position of the obama administration that after the president of the united states signs a law, and it becomes law, that he can on his own after consultation with legal counsel, the justice department, whoever, say, i don't have to comply with a particular provision of that law without going to court first? >> i can only speak for myself. but i think that the president may act in the exercise of his constitutional authority as he understands it, and as circumstances demand, without necessarily going to court. >> how is that different from the position that people in the nixon administration took during watergate, that the president does it, it's legal? how is that different? >> i wouldn't even know where to begin to answer that. >> well, begin with the beginning. can the president of the united states decide he can do whatever he wants to do, because he thinks he's got some

constitutional perfection? despite a clear provision in the law he can't do that? >> this president faced a service member in peril in activity and exercised a constitutional duty and authority to recover that service member. in circumstances in which it was the judgment of the policy, the leading policy makers of this country, that the circumstances were not going to permit the 30-day notification. that's a very concrete response to what was a very compelling situation. >> i understand that you're saying that under these particular circumstances. you're not saying that it's a blanket thing. but you think under certain circumstances, the president of the united states, after he has signed a law and it has become law, can decide certain parts of it he doesn't have to comply with, without going to a court and getting a determination about his constitutional basis for doing so?

>> there are circumstances, and this was one. >> one final question for you, secretary hagel. could you please provide us assurance that there will be no unlawful command influence related to the case of sergeant bergdahl? >> absolutely. i said it here in answer to a couple of questions before. >> thank you, sir. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. i'll recognize myself for five minutes. i want to echo the remarks. appreciate the panelists for being here today. and your leadership in the dodd. and mr. secretary, thank you for your courageous and honorable service in vietnam. as a former soldier myself, i'll start by saying that, the ethos that we leave no soldier behind is very important to the profession of arms. still, i have deep concerns about the judgment in this particular case. and i want to associate myself with the remarks of miss gabbard earlier. first, some context. i must say i respectfully disagree with the administration's decision to keep troops in afghanistan for

two more years. i think that we've largely accomplished what we set out to do. decimating al qaeda and preventing them from having a safe haven in afghanistan. i certainly would stipulate that we have an enduring national security interest to make sure that that remains the case. i don't think we need to leave troops on the ground to do that. i believe we can do that from over the horizon with special operations troops, arabian sea or indian ocean. evidently the administration agrees, because the administration is talking about departing in two years. you know, if the administration believes that we have an interest in continuing to train the afghanistan forces, i don't see why we can't bring them to the united states of america. and train them here. and by the way, the afghanistan people should pay for that. but, you know, we are where we are today, and that is that the administration wants to keep u.s. troops there for two more years. and given that, i question the judgment of this particular decision. and i know we've been over --

i'm not going to ask to rehash a lot of the ground we've been on, but i do want to add this point, that at any point in the negotiations, sir, did it come up that we would want to keep these five detainees in qatar until the last american troop comes home? >> congressman, that was not the nature of the discussion. it was with reference to the period of time for which the security assurances would be in place. >> well, listen, i certainly caught the earlier remark that said, we weren't holding the best cards. i get that. it doesn't appear we were holding any cards. i'm not sure our negotiating position, we gave up very high-level commanders. it doesn't appear to us that we had any kind of leverage. and i just refuse to accept that we had no leverage at all. i mean, they evidently had been wanting to get these five leaders back. and i think at the very minimum, we would have pressed for the

point that these five commanders would not return to afghanistan until the last american troop returned back to our soil. let me say this, that i'm interested to know in the best military judgment of our commanders, our ground commander in afghanistan, the centcom commander and chairman of the joint chiefs. i guess i'm curious why the chairman's not with us today. but i'm interested in their assessment and their go/no-go recommendation. >> thank you, congressman, and thank you for your distinguished service. i know about it, and we appreciate it. chairman dempsey is in london. he is convening a group of chief military defense officers, counterparts of his from nato. this was a conference that was planned months and months ago. he considered not going.

since chairman mckeon asked not to have any uniformed military at this table, i told general dempsey not to come back, because he was not invited to sit here. as to his role, i said in my testimony, as well as the vice chairman, who has been very active on this, admiral winifeld, i think has been in every briefing for the house and senate the last two weeks, they have been very intricately involved in all the meetings, all the counseling, all the steps, signed off, supported. they have not been left out. in any dimension of this. and the vice chairman, as i said, has actually been in all the meetings. >> so i'm understanding that both the vice chairman and chairman recommended go on this mission? >> yes. >> what about the ground

commander and centcom commander? >> they were notified on the 27th of may. general dunford and general austin, their awareness of something going on was there. but again, to keep this as close as we could, they were not informed until four days before the specific operational plans and decisions, until four days before the operation. i believe that i'm right on those dates. >> thank you, gentlemen. we'll now move to chairman mccall. >> thank you, mr. chairman, mr. secretary, mr. preston. i chair the homeland security committee, so i look at it from that vantage point. i do have concerns that this move, this swap empowers and emboldens our enemies. one can only look at what omar is saying about this, when he celebrates. this is a huge triumph in his

words. a colossal victory. for the first time we've negotiated with the taliban as equals. and we gave them everything they asked for, the dream team. these are the heads of intelligence, military, with long ties to osama bin laden. when i was in iraq last month, i met with general demford and ambassador cunningham. as we were standing in front of the afghans, i'm concerned about the influence the five could have on the process. as the ambassador told me, as we withdraw, his biggest fears will be a vacuum and then we'll be hit again. mr. secretary, can you tell me how this move is in our best interest in terms of our security? >> to start with, as i have covered this ground this morning, we got our one remaining prisoner back. i don't think that's an incidental accomplishment.

second, as has been quoted here, here a couple of hours ago, the former central command commander, marine general jim maddos, what he said this sunday -- last sunday, about one of the significant features of this return was, it frees up our forces in afghanistan to not be concerned, and not have any adjustments or realities or limitations, to always be mindful of trying to get our prisoner back. and i think, again, i don't think this is anything to be diminished either, as noted by the congressman, the fact is, our military men and women know that we'll go after them. we won't leave them behind. >> my time's limited.

but one of these five, they've already come out publicly and said, i want to go to afghanistan and kill americans. that concerns me. and these guys over there reviving the movement, if you will, filling the vacuum, then hitting the homeland again, as we saw pre-9/11, there's an old axiom in foreign policy, and you served in the senate foreign affairs committee, armed services for a long time, that we don't negotiate with terrorists. the haqqani network, as i understand it, were responsible for holding the sergeant captive. now, isn't it true that the haqqani network has been designated a foreign terrorist organization? >> they are. >> if so, did we not just negotiate with the terrorists? >> no. we negotiated with the government of qatar. the taliban made the teal. deal. the haqqani network is essentially, as far as we can

tell, a subcontractor to -- and they do it not just with the taliban, but they do it with different groups. >> let's be -- let's be clear. so we negotiated with the middle man, the qatari government, with the haqqani network, who held them captive, held the sergeant captive, and that haqqani -- >> it was the taliban that represented -- that were represented. >> but ultimately it was with the haqqani network which is a foreign terrorist organization. >> well, as i said, yes, they're associated in different ways. we know that. as i said, i think the best way i can describe it is essentially a subcontractor. >> the haqqani network, as i understand it, is the most lethal force over there right now. >> it is. >> and after we withdraw and fill in the vacuum, and from a homeland security standpoint potentially hitting americans --

>> the haqqani network didn't have any role in this deal. preston can give you the specifics of this. >> in my limited time, there's a story about a memo from guantanamo transfer to susan rice. what role does the white house play in your determinations regarding the release of detainees from guantanamo? >> i have the authority and responsibility to make the decisions and notify congress on whether they're going to be transferred or not. >> does it stop with you, or does it go to the white house? >> well, the president signs off as well. but you asked what role they play. my assessments are made based on, yes, the national security council, because the subcommittee that you chair, the secretary of homeland security is part of that. integral, important part of that, for obvious reasons. so is the secretary of state. so is the national director of

intelligence. so is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. so is the president's national security adviser. sure, i want all that. and they all signed off on this decision, by the way. i've got to have all that, because all of them have different pieces. along with our own internal dod pieces. >> i understand that. i see my time is expired. thank you so much for being here today. >> thank you. >> all time is expired. we thank the gentlemen. they've been very gracious with their time this morning and this afternoon. and we thank you for your service. and this meeting is adjourned. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

secretary of defense chuck hagel and the gem counsel of the pentagon, stephen preston, wrapping up some five hours of testimony before the house armed services committee. just to let you know, of course, you can see this online at c-span.org. we will show all of it to you later in our program schedule on the c-span networks. and you can continue your comments as well. as you see there, twitter, #c-span chat. and at facebook.com/c-span. we're also going to take you to live coverage of another story. last night in virginia, the seventh district, in that primary, you probably know, the majority leader eric cantor falling to david brat. 56% to 44%. the majority leader has announced he's holding a news conference this afternoon at 4:30 eastern. we will have that live for you here on c-span3. what's more is that the republican conference is set to

meet shortly. and we have cameras there as well. if there are any comments following that meeting, the house republicans, we'll have live coverage of that here on c-span3 as well. while we wait for the news conference at 4:30, what we'll do is show you a portion of today's very lengthy house armed services committee with chuck hagel and mr. preston.

