growth of the services industries as opposed to traditional labor-intensive and

energy-intensive manufacturing. and number three, with a greater role of private firms and relation to enterprise into the future. this is where the bulk of the governments, this leadership in china's energies are currently focused. where does russia fit into that? the underpinnings of the old growth model and new growth model, and this is where state's contribution has been particularly important lies in long-term energy security and food security. across the energy security, security of raw materials supply and food security questions, china sees in russia a potential long-term huge strategic partner. yet to be fully articulated. yet to be fully expressed. but of direct and fundamental significance to the continuation of this transforming process of china's path to economic modernity. number four is this, that within

the framework of these other three sets of interests, china, however, in the period since i think we could probably point it to october/november last year or maybe september/october last year in a major national conference on diplomatic work, articulated a new approach to the diplomacy, at least in east asia and certainly with the neighboring states. and this is a relevance to russia, as well. the russia problem having resolved, china's new and best way to describe it proactive foreign policy, some would describe it as assertive foreign policy, the chinese word is -- and open to multiple definitions and there is no official one. but basically a lot more active than it used to be. i think that's what we can safely define it in the modern oxford or webster dictionary in

international relations whichever side of the pond you happen to be on. but you don't have to simply be a theorist and observer of statements to conclude that chinese diplomacy has become infinitely more active across the hemisphere in the last six months plus. and we can point to the manifestation of the security policy, as well. and more broadly, multilaterally, as well, as individual multilateral agreements come up for renegotiation or reconsideration, china is now actively asserting its views about how the redraft of any existing international covenant should unfold. why this is relevant to the russian relationship is china finds a large scale strategic partner providing it with diplomatic leverage in various of these negotiations, but not all of them. and correct emphasis was placed before on direct conflicts of

diplomatic interests over the question of the ukraine. but on balance, the chinese find this is a very useful, strategic addition to their repertoire. to conclude, a few thoughts on how this is viewed from a russian perspective. i spent a week in moscow recently in the last two, three months with one single question. what is russia's long-term view of china? and i spoke with the whole range of people across government and semigovernment circles. and there's a high degree of coalesc coalesce, but there are a significant agree of noncoalesce enss, as well. asking how's it going with china, chris? the response is along the lines of, best it's been in 450 years. and so to which i would then say

it's been a bit rough of late, has it? but there's something in it because if you look at this grand narrative between russia and china, going back to the enormous territorial acquisitions. this is by and large a very sharp and cantankerous relationship throughout history, including in the soviet period, for most of it, not all of it. therefore, when you ask, why is that the case? then the answers flow reasonably quickly and freely, number one. china does not challenge legitimacy of our own political arrangements. number two, the economic potential of this relationship provides us with a huge ability to sustain ourself from any sort of economic pressures coming from elsewhere. and frankly become a much bigger driver of growth in the future than we've ever seen in the

past. remember. bilateral economic trade between the two at the present is only about 70, 80 billion in the u.s. in australia, 50 billion or more. but that 70 billion has grown from nowhere in the space of 5 to 7 years. if trajectory they see is huge and the juxtaposition against ukraine is clear and transparent to us all. so our russian friends -- and perhaps until china until recently has been the fact they can work together in pursuit of what's been described already as multipolarity in the multiworld order, which basically means anything that lessens u.s. influence in the order. as acting as a sole power, a unilateral power or one driving consensus against its own interests. and then to conclude on -- what are the anxieties in moscow? and this, i think, is equally

relevant. the anxieties have already been pointed to in part. but when you scratch the surface in moscow, the deep anxiety is over the great strategic competition in central asia. and this is profound and it's deep. the five stuns are very much seen as part of a russian sphere of influence given where they have existed most recently historically in terms of compensation of the soviet union. in that frame, kazakhstan has a significance, given the geographical size with the abundance of the resources. and the russian concern is that over time just given the sheer weight of economic power that china has with its position, it will overwhelm central asia simply by the volume of the economic presence, leading this tenuous thread of an ongoing security relationship with moscow, which will eventually then be overwhelmed. and the final point of which the chinese abstention on the question of the crimean

annexation resolution for the u.n. security council is also, i think, relevant. russia is an enormously proud country. enormously proud of its history and still believing deeply that it is a long national future ahead of it. there is, i think, a deep concern in russia about if and when china starts indicating to russia what it should do in terms of global diplomacy between the united nations system. and this, i believe, is a very deeply entrenched concern in terms of how the ultimate realities have played out between the two of them on the global stage, most particularly through the mechanisms of the u.n. when you ask our chinese friends, how do you now characterize the russia/china relationship. it's not, it's the best it's been in 450 years.

in my experience, they choose these phrases carefully as one that describes the relationship as one of of a collaborative, strategic partnership. so what does that mean? and this is where i think we should conclude. that within the framework of that collaborative, political diplomatic and strategic behavior, what we are likely to see, quite apart from the british framework, but exclusively on a bilateral framework, more and more intense political diplomatic and strategic policy coordination between the two of them. and if the -- if the shanghai meeting represented anything for me it was that. but within the framework of events unfolding over a long period of time which have set the redial on the 1972 deep

change of strategic architecture engineered by american political leadership at the time. >> great, thank you, kevin. >> dr. brzezinski, i know you have to leave in a few minutes, i'd like to give you an opportunity to respond to the other two panelists' comments. also, i want to pick up on particular a thread you raised. which is this issue of the trajectory of russian imperial, you know, sort of dominance of the region and where we think that's going. and in particular, how you see that playing in the central asian context, especially with the eurasian union effort with few members in the room. >> well -- first of all, i think we're basically in an agreement, there may be some differences of emphasis, but i think we are in agreement that this is an extremely complex relationship. but also in terms of the rush/chinese aspect of it, there is a significant asymmetry between what china can do and russia can do under the current circumstances. the one point with which perhaps i would emphasize different

aspects or define it somewhat differently is this issue of the territorial relationship between china and russia. it's absolutely -- that the chinese take the position that legally everything is solved and they stay quiet. but i have also been struck by the fact that in private conversations, some chinese are beginning to bring it up. beginning to bring it up. now, where that will take them, we don't know. but in one respect, we already do know. and namely, the competition for influence in central asia to which just referred to. in part competition, in regard to territories in the broad sense that the chinese in the past view as somehow subordinate sphere of influence. and for the russians, it's a central issue as to whether they can be incorporated into this

elusive, vague concept of the eurasian union. i talked to one top official friendly conversation in which we sort of talked about the last several decades and in which talked about the future. and i realized that no conversation of that type is truly friendly. at least the tone was that. he did say to me suddenly, and i want you to know that we are really moving westward. and when i heard that, i was kind of baffled for a few seconds. and thoughts flashed through my mind. is he talking about some special relationship between china and germany, maybe? or maybe western europe or the union? and then it quickly dawned on me, no, he was talking about central asia. and he started to amplify. amplifying all the different undertakings of the chinese are pursuing. the effect of which is, of course, more cooperative relationship with central asia, but also relationship in which their influence rises.

and someone else's inevitably declines. and then, of course, there is the attitude that the central asians themselves -- part of their game right now and that's been done diplomatically. far less diplomatically by uzbekistan is to limit the significance of the eurasian union. in part simply by enhancing the relationship with the chinese. always emphasizes this is the eurasian economic union. very important qualification. and more or less bluntly told the russians are to go and has invited a nato office to be opened up. which has a kind of echo to the previous comment. so i think this is where the

contest to some extent is beginning, perhaps, to be nurtured. i don't think it's going to expand dramatically or rationally, but i think in the chinese redefinition of their position in the world, they're no longer so inclined to ignore the fact that at one point in a significant fashion, russia benefitted by expanding territorially at china ease expense, this had strategic consequences for china that were negative and perhaps entering a period in which a subtle fashion, a determined fashion, some of these asymmetries can now be reduced or reversed. and what happens in russia will then affect that. if russia at some point becomes a committed, long-term enemy of the united states, it has to be associated with china and de facto as a subordinate.

