that treat iran differently than other countries, nor can the rest of the international community. iran becomes a legitimate partner. so the idea of the comprehensive solution is that for a period of time if iran behaves, if they are not caught cheating and uphold their commitments under the comprehensive solution at the end of the comprehensive solution, they go from being nuclear pariah to nuclear partner. at that point they are subject to the same verification that germany or japan or any other country is subject to. that basically consists of two things, that consists of iaea verification under the safeguards agreement that applies to all countries and the protocol which is enhanced verse verification that they are required to under the jpa. that's it the. there will be more robust verification agreed to under the comprehensive solution. i think the parties are talking about that. but that more robust

verification will end when the comprehensive solution ends. then we revert back to the additional protocol and comprehensive safeguards. the same verification that every other country in the world is subject to. it's a critical question for the committee to ask, whether you're prepared today to agree that if iran behaves for a set period of time then we're prepared to end their sanctions and prepared to end special scrutiny of iran and treat them as if they were japan. i point out in my testimony, there are other examples of countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons programs and we've accepted that. once they have abandoned their nuclear weapon program, we treat them like a normal country. south africa is an example. brazil and argentina are examples. what was different in those cases, not only did they say they were abandoning nuclear weapons programs and take steps in that direction, in those cases there was also a fundamental change in government. in south africa, the apartheid

regime ended and nelson mandela took power and in brazil and argentina two civilian elected governments, and so it was logical in those cases to accept there had been a fundamental change and the government wasn't interested in nuclear weapons. in the case of iran, the vision of the jpa, there doesn't need to be a fundamental change in government, ahmadinejad can be the leader of iran when the comprehensive solution lapses and ahmadinejad will be treated as if he were japan. his country will be treated as if it was japan. that's what's spelled out. so when we talk about verification, i think yes, absolutely we need to focus on verification of the jpa and the comprehensive solution because for a country with iran's track record we have to be suspicious there will be cheating but we need to get to the bottom of what happened in the past.

there are a lot of unanswered questions. the jpa does not compel iran to answer those questions. it sets up a mechanism where there's to be a discussion but no consequences attached if iran fails to cooperate. if the questions remain unanswered the jpa goes forward nonetheless. i think something needs to be done about that to make sure we get answers about the degree to which they pursued a military nuclear program in the past and then even more importantly in the future after the comprehensive solution, i think the committee needs to consider are you satisfied with the standard safeguards and the additional protocol as the only verification that will apply to iran's nuclear program upon the expiration of the comprehensive solution. >> thank you. mr. lauder? >> thank you very much, members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to be here today to help address this vital national security topic. monitoring iranian compliance with a potential nuclear agreement.

i appear before you today in my private capacity as someone who has labored on monitoring and verification over several decades and the views i will be presenting are my own and not intended to represent views of organizations with whom i've been affiliated such as the intelligence community, department of defense and defense science board task force on the assessment of nuclear treaty monitoring and verification. my statement draws in part on those experiences and on the defense science board task force report as well as the work of a nongovernmental task force on verification requirements for nuclear agreement with iran. neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether compliance with any particular nuclear agreement is verifiable. indeed, we do not yet know the details of the monitoring provisions that will emerge in the iranian agreement now under

negotiation or if such an agreement will be concluded. the defense science board task force report underscores that monitoring nuclear programs is very challenging. and that the technical capabilities to do so are limited. but the report suggests a number of steps that can be taken to make monitoring more effective, to develop additional tools and approaches and to mitigate but not entirely eliminate the risk. mr. chairman, i've submitted a statement for the record that outlines key elements to fill facilitate compliance monitoring, elements that i would suggest should be part of an agreement with iran and in which the united states and international community approaches monitoring and implementation of the agreement. the implementation of a monitoring regime should be sufficiently rigorous to determine whether iran has made a fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and toward a

culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. i believe that the monitoring provisions to be included in the agreement will be the main determinanant of the agreement's success. and will be a foundation for all the other essential provisions. a rapid breakout from some facilities known to us and slow sneak out from covert facilities. in agreement with iran should hence provide one, a full explanation of past iranian nuclear activities with possibly military dimensions and until iran answers questions from the international atomic energy agency about such activities, explains who was involved, what actions were taken, and where they took place, there can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear

weapons capabilities has ceased. second, a complete data declaration and robust inspection of iran's nuclear activities, material and equipment. critical parts of iran's nuclear programs are still not well understood by the international community. a final agreement must allow access to sites, persons and records sufficient to make iran's nuclear programs transparent. third, an effective means of monitoring all of iran's procurement activities with possible nuclear applications. a final agreement must prevent iran from continuing to import illicitly materials for its nuclear enterprise. the best way to accomplish this is to set up an agreed channel for any nuclear imports that might be allowed by the agreement. no import outside the channel should be permitted which would reduce ambiguities in the information protected by the monitoring process. successful monitoring regimes in the past have achieved effective verification of compliance

through a combination of measures, which may be held up as a standard by which the judge the adequacy of the monitoring regime to be applied in iran. based on past experience, an iranian monitoring regime should include a combination of negotiated data declarations and national and international monitoring to manage all pieces as well as a consultive body for dispute resolution. the key to all of these measures working effectively is the synergy created among them. data declarations tell us where to look and routine inspections audit the declarations, national and. international unilateral intelligence means protect anomalies and consult body gather information relative to the resolution of those

anomalies. i recognize not all measures will be easily negotiable or ready for rapid implementation. but our goal should be to bring iran from the prior pursuits of nuclear weapons capabilities to a culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. we should seek to do this in negotiations with iran by seeking agreement and securing agreement to effective monitoring measures. we can also reinforce a culture of compliance by vigorously implementing the monitoring regime. some of that implementation falls to the international atomic energy and others need to be carried out by the p5 plus 1 and congress can play a positive and strong role in insisting on effective verification providing the resources necessary for monitoring task and being attentive to compliance issues that may emerge. thank you to the committee for the opportunity to present my ideas on this vital topic.

i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. thank you ranking member and distinguished members of the committee. thank you very much for inviting me to talk here today. in my testimony, i am focusing on the verification aspects of a comprehensive deal. i am basing my remarks on the implementation of safeguard agreement and relevant security council resolutions in iran and compliment them with the experiences drawn in particular from iaea of verification and monitoring activities in south africa after the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program and some experience from syria and north korea. timely detection and prevention of development and acquisition of nuclear weapon or state's capabilities to produce them is a complex thought.

developing weapons of mass deconstruction is one of the close liu kept secrets of a state. there are things we know and aspects of such programs which we can perhaps deduce but also features which we don't know. due to the fact that iran has been running parts of its program first clandestinely and then without satisfactory fulfilling its reporting to the iaea and disregarding security resolutions, iran needs to show the nuclear program is peaceful. processes with negotiators drafting the comprehensive final agreement should avoid. i will now highlight some additional data which should be

included to a final agreement. the strength of the iaea is access to material nuclear material facilities, equipment and people. however, the safeguard is not the magic pill taken once cures everything. no verification system can provide absolute services that fully complies with its undertakings. this is especially the case when applied to problematic states that are noncompliant like iran. throughout the history of discussions of the nuclear program of iran, iran has always brought transparency. transparency to build the confidence of the international community to the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. president rohani recently offered again transparency as one of the tools. such transparency should be understood and implemented in a

meaningful and systematic way, even in the name of transparency, can bear substance only if substance new information and discussions take place and explanations are provided and those are verified. hence openness should be clearly defined and become legally binding and not treated as a goodwill visit to be granted when problems arise. going further, according to the provisions of the safeguard agreement, the state has to declare all nuclear material in its territory. thus military sites do not form sanctuaries but the iaea has the right to conduct inspections under safeguard agreement and complementary access under additional protocol when appropriate. the purpose of the verification mission is to re-establish iran's nonproliferation records. in order to achieve that, iran has to fully comply with

safeguards obligations under the safeguards agreement, iaea statutes and additional protocol and fully implement the verification and clarification requirements made by the iaea board of governors and u.n. security council. but in addition to that additional messages are needed. iran has to provide an expanded declaration and as aspects of its past and current nuclear program including the military dimensions. iran has to provide information on the production of material including imports of those materials and also goes beyond the requirements of the safeguards agreement. in addition to that, iran has to provide information all imports and domestic production of single use and dual use nuclear items as specified by the guidelines of the nuclear suppliers group. and in addition to that, iran

has to provide iaea with unconditional and unrestricted access including short notice inspections to all facilities with equipment records and people and material as required by the iaea. then finally a few words regarding the possibility of military -- why does it matter? there are reports that much of this military work came in halt in 2003. on the other hand, iaea accessed these reports that some of this work has continued since then. it's important to understand the status of iran's military related efforts noting that one of the last duties of people and organizations involved was the document of which they had done. one reason for such effort could have been to save information for further use. unless properly addressed it would be difficult to create a meaningful and robust verification regime for iran.

