on a path. and as long as we keep that pressure on, my personal view, you keep that pressure on, if they want relief they're going to have to perform. and that's where the verification monitoring comes in and so forth. when they're not performing, that pressure continues. >> ambassador, i agree with you. sanctions is what brought iran to the table. my personal belief is that we need to make sure iran understands that the no deal is -- no deal is better than a bad deal. no deal is not the sanctions we had in november of 2013 but orders of magnitude greater bite in those sanctions if there's not a deal that is to our terms and does close those gaps. with that i yield back. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. we go to mr. ted yoho of florida. >> thank you. we've sat here several times in the past year and a half. i think some of you have been here, and i remember ambassador bolton was here and everybody was pretty" agreement that iran was going to have feasible nuclear material to construct a

bomb, five to six bombs, by january, february of this year. has iran accomplished that mission? do they have enough material to do that? >> i don't think we see that. the sense is no, they do not. the concern was when they had 20% purity and enough kilograms up there to have maybe one -- >> but yet we don't have all the information. so we can't say with certainty they don't have that, correct? >> we're just looking at the declared facilities, the facilities we're aware of. there may be undeclared facilities, as the iaea's indicated. >> and mr. lauder and ambassador detrani, you were saying that it's very difficult to monitor and verify iran's compliance with the iranian-u.s. jpa agreement. do you believe these details should have been worked out prior to any agreement starting and releasing sanctions? if you go into a negotiation, you should have everything on the table. i want to know everything you had before you move forward. i mean, would you agree with that? >> sir, i don't have all the modalities of the negotiators and what they were using.

i believe they gave them relief on a certain number of sanctions so they could move forward. >> but if we can't verify now or monitor it, we should have had a way to monitor that stuff, all those parameters before we move forward. i would hope so. how about you, mr. lauder? >> i think it's very important that before there's further loosening of the sanctions, which have brought iran to the table, that we do get this complete and full accounting of iran's intentions and have the data monitoring that's the basis of our monitoring regime. >> in your opinion does the current situation in iran's nuclear program or whatever they're doing in our agreement, does it allow iran to get closer to having a bomb if we stay on the current track? mr. rademaker.

>> i think the obama administration would argue that the current arrangement diminishes the risk of nuclear breakout because it limits the number of new centrifuges that iran can deploy. it limits the -- prevents them from continuing to enrich to the 20% level which they were doing in the past. but on the other hand, there's been some recent analysis done by the bipartisan policy center. it's on their website. they're no longer producing 20% enriched material, but their production of lower enriched 3.5% has gone up by about 25%. >> and then what i've heard today on this panel -- >> the advantages are the progress is substantially less than the obama administration advertised. >> right. but what i've heard on this panel today is they've got way more centrifuges than they need to have for nuclear power production. and so i think we're all in agreement that they're moving in that direction, they've been moving in that direction in the

last 25 to 30 years. playing the cat and mouse game. do you believe that the u.s.-iranian interim agreement was detrimental to the u.s. security, or israel's security or the regional security the way it was negotiated, release the sanctions at the time they did? do you think it was detrimental to do that? just kind of real quickly because i'm rung out of time. >> i think 'twas detrimental on the sanctions side. i also think it was highly detrimental by basically legitimizing centrifuge enrichment in iran which at the time we said was not permitted. >> ambassador detrani, what do you think? >> [ inaudible ]. >> your microphone, please. >> the reporting from the iaea indicates that iran has down blended and converted to uranium oxide their inventory, part of their inventory of 20% purity enriched uranium.

the iaea report speaks about the framework for cooperation. so i think what we've just recently seen from the iaea is that there has been some movement on the part of iran in response to the relief on some of those sanctions. but that's just a very interim type approach to it. certainly if you're sitting in israel you're looking at something different. that's different. >> that brings me up to my last question. since iran -- do you feel like they've abided by the terms of the agreement? >> sir, i don't have all the particulars on, that but according to the iaea, the iaea most recent report is a much more positive report that i've seen in the past with the exception of the weaponization and the militarization. >> okay. and if they don't abide by, that what should we as a nation do? more sanctions? pre-emptive strike? prepare for the day that they do get a nuclear bomb? >> sanctions are biting. sanctions are big. sanctions have had impact. they're having impact. >> i'm out of time. i appreciate your time. thank you. >> we go to mr. juan vargas of california. >> i too want to thank you, mr.