meeting will come to order. please hold the seats for the public. >> at the start of this hearing,

i'm pleased to welcome members of the public, who have such an interest in these proceedings. we intend to conduct this hearing in an orderly and efficient manner to ensure all the members have an opportunity to ask questions, and our witnesses have an opportunity to be heard. to that end, please be advised i'll not tolerate disturbances, including photography standing, or holding signs. i thank you all for your cooperation. i want to thank secretary hagel and mr. preston for testifying before the committee today on the may 31st transfer of five senior taliban detainees from detention at guantanamo bay to the government of qatar. the matter before us is deeply troubling. the committee has begun a full investigation into the administration's decision. it's unprecedented negotiations with terrorists. the national security

implications of releasing these dangerous individuals from u.s. custody, and the violation of national security law. we hope for and expect the department's full cooperation. let me be clear up front on the focus of today's hearing. it is not my intention to dive into the circumstances of the disappearance of sergeant bergdahl from his base in 2009. there will be a time and a process for that. i also do not intend to use this hearing to weigh the merits of returning an american soldier to the united states. everyone who wears the uniform should be returned home. however, the detainee transfer raises policies and legal questions. the explanation we received from the white house officials, at a briefing earlier this week were misleading. and at times blatantly false. this transfer sets a dangerous precedent in negotiating with

terrorists. it reverses long-standing u.s. policy and could incentivize other terrorist organizations, including al qaeda, to increase their use of kidnappings of u.s. personnel. it increases risk to our military and civilian personnel serving in afghanistan and elsewhere. as the president, yourself, and other administration officials have acknowledged, these five terrorists still pose a threat to americans, and afghans alike. and in one year, they will be free to return to afghanistan or anywhere else. what's more, although there will be fewer u.s. personnel in afghanistan in 2015, the return of these five taliban leaders directly threatens the gains of our men and women who have fought and died -- the gains that our men and women fought and died for. it's a clear violation of section 1035 of the national defense authorization act of 2014. there's no compelling reason why

the department could not provide a notification to congress 30 days before the transfer. especially when it has complied with the notification requirement for all previous gitmo detainee transfers since enactment of the law. the statute is more than a notification. it requires detailed national security information, including detailed consideration of risk, and risk mitigation, that the congress and american people would expect any administration to consider before a decision is made to transfer gitmo detainees. it was designed and approved by a bipartisan majority in congress, due to real concerns the dangerous terrorists were being released in a manner that allowed them to return to the battlefield. we're also seeing the consequences of the president's hasty afghanistan withdrawal strategy. afghanistan is at a critical juncture. at the same time, we're focused

on the first democratic transition of government, and supporting security and stability within the country, this negotiation has legitimized the taliban. the organization that safeguarded the 9/11 al qaeda perpetrators, and ruled afghanistan through atrocities. lastly, this transfer sets dangerous precedent for how the president intends to clear out gitmo. the remaining detainees by the obama administration's own analysis include the most dangerous against u.s. forces, and national security interests. in the president's rush to close gitmo, are other deals in the works to release these dangerous individuals. mr. secretary, i don't envy the position you've been put in. we understand the responsibility you bear for signing these transfer agreements, but we're also aware of the immense pressure the white house put on you to transfer these detainees, so it can claim victory for

closing gitmo. nevertheless, we expect the department to abide by the law, and to provide its candid assessment of national security impacts of the president's decisions. this is a bipartisan committee. last month, we passed our authorization act out of committee unanimously. and off the floor with well over 300 votes. that kind of bipartisanship is based on trust. members on this committee trust each other to live up to our word, and when we work with the department, and the white house, to pass legislation, the president will sign, we have to trust that he will follow those laws. the president has broken a bipartisan law and put our troops at greater risk, and i'm eager to find out why. mr. smith? >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this hearing. thank you to our witnesses for being here. i think this is a very appropriate issue for congress to exercise oversight on. there are a lot of questions that need to be answered.

i'm pleased the administration's here today to attempt to answer those questions. i also want to agree up front with the chairman, that one thing we shouldn't talk about today is the circumstances of sergeant bergdahl's -- sorry, of mr. bergdahl's capture. i'm happy about that. regrettably at the briefing on monday that issue did come up. there simply is no proof, no evidence. i think the way mr. bergdahl has been slandered has been scandalous. and i hope we'll take a step back and do what admiral winifeld said, we'll get him home and get him healthy, and due process will be exercised. what should be discussed today are the circumstances of this deal. and i think the chairman raised a number of appropriate questions. and i have enormous sympathy for the president and for you, mr. secretary. it's a very difficult decision that had to be made, whether or not this was an exchange in the best interests of the united states. ultimately i will tell you, i think it was.

we do our level best to bring our service men and women home if we possibly can. not under any circumstances. the issue was raised, would we have traded khalid shaikh mohammed for him? absolutely not. totally different situation. when you're talking about these five members of the taliban, it is a different equation. and that really raises the issues the chairman came up with. who were we negotiating with? he says we were negotiating with terrorists. sergeant bergdahl was captured on the battlefield, in a war zone. the taliban were, until just a few months before that, the legitimate government of afghanistan. the current afghan government has said over and over again, that they want to negotiate with the taliban. any sensible person who looks at the situation in afghanistan right now understands that there is no ultimate peaceful solution, if at some point you don't negotiate with some of the taliban.

which ones? we don't know. to simply dismiss this as one terrorist group and negotiating with terrorists i think totally misstates the situation. this was on the battlefield, in a war zone, a soldier who was captured by a group of people that were the legitimate government in afghanistan, mere months before. i don't know the full implications of that. i completely agree with the chairman that we need to be very, very careful about setting any precedent that we would negotiate with terrorists. but i think this raises an entirely different set of questions that need to be answered and addressed. i would be very interested, secretary hagel, in your viewpoint on that. what does that mean going forward. but understand, the idea that under no circumstances will we negotiate with the taliban is one that has been rejected by virtually everyone. we, the afghan government, if we're going to get any sort of peaceful solution in afghanistan, are going to have to negotiate at least some elements 6 the taliban. which ones? we don't know. that has certainly been the position of the afghan

government. this is an entirely different situation than saying we simply negotiated with terrorists. the second troubling question this raises is the situation in guantanamo. i will disagree with the chairman on one key point. the president is not pursuing this, out of some naked political goal. he wants to close guantanamo just because politically he'd like to. that's not the situation. we have over 150 people held in guantanamo, many of them in very murky status. is it the plan of the united states of america to hold these people forever without charge, and without trial? what would that do to our values? the press dents we've set in a different way if we do that? there's no easy way out of this. but to simply dismiss it that any effort to close guantanamo is purely political, overlooks the fact we're in a difficult situation. in large part because a lot of these people were captured in the first place without a clear understanding of how or why,

without a plan to try them, and now we have them. and it is not the united states of america that i believe in that says, look, we're just going to grab people and hold them without process. how are we going to handle that? one of the interesting questions that's been raised, it has been argued that these five that were captured, would have to have been released at the end of hostilities with afghanistan. it's not my understanding that that's actually the status that we've given them. they are not being treated clearly as prisoners of war. in fact, i believe the phrase was, unlawful enemy combatants is the phrase used for them. if they weren't being held as prisoners of war, is it the administration's position that at the end of our full involvement in afghanistan, we would have to release them? i don't believe that it is. that's been alluded to. that really needs to be clarified. first of all, with regard to these five, but second of all, how many more inmates are there in afghanistan that might be put into that category, that at the

end of 2014 we would feel like we would have to release? again, it's my understanding that it's none of them, that we didn't put them in that law of war category, prisoner of war category that they would have to be released at the end of hostilities. but the category they're in is very murky and confusing and something we have to answer. the final issue that is worth exploring, where i'm in more substantial agreement with the chairman is on the congressional consultation issue. first of all, it is important for the white house to engage with congress just as a way for us to work together to advance the right policies, to consult us on key issues. i think it is wrong that months before -- well, it's wrong that when you knew you were thinking about doing this deal, you didn't take the top leadership in congress and talk about it. i know the concern, that it would have been leaked. as has been mentioned, congress has been trusted with many, many other things, including the location of osama bin laden, and not leaked it. i think that type of consultation would have helped the process, not hurt it.