it would also render difficult for the iaea to determine with the confidence that any nuclear possibility activities are not ongoing. without addressing those questions, the iaea will not be able to come to a conclusion that all nuclear material iran is in peaceful use and element in building confidence of the international community over iran's nuclear program. thank you. >> thank you. ambassador? >> thank you, chairman rice. distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me and having this important hearing. let me say effective monitoring of any agreement with iran will be exceptionally challenging. iran has a demonstrated record of violating its safeguards agreement with the iaea and lack of transparency into iran's nuclear program was cited and documented by the iaea in numerous reports from the director general to board of directors.

iran was negligent in declaring the fuel enrichment plan in 2002 and in 2009 and in fact iran acknowledged both facilities only after they were exposed by an opposition group and reported in the press. there's a record here that one has to be very, very cognizant of as was indicated by the chairman and others this morning. the iaea director general report of 8 november 2011, an important report provided disturbing details regarding iran's nuclear warhead development efforts to allow iran to acquire the expertise necessary to produce nuclear weapons. although there was previous iaea reporting on weaponization, this report was stark in its concern about the military dimension of iran's nuclear program. this is a very, very central part of the issue here. it's not only -- indeed it's covert having covert facilities

but militarization of their nuclear program. the director general on june 2014 just a few days ago said the iaea needed time before they could provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material in iran. a robust monitoring and verification protocol will be necessary to deal with iran's nuclear program. this will be very difficult, a difficult program to implement effectively. at the minimum it will require unfettered access to people and places. indeed, if iran were in compliance with this six u.n. security council resolutions, all forbidding iran from enriching uranium, it would be easier. if iran as they say was interested in a peaceful nuclear program, it's not only through enrichment of uranium that one could achieve and acquire a peaceful nuclear program.

since iran will reportedly be able to enrich uranium at some level. the task will be considerably more difficult. some of the monitoring issues are an accurate baseline of the program is necessary. any meaningful monitoring program attempts to verify compliance with the safeguard agreement. iran declared 15 nuclear facilities at nine locations. is this the totality of the program? they cannot provide credible assurance the of undeclared nuclear material in iran. assurance that there are no covert nuclear facilities in iran capable of enriching uranium is necessary. our experience with north korea strongly reinforces this point. iran announced the intent to construct 10 enrichment facilities and approximately 60,000 additional centrifuges,

deploying sophisticated centrifuges with greater capacity and conforming the existence of nonconforming facilities will be a real challenge. a comprehensive declaration from iran on the nuclear programs is necessary, necessary first step. if any monitoring and verification program. in addition to all related facilities, a list of scientists and technicians who are working at these facilities is necessary. iaea monitors require unfettered access to these individuals and their relevant records and notes. the right to take random samples at ever facility is necessary with testing undergoing at u.s. or iaea labs. the issue of weaponization must be pursued with access to known and explosive high test sites and all relative records. information dealing with miniaturization and making of a nuclear warhead must be pursued for obvious reasons. access to all nuclear work will be necessary and i emphasize

this, any time, any place access to facilities that manufacture, assemble and test centrifuges technical coverage with camera sensors and inspections will be necessary 24/7. technical monitoring the plutonium facility will be required since this facility has one purpose, one purpose, using plutonium for nuclear weapons. if iran is committed to a peaceful nuclear weapon, iraq should be dismantled not monitored. those are some of the issues that the protocol will have to address. the task will be massive. especially if iran is permitted to construct centrifuges with greater capacity and deterring enrichmen does not exceed 5%, so critical. will also be a challenge. if iran is permitted to enrich uranium at facilities.

it will be a principle challenge for any monitoring and verification protocol. thank you. >> thank you, ambassador. the issue of weaponization must be pursued. >> absolutely. >> but and we've all said iran has to sit down and come clean for all of the reasons enumerated and iaea says we're not getting cooperation from iran on this. >> that's a fair point, mr. chairman. absolutely. you mentioned in your opening statement the high explosive test site there. there's no question they have to come clean on all of these issues, no question. >> what if they are not forced to come clean? what are the implications of that? >> i think there are sanctions in place and consequences if you're not coming clean. i think what's the monitoring and verification protocol is all about. >> this is the site agreement we're trying to come to an agreement on in terms of this

issue to satisfy this issue over weaponization. of course, they -- anyway, let's go back one point though to mr. rademaker's key focus on his testimony, the last line of the interim agreement notes that after implementing the final step of the comprehensive solution, for an agreed amount of time, then iran is treated quote, the same. the same as any nonnuclear weapon state that's a party to the npt. so, i think mr. rademaker in your written testimony you said this is a giant get out of jail free card for iran because it means at that point in time, no more sanctions, no more restrictions on procuring nuclear items and no more restrictions on the number of centrifuges it can spin or the level to which it may enrich uranium. at that point in time, under the interim agreement, we've already

conceded that whatever the time frame, after that, you treat iran like you treat japan or germany. completely legitimate. and what does that mean then for verification? what is the consequence? because it really just is a question of trust, isn't it? we began with the argument, you know, referring to trust but verify, but it is completely a question of trust if at the end of the agreement everything is lifted and there is no more verification. mr. rademaker? >> mr. chairman, i think you put your finger on what i see is the biggest single verification challenge before us and that is it is really conceptual challenge, the concept of the joint plan of action is that there's this workout period

where iran is to behave and fulfill its obligations and if they are not caught cheating during that time, then all of the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record, the clear evidence that for decades, the current government has been in concerted effort to -- has pursued a concerted effort to develop a nuclear weapon. if they behave for five or ten or 15 years, are we prepared to say, okay, we will let bygones be bygones and going forward you'll be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest in my testimony is that logically, for the iranians, that's an incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave. if what they want is a nuclear

weapon, you know, they've been struggling and been under international sanctions and been under restrictions on their ability to import components, it's been a slog for them to get where they are. they've been very persistent and stood up this program with only help from the network, they procured things but it's been covert. if they behave for the period of the comprehensive solution, they will be able to move forward with a civilian nuclear program with international cooperation. that's promised to them in the jpa. and the logical thing for them would be to take that deal. behave, then once the comprehensive solution expires, then very aggressively stand up a far more robust civilian infrastructure than they've been able to stand up now. go to tens and thousands of centrifuges and larger quantities of enriched material.

if they choose to break out, do so with a much larger infrastructure in place, with a much larger stockpile of 3.5% enriched material or even 20% enriched material. once the comprehensive solution ends they can go back to producing as much 20% material as they want. >> one of the arguments made to me by one of the ambassadors and arab states was that if this comes to pass and iran is continuing its effort to destabilize other countries in the region and listed country by country where they were from yemen, where they are trying to topple a government and very close to doing so, to their efforts throughout the region. when he exhausted all of the examples, he said a regime with that intent and also having the intent to obtain nuclear weapons capability, you're in danger of

leaving them with a hedge for the region. with their ambitions intact, both in terms of their capability of this weapon, and knowing right now that they can destabilize other regimes and knowing that when you lift sanctions on them, that's going to be more hard currency that they will use to destabilize their neighbors. the argument he was making, i think, was the veiled threat that other states would then do the same thing. attempt to rush to a nuclear weapon in order to try to offset the aggressive nature of this regime. what do you think this portends for proliferation concerns? >> are you directing that question to me, mr. chairman? >> yes, mr. rademaker.

>> i think we already have some history here that's instructive. in 1995, iran announced they wanted to build a civilian nuclear power reactor and russia signed a contract with them to help, and for ten years it was the policy of the united states, under the clinton administration and first half of the bush administration to oppose that and say, iran, this oil rich country, a.m. many energy resources, what do they need a nuclear power reactor for. we need to stop this. it was a high priority for the u.s. diplomatically to turn off the reactor. one of the reasons we wanted to turn it off was because we were afraid it would provide a justification for setting up an enrichment capability to fuel the reactors and that's what the iranians did, covertly and when they were caught. they justified it because they said they needed the fuel for their reactor. so then the focus of our diplomatic activity shifted to

their enrichment program and the bush administration decided to give up in the losing effort to prevent completion of the civil power reactor. we stopped talking about how they shouldn't have a nuclear power plant and started focusing on just the enrichment facility. suddenly it turned out a lot of other middle eastern countries interested in having power plants two and the agreement was negotiated with the uae and saudi arabia. i think the obama administration proceeding on the assumption that we can change policy again and sign off on enrichment in iran and say we're prepared to accept an enrichment -- >> we should learn from past mistakes. >> and the other countries in the region won't say immediately, guess what, we need

enrichment too. how do we say -- how does the united states say to saudi arabia, we only trust iran to have enrichment. we don't trust you, our ally, only trust iran -- >> my time has expired. >> it's untenable. >> i'm going to with mr. ingle. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let's continue that. you know, i am troubled in my opening statement that while we're talking with iran they continue to enrich. i still don't understand how that happened. i don't understand it. and you mentioned, mr. rademaker, the 123 agreement with the uae. i had the uae ambassador in my office. and he mentioned that agreement, which does not allow the uae to enrich for peaceful purposes on their soil. canada has nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes and not allowed to enrich on their soil.