chairman, again for having this meeting and also for the ranking member. and to give us so much time. i appreciate it too. thank you. as many of you know, i've been very critical of the interim deal. i thought it was a mistake. i believe that we first should have gotten the final deal, then we should have negotiated the interim deals. in other words, we first should have made sure that there was no path to getting a nuclear weapon. then we could have negotiated these interim deals because i did think that the sanctions were working. i voted here to ratchet up the sanctions because i think you had to get to that fundamental choice, do you want your nuclear program and do you want to militarize it as you're attempting to do or do you want a functioning economy? we will continue to press the sanctions until you didn't have a functioning economy. i think that would have been the right way to go. but now we are here and we are here. and i think it is a very dangerous situation that we're in. because i do think we're going to get to july 20th and for sure

they're going to want more time. that's what we feared at the beginning. i think that's going to be the case. then what do we do? then do we say we're not going to negotiate and make ourselves look like the bad guys? then it's harder to put the sanctions back on again. so where do we go from here? and i do want to comment, mr. rademaker. i couldn't agree with you more wholeheartedly. if it's a five-year deal, if it's a ten-year deal, if it's even a ten-year deal it's not a deal. i mean, that is a bad deal. this is a situation where you have to make sure you can force them to comply all the way out. because otherwise, they will just simply play cat and mouse and outlast us ten years, and then they'll get on with their nuclear program. so where do we go from here? meaning we're approaching this point. i don't think we're going to be -- >> the monitoring and verifications, congressman. there's no question about it. and we've talked about unfettered access, anytime, anyplace, access to all the facilities. concern about covert facilities, concerned about weaponization.

these are things that need to be drilled down and pursued with great vigor indefinitely. >> right. but i believe we're going to get to the six-month -- assume for a second we get to the six-month and they want more time. i think that's -- what do we do? at that point what do we do? mr. rademaker, you look like -- >> i think it's pretty clear that if we reach the six-month point without having reached agreement on the comprehensive solution that there will be a six-month extension. in fact, the jpa at one point says it will take up to a year to negotiate this. so even in drafting the jpa they were anticipating potentially a six-month extension. i did want to pick up on one thing you said. you said you think the right thing to have done here would be to negotiate the final agreement and then come back and fill in the details. you know, it pains me to say this but i think in fact that is what they did. i mean, the jpa does specify the final agreement. the final agreement is that -- i

read it earlier. the final agreement is that upon the expiration of the comprehensive solution the iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapons state to the npt. so the end state, the final state is no sanctions, no restrictions on their ability to do whatever they want in the nuclear area. ordinary safeguards -- >> if i could interrupt for a second. i thought the issue of having any type of enrichment program. any type of way for them to be able to reach their ability to create the nuclear weapon, the heavy water facility. >> that's there. >> i know what you're saying, and i'm actually not disagreeing with you. but i think that in the final agreement what i would say is if you're going to allow any kind of nuclear power program that had to be one that was so tight there was no way -- you that had to have the fuel coming from somewhere else, montrealed closely, that you'd have to have unfettered access to their country and where they could potentially be hiding things. that's the deal i mean.

because i agree with you. that's why i think -- personally. and again, i've been critical of the people i think associated with this deal were very good-hearted and attempted to negotiate with a western type of nation and found out that that's not who they're negotiating with. i think it was very naive. mr. lauder, could i have you comment on that? >> i think the extent to which negotiations continue, the opportunity that needs to be seized, and i agree with ambassador detrani in this respect, is to use that time to push even harder to expand the monitoring provisions that iran will need to undertake. iran is different. they have violated international norms over an extended period of time. they have not been in compliance with international agreement. it is reasonable then to expect that iran should need to undertake additional -- need additional monitoring provisions