and the second piece that i'm concerned about is the 30-day requirement. i know the president put a signing statement when he signed the law that had that 30-day requirement in it, saying he was concerned about the constitutionality about it. the law is the law. the way you challenge cons stultity is you go to court. figure out whether or not the courts say it's constitutional or not. until the courts rule on that, it is the law. when president bush was in the white house, he had, gosh, hundreds of signing statements. and there was, i believe, a correct amount of outrage amongst many that those signing statements were put out there as a way to simply avoid the law. it wasn't right for president bush to do it, it's not right for president obama to do it. i would be curious to understand the argument for why that 30-day requirement wasn't in place. again, i'll come back to the fact that there was no reason 30-day notice couldn't have been given to the leadership of congress. we can in fact keep a secret. or i would say we're no worse at

it than the administration. if you go back through history in terms of how things get out. i think better consultation with congress is something we'll definitely need going forward. with that, i look forward to your testimony. i thank the chairman for this hearing. >> i ask unanimous consent that the members allowed to participate in the meeting. committee members have had the opportunity to ask questions. is there objection? without objection, noncommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time. mr. secretary? the time is yours. >> mr. chairman, thank you, ranking smith, thank you. and to the members of this committee, i appreciate an opportunity to discuss the recovery of sergeant bowe bergdahl. the transfer of five detainees from guantanamo to qatar. i appreciate having steve preston here with me this morning.

mr. preston was one of our negotiators throughout this process in qatar, and signed on behalf of the united states. the memorandum of understanding between the governments of qatar and the united states. also, here representing the joint chiefs of staff, sitting behind me, is brigadier general pat white, who is the director of the joint staffs, pakistan, afghanistan coordination cell. general white helped coordinate the bergdahl recovery on behalf of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general dempsey. the vice chairman of the joint chiefs, admiral winifield, which the chairman noted, will join us later in the afternoon in the classified closed porgsz of the hearing. as you know, general dempsey and admiral winifeld played critical roles in the meetings at the security council leading up to sergeant bergdahl's release. and supported the decision to move forward with this prisoner

exchange. in my statement today, i will address the issues of chairman mckeon and mr. smith, the issues they raised. when the chairman asked me to testify. and explain why it was so urgent to pursue sergeant bergdahl's release. why we decided to move forward with the detainee transfer. and why it was fully consistent with u.s. law, our nation's interests, and our military's core values. mr. chairman, members of this committee, i want to make one fundamental point. i would never sign any document or make any agreement, agree to any decision that i did not feel was in the best interests of this country. nor would the president of the united states. who made the final decision, with the full support of his national security team.

i recognize that the speed with which we moved in this case has caused great frustration. legitimate questions, and concerns. we could have done a better job, could have done a better job of keeping you informed. but i urge you to remember two things. this was an extraordinary situation. first, we weren't certain that we would transfer those detainees out of guantanamo until we had sergeant bergdahl in hand. and second, we had sergeant bergdahl in hand only a few hours after making the final arrangements. there are legitimate questions about this prisoner exchange, and congress obviously has an important constitutional role and right and responsibility to play in all of our military and intelligence matters. as a former member, mr.

chairman, of the select committee on intelligence and council on foreign relations, i appreciate the vital role congress plays in our national security. and i will present to this committee within the limits of an open, unclassified hearing, and in more detail in the classified hearing, anything i can to answer your questions and assure you this committee, the american people, that this prisoner exchange was done legally, it was substantial mitigation of risk to our country, and in the national interests of this country. let's start with sergeant bergdahl's status as a member of the united states army. he was held captive by the taliban in the haqqani network for almost five years. he was officially listed as missing/captured. no charges were ever brought against sergeant bergdahl, and there are no charges pending now. our entire national security apparatus, the military, the

intelligence community and the state department pursued every avenue to recover sergeant bergdahl just as the american people and this congress, and the congresses before you, expected us to do. in fact, this committee, this committee knows there were a number of congressional resolutions introduced and referred to this committee directing the president of the united states to do everything he could to get sergeant bergdahl released from captivity. we never stopped trying to get him back. as the congress knows that. because he is a soldier in the united states army. questions about sergeant bergdahl's capture are as mr. smith noted, and you, mr. chairman, are separate from our effort to recover him. because we do whatever it takes to recover any and every u.s. service member held in captivity. this pledge is woven into the fabric of our nation and our military. as former central commander marine general jim maddux

previously put it, bottom line, quote, the bottom line is, we don't leave people behind. that is the beginning and that is the end of what we stand for. we keep faith with the guys who sign on, and that is all there is to it. end of quote. as for the circumstances surrounding his captivity as secretary of the army mccue, and army chief of staff will review later, they've said, clearly, last week, that the army will review -- they will review this exchange circumstance captivity of sergeant bergdahl in a comprehensive effort in speaking with sergeant bergdahl. like any american, sergeant bergdahl has rights. and his conduct will be judged on the facts, not political hearsay, posturing charges or innuendo. we do owe that to any american,

and especially those who are members of our military and their families. like most americans, i've been offended, and disappointed. and how the bergdahl family's been treated by some in this country. no family deserves this. i hope there will be some sober reflection on people's conduct regarding this issue, and how it relates to the bergdahl family. in 2011, the obama administration conducted talks with the taliban on the detainee exchange involving the same five taliban detainees that were ultimately transferred after the release of sergeant bergdahl. 2011. these talks, which congress was briefed on, some of you in this room were in those briefings, i understand, which congress was briefed on in november of 2011, and in january of 2012, were broken off by the taliban in march of 2012.

we have not had direct talks with the taliban since this time. in september of 2013, the government of qatar offered to serve as an intermediary, and in november of last year we requested that the taliban provide a new proof of life video of sergeant bergdahl. in january of this year, we received that video, and it was disturbing. some of you may have seen the video. it showed a deterioration in his physical appearance, and mental state, compared to previous videos. our entire intelligence community carefully analyzed every part of it, and concluded that sergeant bergdahl's health was poor, and possibly declining. this gave us growing urgency to act. in april of this year, after briefly suspending engagement with us, the taliban again signaled interest in indirect talks on an exchange.

at that point, we intensified our discussions with the qatar government about security assistances and assurances, particularly security assurances. on may 12th, we signed a memorandum of understanding with qatar detailing the specific security measures that would be undertaken and enforced -- and enforced by them, if any taliban detainees were transferred to their custody. steve preston, who as i noted earlier, signed that memorandum of understanding on behalf of the united states government. and was included in those negotiations. included in this mou were risk/mitigation measures, and commitments from the government of qatar, like travel restrictions, monitoring, information sharing, and limitations of activities as well as other significant measures, which we will detail in the closed portion of this hearing.

they were described, as you know, mr. chairman, in a classified documentation, and notification letter i sent to this committee last week. that memorandum of understanding has been sent to the congress, to the leadership, to the committees, and every member of congress has an opportunity to review that memorandum of understanding in a closed setting. u.s. officials received a warning -- we received a warning from the qatari intermediaries that as we proceeded, time was not on our side. and we'll go into more detail in a classified hearing on those warnings. this indicated that the risk to the sergeant bergdahl's safety were growing. we moved forward with indirect negotiations on how to carry out that exchange, that exchange of

five detainees, and agreed to the mechanics of the exchange on the morning of may 27th, following three days of intensive talks. that same day president obama received a personal commitment in a personal telephone call from the amir of qatar to uphold and enforce the security arrangements, and the final decision was made to move forward with that exchange on that day. as the opportunity to obtain sergeant bergdahl's release became clear, we grew increasingly concerned that any delay, or any leaks could derail the deal and further endanger sergeant bergdahl. we were told by the qataris that a leak, any kind of leak, would end the negotiation for bergdahl's release. we also knew that he would be extremely vulnerable during any movement, and our military

personnel conducting the handoff would be exposed to the possible ambush or other deadly scenarios in very dangerous territory, that we did not control. and we've been given no information on where the handoff would occur. for all these reasons, and more, the exchange needed to take place quickly, efficiently and quietly. we believe this exchange was our last best opportunity to free him. after the exchange was set in motion, only 96 hours passed before sergeant bergdahl was in our hands. throughout this period there was great uncertainty, great uncertainty about whether the deal would go forward. we did not know the general area of the handoff until 24 hours before. we did not know the precise location until one hour before.