if we sign an agreement with iran that says well, they can enrich on their soil but only for peaceful purposes, how do we ever get any of the other countries to not enrich on their soil? aren't we then opening the door to you name it, saudi arabia, turkey, egypt, why should any of those countries negotiate a deal where they will not be allowed to enrich on their soil for peaceful purposes when clearly we're giving it away to iran? >> i agree entirely with your question. it was the point i was just making, once the united states says we're prepared to accept enrichment in iran, the whole effort over the past decade to stem the spread of that technology to other countries, it becomes untenable. how do we explain to any other country, especially allies and friends of the united states,

you're our friend, we're not going to let you have this technology. now, iran, we're prepared to let them have it. you know, i couldn't write the talking points for our diplomats to explain to our allies why we don't trust them to have something that we trust iran to have. i think, what happens when we permanently accept enrichment in iran, by default, we have to accept it anywhere else that wants it. i don't know how -- you can try and make it a financially attractive for them to not go in that direction. but for a country that's determined to have it, to tell them as a matter of policy, it's the policy of the united states, only iran gets to have it and not you, it's not a case that you can persuasively make. >> rohani has said to cnn that iran won't dismantle a single centrifuge.

the joint plan of action calls for a comprehensive solution that says -- quote, would ensure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. is there a way to ensure that iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges? anybody care? >> i think the number of centrifuges is extremely -- there's no question, it's extremely important, certainly for the monitors, especially if they are even more sophisticated if they are putting out that much more capability, absolutely, there's no question that numbers are important. >> okay, let me talk about an editorial that was in the "washington post" a few weeks ago, three weeks ago perhaps. the editorial argued and i said this in my opening statement,

that we can afford to wait, that perhaps time is on our side if the date comes up in july and we don't have a comprehensive agreement, that it might be in the best interest of the united states to put it back another month or two or three or four. that iran is still undergoing a lot of economic difficulty as a result of the sanctions. and that we might have more leverage if we let the date lapse beyond the july 20th date. that was essentially a "washington post" editorial. anybody have any thoughts on that? >> first of all, we should not forget that the joint plan of action is very limited. today we don't know how many centrifuges iran has.

iaea has some declaration about the manufacturing of the replacement of centrifuges but doesn't have the total number of sentry -- centrifuges produced. so what's happening now in the next few months, iran is still likely building additional centrifuges and it's manufacturing components for the iraq reactor and maintains the skills of labor. in addition, producing additional enriched uranium. in my view one should put a cap to this and not wait. the problem doesn't become easier by waiting. >> so you disagree essentially with what the "washington post" editorial said about the fact that iran is still being hurt with sanctions and if we wait, they'll continue to be hurt and it will -- time will not be on their side? you essentially disagree with that? >> i think it's a little bit wishful thinking. >> okay, thank you, mr.

chairman. >> thank you. mr. ingall will now go to ielana. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman. i've been on the record disagreeing with any subsequent agreement that does not require iran to cease and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. we know iran can't be trusted. we have decades of covert activities related to its nuclear program to back that up. yet, we're now relying on two things, number one, that iran is honest with us on disclosing all of its nuclear activities and two, that the verification monitoring and transparency programs that we have in place are strong enough to detect when iran is cheating. but all of the verification and monitoring system operate under

the framework that is presented to us by iran. only what iran has declared as part of the program. and in last month's iaea board of director's report on iran's nuclear program, the director general stated that the iaea cannot provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in iran unless and until iran provides the necessary cooperation with the agency. and we're all familiar with the pentagon report that stated that the united states does not have the capability to locate undeclared or covert nuclear facilities or programs. it's still very possible that iran could be continuing its covert activity and either the iaea nor the u.s. would have any idea and this joint plan of action did nothing to strengthen

verification and monitoring programs or force iran to abide by the additional protocols. mr. heinonen, thank you, you testified to our middle east and north africa subcommittee in jan -- in january and stated that it provides iaea inspectors access only to surveillance records not anywhere else at the facilities, that the surveillance measures are designed to cover only certain activities. how comprehensive are these surveillance records? is it possible that we're only getting access to what iran wants us to see? not getting the full picture that the cameras perhaps only focus on the door and that's what's going on in the room? and also, bad state actors that seek to acquire nuclear weapons and i'm thinking of north korea, of iran, obviously, of libya,

syria, do so surreptiously. we're having them negotiate on the basis of only what has been declared, doesn't the success of any iaea verification and monitoring program depend on access to all sites, all programs, all of the information and people and equipment in order to get the full picture? one other major area of concern that we should all have and which goes largely unaddressed many times is the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. the 2010 u.n. security council resolutions on iran ordered the regime to fully cooperate with the iaea on all outstanding issues, particularly regarding the possible military dimensions of the program. that is not happening and the

latest board of governors reports states not only is iran not complying but there have been extensive activities that may have taken place at parchin, especially seriously undermined the iaea's ability to conduct effective verification. my last question is we're nearing the end of the six-month time frame. there has been no access to parchin, does this undermine the credibility of the deal and the so-called monitoring and verification measures that we have in place? that question and mr. heinonen, are we only seeing what iran wants us to see? how comprehensive are the surveillance records? >> iaea has several measures in place and measures the nuclear material flows and short notice restrictions at the intervals between one or two weeks.

there are additional measures which compliment so we are not relying entirely on the surveillance. it's important that this surveillance is modified so it actually covers all of the centrifuges and not just entrance and exit routes. more important, that it calls for remote monitoring mode so we don't use this valuable iaea inspection resources sitting at the site and reviewing computer screens. >> we should modify it? >> yes and this is what i say in my written testimony. then one small remark still. whenever we verify the correctness and completeness of declarations and look at items which may have not declared, we need to remember that this is a very time consuming process. this doesn't come in one month or even a half year. and an even example of south

africa, we started this verification in 1993. and the task force don't because south africa nuclear program, iran, many many years without any iaea surveillance, so it took until 2010 when the iaea was finally able to say that all nuclear material in south africa will ease in peaceful use. it took a long time based on practices and procedures of the iaea. iran will pay something very similar. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> let's go to mr. brad sherman of california. >> thank you. mr. lauder, i'm interested in your analysis that we have to look at breakout possibility and sneak out possibility. i'm not sure i understand what you mean by culture of compliance.

i think -- let's face it, nelson mandela is not taking over in tehran, the culture will always be to try to maximize their nuclear capacity. mr. rademaker, you brought to our attention what we knew when that was after some period of time iran will be at least according to this agreement, just like any other nonnuclear state except they will have signed and presumably ratified the additional protocol. let's say that's the situation. let's say everything they have now is frozen and dethawed 10 or 15 years from now and they are subject to the additional protocol and that's about it. and they want to sneak, not breakout. how long before they have a bomb? how long before they have a dozen? >> i think my personal concern is that will be up to them.

because -- >> assume that they make an all-out sneak out effort. subject only to the additional protocol, how difficult is it to sneak out if you're subject to the additional protocol? >> there are two dimensions to break out and we talk about how quickly can they do it? that's an important thing. >> i'm talking about how quickly can they do it without being detected. >> right. let me say, for a country like iran, the notion that they are going to race and violate international law and race to produce one nuclear weapon -- >> mr. rademaker, you don't seem to understand my question. i'm not talking about breakout. i'm talking about sneak out. that is to say, undetected efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, assuming they don't want to be detected but they are diligent and hard working and well financed, what can they put together in a few years of being

subject only to the additional protocol? >> basically they will be able to put together everything they want. they will be able to stand up a vastly month robust infrastructure, tens and thousands and hundreds of thousands of centrifuges and tons of enrichment -- >> and under the additional protocol, can they then divert the low enriched uranium to a secret facility and put it up to weapons grade? assuming they don't want to be caught, assuming they are living -- >> more robust the infrastructure, the more quantity of nuclear material they have, the easier it will be. >> why don't i shift to one of the other witnesses. can you answer the same question, subject only to the additional protocol and don't want to get caught, what can they do? >> one of the reasons i use the phrase sneak out in my oral remarks is we have -- international community has focused a lot about the rapid breakout from known facilities.