if russia, however, chooses to democratize after putin is gone, it might be able to enhance its capacity to retain its position in the far east. if it really becomes part of the west and of europe, especially. i once wrote something to the effect that in those circumstances, surely and safely be russian. but especially so if a lot of the people living in it are germans and french and pols and portuguese. i think that's a political uncertainty that confronts this relationship. and a lot of it will depend on how the american/chinese relationship unfolds. if we can keep it stable and cooperative, that is to the good. i refer to the chinese -- i think in some cases very unnecessarily hostile or ironic articles about us. one recent example, the chinese military organ reported on the

aircraft carrier. so we invited them to ours, the reagan one called "reagan." and the chinese are now making a great deal in that particular statement of the fact that our aircraft carrier is so much more modern, more effective, so much capable of being threatening than theirs that this is an invitation deliberately designed to humiliate. that shows, you know, some of the potential tensions here. but i think we have to strive more seriously to avert it. they have to strive seriously to avert it. and just had a long editorial for the first one i've seen in the last two years emphasizing precisely that point that america and china have to resume striving for genuine partnership, that things have somewhat slipped and it isn't

easy to just point finger at one side. and i happen to agree with that. i think we have help to make it more difficult. and they have done it, too. and i think we better take a second look. >> i wanted to follow up on yours. >> thank you very much. >> you know, you mentioned this issue of the chinese clearly making a compromise with regard to the deal and how it's structured and so on. one issue that hasn't come up and didn't seem to come up publicly in the summit is the issue of defense cooperation. membership sense is that has started to shift, as well, in terms of dynamic. i think the russians have been long resistant to sell the chinese finish systems. there was a long dormant period where they were not engaging cooperation there. when president xi took office, cctv seemed to think there was a deal for fighter aircraft and naval vessels. the russians were quick to say,

i don't think so. so do you have any sense -- as to whether there was a defense cooperative component in this whole gas piece and so on? or where you think the trajectory in that part of the relationship is going. i think it's the other key piece. >> i think there's a growing defense cooperative peace between russia and china. but i think it's shifting from a military supply relationship in which russia has provided more advanced military equipment, particularly in terms of fighter aircraft and submarines than the chinese were producing. but not providing their best technology. and now it's shifting toward more military cooperation than the sense of combined operations. >> right. >> there was a joint naval exercise -- there's a technical term. it was, you know, in a room

during the meeting in shanghai. and their naval units have been doing joint exercises together involving other components of the military. i suspect we may see that type of cooperation expanding. but the other side of it is, chinese military technology has been catching up very rapidly. and now china's beginning to be able to produce cutting-edge military technology in certain areas. i think as a strategic goal, china does not want to be dependent on russia for its most advance weapon systems to the extent that russia's prepared to sell them. china may still be interested in buying. but my impression is that the military sales from russia to china have decreased sharply as china has caught up in its own capabilities. >> great. kevin, you talked a little bit

in your remarks about the domestic politics in moscow, how they see things. and also a little bit on the chinese. i wonder if you might expand on how the domestic politics in china factor into this relationship. >> well, you know, every diplomatic observer has to conclude that any country's international policy posture at a given time in history is shaped by domestic political realities, the only question is by how much. and whether that's positive or negative. i think what we have with xi jing ping is a unique product. and that is very self-assured, very self-confident. i think a leader who self-describes himself as a strategist and a grand

strategist in terms of where china goes for the future very comfortable with the exercise of power. perhaps here or elsewhere. not so much primis, but as consequence yields political influence within the system. of a type we have not seen, i believe, a period effectively since 1992. we may agree or disagree on that, but i haven't seen anything like this in the last 20 years or so. that's point number one. the preoccupations are huge. we've spoken about the challenges on the question of china's economic transformation process, which are formidable and complex in their own right if no other challenge existed of any other character. but number two is this, because

xi jing ping based on what i described earlier was national priority number one, which was to keep the chinese communist party in power has launched an anticorruption campaign i have not seen in my years of analyzing modern chinese politics. and certainly unprecedentedly since the late 1970s. this is taking an enormous amount of political energy at the moment. and you've seen it apply to the military, which is significant in itself. the recent public humiliation of the former chief of general staff as well as what's happening within the high levels of the chinese communist leadership proper. this is massive. one of the open speculations at present is the extent to which this is creating domestic forces for reaction within china itself. but on trying to take those two

sets of realities it to the broader equation is how is that, those dynamics, affecting china's international relations posture. and how is it driving the question of the russia relationship in particular? i think because of the authority within the system, what i observe and stand to be corrected by others who follow this more closely is a high degree of chemistry between he and vladimir putin. putin is very popular, domestically within china as a strong leader who is seen to be able to take it up to the united states and take it up to the west. and as a consequence because he sees himself as his nation's strategic architect for the period ahead, i believe that these large moves in terms of the closening in the relationship with russia, a firmer posture and foreign policy terms towards the rest of

east asia and the neighboring states in particular. and those within border disputes in particular. all part of a -- of a strategic evaluation, re-evaluation of where china sees the interest long-term. the third leg is what he announced last year in terms of a new type of strategic relationship with the united states. as dr. brzezinski said before he left, that's the one which has kind of been swinging in the breeze for the last 12 months. and if there's suturing that needs to occur, it is taking that headline, which both president obama and xi jing ping have broadly agreed with and giving it content. that's now quite a rocky road. does that movement toward russia no progress on a new type of relationship with america and a

new proactive relationship with the neighboring states, i think as a projection in some respects of the dominant personality and his analysis of where he wants to take china for the future. >> great. steve, did you want to add to that? >> no. >> that's fine. great. >> well, we'll turn it over to the audience now. we welcome your questions as a standard practice here, if you would identify yourself and let us know which organization you're with and do please try to confine yourself to a fairly brief question. the gentleman in the back there. please wait for the microphone. >> barry wood. mr. rudd, could you say something about the bricks and how both china and russia relate to it? and specifically the plan to set up a development bank? i wonder if this is a means of cooperating in central asia. >> i think we can thank "foreign affairs" magazine for giving the

first definition and whoever read the article, i think it was from goldman's at the time. which weighted together the economies of brazil, russia, india, china, and who else have i left out? >> south africa. >> thank you. >> and whether it becomes bricc, there's diplomacy underway about the possibility of doing that. two, it has been a -- a strategic concept which has in many respects formed a balanced around china in its internal negotiations with other states who are members of the g-20 on the economic front. not just head of government level, and often when you go to major summits around the world, there is a position.

i had a experience in 2009 in co where there was a brics position heading into that conference. on the specific proposal for an infrastructure bank, then there is, which has now been agreed, at least now in principle, this will be largely driven by chinese financial capital. i think that's accepted. there's an active debate about where it's located. therefore whether it comes in china or recent debates about whether it's launched in jaka a jakarta, recognizing the republic of indonesia is going to become one of the ten largest economies in the world before too much longer. 250 million people live there and massive infrastructure needs. in terms of a political symbolism attached to the infrastructure bank and the place within the asian hemisphere, i think it aids

china's strategic and foreign policy interests. but i'll say this with one caveat. the amount of capital this thing will have at its disposal is relatively limited. financial markets will be the principal source of infrastructure needs. and on top of the existing multilateral development banks. so i think in terms of adding capital, financial capital to the region to meet its infrastructure needs, the infrastructure needs. it's fine and dandy, but you should see it in the context of frankly the sheer volume of need and the volume of private capital, which is interested in these areas of investment, as well. >> yep, in the middle here. >> thank you. i want to ask, you know, party experts say despite china being ruled by the communist party and

russia no longer, the u.s./china relationship seems to be better than u.s./russia relationship. why is that? can you explain? and secondary, do you think the triangle relationship is going to involve much further, as the cold war days, but do you think it's going to be involved much further? thank you. >> i'll begin with an answer, but i think prime minister rudd can weigh in on this very effectively also. i think that recent developments in east asia and in europe have tended to push china and russia closer together. and i think that's one of the factors that produced the gas deal that we have been discussing here. that have been negotiating for ten years over price and all of a sudden the pieces fall together.