and we did not know until the moment sergeant bergdahl was handed over safely to u.s. special operations forces that the taliban would hold up their end of the deal. so it wasn't until we recovered sergeant bergdahl on may 31st that we moved ahead with the transfer of the five guantanamo detainees. the president's decision to move forward with the transfer of these detainees was a tough call. i supported it. i stand by it. as secretary of defense, i have the authority and the responsibility, as has been noted here, to determine whether detainees, any detainees, but these specific detainees at guantanamo bay can be transferred to the custody of another country. i take that responsibility, mr. chairman, members of this committee, damn seriously. damn seriously. as i do any responsibility i have in this job. neither i, nor any member of the

president's national security council are under any illusions about these five detainees. they were members of the taliban, which controlled much of afghanistan's prior -- all the territory to america's invasion and overthrow that regime. they're enemy belligerence under war, and taken into guantanamo in late 2001 and 2002. they've been in the u.s. custody at guantanamo since then, 12, 13 years. but they have not been implicated in any attacks against the united states, and we had no basis to prosecute them in a federal court or military commission. it was appropriate to continue to consider them for an exchange, as we had been over the last few years, as congress had been told that we were. and if any of these detainees ever try to rejoin the fight,

they would be doing so at their own peril. there's also always, always some risk associated with the transfer of detainees from guantanamo. this is not a risk-free business. we get that. the u.s. government has transferred 620 detainees, 620 detainees from guantanamo since may 2002. with 532 transfers occurring during the bush administration, and 88 transfers occurring during the obama administration. in the case of these five detainees, the security measures qatar put in place led me, as secretary of defense, to determine consistent with the national defense authorization act that the risk they posed to the united states, our citizens and our interests, were substantially mitigated. i consulted with all of the members of the president's national security team and asked

them, as they reviewed all the details, they reviewed the draft of my notification letter, the specific line-by-line, word-by-word detail of that letter, i asked for their complete reviews, the risks associated, and i asked either concur or object to the transfer. the secretary of state, the attorney general, secretary of homeland security, director of national intelligence, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff all supported this transfer. all put their names on it. there was complete unanimity on this decision, mr. chairman. the president and i would not have moved forward unless we had complete confidence that we were acting lawfully. in the national interests and best traditions of our country. our operation to save sergeant

beryl da bergdahl's life was, first, we complied with the national defense authorization act of 2014 by determining that the risk the detainees posed to the united states, american citizens and our interests was substantially mitigated. and that the transfer was in the national security interests of the united states. second, we fulfilled our commitment to recover all military personnel held captive. third, we followed the precedent of past wartime prisoner exchanges. a practice in our country that dates back to the revolutionary war. and occurred in most wars that will be fought. fourth, because sergeant bergdahl was a detained combatant being held by an enemy force, and not a hostage. it was fully consistent with a long-standing policy not to offer concessions to hostage takers.

the taliban is our enemy. and we are engaged in an armed conflict with them. fifth, we did what was consistent with previous congressional briefings this administration had provided, as i already noted in late 2011 and early 2012, reflecting our intent to conduct a transfer of this nature with these particular five individuals. mr. chairman, i fully understand and appreciate the concerns, the questions about our decision to transfer these five detainees to qatar without providing 30-days notice to congress. but under these exceptional circumstances, a fleeting opportunity to protect the life of an american service member held captive and in danger for almost five years, the national security team and the president of the united states agreed that we needed to act swiftly. we were mindful that this was not simply a detainee transfer, but a military operation with

very high and complicated risks, and a very short window of opportunity that we didn't want to jeopardize. both for the sake of sergeant bergdahl and our bergdahl and o operators in the field who put themselves at great risk to secure his return. in consultation with the department of justice, the administration concluded that the transfer of the five could lawfully proceed. the options available to us to recover sergeant bergdahl were very few and far from perfect, but they often are in war time, mr. chairman, and especially in a complicated war like we've been fighting in afghanistan for 13 years. wars are messy and they're full of imperfect choices. i saw this firsthand during my service in vietnam in 1968. 1968 this committee may recall we sent home nearly 17,000 of

our war dead in one year. i see it as the secretary of defense. a few of you on this committee, few of you on this committee have experienced war, and you've seen it up close. you know there's always something, the war. there's no glory in war. war is always about human beings. it's not about machines. war is a dirty business. we don't like to deal with those realities, but realities they are. and we must deal with them. those of us charged with protecting the national security interests of this country are called upon every day to make hard, tough, imperfect and sometimes unpleasant choices based on the best information we have and within the limits of our laws. and always based on america's interests. war, every part of war, like prisoner exchanges is not some

abstraction or theoretical exercise. the hard choices and options don't fit neatly into clearly defined options in a how-to manual. it's all part of the brutal and imperfect realities we all deal with in war. in the decision to rescue sergeant bergdahl we complied with the law, and we did what we believed was in the best interests of our country, our military, and sergeant bergdahl. the president has constitutional responsibilities and constitutional authorities to protect american citizens and members of our armed forces. that's what he did. america does not leave its soldiers behind. they made the right decisions. we did it for the right reasons, to bring home one of our own people. as all of you know, i value the defense department's partnership with this congress and the trust we developed over the years. i know that trust has been broken. i know you have questions about

that. i'll tell you something else, i have always been straightforward, completely transparent with this committee since i have been secretary of defense. i will continue to do that. i will do that always with all my relationships and associations and responsibilities to the congress. that's what i always demanded, mr. chairman, of any administration when i was a member of the united states senate. i have been on your side of this equation. i understand it. that's what i've done this morning with this statement i have made and i made the decision i did, and i've explained that in general terms. the circumstances surrounding my decisions were imperfect and these decisions that have to lead to some kind of judgment always are.

the president is in the same position, but you have to make a choice. you have to make a decision. the day after the bergdahl operation at bagram air force base in afghanistan, i met with a team of special operation operators that recovered sergeant bergdahl. they are the best of the best, people who didn't hesitate to put themselves at incredible personal risk to recover one of their own. and i know we all thanked them. i know this committee thanks them and we appreciate everything that they do. and we thank all of our men and women in afghanistan that make the difficult sacrifices every day to this country. earlier this week we were reminded of the heavy costs of war, the heavy costs of war when we lost five american service men in afghanistan. i know our thoughts and our prayers are with their families.

we're grateful for their service. we're grateful for the service of all of our men and women in uniform around the world. as i conclude, mr. chairman, i want to again thank this committee, this committee for what you do every day to support our men and women around the world. mr. chairman, i appreciate the opportunity to make this statement and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, mr. secretary. in your statement you indicated that the president had made the final decision on this operation. i appreciate you clarifying that. we had a briefing just a couple of days ago, and the last question asked by a member of congress of the briefers was who made the final decision and one of the briefers had stated you made the final decision. i think all of us understand how this place works, and a decision of this nature is always made by the commander in chief and i

think that you've clarified that and i appreciate that. mr. secretary, one of the things that has bothered me the most about this is the fact that we did pass a law last year that stated that congress should be notified 30 days before any transfer of detainees from guantanamo. just a little history. we were briefed, some of us, some of the leadership on this committee and other pertinent committees in congress starting in november of '11 that there was negotiations -- that we were entering into negotiations with the taliban looking towards reconciliation at some point. along with that -- in that meeting there was also mention

about a potential transfer of detainees, as you mentioned for the release of sergeant bergdahl. that was followed up with another briefing in january, and then the taliban set up a headquarters in qatar. president karzai learned about it, everything hit the fan and we were briefed again saying that all of those negotiations have come to a halt. if we start those negotiations again, we will inform you. we never heard another briefing on that matter. and so when we passed that law we felt that we did it for a good reason. the law didn't just state that we would be given a notice, it

required that the department provide numerous pieces of critical information, including how the risk posed by the detainee had been substantially mitigated, how the transfers and the national security interests of the united states, an assessment of the capacity, willingness and past practices of the receiving country along with the notice, along with several other pieces of information, and previous ndaas had also required that same thing. in fact, our language that we had passed in this committee and through this body was softened some by language from the senate that we worked out in conference which was the final language that was passed last year. you know, mr. secretary, i think you have just made a very strong case for the position taken by the president and the administration. you just left one thing out. these negotiations, as we were

told in a briefing last week, started in january of this year with the tape and with the other things that went forth, and i've been told in a couple of different briefings now that somewhere i think the final number given to us a couple of days ago was somewhere between 80 and 90 people in the department of justice, the state department, the homeland security i guess was one of them and the department of defense knew about this, 80 to 90 people. the only one i know of that was elected was the president and perhaps the vice president. we don't know who those 80 or 90 people were, yet in all that time the leadership of the house that has the responsibility, a co-leadership according to the constitution with the president of the united states was not

informed, not told of any of this. if you had -- or somebody, i think you have the most credibility, but if you had been able to meet with the responsible people in the congress and give them the same story you just now gave us, the law would have been complied with, we didn't need to know the operational details, we didn't need to know anything of that other than the things that i've mentioned that the law states, and full compliance with the law would have been met. and i don't think we would have pushed back at all, and yet when the law is ignored and, you know, we all have -- we all feel keenly the responsibilities that we have, sometimes more than others. this is one of those times where this is a very important principle, and i wish that you or somebody had sat down with