to build confidence in the international community, that they are changing their path. >> thank you. my time is expired. i want to say i think that iran is like north korea. i believe if they get a nuclear weapon they'll also threaten to bomb los angeles or else -- and i unfortunately think that they might have the nerve to do it. thank you. >> thank you, mr. vargas. we go now to mr. george holding of north carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think we can all agree that if the obama administration is able to craft a final agreement with iran that it would be a huge foreign policy win, at least in the eyes of the administration, a foreign policy win, a political win, truly in an environment of an administration that is some what bereft of foreign policy wins or accolades. you know, my concern is that if they achieve what they consider

a win that they'll lack the political will to risk tarnishing that win by calling out a violation that we find subsequently. so my question, i'm going to just run down the line and have each of you all respond to this, is what internal controls are there there? red team, so to speak, that would ensure that the politics of trying to salvage this foreign policy win don't trump good sense in the white house as far as calling out a violation. mr. rademaker, take 30 seconds, and let's go down, and by the time everyone's done that i'll be out of time. >> i honestly don't know what sort of checks there might be within the administration. every president can structure decision-making on foreign policy in his administration in the way he sees fit. i'd like to think that there are people at the defense department that are vigilant, that there are people in the intelligence

community drawing attention to problems. but i don't know. i think the ultimate red team is the united states congress. and this committee -- >> perhaps that might have been helpful as the president was considering exchanging bergdahl for five taliban terrorists. >> well, the good news here i think for the congress is i think one of the things the iranians are demanding is an end to all u.s. sanctions. in fact, they're promised that in the jpa. and i don't think the president has the authority unilaterally to get rid of all of the sanctions. he has some waivers. he has some ability not to enforce certain laws. but i think at the end of the day there are certain things that only the congress is going to be able to do. so for them to be able to fulfill their commitments to the iranians in this negotiation they're going to need this committee and this congress to pass legislation. and that will afford you an opportunity to pass judgment on the entire arrangement.

and for that reason, i would think it would behoove the administration to consult closely with you now to make sure that you are prepared to accept -- >> indeed. >> i don't know if that's happening. but ultimately, they need to persuade you that they've struck a good deal and if there are details you're unhappy about it's better to know that now rather than promise things to the iranians that they're not going to be able to deliver. >> mr. lauder? >> i agree that perhaps the most effective red team for this will be the u.s. congress. you will have the opportunity, i'm presuming to say this, as an outsider, but this is not a treaty. but you will have the functional equivalent of a resolution of ratification when you deal with the sanctions question. and that is an opportunity to express the congress's views about the types of capabilities that need to be -- for

monitoring that need to be nurtured in the u.s. government, that need to be funded in u.s. government. and you can ask for a periodic compliance report. it could be the extent to which iran is complying with the agreement and what types of anomalies are being detected, what is being done to resolve that. they ask for both a periodic unclassified and a classified report. that's certainly been a feature of other agreements in the past. i didn't used to like them when i was in the executive branch because they were a lot of work and it led to -- it led to a lot of internal debate, but i think it's something to make sure that the iranians understand that their compliance is going to be very important to the united states across all the branches. >> thank you, mr. heinonen? >> thank you. i agree with mr. lauder and the best is actually the public opinion, that you make the deal

open and open compliance reports. and this deal is important. this is important not only to the security of the united states of america but the regional security, and this sets a benchmark, for example, for how we're going to deal in the future with north korea. this has a lot of ramifications and they don't end here. >> i believe ground truth will be the monitors in the field, the iaea and other countries. i believe it's those foreign governments that also have access and unique insights into what's going on there. i think a strong case can be made that they can speak to compliance issues and if iran is gone on to their own way and cheating and so forth i don't think anyone will be able to conceal that aspect to it. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. holding. we thank all our witnesses for their testimony today, and i think you've given us a lot to consider as the administration continues to negotiate. i am particularly troubled that, as mr. rademaker put it, this

agreement puts iran on the path from nuclear pariah to nuclear partner. and i don't think any member of the committee is comfortable with that given the supreme leader's comments in may in particular about expectations that we might try to limit their ballistic missile program. as i quoted earlier, he said, "this is a stupid idiotic expectation." but i didn't give you the rest of his quote, which to me is very revealing. he said, "the revolutionary guards should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the present level. they should mass-produce ballistic missiles." he said, "this is the main duty of all military officials." now, he's not referring to a space program here. and when you combine that with a

call for the head of iran's atomic energy organization to add 30,000 centrifuges last month to iran's existing 19,000, ignoring what the iranian officials and what their leader is saying on this subject as they move forward with their program is very concerning to me. and i especially wanted to thank mr. angle and the other members of this committee and our witnesses for the chance today to take a good hard look at the ongoing negotiations. thank you all very much. and we stand adjourned.