i think it's not accidental that the united states relationship with china has developed much more positively than ru russian/chinese relations. if you look at our bilateral trade, it runs over $500 billion a year. russian trade with china is still under $100 billion a year. russia is now interested in diversifying away from europe. and on the gas level. if you look at the trade statistics, russia's number one trading partner both for exports and imports is europe, the eu. china is second in terms of both exports and imports now, but the differential between the eu trade and the china trade is very sharp. i'm talking about four or five

times larger in the case of the eu. so that china has been able to develop certain areas of cooperation with russia that have been beneficial to china. and i've earlier referred to military technology, for example, as one of those. but in terms of modernizing its economy, in terms of the expertise needed, namely what you are caught in universities about development and about business management, china has largely turned to the western countries, particularly the united states, not to russia as it did in the past. and as i mentioned, until recently, russia has been resistant to overcommitting itself to the development of china. i think it's too early to tell whether or not the recent cooperative trends will be extended into the future for a long period of time. for example, japan also shares a strong interest in getting expanded access to the natural resources in siberia and the

eastern territories of the -- of russia. and i wouldn't be surprised if you were to see a russian /japanese deal involving oil, gas, timber, other types of minerals that they are interested in developing. so i think this is something we have to watch. there's no question that sign of russian relationship at the moment is at a high point. but i don't think that china has lost sight of the fact that the united states still and very importantly respects much more important to its ability to achieve t achieve. >> just briefly, on the triangular aspect which you made as part of the second part of

your question. >> from china's perspective, my judgment is that strategic leverage to be obtained by an improved relationship with moscow. and i think that informs part of recent decisions. it doesn't explain all of them. but i think that is a reality. secondly, however, china in doing so has been simultaneously active in reaffirming the principles which govern its relationship with russia. these are not new, but continuing since the day of yeltson really. and that is principles of, first of all, there will be no alliance. and the second one is that there will be no conflict, you know. and the third is, not directed to the third party. and so the chinese i've noticed in recent commentary, have

continued to emphasize that in order to discourage the view this is heading in the direction of some form of informal or even formal military alliance with russia. i think it's important to bear that in mind. there is strategic leverage is one thing, strategic alliance is another thing. and we need to be clear in that thinking, as well. here's the third thing about the strategic triangle, which is important for the medium to long-term. and that is china hasn't internally concluded it is being contained by the united states. that's the internal conclusion. whether we support that conclusion, agree with it analytically or not is to some extent beside the point. that is very much the internal conclusion. and in part explains china's behavior in relation to the triangular relationship. and therefore, what i described earlier as being mindful of not

oversimplifying the complex. a shift in the dynamics of the triangle which have been unfolding for quite some time. and i think the extent of that shift has been in many respects symbolized by the recent shanghai meeting. it doesn't go from strategic neutrality to strategic leverage on to strategic alliance. but i think the nature of that triangle has been significantly changed. >> i always try to resist the desire to play player/coach. but to throw in a brief comment on that, especially on the triangular relationship. i think it's important to look at two things in the way chinese are describing the relationship that are quite important. the first is this fact that, you know, there is -- they're calling for a new style of great power relations. the russians aren't included. that says something about how

they see that triangle developing these days. an important point to take into consideration, how does china intend to use the relationship with the russians to balance the relationship with the united states. and in particular, to the degree they see having an active russia corridor option, i think, actually, under the relationship of managing relations is a critical factor. and i think some would argue if we, the united states, in their terms are foolish enough to allow them to maintain that active card, that's our fault. and the strategic triangular relationship. next question. made a friend here. >> thank you. my name is jeannie wit. i thank prime minister rudd and ambassador roy and chris. you mentioned, prime minister

rudd, the shanghai communique in the '70s and the recent shanghai and mentioned the trilateral and the balance. and i remember you have talk about equilibrium of powers in asia. and i'm most concerned about southeast asia and the south china sea. i'm going to ask you as the leader of australia, where do you see the role of australia and old allies, u.s. allies, pacific allies in that region? especially with the current situation in the southeast china sea or the south china sea with china actively assertively, aggressively invaded. it did invade vietnam and all the countries, especially the philippines.

and there had been people killed recently, two ships sank. and right now, we have about more than 100 vessels, chinese vessels in that area, including air forces and military efforts. >> thank you. firstly, i'm not the prime minister of australia. >> but you play him on tv. >> that's a different bloke, tony abbott. >> you all look the same. >> ouch. >> americans. i can never tell them apart myself. >> talk the same. you and the guys from mississippi. it's all the same accent. shall we continue this? anyway, let's go to the core elements of your question, which is one of what is unfolding in the maritime space and secondly what policy should be considered in response to it.

i think it is fair to say that i have not seen such activity in these maritime zones. but the east china sea and south china sea, i think, at least, since the mid-70s. and you could have an argument about that in terms of what happened in the south china sea before then. and it is at a more -- at a more fractious state than i have seen certainly in my diplomatic career, which began in the early' 80s. that causes me concern. it causes me concern for one particular reason and we have never taken a position on who is right and wrong on territorial dispute. and for the simple reason the complexity is mind-boggling. that's why you have other dispute resolution mechanisms available. however, what worries me is what i've said repeatedly about the

danger of conflict through miscalculation. and poor incident management. there is a piece of mathematics here which people who fly aircraft and drive ships usually tell you about. which is the more metal you've got in a given space at any given time, the more likely they're likely to hit each other. and therefore, if that is the case, we now have literally hundreds of assets rolling around the place. in particular zones at particular times. we have varying degrees of skill on the part of those who are driving these assets. then incident management becomes very -- incident probability is high. incident management enters into the equation. and so when i read reports of aircraft in the east china sea recently passing within 35

meters of each other at considerable speed, i become deeply anxious about, a, the probability of incidents, but b, most particularly, about the absence of protocols for the handling once they've occurred. for me, what i become quite lekry about in this current environment and worries me deeply is notwithstanding all the preexisting strategic tensions which exist, the historical animosities which exist, the political disagreements which currently pertain. it is simply the rising mathematical probability of an incident. the absence of product call to management, managed such an incident. and therefore, the risk of escalation of the incident into high level of conflict. you don't have to be a road scholar to work out there's a huge historical precedence for

this. that's what worries me. you asked about my country. i'm a guy who has advocated for the last five or six years that in order to construct effective confidence and security building measures in asia, we need to overtime begin the construction of what i've called in a speech in 2008 called prime minister in an asian pacific community. some might see that as lofty and idealistic, i do not. beginning with the most basic forms of political security and economic cooperation and building step by step to paraphrase -- step by step across the river. and as one level of trust builds into another. we don't have any institution like that at the moment. and while these institutions do not solve necessarily fundamental preexisting confl t conflic conflicts, they can take the

edge off them. and so it's my proposal, 2010 through some australian diplomacy with others. we manage to get america and russia into the east asian summit all around the one table now. it has an open agenda to discuss political economics, strategic, whatever questions you want. my strong argument is we begin using it. and item number one should be a region wide protocol for managing incidents in the air and incidents at sea. those who are perspective, shall i say, participants in an incident. participants of an incident, you're now talking about seven or eight sets of armed forces across air force, civilian aircraft, customs aircraft, customs and patrol boats, naval aircraft, fishing vessels. this rubik's cube of complexity is such that you need governing

protocols. that's where i believe we should go. >> researcher, just follow-up o that comment that you just made. isn't the structure of alliances that's developing or does exist now in east asia actually complicate the situation, which would arise if there were a very serious incident of the type that you were just imagining? and i was struck by the comment of a chinese analyst who said well, one thing we don't chinese don't really understand is how to deal with these alliances. i mean we have japan/america alliance. we have philippines/america alliance. we can deal with a country, okay, one at a time. but we're not so familiar here. and isn't the sort of worry about the way the alliances play into the possible of a serious incident and sort of pulling everybody in, what's led to the recent books, for example, by hugh white and malcolm frazier really questioning what might happen here?