the leadership of the congress, including the senate, and told us the same things that you've just told us in your briefing here. i think it would have gone -- would have been very helpful in re-establishing or establishing or keeping the truts that we should have between the congress, the president of the united states, the supreme court, all of us trying to work together to the satisfaction of the constitution and the american people that we're all sent here to serve. let me just ask one question, secretary hagel. will the department fully cooperate with this committee's inquiry going forward with the detainee exchange, including the recent requests that i sent a

couple of days ago for documents? >> absolutely. yes. >> thank you very much, and thank you for your service in the military in uniform, in the senate, and now in this very tough job that you hold. >> thank you. >> mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think two very important parts to this. one the chairman just mentioned which i'll get to in a second, but the first is this whole notion that we have somehow broken precedent, that this negotiation, we negotiated with terrorists in exchange for this, went against the long standing u.s. policy, and i think that has been the central criticism from the speaker yesterday and i think it's just absolutely wrong given the situation that we were in as you described it. we went to war in afghanistan. sergeant bergdahl was fighting in that war and we were fighting directly against the taliban. you know, for the first couple of months they were the

government and they were knocked out and kept fighting as an insurgent force. can you walk us through -- maybe mr. preston as the lawyer you can view this. there are exchanges that you mentioned in just about every war we've fought of prisoners and whatever one may think of the taliban, we were fighting a war with them. it was in a battle zone. it was not, you know, a diplomat or a civilian, it was a member of the armed forces who was captured in that battle so how -- do you think that we've set some precedent here for negotiating with terrorists or is this clearly, as it is in my mind, in a different legal category? >> congressman smith, thank you. is, as you noted, allude today some of this in my general statement. two general comments to respond and then i'll ask mr. preston for, as you've suggested, his

thoughts. one, this was an extraordinary situation for reasons i mentioned i think in the classified briefings that some of you have attended, had heard, we'll get more into the extraordinary dynamics when we close this hearing down and go into classified. it was a very unique set of dynamics that we were dealing with, that's number one. on the precedent-setting side of this, i'm not the legal person here, but i do occasionally read, and i don't think there were any precedents set by this. as far as i know from past wars and how we have always gotten our prisoners back or attempted to get them back time of war or after war, we can get into all

the appropriate categorizations of who are combatants and who we're at war with, who are terrorists, and we have legal definitions for all of those, but i said something at the beginning of my testimony here. i know it's imperfect, but i do think it plays into the larger scope of what we are dealing with, what we are dealing with, still dealing with and will continue to deal with not just in yemen, what's going on all over the world. what is unprecedented today is the threats and what we're up against around the world. organized, sophisticated terrorist groups. now we declared war on any of them or how will we define them other than some as terrorist groups, but these are different dynamics in unprecedented situations that this country has

never had to deal with before. i'll make one last comment and then ask mr. preston for his legal opinion on your question. you all have major responsibilities. we each in government have major responsibilities. i have the responsibility of getting up every morning. i've got one -- one responsibility, and that's the security of this country. that's what i'm charged with. that's what the president asked me to do, the senate confirmed me to do that, i agreed to do it, i took an oath of office. we all take the same oath of office and that's to the constitution and security of this country. that is my primary focus every day. you all have your focuses. not -- not too dissimilar from mine either on some of these things, i just happen to have a more narrow gauge of what i do. the president of the united states has the ultimate responsibility for the security of this country, so i just remind us of all -- all of this,

it's imperfect, i know, and it might sound like an excuse, but it's not an excuse. it's reality. i'll ask mr. preston. >> thank you. there's, of course, a good deal of detail -- technical/legal detail in what constitutes a p.o.w. per se versus a detained combatant versus privileged, unprivileged combatant. i don't think we need to get into that to answer your question. what we had were detained combatants held by the armed forces in the same armed conflict. as such, this exchange falls within the tradition of prisoner exchanges between opposing forces in time of war. now it is true that the taliban is not the conventional nation state that has been party to conventional armed conflicts in the past, but it's not the

character of the holding party, it's the character of the detainee that inspires and motivates our commitment to the recovery of service members held abroad. we don't see this as setting a particular precedent, both because it does fall within that tradition of prisoner exchanges and there have been in the past occasions where united states has dealt with non-state actors who were holding service -- a service member in order to achieve their recovery. >> can you give us a specific example of that? >> example i'm aware of is the helicopter pilot michael durant in somalia who was held captive by the warlord muhammad hadid and the united states regained durant's freedom and -- functionally in exchange for individuals that were captured

in the same operation. >> yeah, i just want to say again, i think any characterization is negotiating with terrorists, totally misses the fact that we were and are at war and sergeant bergdahl was a member of our military fighting that war. on the gitmo piece, is it your opinion that at the end, you know, say 2014 we consider that to be the end of hostilities, which is an interesting argument because we're still going to have 10,000 troops there, but assuming at some point there was an end of hostilities, that these five would have had to have been released at the end of hostilities? is that the department's opinion? are they undecided? or do they feel the opposite? >> sir, the way i would answer that is to say that we believe we have under domestic law, specifically the aumf and under international law principles of the law of armed conflict that we have authority to hold and had the authority to hold these five at guantanamo as enemy

belidge randge ger rants. >> ien after? >> there will come a time when it will come to an end, and at that point the law of order of rationale for continuing to hold these unprivileged belidge rants would end unless there were some other basis for continuing to hold them. >> but that's -- >> such as prosecution. >> not just -- not just the war in afghanistan. >> that's right. >> the broader battle as defined under the aumf? >> the further point i'd make is i'm not aware of any determination as yet that with the cessation of the current combat mission at the end of this year that the -- that the armed conflicts are determined to be over such that it would trigger the consequences that we've been discussing. >> thank you. and the last thing i'll say, no

need to respond to this, but i'll re-emphasize the point the chairman made, the point i made in my opening statement, it would be oh, so more helpful -- let me say the department of defense in my experience has been very good about consulting with us and about working with this body so it's not really about that. the white house, on the other hand, has not been very good about keeping in touch with congress, working with us, consulting with us on major policy issues. it's sort of hit or miss. and if we could do better at that, it would make my job a whole lot easier if we could just trust congress a little bit and have those consultations before policy decisions are finalized. i think it would make this entire town work better than it is right now. i yield back. >> gentleman yields back. there are two things i need clarified. did you, mr. preston, say that -- that at some point

conflict would end and then we would release these people or we would have to release them, there would be no reason to hold them? and that that conflict is ending in december of this year? >> sir, my point was when the armed conflict ends, the international law basis for continuing to hold people who are being held on the basis of their membership in -- >> i'm sorry, mr. preston, but you have to point out which armed conflict you're talking about. your answer was not the armed conflict in afghanistan, it was the one as defined under the aumf. in other words, as long as we're fighting al qaeda and as long as we're fighting their associated forces, that is the armed forces conflict you were talking about not afghanistan. that's the point of the chairman's question. >> the point is we're currently in armed conflict with the taliban and with al qaeda. at some point the armed conflict with the taliban ends and at

that point for those detainees that are being held as enemy beligerants against our enemy, the taliban, unless there is an additional basis for holding them, then we would no longer have that international law basis for holding them. now it has been suggested that taliban may also be -- can be held as associates of al qaeda as the conflict with al qaeda continues. >> the point that mr. smith made is that this -- this conflict may not end in december just because the majority of our troops are pulled out. is that your understanding? >> that's my understanding as well, sir. >> we thought the conflict was over in iraq and we see that it is not, that it continues to go on. now, the second thing i may have left a wrong impression when i

was talking to the secretary saying that if you had given the same report that that probably would have just solved everything. we still have big concerns about the five, and i didn't mention that when we were briefed in november of '11 and january of '12 that there was real concerns of members of congress that those five would be released. in fact, there was real opposition to it, and that's why we're very concerned that we weren't told other than if we would re-enter those negotiations you would be told and we weren't. so those are things we really need to have clarified and worked through. mr. thorn berry? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, i'd like to just begin with a brief additional observation on the notification issue. for the past several years this committee has worked on a bipartisan basis to establish an

oversight structure for cyber operations, for terrorism operations and for sensitive military operations, and an oversight structure that allows the department to have the flexibility it needs to operate in a volatile, rapidly changing world and still give us the ability to exercise our duties under the constitution. now the basis for all of those in all three of those areas is that we get timely, accurate information from the department, and this failure, even if it was ordered by the white house, undermines the ability to have that sort of oversight structure. i've been a member of the intelligence committee for ten years. our work depends on getting accurate, timely information from the intelligence community. if the president can violate the law and say, no, in this case we're not going to give you the information, it undermines the oversight procession th that we

with the intelligence community. my point is it's not just about this incident. it's not about somebody having their feelings hurt. this decision undermines a lot of the working relationship in all these areas of national security, and i think it's important that the whole administration understands some of the ramifications of this. let me ask a specific question. press reports indicate that sergeant bergdahl was captured by a conni network commander and was held by the hakoni network. is that true? >> what i would prefer as i noted in the classified session that we get into the specifics of that 15-6 commander's evaluation report that was done on the circumstances at the time of sergeant bergdahl's capture. i believe that was done in august of 2009. that's been sent up here unredacted, sent up here yesterday, and i would just as