c-span's new book sundays at eight includes huffing-to-be post senior military correspondent david wood. >> there's something that drives them to this ideal of service and the -- it's like so many people i know who served in war, is that the intensity of the experience, the intensity of the relationships they had with their combat buddies are so strong and so pure and true that they look back on those times with longing. and so i'd always asked them, you know, do you wish this had never happened, and they're like, i'd do it again in a heartbeat.

i think there's something else that goes on there too, and it is that going through a near death experience somehow seems to give them so much strength and courage and optimism that i think that's one reason why they would do it again. >> read more of our conversation with david wood and other featured interviews from our book notes and q & a programs in c-span's "sundays at eight," from public affairs book, now available as a father's day gift at your favorite book seller. the center for strategic and international studies held a discussion monday on china-russia relations. with former australian prime minister kevin rudd and former u.s. ambassador to china stapleton roy. they discussed both of those nations' increasing tensions

with the u.s. even as relations between china and russia continue to warm. this is 90 minutes. >> good afternoon, everyone. my name is chris johnson. i'm the freeman chair in china studies here. it's great to see so many friends to join us for what i think is going to be an absolutely fantastic panel. i couldn't be more proud of the panel we managed to put together. obviously, an issue of tremendous concern, lots of thinking about what's going on in the sino-russia relationship and how it matters for sino-china -- or si sino-russian-u.s. triangular relations. you all have the bio. this is another installment in our china reality check series where we try to look at issues that are either controversial by their nature, are poorly understood here in washington or we just feel deserve more attention across the board. and this topic certainly struck me as i was in shanghai watching

the summit between president putin and xi as something i needed to do as soon as i got back. so i'm very pleased all these great gentlemen were coordinating their schedules. it wasn't easy but we managed to get them all in one room. we're going to have dr. brzezinski start off. ambassador roy will follow and prime minister rudd will follow up from that. just getting some framing remarks. we'll have a few questions and answers amongst ourselves here and then we'll turn it over to the audience for broader discussion. dr. brzezinski. >> thank you very much. i take it we're supposed to talk about the agreement between russia and china and its implications. let me make three basic points about it. because in my judgment at least it is still in the realm of speculation. perhaps my two colleagues know much more about it because they know more about china than i do. but on the whole so far most of the issues that arise out of that agreement are subject to some degree of uncertainty. my sense of that agreement, however, on the whole is that it

does not really create a situation in which the russians are gaining a great deal. they're gaining something that's essential to them, is important for them, and it can contribute to some degree of influence and success. but they don't retain in my view at least as much freedom of action subsequent time as the chinese. after all, it's a long-term agreement. it's a long-term agreement which involves commitments by both sides of substantial character but of much larger character on the russian part than on the chinese. moreover, the russians are making a commitment to china of a sort that they'll have a long-term interest in maintaining its maximum or perhaps even enlarging. their relationship on that same issue with the european unusual is already estimated and will probably decline. so they have a vast interest in

this being successful and sustained. the chinese of course do also. it's good to have this russian support. it does provide them with a degree of guarantee for the future. that's very important. but consider this. in some years to come there could be issues pertaining to, for example, new opportunities from iran. there could be new opportunities to purchase a great deal of energy from saudi arabia. especially as the structure of world distribution comes out from saudi arabia will be altered. the chinese already have a far-reaching long-term agreement with turkmenistan which can grow in size, and they certainly want to preserve it. so in a sense my feeling is that while this is a mutually beneficial agreement the strategic consequences of it are

more promising for china than for russia. it doesn't imply in any sense some cleavage between them. ats normal outcome of the prolonged negotiating relationship. but the chinese retain options subsequent in time regarding that agreement that are not open in the same degree to the russians. and the minor second aspect, i don't know what the price structure for the agreement was, but talking recently to some central asians who obviously have a keen interest of their own in this agreement, i got the impression that their view was that the russians are were compelled to make some serious concessions in the price. so that e-mail from the sort of price structure point of view, this probably was more to the benefit of the chinese than to the russians. but it does emphasize enforcement of an enduring