>> yeah, a lot of them fundamentally disagree with the work by hugh white and for a whole range of reasons. which i won't go into. but let me just go to the question of alliances. what do all these alliances with the united states have in east asia and have in common? most of them, by and large, predate the emergence of the people's republic of china, or certainly any strategic capacity of the people's republic of china to constitute a perceived threat to anybody. take the state of the australian alliance which was formed in 1952. you look at the diplomatic history there. why do we end up with an alliance in 1952 even though we'd been allies during the war and the first world war. we ended up with that, that was the price to pay for the u.s./japan peace treaty, and the u.s./japan security treaty. because, politicians in australia at the time, having just been through the second

world war were not about to be positive on the question of any future emergence of a militarist japan. and so the entire strategic frame within which that was put to the had nothing to do with china, let me tell you. it was also to do with a threat as it was perceived from china where we just lost a whole bunch of people in the second world war and with japan in the second world war and where ear going to go into the future. and so it is, if you look at the alliance structures across most of east asia, the japanese one, the korean one, is obviously different because the korean war. that with thailand, and the philippines, frankly they come out of different historical circumstances. so the idea that these things have their origin in -- or their current manifestation in an anti-chinese form of strategic behavior i think begs a whole lot of further analysis. there's a further question, too. if you're a bunch of australians occupying a continent as large as the united states, and there are 23 million of you, then --

which is half the population of california, with an economy the size of the netherlands, well, no, about the size of the republic of korea, it kind of makes sense to be allied with someone who you had a few things to do with over the last 100 years. and so, against, whatever future contingencies might unfold, if you're responsible for 32,000 kilometers of coastline, which is more than you guys have ever looked after, on the basis of that as an independent nation say yeah, yeah, alliance is not a bad idea. >> steve, do you want to toss in a word or two on that? >> just very briefly comment on the fact, perhaps our alliance structure confuses chinese who would prefer to sort of deal bilaterally with these issues. i think it's very important, however, that they read and understand the nature of our alliances. they're fundamentally defensive. but in the case of both the japan alliance, and the philippine alliance, in the case

of the philippine alliance, an attack on a philippine ship or aircraft anywhere in the pacific is covered by the alliance. in the case of the japan one, it applies to areas administered by japan. not simply to japanese territory as recognized by the united states. the chinese don't like us to point this out. but the reason we point it out is to avoid inadvertent misunderstanding of the nature of alliances. now the other side of the coin is equally strong. the united states does not want to get into conflict with china or any other country over essentially minor territorial issues involving uninhabited rocks in the south china or east china sea. we have -- haven't lost our good sense. in wanting to be a good ally of the allies to protect them

against aggression not over provocative behavior over disputed territories of the sort that's occurring. basically the american approach -- i would add a third element. we did not sign the declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea that was signed by china and the ten southeast asian countries in 2002. but if you look at the statement of then secretary of defense panetta, two years ago, you will find the american position is based exactly on the principles that were set out in the declaration of parties. peaceful resolution of disputes, no threat or use of force, no provocative actions. efforts to constructively approach differences. if the principles of that declaration had been carried out by all of the signatories, we wouldn't have the current levels of tension in the south china sea. and we believe in those principles, and we deal with our allies in terms of upholding

those principles. but we also will be allies if they are subjected to unprovoked aggression. >> great. well i think we've just about reached time. i want to thank you both for your very insightful comments. and dr. brzezinski in absentia and really appreciate the audience's participation, as well. [ applause ] with live coverage of the u.s. house on c-span and the senate on c-span2, here on c-span3 we complement that coverage by showing you the most relevant congressional hearings and public affairs events. and then on weekends, c-span3 is the home to american history tv. with programs that tell our nation's story, including six unique series. the civil war's 150th anniversary. visiting battlefields and key events. american artifacts. touring museums, and historic sites to discover what artifacts reveal about america's past.

history bookshelf with the best-known american history writers. the presidency, looking at the policies and legacies of our nation's commanders in chief. lectures in history, with top college professors delving into america's past. and our new series, real america, featuring archival government and educational films from the 1930s through the '70s. c-span3. created by the cable tv industry, and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd, like us on facebook, and follow us on twitter. here on c-span3 we are live at the rayburn house office building on capitol hill. where the house armed services committee is set to begin a hearing with defense secretary chuck hagel. he is set to testify today on the may 31st prisoner release of army sergeant bowe bergdahl, who had been in taliban captivity since 2009. the prisoner swap involved five taliban gitmo, guantanamo

detainees, and secretary hagel is set to testify again today for up to four hours. the hearing scheduled until 2:00 p.m. eastern. here on c-span3. we'll have coverage here, also on c-span radio. we're looking for your comments on facebook. facebook.com/cspan. and you can also join the conversation on twitter, the hashtag is #c-spanchat. we will hop on our phones and lear from you as well. a number of members of the committee already gathering ahead of the hearing today. the house is gaveling in, also, just about at this hour, too, as they later today take up the agriculture spending bill. the administration already has sent up officials to brief both members of the house and senate on the prisoner swap. senators getting a closed-door briefing yesterday. and "the new york times" head line bergdahl briefing fails to allay senators' doubts. they quote senator joe manchin saying quote was it a good deal or a bad deal? he says in my mind it's still a bad deal. i still can't explain it back

home to my fellow west virgin n virginians. that's from senator joe manchin. "the new york times" writes that lawmakers in both chambers moved toward some kind of legislative confrontation. the house appropriations committee voted yesterday, 33-13, to bar the use of federal money to transfer detainees from the military prison at guantanamo bay. six democrats voted yes. senator ted cruz, a republican of texas, is reportedly drafting similar legislation. that reporting from the "new york times." so again the hearing today, set to begin in just a few minutes, as members gather, and we will have live coverage throughout the day here on c-span3.

this hearing will come to order. please hold, as we seat the public.

at the start of this hearing, i'm pleased to welcome members of the public who have such an interest in these proceedings. we intend to conduct this hearing in an orderly and efficient manner to ensure all the members have an opportunity to ask questions and our witnesses have an opportunity to be heard. to that end, please be advised i'll not tolerate disturbances of these proceedings, including verbal destructions, photography, standing, or holding signs. i thank you all for your cooperation. i want to thank secretary hagel, and mr. preston, for testifying before the committee today on the may 31st transfer of five senior taliban detainees from detention at guantanamo bay to the government of qatar. the matter before us is deeply troubling. the committee has begun a full investigation into the

administration's decision. it's unprecedented negotiations with terrorists, the national security implications of releasing these dangerous individuals from u.s. custody, and the violation of national security law. we hope for and expect the department's full cooperation. let me be clear up front on the focus of today's hearing. it is not my intention to dive into the circumstances of the disappearance of sergeant bergdahl from his base in 2009. there will be a time and a process for that. i also do not intend to use this hearing to weigh the merits of returning an american soldier to the united states. everyone who wears the uniform should be returned home. however, the detainee transfer raises numerous national security policy and legal questions. the explanations we received from the white house officials at a housewide briefing earlier this week were misleading, and

at times blatantly false. this transfer sets a dangerous precedent in negotiating with terrorists. it reverses long-standing u.s. policy and could incentivize other terrorist organizations, including al qaeda, to increase their use of kidnappings of u.s. personnel. it increases risk to our military and civilian personnel serving in afghanistan and elsewhere. as the president, yourself, and other administration officials have acknowledged, these five terrorists still pose a threat to americans, and afghans alike. and in one year they will be free to return to afghanistan, or anywhere else. what's more, although there will be fewer u.s. personnel in afghanistan in 2015, the return of these five taliban leaders directly threatens the gains of our men and women who have fought and died -- the gains that our american women have fought and died for. the transfer is a clear violation of section 1035 of the