soon get into that in a classified -- >> well, i'm not -- >> but i would say this though, i would say this. he was -- in that report that the army did, he was classified asmissing/captive. >> i wasn't focused on -- i'm trying to verify as i understand t administration people have said clearly it was the hakoni network that kept him. >> well, the hakoni network did have him through periods of time. this was another complication. over a five-year period he was moved around. we had difficulty finding him and knowing where he was. different groups held him so it was the complication of the hakoni's being part of this, that's right. >> okay. it's also true the hakoni network is listed as being a

foreign terrorist? >> that's right. but we didn't negotiate with hakoni. >> okay. i think that's a subject we'll want to discuss more if we must in the classified session, but i think who held him -- >> i want to make sure the record's clear on that. we engaged the qataris and they engaged the taliban. now if the hakanis were subcontracting to the taliban or whatever that relationship, as you know, there's the pakistan taliban and afghan taliban, there's a difference there so we get back into definitions of who has responsibility for whom, but i just want to make sure that that's clear on the record and we can go into a lot more detail. >> well, i think you just pointed out some of the difficulty in making categorical

statements that we don't negotiate with terrorists when at some point the hakanis had him. let me ask another question. the five detainees that were released. you said that there is always some risk associated with releasing someone from guantanamo, but you also said they have not been implicated in any attacks on the united states. i have some unclassified summary of evidence before the combatant status review tribunals. for example, for mr. fassal it says the detainee engaged in hostilities against the united states or its coalition partners, maybe there's a difference between us and our partners, for mr. wazik, it says the detainee participated in military operations against the coalition. so at least at some point there was evidence that they were involved in hostilities, military operations against the coalition, weren't there? >> yes. they were mid to high-ranking

members of the taliban government -- of the taliban so, yes, they were part of planning, but what my point was, we have no direct evidence of any direct involvement in their direct attacks on the united states or any of our troops. they were part of the taliban at the time some were given to us. we picked two of them up, captured two but, yes, they were combatants. >> so your point is they didn't pull the trigger but they were senior commanders of the taliban military who directed operations against the united states coalition partners. would that be a better way to do. >> as i said, they were mbatants combatants. we were at war with the talibann there's no getting around that.h i made that point, i thought, pretty clearly.aden >> just like bin laden didn't la pull a trigger, but we went hi

after him because he's the one that caused the 9/11. ms. davis. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you both for being here. mr. secretary, i do think that your presentation did provide uk the additional ways of really looking at the discussion.sion. i do understand how people feel in terms of notice, but i wanted to have an opportunity to just j look at that issue and whether d or not the circumstances under which he was captured or the te fact that regardless of whether or not his life was in danger would have made any difference in termsin of the 30-day noticey you know, it's difficult for mr

to imagine that members would have included that within the language of that bill. to what extent were those situations weighing on the decision of whether or not to engage in that discussion durinn the imminent danger period? >> well, all of those were th factors that we had to consider as we were thinking through tho this. his deteriorating health, which was clear to us from the last proof of life video we had. the uncertainty of where he was. who exactly held him.ld hi again, i remind everybody, this service member was held in pretty difficult circumstances for almost five years, and we e don't know the facts of all of e that until he gets back and we're able to get the facts. the urgency of getting him.

the fleeting opportunity that made clear to us by the qataris in our engagements, ent negotiations. mr. preston was there through those. all these were factors. the concern about leaks we were. warned about. every one of these different fet dimensions we had to think through, and we did believe, as i said, and we had information to support this, that this effort might be the last real ve effort that we have to get him back. there were too many things floating around that we didn't control, we didn't know enough about, so we had to factor in tf all of those. >> did you have any other -- did you i guess entertain other es approaches to his rescue that you were looking at at that

particular time? and why were any of those not followed? >> well, congresswoman, we were as i said in my statement, sinc. the time he went missing, we were looking at different ways t to get him back. our combatant commanders were always looking at plans, possibilities, options, rescue , missions and so on, but as i said in my remarks, we had to e factor in the risks to our othe forces to go get him.e was and if he was in pakistan, we know he was moved in and out across the border.d that would also affect some ns. different dimensions.yes, yes, we looked at all the options. had all thet possibilities. but up until this last time when we got him, this -- in our in opinion, our intelligence igence

community's opinion, our military, everyone who was e involved, this was the best the possibility that we had to get him out and we were concerned we might lose him.lose as i gave you some dimension of the time frame, we didn't even r know where we were going to pick him up. it was less than an hour. >> and the detainees were deta there -- was it always just five or were there others? were th >> well, it actually started with six, as some of you may recall. >> right. i understand. >> one of them died. and there had been back and and forth. they wanted all of the taliban a detainees at one point and we said, no.d so this is part of the whole engagement of what we need to do and where we do -- we draw a line saying, no, we're not goino to do this. so, yes, there were different variations of that engagement et

over the years. >> all right. thank you.. thank you, mr. secretary. >> mr.mu jeaones? >> mr. chairman, thank you. secretary hagel, good to see th both of you. here thank you for being here today.r mr. secretary, on june 1 you were on "meet the press" and yor expressed the hope that thege od release of sergeant bergdahl ct would lead to direct u.s. talks with the taliban. with t mr. secretary, the taliban has n stated there will be no peace with the afghan government, with the united states or any foreigr presence as long as troops remain in afghanistan and prisons are contained at contai guantanamo bayne. they have repeated these statements time and time again n and have proven they do not nit desire peace with the united states or with its al liegs.wi with this known, why did you att that point on "meet the press" "

express hope, and we can all have hope, that there would -- h the release of the sergeant to would lead to some type of t direct negotiations with the united states and do you today y feel that that is still a real possibility? maybe there's something you want to say in the classified setting that you can't say here today, but this to me -- your statemene was received by many of the peop people that i represent in the third district of north carolina that maybe there was in this rgt negotiation about the, sergeantm that maybe there were some signals sent to you, sir, or to the administration that there might be t an opportunity for direct negotiations with the t taliban. knowing the history of the tali, taliban, knowing how they fault the russians, alexander the great and the britts and their h fighting the americans, i would

hope that maybe you do know now something that you can share re with us if not in a public i setting but a private setting. can you comment, sir?mment, >> congressman jones, thank you. good to see you again. thank you. first, as you know, the position of the united states government regarding the taliban has alwayb been we support a reconciliatiom between the afghan government and the taliban.that that's been a general position, as you know. as to the specific answer i gavr on "meet the press," it was to e specific question when we were talking about sergeant bergda bergdahl's release. i don't recall exactlyt the question, but if i can piece itr together enough to respond, i o think the question was set up, well, could this lead to talks h with the taliban or reconciliation?

and as you've quoted me, i said, i hope, maybe, whatever, but, no, that -- that wasn't any wink direct hint or wink or possibility that i know w something that that's going to happen, but i would also remind us again, too, that if you at if recall, some of you do because you were in some of these meetings, briefings in the 2011-2012 time frame, i wasn't in this se job at this time fra but i've looked at the files and i've seen it all. there was a larger scope and l framework and reconciliation which included bergdahl's release but the current situation we were in was a straight, get bergdahl. now, that doesn't dismiss, congressman, the hope that there

can be some possibility of the afghan government and taliban finding a reconciliation somehow, some way. i but in no way did i -- was i ply intending to imply in that answ answer that there's something else going on out here.h >>er well, my interest was simpl that theib taliban's history do not seem that they want to see e foreign presence that's going to influence the future of their country, and i was hopeful that maybe in the negotiations for the sergeant that maybe there had been some signal sent with i the media. and if there has been, maybe you could throw your staff or maybe in a classified setting let me d know that there are some possibilities because my marines down in camp lejeune, quite ca frankly, are tiredmp of going t afghanistan and getting their d

legs blown off. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. and we will, congressman jones. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman.. mr. secretary and mr. s prestono want to thank you for being herg today for your testimony. as we were reminded just yesterday with the loss of five american special operating ating forces, afghanistan obviously remains very dangerous and a a battlefield for our voluntary military, and i join many of my colleagues, of course, in olleag expressing gratitude of the th return of an american prisoner n of war, the return of any u.s. y service member from enemy enemy captivity it should be a her priority for his or her soldierr and of course for our country. e sergeant bergdahl is an american soldier and we certainly are grateful that he has been freedh that said, this whole situation

raises many troubling concerns and among them, of course, this committee has significant oversight role. the there are legitimate questions regarding both congressional l t notification as wellhe as long-term incentives for the taliban and al qaeda. certainly significant personneli and other resources have been expended to conduct what could result very in dangerous and urg disturbing incentives on the battlefield. as one taliban commander said, d and i quote, it has encouraged our people. now everybody will work hard to capture such an important bird,, end quote. so, mr. secretary, how do you anticipate this transfer will im impact the incentives and behavior for the taliban and ala qaeda? are we preparede to counter any new behavior?