one of our concerns has to be -- just as you indicated in your question, mr. sherman, is if iran moves at a slower pace but behind the scenes at facilities that we don't know about, it can continue down that path to nuclear weapons in ways that normal iaea procedures would not necessarily be able to detect. that's one of the reasons -- >> would they be able to put together without being detected subject only to the additional protocol five bombs in the five years after this agreement goes to -- is eclipsed? >> i -- go back to testimony that director national intelligence clapper gave before the hill where he said that the fundamental constraining element or fundamental point what

decision iran will make -- >> i already told you the decision. the decision would be develop a nuclear capacity and don't get caught. >> right. >> work hard. assuming that's the decision, does anybody have an answer to the question? >> in terms of time frame? >> yes, i said could they do five bombs in five years? subject only to the additional protocol? >> yes. >> i just picked that number out. do you have a better estimate of what -- does anyone on the panel have a better estimate of what they can do subject only to the additional protocol assuming they don't want to get caught. mr. heinonen. >> certainly important for the iaea in terms of verification, but we should not forget here that iran can do a plan how to do it. they see the strengths of the iaea and weaknesses and actually can do a hybrid approach, do something at the declared facilities and do something in

undeclared and in a combination you have this what you are afraid of. i think this needs quite a thorough analysis and rethinking how the verification system is set up after the sanctions get relieved. i also want to bring to your attention that actually this whole thing will appear stepwise process. once the comprehensive -- >> excuse me, my time expired. does anybody disagree, five bombs in five years after they are subject to the protocol. >> we don't disagree, that's why we need more than the additional protocol. >> you do or don't agree? >> with the additional protocol it's a possibility. you need unfettered access to everything. >> i agree with that but let me say, i have a slightly different different concern, if they choose at some point in the future to become a nuclear

weapon state, not sneaking but say, okay, circumstances have changed we need to have nuclear weapons, if they do that today, they can make a mad dash and in period of months they'll have maybe two or three nuclear weapons. if they have a vastly more robust infrastructure after the expiration of the comprehensive solution and at that point decide okay now we're abandoning and becoming a nuclear weapons state. what will they have? it won't be two or three nuclear weapons. it will be dozens. what they will have upon breaking out with the much larger infrastructure -- >> knowing my time has expired, i think they'll sneak out then break out because if they have five nuclear weapons our response to their announcement of break out and our response to their test will be considerably more similar to how we've treated north korea than how we

treated gadhafi or saddam hussein. i yield back. >> we go to mr. chris smith of new jersey. >> thank you for calling this extraordinarily timely hearing for the insight provided by our distinguished witnesses. as you know, mr. chairman, last week on june 4th, we recognized the anniversary of tiananmen square. bill clinton, on may 26th, 1994, delinked human rights with trade, beijing knew that human rights were a super flus and talking point and no real consequence if they violated with impunity. i'm concerned fast forward to the joint plan of action that when the iran looked us in the eyes, they knew they could get major concessions and they already have achieved that with the sanctions regime. how are we ever going to put that back together?

and this could be analagous to the piece in our time, the infamous quote after meeting with the germans. these are game-changing days. i'm very concerned secretary rademaker, your service has been extraordinary over the decades and reminded us iran has a deplorable history of deception and covert construction of facility are acknowledged only when revealed or exposed, catch me if you can mentality. reminds me of hansz blitz traveling around iraq checking for weapons of mass destruction, six binding resolutions demanding that they suspend uranium enrichment. that now has changed and no longer what we have demanded through the jpa. as you pointed out, persuaded the united states and others to no right to enrichment and also call the biggest concession, the idea of the ill-defined time

period, wait out a certain period of time not defined and at that point you elaborated that a few times in your statement just a moment ago. my questions would be, one, human rights are very often the canary in the coal mine. in meetings and conversations with the foreign minister of iran have said, you can do a grand stroke. release the political prisoners, release said ibadini and said they may be meaning business. there may be a sense of sincerity. i find it almost laughable in the preamble when it says on november 24th to the joint plan of action, iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. if you believe that, i'll sell you the brooklyn bridge. so, of course, trust and verify on site verification are all absolutely required but i think we're setting up ourselves to

fail and now russia certainly is what kind of friend or colleague or partner are they going to be given everything that's happened in kiev and certainly in the ukraine. so a couple of questions, the whole idea of the duration, mr. secretary, if you could really elaborate that even further, 20 years, 25 years, it ought to be forever and as you said to think that iran might be construed to be japan and i think in your testimony you made some very, very good points about the whole idea that argentina and they matriculated from a dictatorship to democracy. south africa, so the examples were very well taken and you also said something, if you elaborate quickly on you need to anticipate that the executive branch officials are going to become deeply invested in the success of the jpa. almost like a mission accomplished mentality when the

threats to the region are so high that political chicanery should be nowhere on the map so if you can respond. >> yes, mr. chairman, i'm happy to respond. you know, it's sort of a conceptual thing, the concept of the jpa is we're not going to insist on a change in government. we're not going to insist on a change in your guiding philosophy. we're just going to look at your behavior for a set period of time and if you behave as you promised, then it is your get out of jail free card. you will be able to go forward as a fully accepted legitimate member of the nuclear club. and that's being promised to them up front with no -- all they have to do is comply with

whatever is in that agreement and nothing more. to me, you know, the congress, the american people are being asked to buy a pig in a poke because we don't know, we don't know who will be the leader of iran in five or ten or 15 years when this thing expires. we don't know what they'll be doing with respect to promoting terrorism around the word. we don't know how much they'll be meddling in syria or iraq. we just don't know yet we're making this commitment up front you behave and here are all the benefits you get and i guess i would suggest that the judgment whether they are to be considered rehabilitative and treated like a normal nation is one that is really premature to make today. it's a judgment maybe to be made much closer to the event and i don't see that in in framework. i mean we're making the judgment today if they -- if they behave for ten years or whatever the period is then they will be deemed rehabilitated and, you know, congress will have an important role here because i

believe the administration is going to need you to enact legislation permitting them to wave some of the sanctions that are currently in place and so legislatively you will address this and, you know, i think in that context you ought to be thinking about to what extent are we prepared to accept this concept that all verification, all extraordinary verification ends and they become treated -- they become subject only to the verification that other countries are subject to. you know, the trust but verify, you know, that's the wrong concept for a country with the track record of iran. for iran it can't be trusted. it has to be verified but verified. i don't know where -- how trust can even be part of the equation given their track record. >> we go now to mr. gregory meeks of new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for this important hearing and -- because i for a long time have been worried

about iran getting a nuclear weapon. i think that one thing that everybody on this committee says and i've heard the president say it also that it's unacceptable, that that's a no starter for iran to have a nuclear weapon, and i was, you know, just thinking listening to you, mr. rademaker, at the beginning of your statement which really concerned me was that on your return here we're still talking 20 years later or 25 years later you said that the threat was in 1992 about iran getting a nuclear weapon and, unfortunately, here we are today at 2014 with the same concerns, which i would believe that various administrations, democratic and republican have had different strategies in trying to make sure that we can

assure ourselves of iran not having a nuclear weapon, and here we are still at this juncture and this president has proposed trying to see what we can do talking with iran not only by ourselves, but an unprecedented level with some of our allies and some folks who may not be, you know, because i think you have to have everybody there with the p5 plus 1 and as i hear the dialogue going back and forth, you know, the question that i ask myself sometimes and i guess the first question that i would ask you because it just seems as though when we were successful with sanctions it was when it became

multilateral and not just unilateral and if we want to make sure that we contain iran and make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon and if they violate any of the don't allow the iaea to get in or anything of that nature, then i would think that if we have to ramp up sanctions, we would want to be able to do that with other nations, because that seems as though when it has been successful, and so given iran's history that and from what i've heard thus far which makes sense to me, that they don't follow through and they're not going to follow through then we're going to need to make sure that we still have the unity among ourselves so that we can make sure that those sanctions that we have to put on or implement are not sanctions that's just done by the united states but

are sanctions that are also done by the p5 plus 1 countries so they become very important to us, i think so my -- you know, and i'm going back and forth and thinking, so the effort at least the initial effort that's being made to have negotiations under the p5 plus 1 and to make sure that the iaea has access to whatever they're doing there it seems to me tremendously important because we have not been there before and we want to verify what they're doing and what they're not doing extremely so i guess i'm trying to get a sense of from you, do you think that the effort that is at least being made thus far so in regards to the conversations that are taking place, we don't know what the end results are going to be because if they're failure then we got to make sure we ramp up these sanctions, et cetera, do you think that we should make the effort that is being made currently by the

administration? to anyone? >> i certainly believe we should make the effort. no question, and that's why the monitoring and verification protocol is so, so important. all points you made, congressman meeks, exactly right, unfettered access because we're concerned on weaponization and covert facilities there. they've not been forthcoming. absolutely and the u.n. security council resolution 1929 speaks to this issue. iran should cooperate fully with the iaea on all outstanding issues particularly those that give rise to concerns about military di mentions of their nuclear program so even you have the u.n. security council coming forth with a resolution saying this so we go fort so the key would be a robust, meaningful monitoring and verification regime. >> anybody else? >> i've said some critical things about the jpa but you

shouldn't infer from that i infer from that i try to negotiate with iran an end to their nuclear weapons program and an end to the risk of nuclear proliferation to iran. i think a negotiated solution is by far the best outcome, you know, as opposed to, you know, continuing with the sanctions and we continue with sanctions and they continue with their number development. that's not a good solution. military attack, it's a temporary solution, but not a permanent solution so negotiated solution is ideal if you can get it. but, you know, it's always -- it has always been possible to negotiate an agreement with iran. i mean all we have to do is accept agree to their demands in the -- we've got a deal and, you know, that's obviously not