national defense authorization act of 2014. there is no compelling reason why the department could not provide a notification to congress 30 days before the transfer. especially when it has complied with the notification requirement for all previous gitmo detainee transfers since enactment of the law. the statute is more than a notification. it requires detailed national security information, including detailed consideration of risk, and risk mitigation. that the congress and american people would expect any administration to consider before a decision is made to transfer gitmo detainees. it was designed and approved by a bipartisan majority in congress, due to real concerns the dangerous terrorists were being released in a manner that allowed them to return to the battlefield. we're also seeing the consequences of the president's hasty afghanistan withdrawal

strategy. afghanistan is at a critical juncture. at the same time we're focused on the first democratic transition of government, and supporting security and stability within the country. this negotiation has legitimized the taliban. the organization that safeguarded the 9/11 al qaeda perpetrators and ruled afghanistan through atrocities. lastly, this transfer sets dangerous precedent for how the president intends to clear out gitmo. the remaining detainees, by the obama administration's own analysis, include the most dangerous against u.s. forces and national security interests. in the president's rush to close gitmo, are other deals in the works to release these dangerous individuals? mr. secretary, i don't envy the position you have been put in. we understand the responsibility you bear for signing these transfer agreements. but we're also aware of the

immense pressure the white house has put on you to transfer these detainees so it can claim victory for closing gitmo. nevertheless, we expect the department to abide by the law and to provide its candid assessment of national security impacts of the president's decisions. this is a bipartisan committee. last month we passed our authorization act out of committee unanimously. and off the floor with well over 300 votes. that kind of bipartisanship is based on trust. members on this committee trust each other to live up to our word, and when we work with the department, and the white house, to pass legislation, the president will sign, we have to trust that he will follow those laws. the president has broken a bipartisan law and put our troops at greater risk. and i'm eager to find out why. mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this hearing. thank you to our witnesses for

being here. i think this is a very appropriate issue for congress to exercise over sight on and there are a lot of questions that need to be answered and i'm pleased the administration's here today to attempt to answer those questions. i also want to agree up front with the chairman that one thing we shouldn't talk about today is the cirques of sergeant bergdahl's -- sorry, mr. bergdahl's capture. i'm happy about that. i regrettably at the briefing we had on monday that issue did come up. there simply is no proof, no evidence, i think the way mr. bergdahl has been slaernded has been scandalous. you know, and i hope we'll take a step back and do what admiral winifield said we'll get him home, get him healthy and figure out what happened and due process will be exercised. that should not be discussed today. what should be discussed are the circumstances of this deal. and i think the chairman raised a number of appropriate questions, and i have enormous sympathy for the president and for you, mr. secretary, over a very difficult decision that had to be made here in terms of figuring out whether or not this

was an exchange that was in the best interests of the united states. ultimately, i will tell you, i think it was. we do our level best to bring our service men and women home if we possibly can. not under any circumstances. the issue was raised, you know, would we have traded khalid shaikh mohammed for him. absolutely not. totally different situation. but when you're talking about these five members of the taliban, it is a different equation. and that really raises the issues that the chairman came up with. what -- who were we negotiating with? he says we were negotiating with terrorists. but sergeant bergdahl was captured on the battlefield, in a war zone. the taliban were, until just a few months before that, the legitimate government of afghanistan. the current afghan government has said over and over again that they want to negotiate with the taliban. any sensible person who looks at the situation in afghanistan right now understands that there

is no ultimate peaceful solution if at some point you don't negotiate with some of the taliban. which ones? we don't know. so to simply dismiss this as one terrorist group in negotiating with terrorists i think totally misstates the situation. this was on the battlefield, in a war zone, a soldier who was captured by a group of people that were the legitimate government of afghanistan mere months before. i don't know the full implications of that. and i completely agree with the chairman that we need to be very, very careful about setting any precedent that we would negotiate with terrorists. but i think this raises an entirely different set of questions that need to be answered and addressed and i would be very interested, secretary hagel, in your viewpoint on that. hat does that mean going forward? but understand the idea that under no circumstances will we negotiate with the taliban is one that has been rejected by virtually everyone. we, the afghan government, if we're going to get any sort of peaceful solution in afghanistan, are going to have

to negotiate with at least some elements of the taliban. which ones? we don't know. but that has certainly been the position of the afghan government, so this is an entirely different situation than saying we simply negotiated with terrorists. the second troubling question this raises, is the situation in guantanamo. and i will disagree with the chairman on one key point. the president is not pursuing this out of some naked political goal. he wants to close guantanamo just because politically he'd like to. that's not the situation. we have over 150 people held in guantanamo, many of them in very murky status. is it the plan of the united states of america to hold these people forever, without charge, and without trial? what would that do to our values, to precedents that we've set in a different way if we do that? now there's no easy way out of this. but to simply dismiss it and say, any effort to try to close guantanamo is purely political overlooks the fact that we're in a very difficult situation.

in large part because a lot of these people were captured in the first place without a clear understanding of how or why, without a plan to try them, and now we have them. and it is not the united states of america that i believe in that says look, we're just going to grab people and hold them forever without charge, without trial, without process. how are we going to handle that? one of the interesting questions that's raised that has been -- it has been argued that these five that were captured would have to have been released at the end of hostilities with afghanistan. it's not my understanding that that's actually the status that we've given them. they are not being treated clearly as prisoners of war. in fact i believe the phrase was unlawful enemy combatants has been the phrase that has been used of them. so if they weren't being held as prisoners of war, is it the administration's position that at the end of our full involvement in afghanistan, we would have to release them? i don't believe that it is. that's been alluded to. that really needs to be clarified. first of all, with regard to these five. but second of all, how many more

inmates are there in afghanistan that might be put into that category? that at the end of 2014 we would feel like we would have to release. again, it's my understanding that it's none of them. that we didn't put them in that prisoner of war category where they would have to be released at the end of hostilities. but the category they are in is very murky and very confusing and something we have to answer if we're going to live up to our own constitutional values. now the final issue that i think is worth exploring and where i am in more substantial agreement with the chairman is on the congressional consultation issue. and there's two pieces to this. first of all, it is very important, i believe, for the white house to engage with congress, just as a way for us to work together to advance the right policies. to consult us on key issues. and i think it is wrong that months before -- well, it's wrong that when you knew that you were thinking about doing this deal you didn't take the top leadership in congress and talk about it. now, i know the concern, the concern was that it would have been leaked. but as has been mentioned, congress has been trusted with

many, many other things, including the location of osama bin laden, and not leaked it. i think that type of consultation would have helped the process, not hurt it. and the second piece that i'm concerned about is the 30-day requirement. now i know the president put a signing statement when he signed the law that had that 30-day requirement in it, saying that he was concerned about the constitutionality about it. but the law is the law. the way you challenge constitutionality is you go to court. and you figure out whether or not the courts say it's constitutional or not. and until the courts rule on that, it is the law. when president bush was in the white house, he had gosh, hundreds of signing statements. and there was, i believe, a correct amount of outrage amongst many that those signing statements were put out there as a way to simply avoid the law. was it right for president bush to do it, it's not right for president obama to do it, so i would be very keerious to understand the argument for why that 30-day requirement wasn't in place and again i'll come back to the fact that there was no reason that 30 days notice

couldn't have been given to the leadership of congress. we can, in fact, keep a secret. or i would say we're no worse at it than the administration if you go back through history in terms of how things get out. so i think better consultation with congress is something we will definitely need going forward. with that i look forward to your testimony. i thank the chairman for this hearing. >> i ask unanimous consent that noncommittee members if any be allowed to participate in today's hearing. after all committee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. is there objection? without objection, noncommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time. mr. secretary, the time is yours. >> mr. chairman. i thank you, ranking member smith, thank you. and to the members of this committee, i appreciate an opportunity to discuss the recovery of sergeant bowe bergdahl, and the transfer of five detainees from guantanamo bay to qatar.