>> congressman, i would answer this way. i think everybody on this war, committee knows some more than other, war is a dangerous so a s business. a soldier is always, always at i risk.that that's number one. two, you probably know that theb taliban hasly standing orders t capture american service members, and that's been a standing order for 12 years. so there's nothing new here about where the taliban have been and where they continue to t. but i would say this also, now that we have our last prisoner back, this very much gives us gi more flexibility, quite frankly, to free up resources that every day we were thinking about our commanders on theth ground in tt area, how -- if we have the opportunity, how can we get

bergdahl. now that he's back, that frees up that obligation.up i think that actually strengthens the point.rength and the last point i'd make. whv i mentioned this in my comments and those of you in uniform kno this, pretty basic in the military. i expressed it in many different ways by quoting different senior members of our military and retired, that to have our men oe and women in uniform all over the world who some are more at risk than others every day, to y have them be reassured that this country will come get them or will make every effort to go get them has got to be pretty significant. and i was told that by all of our commanders. it can be issues on the issue specifics of sergeant bergdahl, but that's irrelevant, quite mr frankly. he was a member of our armed fo

forces and we went and we got him back after five years. i think that's pretty prett significant. and i think it also falls intoo the category of answering your o question. thank you. >> mr. secretary, thank you for that answer. the -- as the chairman and the ranking member have r mentionedt their opening statements, st questions about sergeant bergdahl's conduct should be addressed with due process at the appropriate time and such, d but could you settle one port, conflicting report at least in, terms -- regarding the number of the loss of soldiers who may have been involved in searching for sergeant bergdahl?bergd >>ah first, any loss of any soldier is a terrible loss to their family, to our country. and i think we should note that

first.first. second, your question has been n asked a number of times. i've n personally gone back and asked that question inside the . pentagon, in the army, in all ou our reports i have seen no evidence that directly links any american combat death to the rescue or finding or search of sergeant bergdahl, and i've asked the question. t we've all asked the question.i i have seen no evidence, no facts presented to me when i asked that question. >> mr. secretary, you did say there's nothing new here that g the taliban's always out to try to capture us, but isn't it true that there is one thing knew that we have now made the tradea for a hostage?ostage? >> no, he was not a hostage, he was a prisoner of war.

that's not new. >> have we made other trades with the taliban? >> with the taliban? i don't know. i don't think so.n't th >> i don't think so. thank you. mr. forbes? >> thank you, mr. chairman.airm. mr. secretary, thank you for being here and for mentioning n the need forti transparency. and as you talked about our abot anability to prosecute the prosc individuals that wereut releaset this administration has not exactly had a stellar record ong prosecution of people at gitmo. when you look at the fact that d the lead prosecutor for the 9/1u terroristst would have had a guilty plea, they've shut him down and we've been five years and still haven't brought them o to trial. secondly, i don't think even you would argue that the conversations that took place in 2011 complied with the law. and basically what we're tryingo to get g across is we're a nati of

laws.e they you can't just pick and'r choosw because they're convenient or oe not convenient which ones we're going to enforce and which oness we aren't.said and the third thing is, you sae this, there are limits to trades we would make and draw the linee i want to talk about where we draw the line.ially eq it was essentially equivalent to releasing a deputy secretary of defense, a deputy secretary of interior, a governor and a resit commander. when the president was asked if there was a possibility of them returning to activities that are detrimental to the u.s. his answer was, absolutely. our deputy director of national intelligence was even harsher. he said the latest community wide u.s. intelligence assessment on these five terrorists said he expected four out of the five taliban leaders would return to the battlefield. this assessment was in accord i with the 2008 report says five s were at high risk to launch an

attack against the united states and its allies if they were of liberated. you state in your testimony that if any of the detainees were to try to join the fight, they would be doing so at their own a peril. does this mean you would put american lives at risk to go after them? >> congressman, we have american lives at risk every day. >> but not -- not -- not individuals that we've releasede and put-back out there. so my question is, would we put american lives at risk to go g after them if they rejoined the fight? >> well, depending on the reat. threat. also let me l remind you of the other pieces that you didn't ion mention in our analysis of these five. thetell intelligence community said clearly that these five are not a threat to the homeland. >> >> mr. secretary, you have said it here, that if they rejoined the fight, they do it at their own peril.>> in my question's a pretty simple . one. would we put american lives at risk to go after them?

>> we have -- or no? >> yes or no? >> we -- we have american lives put at risk -- -- >> i understand that, mr. secretary. my question is would we put ut american lives at risk to go after these individuals if they rejoin the fight? >> well, yes. >> okay. >> because -- >> if that's the case, let me ask you two other questions -- >> you couldco use the same argument on yemen and everywhert else. >> i can but not because of individuals we've released. and the second question i would ask you is two parts. in the calculus that you've made for releasing these individuals, were you asked or did you make an assessment of the number of lives lost or put at risk in capturing these vits in the first place and did you make an assessment l of their lafs if w have to go recapture them againi >> again, i saw no evidence, no facts. i asked the question about how

these five found their way to guantanamo, and i have in fronte of me the facts on the five.tw two of them were detained by u.s. forces.>> >> mr. isecretary, i only havee some seconds. >> the answer is no.no. >> so you didn't even make a calculus -- >> no, i said i did. you asked if there were lives h lost in capturing these. >> you said no? have no direct evidence that there was any american lives -- >> did you make an ame assessmed how many american lives may be put at risk if they have to be recaptured? >> no. >> okay. >> there's -- there's risks we have to our country, threats to our country every day everywhere and the other point i would make on this, we determined that s as there wasub substantial mitigatn of risk for this country, for sr our interests.our se for our service members when we

made this decision. and we were satisfied that we met -- we could make that that determination. of t just flies in the face all the other evidence we have h and with that, mr. chairman, i yield back.chair >> ms. bordalieau. . >> thank you, very much, mr. chairman, secretary hagel and mr. preston.pearin thank you very much for provid appearing today and providing uy with your testimony. secretary hagel, i approachha y the detailed information that you had in your state and i support your position.inued i doco appreciate your commitme to the men and women in uniform and your steadfast leadership during these challenging times. my first question is for you, r mr. secretary, what impact would sergeant bergdahl's continued se imprisonment if we had not engaged in his exchange have had on the security situation in ioi afghanistan as we draw down

forces? did his continued imprisonment create a heightened security threat to our men and women in uniform? >> r well, in a sense, n, that congresswoman, that as i answered in a previous questionn about putting at risk american lives to capture him -- not to r capture him but to get him back and to do that, it would have if taken another course of action or we would have taken another option, that would have put ourt men and women at risk. our men and women are at risk in carrying out this one mission i but fortunately it was done the right way.n, again, i don't think that efforn has gotten enough attention. this was all done in less than 60 seconds. not one death. n not one issue. not one problem.not o and i've seen very little seen recognition of that given to our

forces by anybody. i mean, that -- that's -- that . was a significant effort by our armed forces knowing as little as they did but planning it as well as they did and having theo outcome as positive as it was. so thank you. >> i agree. my next question is for mr. preston.is with the heightened media attention, how will you ensure sergeant bergdahl receives a fair investigation? >> thank you. we will pursue our useful nd policies and practices with respect to investigations and follow-on actions. a key element of that is avoiding what is referred to asf unlawful or undue command influence so you will see the leadership, military and depart civilian amet the department, he been entirely neutral of their discussion on this and focusing

on ensuring due process withouta prejudging what the outcomet should be one way or the other. those dealing with sergeant bergdahl more directly and the army more generally are, i beli believe, sensitive to ensuring that in the process of bringing him home, restoring him to health, debriefing him for intelligence purposes and then t ultimately reviewing theh circumstance bes of his capturee that fairness be preserved and that his rights be preser zblfde thank you. thank you. and my final question is for secretary hagel.ior to prior to securing the recovery ofof sergeant bergdahl had you received correspondence from re members of congress requesting r that you takees action to obtai sergeant bergdahl's release?>> >> yes. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. miller. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

thank you, mr. secretary for li being here.ng i'm looking at your testimony g, and on the third page it says we complied with the national defense authorization act of 20 2014. did you or did you nothi notify congress within the 30-daytime frame, yes or no? >> no. what i -- >> no, sir. yes or no. >> all right.or no. >> does the administration adm intend to violate the notice irn requirements ofts section 1035 the ndaa and section 8111 of the d.o.d. act of future transfers? >> not unless they're -- not ss unless there is an extraordinare set of circumstances like this e would we be in a position to a make a call. >> lua sure this committee that the department will not proceed with future detainee transfers without notifying congress co consistent with the law?with the >> we have, i believe, before mn time in every circumstance except this one and we intend tt

continue to do this. >> you were part of the legislative branch. we make the laws. you're part of the executive branch now which is the responsibility to enforce the law.t th whose responsibility is it to interpret the law? is it the president's lity responsibility or is it the court's? >> the court's. then >> then why did the president t make the decision or you make ou the decision not to notify congress? >> we believed in the justice department office of legal counsel --xecu >> part of the executive branch. >> told the president that he had the constitutional authority to door that. he had under his constitutional powers the authority to make the decision that he did.e >> you said that you would put d american lives at risk if the -- if the taliban prisoners that were swapped in the secret deall would rejoin the fight if they e rejoined the fight in af afghanistan. what ifgh they rejoined it from somewhere else?