acceptable so, you know -- you want to negotiate and get a deal that actually addresses -- >> right. we know it's not easy. if it was easy, it would have been done. we know it's hard. i mean, this is hard stuff and that's why this hearing is good. that's why listening to you and having this dialogue is good and hearing sides and hearing from folks and hearing from other countries is good because this is not easy. if it was easy it would be done. this is hard stuff and thank you for your testimony. i'm out of time. >> we go to mr. rohrabacher of california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to thank you, chairman royce for calling today's hearing and all of us should agree that one of the great foreign policy challenges we face and more significant

foreign policy challenges we face are preventing a nuclear armed mullah dictatorship in iran. i think that one of the things that's been lacking in this discussion so far today is the fact that we wouldn't care, there's a fundamental difference here is that we wouldn't care if this was brazil, we wouldn't care if this was ireland that wanted to have this nuclear facilities that could result in a nuclear bomb. what we have is one of the world's worst human rights abusers, china being the worst, and this mullah dictatorship has jails filled with people that want to get along with the rest of the world. so perhaps the only way that we're going to succeed in not permitting the mullah dictatorship from having a nuclear weapon from what it's -- i'm gleaning from what you're

saying -- frankly, the only way we're going to succeed is if we get rid of the new mullah dictatorship in iran. i mean, the bottom line is if we can't convince them and i am taking it from what i've heard today that we're not going to be able to -- we'll have to take their word for it that they're not going to utilize this new capability, i don't believe that we're going to convince them that through a culture of compliance that they're going to change their ways because they want to fit into the culture. we're either going to have to get rid of them or they're going to have the bomb and when they have the bomb, they may well as we know they're fanatics, so the question is is shouldn't we be supporting the -- instead of relying on negotiations with the mullahs, shouldn't we be supporting those elms in iran that are -- would like to overthrow the mullahs and establish a real democracy? anyone want to go on record as saying that, i guess not. finally, let me ask --

>> if i could, that -- you know, i use that phrase culture of compliance as an aspirational goal in the sense that what we're ultimately trying to do through negotiated measures, through sanctions, through all of the steps that the international community has taken is to bring about a more open and modern iran and this is one set of tools, there's obviously a variety of tools and the inspection process itself, you know, begins -- as we found in -- >> let me just say -- i don't believe that the mullahs want to be cool and go along with what the culture is all about when we establish this new culture. i want to get -- two minutes left, a minute and a half. are the russians still engaged in the engineering and the

development of the technologies that are going on that -- the centrifuges that will make the weapons possible? are the russian engineers engaged in this? >> sir, actually the iaea knows very little about the involvement of other countries to iran's nuclear program currently. because of the limitations of the inspections and, therefore, iaea has not been able to fully investigate, for example, the development -- >> i'm asking. i got one minute left. are the russian engineers still engaged in this project? >> i think that for the process there has not been direct russian engineers directly involved. there are some assumptions on the weaponization part of the individual -- but it appears that no russians were part of the enrichment program. so right now in terms of the -- the actual building of this facility was a russian project,

was it not? >> no. >> it wasn't? >> no, it was a power plant with nuclear power plant. >> that's what i'm talking about. the nuclear power plant -- was the nuclear power plant built by the russians? >> yes, that's true. >> and there couldn't be -- the centrifuges wouldn't make any difference if they didn't have the nuclear power plant, right? >> i don't think that they need the centrifuges for their nuclear power plant to start with. >> no, no, i understand that. the point is when the russians came on board, i remember going to the ambassador in 1999, our american ambassador suggesting we give the russians an alternative place to build several nuclear power plants

because this would lead to this moment, and nothing happened. i said the same thing to condoleezza rice intelligence about a year later, and nothing happened. we have been -- when the rugs first started building this nuclear power plant we were leading up to this day and i would hope that i'm sorry that it looks like our cooperation level with the russians is actually gone down since this moment and perhaps this is something that would show a sign of good faith on their part if they would start cooperating with us in dealing specifically with the iranians. would you indulge me for one more question? has there -- was there an offer -- do any of you know of an offer by the russian government to refrain -- to withdraw from this project early on before that -- the nuclear power plant was done before that part of the -- do you know of any offer made by the russians to withdraw from this project at a time which could have pry ferentzed us from coming to this point? i've been told there was an

offer and that we didn't pay any attention to it and that was under george w. bush's administration. thank you very much. >> thank you. we go to mr. ted deutch of florida. >> mr. rademaker, you referred back to two decades ago when we were concerned about iran's nuclear program. and i'm trying to get a sense from the panel, going forward we're talking about verifying a comprehensive agreement. and yet for as long as we've worried about the nuclear program in iran, how confident were we, how confident were we that there wasn't a facility? i don't recall when the time it was discovered. you can speak to that but how confident were we that there weren't other falls, enrichment facilities beyond natanz, let's start with that, mr. rademaker.

>> the answer to your question is, we were never -- we've never been confident there is no secret facility. natanz was a secret facility until it was revealed in 2002. like and then for a long period of time that was the only enrichment facility we knew of in iran and then the other one was revealed and it was, again, an even more secretive underground facility so, you know, today is there yet a third underground enrichment facility somewhere in iran under construction, in operation? you know, i don't think anybody can -- given that record, that history i don't think anybody could come to you and say we're confident there's not and that's why the question of a verification is so critically important both in the near term through the jpa and the comprehensive solution but also as i suggested in nye testimony even afterwards because

afterwards when the comprehensive solution expire, the level of verification is going to go way, way down. >> anyone else on the panel that's confident that these are the only enrichment facilities in iran? >> i think as mr. rademaker has said, one of the reasons why i think all four of us have been strong proponents of additional monitoring measures that are comprehensive and go beyond just certain facilities is to try to reduce the uncertainty about what's going on elsewhere in iran that maybe we don't fully understand and that's also why it's very important to get that precise and detailed comprehensive and complete accounting from iran about its past activities that needs to be part of the agreement. >> right, that's -- and that's what -- that's what troubles me the most. we're now a little more than a month away from the expiration of the six-month period and we have been talking for -- how long have we been talking about

the military, possible military dimensions, mr. heinonen? when was the first i.d. report that talked about the military dementias of the program? >> actually the first time it was mentioned indirectly was in spring 2004 if i remember correctly. >> so we're negotiating during this interim period to get to a comprehensive agreement for a decade, for a decade we've worried about the possible military dimensions of the program. that's what's been driving congressional action. that's why we've been engaged in these deliberations for now some several decades. but for ten years, we've worried about this. we've known about this and yet what access is we been given thus far during this initial period when the goal is to negotiate a comprehensive agreement, what access have we been given and what access have we been given to the other areas that we might be interested in

to ensure that iran has come clean on the military dimensions of its program? mr. ambassador? >> sir, that's why we want a robust monitoring and verification regime as we go forward knowing what you just said. >> right. but here's -- i appreciate that. the question is, it's a -- you know, it's a chicken and egg situation, right? i mean, how do we agree to any sort of comprehensive agreement with an adequate level of verification if to date on the most concerning issue about iran's nuclear program the iranians haven't been willing to provide any access at all? >> no, it's a fair point, sir, that's why persistent and continuous access to all the facilities, the ability to take

sample, the ability to question people, to see documents and everything is very basic to a robust monitoring verification given what you just said. >> right, and certainly before -- before we would ever entertain the possibility of extending this interim agreement for another six-month period, certainly we should expect that the iranians would at least be willing to grant us that access in the areas that for more than a decade we've had these concern, mr. rademaker? >> yeah, i just wanted to intercorrect the point that regrettably this is another area where the jps is deficient because the jpa. there's one sentence in the jpa that talks about the history.

it doesn't use the term military dimension but that's what they're talking about and let me read you the sentence. this is how this question, this critically important question is addressed in the jpa. it says, they would create a joint commission of the two sides, the p5 plus 1 and it will work with the iaea to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern. that's all it says. so there's a mechanism that's going to work with the iaea to try and figure this out. nothing in the jpa depends on it actually being worked out. in other words, if this mechanism utterly fails to achieve satisfaction for the iaea, that's unfortunate but it doesn't stand in the way of the rest of the jpa. now, what's going on here, i have to say i think regrettably what happened was our negotiators found this to be a very hard issue because i think the iranians have a lot to hide. there's a lot of history they don't want to talk about and so this became a sticking point in the initial discussions and the answer that the negotiators, the p5 plus 1 ultimately settled on was we're going to shift this issue to the iaea. it's going to become the iaea's problem to get to the bottom -- we'll have i ajoint commission that will try to work -- >> mr. rademaker, i'm sorry. >> if we don't get to the bottom --