and i appreciate having the department of defense's general counsel steve preston here with me this morning. mr. preston was one of our negotiators throughout this process in qatar and signed on behalf of the united states the memorandum of understanding between the governments of qatar and the united states. also, here representing the joint chiefs of staff, sitting behind me, is brigadier general pat white, who was the director of the joint staffs pakistan, afghanistan coordination cell. general white helped coordinate theburg dal recovery on behalf of the chairman through the joint chiefs of staff general dempsey. the vice president of the joint chiefs admiral winnefeld who the chairman has noted will join us later this morning in the classified closed portion of the hearing. and as you know, general dempsey and admiral winnefeld played critical roles in the feetings at the national security council

leading up to sergeant bergdahl's release, and supported the decision to move forward with this prisoner exchange. in my statement today, i will address the issues of chairman mckeon and mr. smith, the issues they raised when the chairman asked me to testify. and explain why it was so urgent to pursue sergeant bergdahl's release. why we decided to move forward with the detainee transfer. and why it was fully consistent with u.s. law, our nation's interests, and our military's core values. mr. chairman, members of this committee, i want to make one fundamental point. i would never sign any document or make any agreement, agree to any decision, that i did not feel was in the best interest of this country. nor would the president of the united states.

who made the final decision with the full support of his national security team. i recognize that the speed with which we moved in this case has caused great frustration. legitimate questions, and concern. we could have done a better job. could have done a better job of keeping you informed. but i urge you to remember two things. this was an extraordinary situation. first, we weren't certain that we would transfer those detainees out of guantanamo until we had sergeant bergdahl in hand. and second, we had sergeant bergdahl in hand only a few hours after making the final arrangements. there are legitimate questions about this prisoner exchange, and congress obviously has an important constitutional role and right and responsibility to play in all of our military and

intelligence matters. as a former member, mr. chairman, of the senate select committee on intelligence, and the council on foreign relations i appreciate the vital role congress plays in our national security. and i will present to this committee within the limits of an open, unclassified hearing, and in more detail in the classified hearing, everything i can to answer your questions and assure you this committee, the american people, that this prisoner exchange was done legally, it was substantial mitigation of risk, to our country, and in the national interests. of this country. let's start with sergeant bergdahl's status as a member of the united states army. he was held captive by the taliban in the haqqani network for almost five years. he was officially listed as missing/captured. no charges were ever brought against sergeant bergdahl, and

there are no charges pending now. our entire national security apparatus, the military, the intelligence community and the state department pursued every avenue to recover sergeant bergdahl just as the american people and this congress and the congresses before you expected us to do. in fact, this committee, this committee knows there were a number of congressional resolutions introduced and referred to this committee directing the president of the united states to do everything he could to get sergeant bergdahl released from captivity. we never stopped trying to get him back. as the congress knows that. because he is a soldier in the united states army. questions about sergeant bergdahl's capture are as mr. smith noted and you mr. chairman are separate from our effort to recover him. because we do whatever it takes to recover any and every u.s. service member held in captivity. this pledge is woven into the fabric of our nation and our

military. as former central commander marine general jim matis recently put it bottom line is quote the bottom line is we don't leave people behind. that is the beginning and that is the end of what we stand for. we keep faith with the guys who sign on, and that is all there is to it. end of quote. as for the circumstances surrounding his captivity, as secretary of the army mchugh and army chief of staff odierno will review later, and they've said, clearly, last week, that the army will review, they will review this exchange, circumstance, captivity of sergea sergeant bergdahl in a comprehensive, coordinated effort that will include speaking with sergeant bergdahl, and i think need not remind anyone on this committee, like any american sergeant bergdahl has rights. and his conduct will be judged

on the facts, not politically hearsay, posturing, charges, or innuendo. we do owe that to any american, and especially those who are members of our military wand their families. like most americans i've been offended and disappointed in how the bergdahl family's been treated by some in this country. no family deserves this. i hope there will be some sober reflection on people's conduct regarding this issue, and how it relates to the bergdahl family. in 2011, the obama administration conducted talks with the taliban on a detainee exchange involving the same five taliban detainees that were ultimately transferred after the release of sergeant bergdahl. 2011. these talks, which congress was briefed on, some of you in this room were in those briefings, i understand, which congress was briefed on in november of 2011, and in january of 2012, were

broken off by the taliban in march of 2012. we have not had direct talks with the taliban since this time. in september of 2013, the government of qatar offered to serve as an intermediary, and in november of last year, we requested that the taliban provide a new proof of life video of sergeant bergdahl. in january of this year, we received that video, and it was disturbing. some of you may have seen the video. it showed a deterioration in his physical appearance and mental state compared to previous videos. our entire intelligence community carefully analyzed every part of it. and concluded that sergeant bergdahl's health was poor, and possibly declining. this gave us growing urgency to act. in april of this year, after briefly suspending engagement with us, the taliban again

signaled interest in indirect talks on an exchange. at that point we intensified our discussions with the qatar government about security assistances and assurances. particularly security assurances. on may 12th, we signed a memoranda of understanding with qatar detailing the specific security measures that would be undertaken, and enforced, and enforced by them if any taliban detainees were transferred to their custody. steve preston, who as i noted earlier, signed that memoranda of understanding on behalf of the united states government, and was included in those negotiations. included in this mou were specific risk mitigation measures, and commitments from the government of qatar, like travel restrictions, monitoring, information sharing, and limitations on activities, as

well as other significant measures, which we will detail in the closed portion of this hearing. they were described, as you know, mr. chairman, in the classified documentation and notification letter i sent to this committee last week. that memoranda of understanding has been sent to the congress, to the leadership, to the committees, and every member of congress has an opportunity to review that memoranda of understanding in a closed setting. u.s. officials received a warning. we received a warning from the qatari intermediaries that as we proceeded, time was not on our side. and we'll go into more detail in a classified hearing on those warnings. this indicated that the risk to the sergeant bergdahl's safety were growing.

we moved forward with indirect negotiations on how to carry out that exchange. that exchange of five detainees. and agreed to the mechanics of the exchange on the morning of may 27th. following three days of intensive talks. that same day president obama received a personal commitment and a personal telephone call from the emir of qatar to uphold and enforce the security arrangements and the final decision was made to move forward with that exchange on that day. as the opportunity to obtain sergeant bergdahl's release became clear, we grew increasingly concerned that any delay or any leaks could derail the deal and further endanger sergeant bergdahl. we were told by the qataris that a leak, any kind of leak, would end the negotiation for bergdahl's release.

we also knew that he would be extremely vulnerable during any movement and our military personnel conducting the handoff would be exposed to the possible ambush or other deadly scenarios in very dangerous territory that we did not control. and we'd been given no information on where the handoff would occur. for all these reasons and more, the exchange needed to take place quickly, efficiently, and quietly. we believe this exchange was our last, best opportunity to free him. after the exchange was set in motion, only 96 hours passed before sergeant bergdahl was in our hands. throughout this period there was great uncertainty. great uncertainty about whether the deal would go forward. we did not know the general area of the handoff until 24 hours before.

we did not know the precise location until one hour before. and we did not know until the moment sergeant bergdahl was handed over safely to u.s. special operations forces, that the taliban would hold up their end of the deal. so it wasn't until we recovered sergeant bergdahl on may 31st that we moved ahead with the transfer of the five guantanamo detainees. the president's decision to move forward with the transfer of these detainees was a tough call. i supported it. i stand by it. as secretary of defense i have the authority and the responsibility, as has been noted here, to determine whether detainees, any detainees, but these specific detainees at guantanamo bay, can be transferred to the custody of another country. i take that responsibility, mr. chairman, members of this committee, damn seriously. damn seriously.