they don't have to be on the o battlefield in afghanistan. certainly we would pursue them m wherever they are. >> w te would dohe everything w needed to do to, as we have we said, deal with thatha threat, we are doing today. >> you -- your testimony is we're doing everything that we can -- >> to deal with the threats to the united states of america, whether they're in afghanistan, whether they're in yemen, whether they're in homeland defense. it isn't just h limited to lim afghanistan, the threats that face this country. >> mr. secretary, you keep saying we can't get the facts frome sarergeant bergdahl until returns home. a have you ever thought about going to ndlandstuhl and talkin to him there?me >> i don't know how much medical training you've had, congressman. i haven't had much.at what we are doing is allowing the doctor -- >> i'll tell you what, mr. secre secretary. wait a wminute.ake th wait ae minute. no, why hasn't he been returned to

the united states?e. we have seriously wounded soldiers that are returned to the united states almost immediately after they are stabilized. how long did jessica lynch wait. before she was returned to the united states? you're trying to tell me that he's being held in landstuhl, germany, because of his medical condition. >> congressman, i hope you'reno not implying anything other tha that. >> i'm just asking yout a question, mr. secretary. >> i'm going toy. give you an answer. i don't like theo implication t the question. >> answer it. answer it. r. >> he's being held there because our medical professionals don'te believe he's ready.t until they believe he is ready to take the next step to rehabilitation. >> have you ever seen a traumatically injured service member brought to the united me states immediately upon being stabilized at landstuhl? we do it all the time. >> t >> this isn't just about a physical situation, congressmanm this guy was held for almost

five years in god knows what wt kind of conditions. we do know some of the conditions from our intelligence community, not from, by the way, bergdahl. this is not just about can he o get on his feet and walk and get >> i'm telling you that the medical professionals that we rely on their judgment for his health, which i assume everybody respects, have made the determination and will make the determination that when he is ready to move and move to the next step, which will most likely be in san antonio, then we can proceed. that's what i'm saying. >> one other question. why is the army just now reviewing the circumstances of sergeant bergdahl's capture? >> they're not. i said in my testimony and i said in my comments they did it back after he went missing in 2009. that 15-6 report was filed, completed by general scaparrotti who is our commanding general in korea, in august of 2009.

that 15-6 report, review, complete, not redacted, was sent up to the hill yesterday, to the committees. >> thank you, mr. secretary. >> and you're welcome to read it. >> thank you. >> and that will be made available to all the members in the proper setting to review. mr. courtney. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses for being here today and, secretary hagel, for your powerful testimony which, again, laid out the fact that this is -- not every choice in your position is always black and white. you've got to weigh a lot of factors. and one of the factors which i just want to kind of maybe re-emphasize is in terms of when you were deciding this back on may 27th, i mean it wasn't like you had a lot of other options. there was no plan b or plan c that was sitting on your desk in terms of how to get this

american soldier back in our jurisdiction, isn't that correct? >> that's exactly correct. there was no option. >> there are members who have been on some of the shows saying, well, we should have sent special forces in to get him. we actually were not totally clear about where he was. >> that's right. >> and so there really wasn't even a place to send special forces to recover him. you also, again, and this has been alluded to earlier, is that in terms of the risk mitigation of the five transferees, taliban transferees, that if they do get back into the conflict, they do so at their own peril. secretary kerry, i think, in some public setting also made the comment that it's not like we're totally without options to, you know, raise their risks in terms of getting back involved in the fight. again, they don't always involve the use of military personnel. i mean we have all been on the

codels over to afghanistan, most of us, and have seen the availability of unmanned assets that we have to take out targets that, again, have been identified through the chain of command. isn't that correct? >> that's correct. >> and certainly that would be available to us, again, if a situation arose that would not put soldiers or airmen or anyone necessarily at risk? >> that's right. >> mr. preston, you know, we've been sort of talking about the legal sort of consultation that was going on with your office and the department of justice during that five- or six-day period when the decisions were being made. did doj address, in terms of the legal opinions that you were given, the question of consultation with congress, the 30-day requirement? >> yes, sir.

pardon me. the administration sought the guidance from the department of justice on the applicability and impact of the 30-day notice requirement under these circumstances and received guidance from the department of justice. >> and was that in writing? >> it was not by means of a formal memorandum opinion, but rather by e-mail exchange principally. >> we're going to leave this hearing to join a news conference on capitol hill. ear rick cantor who has lost his primary election last night and announcing that he'll step down as majority leader. >> what is your next move? >> that is probably between my wife and me and i will be looking to see how i can best serve, how i can best be a part of what we really have been about here with the agenda

called an america that works. remember what it's premised upon. the notion that conservative solutions of personal responsibility, limited government, more liberty can produce the results and solve so many of the problems that the america people have been facing in an obama economy under the obama administration. so thank you all very much. >> think you might run again in two years? eric cantor speaking to reporters after the republican conference meeting this afternoon for a half an hour or 40 minutes or so. the majority leader announcing he will be stepping down as of july 31st. the reason, less than 24 hours ago eric cantor lost his primary bid for an eighth term representing the 7th district in virginia in what is common will being accepted as a stunning upset. dave brat supported by the tea

party and others defeating cantor by more than ten points yesterday in that primary in virginia. we're going to open up our phone lines and hear what you have to think about the resignation of eric cantor as majority leader. he'll serve out his term apparently but step down as majority leader. a and he's leaving the meeting here. for republicans call 202-585-3885, democrats, 202-585-3886. it caps the, again, less than 24-hour period where eric cantor has been defeated in his primary bid in virginia yesterday and back on capitol hill today for a full day of legislative work in the house. they've been working on the agriculture spending bill and as a matter of fact a sere rose of votes coming up in the house shortly on that bill. the majority leader stayed in washington yesterday, on the day

of his primary yesterday for that very reason. the 7th district of virginia is richmond and the areas north of richmond and south of richmond. a couple of tweets and comments -- we welcome your comments at facebook.com/c-span. let's check twitter. this is a look at some of the reaction from political reporters. the "national journal" reports that the gop leadership election will be held next thursday, june 19th. john stanton, bureau chief of buzzfeed said, setting an early leadership election definitely would help mccarthey who has been doing it for months. kevin mccarthey lines up committee chairs for his house majority bid. you may have heard it in that news conference, we were over on

c-span for a while. we're on c-span3. eric cantor did throw his support behind kevin mccarthey. let's go to rochelle, new york, democrats line. michael, what do you think of the news over the last 24 hours, particularly here, the resignation of eric cantor. go ahead and may make sure your mute your television there, michael. go ahead . >> caller: i say he's referring to everything bad under obama. and if you look at the market, which has been fantastic for on and on and on, in other words, it certainly is ridiculous to say that we're doing that bad. general motors, the economy and everything has been much better. actually he's just being very conservative republican taking a shot at obama. of course, obama, he's not the

greatest in the world but he's doing reasonable well. that's all. >> tom is in key largo, florida, independent caller. tom, do us a favor and make sure you mute your television or your video and then go ahead with your comments. hello, key largo, are you there? >> caller: i'm call from eufaula. my name is tom. >> go ahead. >> i wanted to make a comment stating that leader cantor's time simply was to be stepped down and that now he's going to go away and someone better will take his place. >> huntsville, pennsylvania, dave is on the republican line. what's all this mean for the party there, dave? >> okay. i'm here. just the guy that won, took over cantor, how the tea party got him in, i'm just kind of confused, being a republican, why if republican party is kind of like taking a back seat to the tea party. i don't know why they can't become one again.

i just had that comment. that's it. >> and this was the headline on the "richmond times" dispatch. david brat stuns house majority leader eric cantor in gop primary. billy on the independent line. >> caller: thanks for taking my call. just calling in to voice an opinion. cantor again taking a swipe at the president and he's talking about the conservative views, but what he doesn't realize is those were the views that he lost on. does he realize right now that he lost? and it's ridiculous the things that he said. he lost. he actually lost. and until he accepts that, not that obama lost, cantor lost to another person with an agenda which is the same b