>> i'm out of time. i appreciate that and i just hope that at -- given that it's now more than a decade that we've worried about the military di mentions of the iranian nuclear program per the iaea, longer for a lot of the rest of us, that at a bare minimum, congress should be informed on the very detailed nature of whatever talks have taken place surrounding that issue before we should be asked to budge an inch on any sanctions relief and in fact whether to extend beyond six months. >> mr. deutch, i think you and i should talk after this hearing on that very subject. i appreciate it. let's go now to mr. steve chabot of ohio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. last year, the asia subcommittee which i chair and the middle east subcommittee chaired by ileana ros-lehtinen held a joint hearing to discuss the linkages between covert and illicit activities in iran, north korea and syria. it's been reported for some time that north korea has been assisting and supplying iran's missile program.

given the history of north korea and the failure of the u.s. and international community to stop pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons, what lessons should be applied to the situation with iran moving forward and what provisions, if any, in the agreement prevent iran from outsourcing their nuclear program to another country as was in the case with north korea? i see you nodding, mr. lauder. so i'll go to you first if you'd like. >> i'll start. i'm sure ambassador detrani will have something to add to this point, as well. one of the reasons why i argued in my statement that it's very important to have an effective means of monitoring iranian procurement particularly if they're going to be allowed to have a peaceful nuclear program

as part of whatever agreement emerges, is to make sure that in the noise of those procurement efforts that iran is not able to outsource significant parts of its nuclear weapons development program to other states or to nonstate arcs, the a.q. khans of the world, the states like korea and also to get a good handle on what procurement that they're taking. because there has been this long track record of iran looking for various sources throughout the world that could aid its nuclear development. >> ambassador detrani. >> let me note on iran -- for north korea, we have a real example here of how important verification and monitoring is. in 2008 when we were proceeding with the dismantlement programs of yongbyon there was a verification, monitoring verification protocol they agreed to orally. when we asked for them to put it in writing because that was a very robust monitoring verification protocol, it required, if you will,

unfettered access anywhere, any time. samples taken out of the country, they refused to put it in writing and that was the end and since then they've not come back to the table so it showed how important that verification piece of the equation is with north korea. i would think the same with iran with the very robust meaningful monitoring verification protocol that insists on unfettered access and samples and so fort would be critical as we move forward and that's the example we got from north korea. >> thank you. let me shift gears for just a moment. what -- where does israel fit into all of this and their views on iran compliant issues and just what attention is being paid in that area? verification mr. rademaker? >> israel is concerned about the iranian nuclear program and with good reason. iran has -- iranian leaders have

on mull the occasions said israel should be wiped from the face of the earth or wiped off the map of the earth. so for a country like israel, that's obviously alarming that you have those kinds of statements of intention coupled with technological activity that seems aimed at producing a nuclear weapon which would actually enable them to do precisely what they seem -- what they're saying they'd like to see happen. so, the united states has a lot to be worried about. i think iran's other neighbors and the persian gulf region have a lot to be worried about and israel has a lot to be worried about. israel is paying a lot of attention to this problem. my understanding is there's a

great deal of apprehension in israel about the current course of the diplomacy. as i said earlier it's always been possible to negotiate a deal with iran. just agree to what they're asking for and we can have a deal and i think the israelis are concerned that the deal that was struck last year leans too far in the direction of iran's negotiating objectives. they are allowed to continue enriching -- they get sanctions relief. the momentum in the direction of tightening sanctions has all been reversed and then they are promised this get out of jail free card that -- they can continue to enrich at a level that's being negotiated right now and then when that period expires they can do all the enrichment they want. they can do all reprocessing they want. none of that will be limited so the israelis i think are deeply

concerned about that and my sense is that it's given rise to some tension in the bilateral relationship between the united states and israel. >> thank you. >> we go to karen bass of california. >> thank you, mr. chair. the obama administration intimated a final agreement that leaves iran with a nuclear weapons breakout time of six months to a year may be acceptable. i wanted to know from the panelists, whoever chooses to answer what you think of the idea if a six-month breakout window would be a sufficient period of time to detect and counterago an iranian breakout? go ahead. >> well, certainly six months is a very short period of time in international diplomacy. and it depends how iran will deviate from the agreement or how it may renegade. there are several options available there.

and if it goes, for example, in such a way that the only evidence with cia has are the environmental sample results which normally take about three months to deliver, six months is much too short time because you need to take additional samples, you can perhaps analyze them faster, but it has a lot of vulnerabilities and it's also very difficult to estimate the unknowns, what kind of parameter you have there, how long it will take to find out, you need to prove it, et cetera, so six months is for me from the very, very short end. >> yes, mr. lauder. >> if i could just add, i think some of us feel that there may be too much emphasis on a time line, because it's very hard to say for sure, well, iran's six month as way from a weapon or it's 5.5 months away from a weapon or even react if that time. and i think that's why several of us have been advocating that the really important thing to

get right in this agreement is to layer on sufficient monitoring measures so you really have a sense of what's the attack status of its program to the extent you can get it because everything else falls from that. >> yes. >> forgive me if i sound like a broken record but the six-month breakout time is fine, but let's bear in mind that six-month -- that six-month period will only apply during the period of the comprehensive solution. when the comprehensive solution ends and that's going to be in five or ten or 15 years then all of the things that give us that six-month window go away. >> well -- >> they will no longer be limited in the number of centrifuges, the amount of enrichments here so at that moment that solution expires it won't be six months anymore. it'll be six weeks or six days. >> right. and i heard you say that earlier so what do you think it should be?

so it shouldn't be five years, it should be 10 year, 15 year, forever. what are your thoughts about that. >> on the comprehensive solution? >> right. >> i think the enhanced verification requirements, the restrictions -- well, i don't think given their history i don't think iran should be permitted to enrich at all. i think it should be that they're not allowed to enrich but the restrictions on what they can do and the enhanced verification that applies to that i believe should extend indefinitely until the international community can reach a judgment that it is satisfied that iran is now like south africa. they've turned a corner. they're no longer a nuclear proliferation -- >> you mentioned -- >> i think it's going to take more than just good behavior for a finite period of time before i will feel comfortable that there's been a general win change of heart.

>> you and several of the other panelists mentioned several country, south africa, i think, brazil. are there any other examples internationally where it's been without a specific time line? you know what i mean? >> well, certainly -- >> in other words, we continue to -- >> let me also declare their program and gave their program up -- >> say it again. >> they also gave their program. they declared it. >> all right. thank you. i yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you, karen bass. now we go to adam kinzinger of illinois. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you all for being here and helping educate us and talk about some of these important issues. i mean, as i look around the world and i look around especially the middle east, i guess i'm excited that the administration is so giddy about the prospect of negotiations with iran, i think if a lot of the pending negotiations we heard yesterday from the

administration about how they're hopeful that the situation going on with the release of five taliban will help lead to a reinvigorated italian to come negotiate with the united states. i reminded some folks in the administration that in fact pakistan's in negotiations with the taliban right now and about a day or two ago 18 people were killed in the airport in a fight with the taliban. a look at the situation in israel, the israel/palestine negotiations and all the effort that the administration's putting into that which while we would all love that to be solved it's probably a regional smaller conflict on the basis of conflicts that surround and enenvelope the entire middle east. look at the negotiations with russia, how well some of those have gone and circa and the situation we find ourselves in there. so i don't have a lot of hope in the future of negotiations from this administration. and i would ask if anybody and i'm going to ask this

rhetorically and you can feel free to comment if we've had any success with negotiations with an enemy of the united states. we had our boot on the throat of the iranians at a time when we really could have, i think, ended the question of nuclear arms in iran, but we backed away. and it's always interesting to me how the iranians feel like they can be in any position at all to have any bargaining power at the table and have any demands from the very beginning. we've determined that they should not have the right to nuclear weapons program and i think that pretty much says it. but that said i want to go on to an issue that hasn't been touched on yet very briefly. i can ask four of you to comment to the level of your expertise. can you talk about the iranian ballistic missile program. they're developing the ability to deliver nuclear weapons through a ballistic missile program. yet, of course, they claim that

they have no desire for the weaponization of their nuclear program so i'm curious if whoever has -- wants to go first if you can talk about the situation where iran finds itself right now with ballistic missiles. mr. lauder. >> well, the iranian ballistic missile program is a capability that is of concern, ought to be of concern and, in fact, if -- if it would be difficult to negotiate at this stage given what has transpired already. but i would think that it would be very important to begin to find a way to add additional constraints on that program and to add additional monitoring against the program. i mean, you may recall in the heyday of arms control agreements between the united states and the soviet union, for

example, we chose to focus on delivery vehicles, because they were easier to monitor in some ways than the nuclear weapons themselves or the nuclear programs themselves and i think constraints and monitoring on the iranian ballistic missile program would be -- would be a very useful compliment to the types of things that we've been talking about so far. >> do we have the ability to do that in the law? look, when you're negotiating with the russians and you have arms limitation agreements and two superpowers both with a vested interest in trying to calm the situation, this is an asymmetric situation. iran is no soviet union. i mean, do we really believe that we could put in place a way to just to monitor and this is what i'm going to ask you, are there ways to put in place to monitor what they're doing and do it with assurances they're not hiding anything in mountains or underground. >> one of the challenges we face you quite rightly point out this is very much an asymmetric relationship.