as i do any responsibility i have in this job. neither i nor any member of the president's national security council are under any illusions about these five detainees. they were members of the taliban. which controlled much of afghanistan's prior, all the territory to america's invasion and overthrow of that regime. they were enemy belligerents detained under the law of war, and taken to guantanamo in late 2001 and 2002. they've been in the u.s. kid toddy at zbaun mow since then, 12, 13 years, but they have not been implicated in any attacks against the united states, and we had no basis to prosecute them in a federal court or military commission. it was appropriate to continue to consider them for an exchange, as we had been over the last few years, as congress had been told that we were.

and if any of these detainees ever try to rejoin the fight, they would be doing so at their own peril. there's also always always some risk associated with the transfer of detainees from guantanamo. this is not a risk-free business. we get that. the u.s. government has transferred 620 detainees. 620 detainees from guantanamo since may, 2002. with 532 transfers occurring during the bush administration. and 88 transfers occurring during the obama administration. in the case of these five detainees the security measures qatar put in place led me as secretary of defense to determine consistent with the national defense authorization act that the risk they posed to the united states, our citizens and our interests, were substantially mitigated.

i consulted with all of the members of the president's national security team and asked them, as they reviewed all the details, they reviewed the draft of my notification letter, the specific line by line, word by word details of that letter, i asked for their complete reviews, the risks associated, and i asked either concur or object to the transfer. the secretary of state, the attorney general, secretary of homeland security, director of national intelligence, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff all supported this transfer. all put their names on it. there was complete unanimity on this decision, mr. chairman. the president and i would not have moved forward unless we in

the national interests and the best traditions of our country. our operation to save sergeant bergdahl's and the u.s. laws and national security interests in at least five ways. first, we complied with the national defense authorization act of 2014 by determining that the risk of detainees posed to the united states, american citizens, and our interests was substantially mitigated. and that the transfer was in the national security interest of the united states. second, we fulfilled our commitment to recover all military personnel held captive. third, we followed the precedent of past wartime prisoner exchanges. a practice in our country that dates back to the revolutionary war. and has occurred in most wars that we fought. fourth, because sergeant bergdahl was a detained combatant, being held by an enemy force, and not a hostage,

it was fully consistent with our long-standing policy not to offer concessions to hostage takers. the taliban is our enemy. and we are engaged in an armed conflict with them. fifth, we did what was consistent with previous congressional briefings this administration has provided, as i've already noted in late 2011 and early 2012. reflecting our intent to conduct a transfer of this nature with these particular five individuals. mr. chairman, i fully understand and appreciate the concerns, the questions about our decision to transfer these five detainees to qatar without providing 30 days notice to congress. but under these exceptional circumstances, a fleeting opportunity to protect the life of an american service member held captive and in danger for almost five years, the national security team and the president of the united states agreed that we needed to act swiftly.

we were mindful that this was not simply a detainee transfer. but a military operation with very high and complicated risks and a very short window of opportunity that we didn't want to jeopardize. both for the sake of sergeant bergdahl, and our operators in the field who put themselves at great risk to secure his return. in consultation with the department of justice, the administration concluded that the transfer of the five could lawfully proceed. the options available to us to recover sergeant bergdahl were very few. and far from perfect. but they often are in wartime, mr. chairman. and especially in a complicated war like we've been fighting in afghanistan for 13 years. wars are messy. and they're full of imperfect choices. i saw this firsthand during my service in vietnam in 1968.

1968 this committee may recall we sent home nearly 17,000 of our war dead in one year. i see it as the secretary of defense. a few of you on this committee, a few of you on this committee have experienced war, and you've seen it up close. you know there's always suffering in war. there's no glory in war. war is always about human beings. it's not about machines. war is a dirty business. and we don't like to deal with those realities. but realities, they are. and we must deal with them. those of us charged with protecting the national security interests of this country are called upon every day to make the hard, tough, imperfect, and sometimes unpleasant choices based on the best information we have, and within the limits of our laws. and always based on america's interests. war, every part of war, like

prisoner exchanges, is not some abstraction or theoretical exercise. the hard choices and options don't fit neatly into clearly defined instructions in how-to manuals. all of these decisions are part of the brutal, imperfect realities we all deal with in war. in the decision to rescue sergeant bergdahl we complied with the law. and we did what we believed was in the best interest of our country, our military, and sergea sergeant bergdahl. the president has constitutional responsibilities, and constitutional authorities to protect american citizens, and members of our armed forces. that's what he did. america does not leave its soldiers behind. we made the right decision. and we did it for the right reasons. to bring home one of our own people. as all of you know i value the defense department's partnership, partnership with this congress, and the trust we've developed over the years.

i know that trust has been broken. i know you have questions about that. but i'll tell you something else, i have always been straightforward, completely transparent about this committee since i've been secretary of defense. i will continue to do that. i will do that always with all my relationships, associations and responsibilities to the congress. that's what i always demanded, mr. chairman, of any administration when i was a member of the united states senate. i've been on your side of this equation. i understand it. that's what i've done this morning with the statement i've made and i made the decision i did. and i've explained that in general terms. the circumstances surrounding my decisions were imperfect. and these decisions that have to

lead to some kind of judgment always are. the president is in the same position. but you have to make a choice. you have to make a decision. the day after the bergdahl operation, at bagram air base in afghanistan, i met with a team of special operators that recovered sergeant bergdahl. they are the best of the best. people who didn't hesitate to put themselves at incredible personal risk to recover one of their own. and i know we all thank them. i know this committee thanks them. and we appreciate everything that they do. and we thank all of our men and women in afghanistan who make the difficult sacrifices every day for this country. earlier this week we were reminded of the heavy costs of war. the heavy costs of war when we lost five american servicemen in afghanistan.

i know our thoughts and our prayers are with their families. we're grateful for their service. but we're grateful for the service of all our men and women in uniform around the world. as i conclude mr. chairman i want to again thank this committee. this committee for what you do every day to support our men and women around the world. mr. chairman, i appreciate the opportunity to make this statement, i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much mr. secretary. in your statement, you indicated that the president had made the final decision on this operation. i appreciate your clarifying that. we had a briefing just a couple of days ago, and the last question asked by a member of congress of the briefers was who made the final decision, and one of the briefers stated that you had made the final decision. i think all of us understand how

this place works. and a decision of this nature is always made by the commander in chief. and i think that you clarified that, and i appreciate that. mr. secretary, one of the things that has bothered me the most about this is the fact that we did pass a law last year that stated that congress should be notified 30 days before any transfer of detainees from guantanamo. just a little history. we were briefed, some of us, some of the leadership, on this committee and other pertinent committees in congress, starting in november of '11 that there was negotiations that we were entering into negotiations with the taliban looking towards reconciliation at some point.

along with that -- in that meeting, there was also mention about a potential transfer of detainees, as you mentioned, for the release of sergeant bergdahl. that was followed up with another briefing in january. and then the taliban set up a headquarters in qatar. president karzai learned of that. everything hit the fan. and we were briefed again, saying that all of those negotiations have come to a halt. if we start those negotiations again, we will inform you. we never heard another briefing on that matter. and so when we passed that law, we felt that we did it for a

good reason. the law didn't just state that we would be given a notice. it required that the department would provide numerous pieces of critical information, including how the risk posed by the detainee had been substantially mitigated, how the transfer is in the national security interest of the united states, an assessment of the capacity, willingness, and past practices of the receiving country, along with the notice, along with several other pieces of information. and previous ndaas

with the tape, and with the other things that went forth. and i've been told in a couple of different briefings now that somewhere, i think the final number given to us a couple days ago was somewhere between 80 and 90 people in the department of justice, the state department, the homeland security, i guess was one of them, and the department of defense, knew about this, 80 to 90 people. the only one i know of that was elected was the president, and perhaps the vice president. we don't know who those 80 or 90 people were. yet, in all that time, the leadership of the house that has the responsibility, a