relationship, the one that can be altered asymmetrically. my second point pertains to the geostrategic realities of that relationship more generally. clearly, russia, china, and the united states are the world's most preeminent powers, although president obama on the whole correctly demoted russia publicly in recent times to the status of a very major regional power. not global power. i don't want to take issue with my president, especially since i'm sympathetic to that point of view, but i do have to acknowledge that when it comes to atomic weapons russia is a global power. it is a global power that's close to being a peer of ours. whereas china is not. and that of course introduces a significant asymmetry in the russian-chinese relationship. although i rather doubt that either the russians or the chinese are contemplating a nuclear engagement against each

other. russia is a global atomic power. china is not. china lags behind the united states. and lags behind russia. the chinese believe in minimal nuclear deterrence, inflicting a minimal amount of damage sufficient tone force political consequences that they view desirable but not wreak total damage either on us or on the russians in their targeting. that makes some significant difference. secondly here, however, on the other hand both china and the united states are global economic powers. russia is not. worse than that, china is a growing global economic power. russia is not. russia is a receding regional at best economic power.

and that problem is getting more serious for the russians. so here it is also a matter of some asymmetry in the relationship. and one could even argue that one of the highly possible consequences of the ukrainian adventure is going to be a result which might well be one of the most damaging territorial geopolitical outcomes for russia in its entire imperial history. if you think of russia's imperial history, it has been one of steady growth, with some setbacks here or there. but the setbacks were never really decisive. the war in crimea in the 1850s was a setback. the war with the japanese was a setback of some far eastern

significance but not fundamental. the defeat in 1940s would have been that. but russia prevailed. but the possibility of losing ukraine is going to be the most serious territorial defeat for russia. it will mean the loss of more than 40 million people. and a large piece of territory. and putin has already accomplished something that hasn't been achieved by anyone so far in the russian-ukrainian relationship. unlike, for example, the poles, who for a variety of my judgment on the whole legitimate reasons strongly suspect and destruct -- distrust the russians. the ukraineians have not harbored animus toward russia by and large. the results of crimea plus what's going on is creating a nation of intense hostility towards russia.

and if the outcome is one that sustains a west-oriented ukraine laush will have suffered. and i think the probabilities are will suffer the greatest setback insofar as its territorial history is concerned. the chinese are not threatened with that. the chinese have from their point of view unfortunately rather bad relationships with the majority of the countries on which they border. there are claims and counterclaims. and the russians and others are worried about that. the largest piece of territory lost by china historically is to russia. so far the chinese have not raised it openly. although in private conversations with some people, myself included, they have mentioned it rather explicitly. that is a problem for the future which the russians cannot entirely ignore. and the chinese, while having

regional conflicts, local conflicts with some of the neighbors, with some exceptions on the whole have acted with restraint. on the whole. there have been some problems lately with maritime limits and so forth. but they have not resulted in drastic outcomes. my last and third point is what about the geostrategic trajectories of these three countries? here again on russia i can be very straightforward and simple. it is a downward trend. the by and large general trends are negative. take it in terms of population. russian population is declining. take it in terms of russian social talent. large parts of it, not overwhelming but significant, are emigrating. take it in terms of durability of human life. russia is still relatively on

the low level compared to advanced societies. take it in terms of private capital. every successful member of the new middle class is trying to export money somewhere else. now, some of that up to a point is happening in china too. there's no doubt that the new class of multibillionaires is trying to export a great deal of its capital. but by and large, there is still nothing comparable in any way to what is transpiring in russia. there is not a mass emigration movement. there is a sense of vitality. and there is a sense of prospective success. china rising peacefully is still the predominant slogan in the country, at least on the official level. and in that sense the geostrategic trajectory of china is rather positive. and again, in sharp contrast to russia. now, that of course from the chinese point of view and from the global perspective is

complicated by the fact that the chinese-russian relationship is not the preeminent global relationship. it is the chinese-american relationship that is the globally preeminent relationship. but the decline of russia in that triangular relationship obviously boosts the influence of china, gives china the option of utilizing russia whenever convenient, but presumably out of caution and strategic intelligence not associating themselves with russia too much. look at the u.n. votes, for example, on ukraine. china explicitly abstained. abstained from a resolution which was explicitly condemning russia. they didn't back russia. they didn't try to veto the resolution. they simply abstained. which shows that the russians do not enjoy the preeminent place in chinese strategic calculations. it is still the united states.