this is not where the united states is concerning some of its capability compared to something that we're asking iran to do. we're asking iran to stop doing what it has been doing illicitly in -- against international norms and international agreements and we're trying to trade off sanctions relief against that. we know how to monitor missiles an we certainly have a track record of things that we could put in place if we could bring iran to that position. >> no, but your point is right on. that's so central because if we're talking about weaponization and miniaturization that's a delivery system you have to look at the ballistic missile program and that's one program they worked with north korea on and so forth and continue to develop so that's a very central piece to any meaningful monitoring verification protocol. the missiles have to be very, very much a part of that. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i have a million other things but i yield back. >> we go now to mr. william keating of massachusetts. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to thank the panel for

their very important discussion this morning. i think it underscores to me and many of our members the need for congress to be informed fully before the agreement is to go forward and many of the issues you brought up are critical ones. my role in the committee also is ranking member on europe eurasia and would like to shift more into european perspective of things and how do you assess the role of our european partners in the pf1 negotiations especially with catherine ashton, stepping down as eu high representative. does that have an effect at all and would you comment on that, you know, our partners and how they're viewing the situation and give us your expertise in that area, as well. >> my only comment on that would be the europeans have the extremely concerned the last question about ballistic missiles because if north korea has the capability and are working on that to touch europe with their ballistic missile systems and if there is a nuclear program and they're making it, so i think the european nations have to be extremely concerned about the nuclear program in iran. no question. >> could any of you comment on the effect of the u.s. dealing with our european partners, as

well, in this? and what things could raise as potential conflicts, what things could we do to ameliorate things going forward. >> sir, on your question about kathy ashton. obviously she's been a central player. i think her departure will make a difference although we don't know exactly what it will be because we don't know who her replacement will be and everything will depend on the personality of her successor. more broadly speaking, the observation was made earlier that for our sanctions policy to work, we need cooperation of our economic partners and there have been plenty of hiccups along the way but by and large in recent years the cooperation has been pretty good. you know, i think congress has provided incredible leadership in the sanctions area, the shorthand that's applied to this is the menendez-kirk amendmentments to the defense authorization bill. there have been two of them but

the way they impose financial sanctions in a creative way dined to discourage the importation of iranian oil, but, you know, it was done very cleverly and calibrated way that is actually working and, you know, there's a lot -- conversation about frozen iranian assets in foreign banks, you know, these are not funds that are actually frozen but funds being held in those banks and can't be repatriated in cash form to iran because of the u.s. sanctions policy that congress mandated and that other countries are cooperating on. so the partnership has worked pretty well. i think in terms of the actual diplomacy, it's interesting, i was involved in it to some extent when i served in the bush administration and i mean there are times that some of our european partners take a harder

line on iran than the united states does and, you know, i think for example the current french government has been pretty firm in its demands of the iranians and so it's gratifying to see sometimes sobering to see some of our allies take a harder line on the iranian nuclear program than the u.s. government. >> if the pf plus 1 moves forward and there's some kind of long-term agreement and some of the ambiguity or lack of robust verification that you talked about this morning isn't in place, what are the concerns as a group? what, for instance, would happen if the eu would move more ahead in lifting those sanctions unilaterally or as a group? do you see that as a real concern going forward? >> that kind of disengagement -- >> lifting sanctions like that would be i think a terrible move and it would move us in the wrong direction. i think we have to be united on

something like this. >> and then lastly, i just want to touch base a little bit on russia. if the u.s. and the eu imposed sanctions on russia's oil and gas sector at any point what implication, if any, will increase european demand for gas having our ability to sustain international consensus regarding sanctions on iran? >> that's a pretty complex question having to do with the functioning of global energy markets. both iran and russia are major energy exporters and so i guess they both benefit from higher prices and they both benefit from the emergence of shortages. so, you know, it is one of the challenges that i believe the

united states faces in dealing with russia, the fact that i think something like 30% of european gas consumption is russian gas and, you know, there's an effort to you to build a pipeline across turkey and into southern europe ideally to be filled with gas and the iranians would be happy to put their gas in the pipeline if they were allowed to do that. i think it's a central tentative u.s. policy. we don't want that to happen. but the energy equation is a complex one and, you know, iran as a government is guilty of gross financial mismanagement and so, you know, their energy resources are relatively undeveloped compared to what they could be with better management.

>> okay. we go now to mr. randy weber of texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. our colleague down to the left, mr. meeks said that negotiating with iran is not easy. and i think you -- is mr. rademaker? is that how you say that -- said negotiating would be easy, my words if we rolled over and played dead and if we give them everything they want. was it you that said that? >> yes. >> you know, my opinion is if we're not careful in these negotiations we're going to get what we got in the guantanamo trade. we get to keep one conventional weapon. they get five nuclear weapons so it turns out adam kinzinger is correct. negotiations have not been kind to us during this administration if i can put it rather glibly. if we don't realize that there's a danger in negotiating with iran we're fooling ourselves. anybody here on the panel remember when the first time that iran referred to the united states as the great satan? anybody? >> was it -- '79. >> november the 5th, 1979 when

ayatollah khomeini called us the great satan so for 35 years they've been exporting terrorism calling us the great satan -- i don't know what time it was then israel was the small satan. so should we be saying -- when we talk about negotiating with iran, the terrorists, here we are negotiating with a group of people who will -- a radical islamic fundamentalist jihadist terrorist khomeini who the jihadists believe in exporting terrorism to the extent that they will strap explosives on young boys and girls to kill other boys and girls and innocent men and women and we think we are we can negotiate with them? i believe it was you, mr. lauder who said that we need a list of all of their scientists who are working on their program and i don't know if you saw "the wall street journal" article on may 27th, where there is a group of opposition leaders who have

identified moshin is his name, i think as probably the father of their nuclear weapon. would you agree with that? mr. chairman, by the way, mr. chairman, if i may i'd like to get the letter into the record. >> without objection we will include that, mr. weber. >> would you agree with that? >> i think it's very important that we have access as part of the monitoring regime of the key personnel in part of iran's nuclear program. >> do you agree that he is the father of their nuclear program? >> i don't know -- most nuclear programs probably have multiple fathers. i certainly -- >> do you know this gentleman.

>> i know the name, know the individual, yes, sir, know of. >> mr. ambassador, you're shaking your head. okay. turn your mic on, please, sir. turn your mic on. >> yes, i've heard the name before, sir. >> i've heard the name. >> with the nuclear program. >> would you give this credence then or just something you heard in passing? >> no, i think -- >> you think -- >> i think there's something to it. >> okay. you mentioned also, mr. lauder, the facility -- first of all, that once we should get that list of those involved, those scientists, we should have any time, anyplace access for 24/7. i think that was you that said that. in today's hearing. which i can't agree more and keep in context we have terrorists who will kill innocent children, men and women, and who have been lying

for over -- and doing as such for over 35 years. how long do you think we ought to give them a chance to prove themselves? trust but verify, 24/7 any time any place access. should it be 35 years? should they stop their ex-poring of terrorism to syria or i should say supporting in syria and you can go right down the list, afghanistan, iraq, all the terrorism they're supporting, should it be 35 years or is 35 months long enough or not long enough? we'll start with you, mr. rademaker. >> the question is -- >> how long should we expect them to be compliant before we can trust them? >> i have a hard time answering that. it's sort of like the supreme court on -- >> is three months -- >> obscenity, i'll know it when i see it.

i don't think you can measure this by a time line. i think the measure of whether you can trust iran -- >> okay. >> -- will be the totality of -- >> okay, i got you. >> of the atmosphere. who is in power. what policies are they pursuing? >> i got you and what do we catch them with if we're diligent enough? i'm almost out of time. let's go to mr. lauder real quick. >> well, and i agree with mr. -- some of the comments mr. rademaker made earlier that we have to be about this monitoring and verification regime for the long term. i mean there may be aspects of it. >> but six months, karen bass asked the questions, six months is not long enough, agreed? >> oh, for a monitoring -- oh, it has to be longer. >> mr. heinonen, i'm out of time. very quick. what do you think the length of time ought to be? >> more than six months but it depends also on the compliance, how the compliance is dealt with. what kind of process we will

have in place when something comes up when we see that the iran has not complied and the track record is pretty poor there. we have had a number of -- >> forgive me, mr. ambassador. >> i say this is going to be indefinite. the part of the npt, you'll have to have monitors, you know, the extra protocols and the unfettered access is going to have to be there indefinitely. >> we go to mr. david cicilline from rhode island. >> thank you to the witnesses for this very useful testimony and this very serious issue. the hearing underscores the principal challenge we face as a country. how do we reach agreement with a party with very serious consequences that has been deeply untrustworethink and deceptive and i think in part our success depends on our ability to monitor effectively and to respond effectively to any failings in the agreement, so i want to first ask the witnesses the joint plan of action calls for a comprehensive solution that and i quote would ensure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful, end quote. we have also heard president rouhani say that iran will not