co-leadership, according to the constitution, with the president of the united states, was not informed, not told of any of this. if you had -- or somebody, i think you have the most credibility, but if you had been able to meet with the responsible people in the congress, and give them the same story you just now gave us, the law would have been complied with. we didn't need to know the operational details. we didn't need to know anything than that other than the things that i've mentioned that the law states. in full compliance with the law would have been met. and i don't think we would have pushed back at all. and yet when the law's ignored, and, you know, we all have -- we all feel keenly the responsibilities that we have. sometimes more than others. this is one of those times where this is a very important

principle, and i wish that you, or somebody, had sat down with the leadership of the congress, including the senate, and told us the same things that you've just told us in your briefing here. i think it would have gone -- would have been very helpful in re-establishing, or establishing, or keeping, the trust that we should have between the congress, the president of the united states, the supreme court, all of us trying to work together to the satisfaction of the constitution, and the american people that were all sent here to serve. let me just ask one question, secretary hagel, will the department fully cooperate with this committee's inquiry going forward with the detainee

exchange, including the recent request that i sent a couple of days ago for documents? >> absolutely. yes. >> thank you very much. and thank you for your service in the military in uniform, in the senate, and now in this very tough job that you hold. >> thank you. >> mr. smith? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think two very important parts to this. one is the one the chairman just mentioned which i'll get to in a second. but the first is this whole notion that we have somehow broken precedent. that this negotiation, we negotiated with terrorists, in exchange for this, and that you know, went against a long-standing u.s. policy. and i think that has been the central criticism, the criticism from the speaker yesterday, and i think it's just absolutely wrong given the situation that we were in. as you described it. we went to war in afghanistan. sergeant bergdahl was fighting in that war. and we were fighting directly

against the taliban. you know for the first couple of months they were the government. they were knocked out and they kept fighting as an insurgent force. could you walk us through, and maybe mr. preston, as the lawyer, you can sort maybe, mr. preston, as the lawyer you can get into this, how you view this and whether or not this is unprecedented. there certainly doesn't seem to be. there's been schaenexchanges in about every war we fought of prisoners. whatever we thought of the taliban, we were fighting a war with them. it was a battle zone. it was not a diplomat or a civil van, it was a member of the armed forces who was captured in that battle so do you think that we've set some precedent for negotiating with terrorists or is it clearly, as it is in my mind, in a different legal category? >> congressman smith, thank you. i as you noted, alluded to some of this in general terms in my

statement. two general comments to respond and then i'll ask mr. preston, you suggested his thoughts. one, this was an extraordinary situation. for the reasons i mentioned, i think in the classified briefings that some of you have attended or heard will get more into the extraordinary dynamics when we close this hearing down and go into classified. it was a very unique set of dynamics that we were dealing with, that's number one. on the precedent-setting side of this, i'm not the legal person here, but i do occasionally read, and i don't think there were any precedents set by this. as far as from what i know from past wars and the way we've always gotten our prisoners back

or attempted to get back at the time of war or after war, we can get into all the appropriate categorizations of who are combatants and who are we at war with and who are terrorists. and we have legal definitions for all of those. but i said something at the beginning of my testimony here. i know it's imperfect, but i do think it plays into the larger scope of what we were dealing with, what we are dealing, with still dealing with and will be dealing with not just in afghanistan. but you look at yemen, what's going on all over the world. what is unprecedented today is the threats and what we're up against around the world. organized, sophisticated terrorist groups. now, have we declared on war on any of them or how would we define them other than some as

terrorist groups, but these are different dynamics in unprecedented situations that this country has never had to deal with before. i'll make one last comment and then ask mr. preston for his legal opinion on your question. you all have major responsibilities. we each in government have major responsibilities. i have the responsibility of getting up every morning, i've got one responsibility and that's the security of this country. that's what i'm charged with. that's what the president asked me to do, the senate confirmed me to do that, i agreed to do it, i took an oath of office. we all take the same oath of office and that's to the constitution and security of this country. that is my primary focus every day. you all have your focuses. not too dissimilar from mine either on some of these things. i just happen to have a more narrow gauge in what i do. the president of the united states has the ultimate

responsibility for the security of this country. so i just remind us of all of this. it's imperfect, i know, and it might sound like an excuse but it's not an excuse, it's reality. i'll ask mr. preston. >> thank you. there's, of course, a good deal of technical legal detail in what constitutes a p.o.w. per se versus a detained combatant or privileged or unprivileged belligerent. i don't think we need to get into that to answer your question. what we had were detained combatants held by opposing forces in the samd armed conflict. as such this exchange falls within the tradition of prisoner exchanges between opposing forces in time of war. now, it is true that the taliban is not the conventional nation

state that has been party to conventional armed conflict in the past, but it's not the character of the holding party. it's the character of the detainee that inspires and motivates our commitment to the recovery of service members held abro abroad. we don't see those as setting a particular precedent both because it does ball within that tradition of prisoner exchanges and there have been in the past occasions where the united states has dealt with nonstate actors who are holding a service member in order to achieve their recovery. >> can you give us a specific example of that? >> the one example i'm aware of is the helicopter pilot, michael durant, in somalia who was held captive by the war lord mohammed adid and there was a quiet, as i understand it, arrangement whereby the united states

regained durant's freedom and functionally in exchange for individuals that were captured in the same operation. >> and i just want to say again any characterization of this as negotiating with terrorists totally misses the fact that we were and are at war. sergeant bergdahl was a member of our military fighting that war. on the gitmo piece, is it your opinion that at the end -- say 2014 we consider that to be the end of hostilities, which is an interesting argument because we're still going to have 10,000 troops there, that assuming there was an end of hostilities that these five would have had to have been released as the end of hostilities? is that the department's opinion? are they undecided or do they feel the opposite? >> sir, the way i would answer that is to say that we believe we have under domestic law, specifically the aomf, and under international law principles of the law of armed conflict that

we have authority to hold and had the authority to hold these five at guantanamo as enemy belligerents. >> even after the war would have been over? >> i will speak to that. there will come a point in time where the armed engagements we're engaged in with the taliban come to an end. at that pointing the law of war rationale for continuing to hold these unprivileged belligerents would end unless there were some other basis for continuing to hold them such as prosecution. >> it's not just -- not just the war in afghanistan. >> that's right. >> it's the broader battle as defined under the aumf. >> and the further point is i'm not aware of any determination as yet that with the cessation of the current combat mission at the end of this year that the armed conflicts are determined

to be over such that would determine the circumstances we've been discussing. >> and the last thing i'll say and no need to respond to this but i'll just reemphasize a pointing the chairman has made and i made in my opening statement, let me just say the department of defense in my experience has been very good about consulting with us and about working with this body. so it's not really about that. the white house on the other hand has not been very good about keeping in touch with congress, working with us, consulting with us on major policy issues. it's sort of hit or miss. if we could do better at that, it would make my job a whole lot easier if we could just trust congress a little bit and have those consultations before policy decisions are finalized. i think it would make this entire town work better than it is right now. i yield back. >> there are two things i need

clarified. did you, mr. preston, say that at some point conflict would end and then we would release these people or we would have to release them, there would be no reason to hold them and that that conflict is ending in december of this year? >> sir, the point was when the conflict ends the international law basis for continuing to hold people who are being held on the basis of their membership in the -- >> i'm sorry, mr. preston, but you have to point out which armed conflict you're talking about. your answer was not the armed conflict in the afghanistan, it was the one as defined under the aumf. as long as we're fighting al qaeda and as long as we're fighting their associated forces, that is the armed conflict that you were talking about being over, not afghanistan. i believe that's the point of the chairman's question. >> the point is we're currently in armed conflict with the taliban and with al qaeda.

at some point the armed conflict with the taliban ends. at that point for those detainees who are being held as enemy belligerents against our enemy, the taliban, unless there is additional basis for holding them, then we would no longer have that international law basis for holding them. now, it has been suggested that taliban may also held as associates of al qaeda as the conflict with al qaeda continues. >> the point that mr. smith made is that this conflict may not end in december, just because the majority of our troops are pulled out. is that your understanding? >> that is my understanding as