dismantle a single centrifuge and so my first question is is there a way to ensure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges? >> let me just start off by saying they're talking about building additional centrifuges even more sophisticated centrifuges that flies in the face of what we're going after here. it should be going the other way around. they should need fewer and not enhancing. that's where it should be going. >> is it even possible to develop or a sustain a program which is exclusively peaceful that does not require some diminution of the production of centrifuges? >> well, certainly with the numbers they have now and the figure is about 19,000 people are putting out we saw recently

just a year ago they had enough uranium at the 20% purity level which would have given them maybe enough to get one nuclear weapon. so, yeah, so what they have now is sufficient to get them in the nuclear business, no question about that. >> mr. rademaker, you were about to say something. >> yes, the iranians, of course, will tell you that today their nuclear program is exclusively peaceful and they'll say, you know, we don't have to do anything because it is an exclusively peaceful program. we, of course, don't accept that. if your question is how many centrifuges can they be operating and we can be confident that it's exclusively peaceful, my personal answer is that with the current government, with its history, with everything we know about where they've been, the answer they should have -- for me to say i'm confident their program is peaceful, the answer is zero centrifuges. unfortunately, we're in a situation where under the jpa it's clear they're going to have some number of operating centrifuges and that troubles me because i don't understand why they need any and i think it is something of a logical conundrum because their argument is this is, you know, we're developing infrastructure to produce fuel for our civil nuclear program. well, if you buy that, then they actually do need a lot more centrifuges than they have now.

and so, you know, this idea that you're going to, you know, negotiate some number and it's going to be lower than what they have now and that that's evidence of a peaceful program, well, you know, some minimal number of centrifuges makes no economic sense in commercial terms, makes a lot of sense in military terms, but that is sort of where we are. we're sort of negotiating down to a centrifuge program that whose size will only make sense in the context of a military program. so i think it would have been more logical to go with a requirement that they have zero operating centrifuges. >> which actually gets to my next question is, i think many of us think they were not sufficient constraints in the joint plan of action with respect to research and development. and sort of views the current state of technology as if it's

sort of frozen in time and wondering what your thoughts are about what should be in a final agreement that would impose responsible constraints on research and development such as i mean to ensure us that the security of our country and the limitations of any final limitations of a final agreement. >> most certainly access to the facilities, access to the scientists, the technicians, access to the notes, the data, access to the past records. i think it's important to really go way back with iran on this to confirm where they are, to determine what is their state of capabilities. i think that's all necessary. >> but in addition to the knowledge of that are there any limitation that's we should try to secure in a final agreement to actually limit research and development in their nuclear capability? >> frauirst of all, we need to p in our mind that these are technologies, once you have a centrifuge you can produce uranium for peaceful purposes or not peaceful purposes. it's not the technical topic.

it's the behavior of the state. also economic rationale, as rademaker said. i personally see it as very hard to argue that iran needs enrichment for power plant. and their concern is that nobody sells them enriched uranium. but iran doesn't have uranium in its soil. so if you are not able to buy uranium then you are well dressed but nowhere to go with the enrichment plant. sow need to think about the rationale as a justification and base your argument to that. >> thank you p i yield back, mr. chairman. >> we're going to go to mr. ron desanityis of florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i've been struck by watching the ayatollah's reaction to how

things have unfolded. he spoke the other day in front of a banner that said america cannot do a damn thing, i believe. and he basically said that they have renounced the idea of any military actions. and so i think -- i'm trying to understand from their perspective he sees sanctions being eased, force being ruled out, so what incentive does he have to want to change his course of conduct? to me he's absolutely incentivized to want to continue to enrich and to have a nuclear capability. and so does anyone want to quibble with me about from the ayatollah's perspective haven't we provided him as he sees it a road map to continue on? >> i think you point to a wellfounded concern.

what brought iran to the negotiating table in the first place? it was pressure. economic pressure. political pressure. that pressure has been relieved to some extent. and certainly on the military side i think they probably are a lot less concerned about the threat of a u.s. military strike today than they would have been a year or two ago. we have negotiators that are meeting with the iranians right now. they're meeting today in geneva. maybe they're making progress. i don't know. but i'm sort of concerned that iran right now, i think they know what they need to agree to to get a deal. they're refusing to make that deal. they're holding out for better terms. is that because they're under less pressure and they calculate that the pressure's going to diminish over time? in other words, that the current trajectory is in their favor. yeah, i worry a lot that that's what they're thinking.

maybe our diplomats are troo too. i think they're probably frustrated they can't get the iranians to say yes to whatever proposal they've made to them. >> well, look, sometimes i think my frustration with seeing how some of this has unfolded, particularly looking at people in the state department, is they will deal with iran and treat them in a way that i think imputes too much of a western sensibility into how iran conducts themselves. i don't think they recognize enough the extent to which they're motivated by their virulent form of islamic jihad, the ability to continue to wage war against infidels, the united states being the great satan. so i just look at it, and i think from their perspective i think they see them playing us like a fiddle. i understand we have negotiations. i am absolutely not optimistic that that is going to be done and that iran is going to willing willingly disarm itself.

i hope i'm wrong but i think that's nevertheless where we are. and i'll yield back the balance of my time. >> mr. brad schneider of illinois. >> thank you, mr. chairman. again, echoing what's been said today, thank you for calling this hearing and for allowing us to conduct it in a bipartisan way on an issue of grave importance. mr. rademaker, let me start with you. you touched on in your testimony and subsequent conversations the fact they're not, the concern that the deal being negotiated is a time-based agreement, that iran just sits tight for a period of time and then is free to proceed however the country wants to under a term that would treat iran like japan. i think the sense that we all need to understand is that iran is not japan. iran is a revolutionary regime. it's got hegemonic ambitions and clearly demonstrated nefarious intent and deeds. and the idea that such a state could be treated like japan, i would argue the exact opposite.

such a state can never be treated like japan or treated in the same manner as the jpoa says, as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the mpt. iran is different. and as we sit here, today is exactly 40 days away from the july 20th deadline set by the agreement. and again, as was previously mentioned, there is talk about moving iran back on the pathway to nuclear weapons capability. i think many of us have stated here before and again today that moving iran backwards is not sufficient, the goal should be to move iran off the path to a nuclear weapon. by that long way of introduction, mr. rademaker, for the whole panel, is there any reason why we should be giving up as you stated, the goal of holding iran to zero enrichment, holding iran to not having an iraq plutonium reactor, holding

iran to fully disclosing their previous potential military dimensions of their nuclear program? >> well, first of all corporationman, i think you and i are in violent agreement about our perspective on this. in answer to your question, the rationale for allowing them to enrich, i'm really the wrong person to ask to provide such a rationale because where i come down is that the correct answer they should not be allowed to enrich given their history. i think if you want someone to give you a reason to permit that perhaps you need -- >> does anyone have any case that would justify allowing iran to enrich? i think the sense is that we all are in agreement that that shouldn't be. i know before november 24th last year when the announcement of the agreement was made the conversation was in my terms permanently closing any and all

pathways for iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. it seems the concern is this is not closing those pathways at all. mr. lauder, in your written testimony you talked about the sense of, well, how to deal with non-compliance. how do we deal with non-compliance before we even have an agreement? what should we be doing now to make sure iran has the incentive to go forward? >> well, i think it's an excellent question, and i think it comes back again to this theme of to begin to have any confidence that this agreement will be complied with we have to go back to iran's past and have to press them to make a full disclosure of what they have done in the past on their nuclear program. we still have the leverage of sanctions. we still have the leverage of nothing's agreed to, everything's agreed.

but that understanding of what iran has done in the past becomes the foundation then for the monitoring regime. and we do have to push for that. ambassador -- i'm sorry. >> in 2003 when they reached an agreement with iran, actually there was a paragraph there which required iran to come through with the complete past history of its nuclear program, and it failed to do so. and i think we need to look at what was the reason for the failure? was there some other mechanism we should apply when this will surface? and i think this is the most important element of this new agreement to be concluded. >> ambassador detrani. >> if i could just comment. sanctions. they made it very clear they need relief. sanctions and sanctions. going after the financial systems, institutions and so forth, their illicit activities. this is so key. and that's the pressure. that's the pressure to keep them

on a path. and as long as we keep that pressure on, my personal view, you keep that pressure on, if they want relief they're going to have to perform. and that's where the verification monitoring comes in and so forth. when they're not performing, that pressure continues. >> ambassador, i agree with you. sanctions is what brought iran to the table. my personal belief is that we need to make sure iran understands that the no deal is -- no deal is better than a bad deal. no deal is not the sanctions we had in november of 2013 but orders of magnitude greater bite in those sanctions if there's not a deal that is to our terms and does close those gaps. with that i yield back. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. we go to mr. ted yoho of florida. >> thank you. we've sat here several times in the past year and a half. i think some of you have been here, and i remember ambassador bolton was here and everybody was pretty" agreement that iran was going to have feasible