and hence, a great deal of what transpires in the triangular relationship also depends on us. can we maintain a posture that enhances the significance mutually of the american-chinese relationship? because that impacts on the chinese-russian regsship. a and here i have some reservations on both sides. and i'm not trying to be solomonic. i think both sides lately have not acted as skillfully and as intelligently as one might wish. i had from the very beginning some reservations about the wording of the pivot speech the moment i read it, i said to myself i really wonder how the chinese will interpret it. why put such heavy emphasis on the significance of a military shift to the far east with the algerian -- with the afghan war coming to an end?

why put so much stress on it? why talk implicitly about some form of containment in that context? by hints about maritime or territorial problems. why not simply say, which would have been truthful and accurate and served the same purpose by saying the united states has been part of the far east since 1905, the roosevelt negotiating treaties between japan and russia. and it remains one and will remain one. and you don't have to say it involves aircraft carriers or military personnel or new deploymen deployments. or mr. rodman in your country, actually, where it wasn't specified very clearly where the american marines to be stationed there are to defend australia from china or from getting a new -- what is the country called? >> new guinea. >> papua-new guinea. >> but the fact it's going to be american troops there i thought was somewhat wrong message.

not necessary. lately even in some speechd, in particularly the west point speech, there are some references to china in relationship to other issues which implied a somewhat ambivalent assessment of the chinese role in the world. i think we have to be more careful in that respect. and of course our newspapers can be naturally and instinctively critical of the chinese political system being free. the chinese, however, have been responding to this or maybe even contributing to it through an increasingly negative press about the united states. the fact of the matter is much of the chinese officially controlled press is very hostile towards the united states. and very explicitly so. some of the articles which i read every week are emphasizing american aggressiveness, american insensitivity, american domineering aspirations, and so forth. and that i think feeds a sense

of mutual -- mutually increasing antagonism potential ly, mutual suspicions and uncertainties. just coming here i was reading an article entitled "american hegemonist's biggest threat to china is the americanization of china." from a major chinese publication. it is of course connected with systemic challenges within china itself. the chinese don't like the comparison between themselves and ourselves in terms of who has the largest number of corrupt public officials. i think it's a close call as to which one does. except the problem is that our corrupt officials act in keeping with our financial culture. that is to say, enrich yourself as much as you can and rip anybody off as much as you can. the chinese officials happen to

be members of the standing committee of the communist party of china. i thought a communist party had rather different principles regarding distribution of wealth. so it's even more of a challenge to their internal lodgic and stability than ours. but the interaction of the two perhaps has a somewhat cross-feeding effect. so these the are kinds of problems that i think can surface and link to specific problems on the ground could become quite serious. one of the things to watch, and i'll end on this, insofar as strategic prospects is concerned, is the potential evolution of a very specific japanese-indian relationship. the indian press is full of articles about the new connection between modi and abe and how logical it is for a potentially strong maritime power, technologically highly advanced, such as china to a close relationship with india

which is threatened territorially by a nearby strong neighbor. so the chinese too i think have to be very careful in how they handle their external affairs. and for us the challenge is to prove to everyone that america's energy for continued growth and vitality and social success has not been dissipated and especially by social trends, which warn of certain potential social risks and tensions. and i'll end by simply mentioning it. the growing disparity between the very rich and few of them and the very many increasingly poor, and they're the vast majority. thanks. >> thank you. ambassador roy. >> thank you. dr. brzezinski has made my task very easy because i basically agree with the various points that he has made. but when we're talking about russian relations with china, it can't be all summarized in just the few minutes. so there are some additional

points that i would like to make. first, it's vitally important not to oversimplify the relationship. it's an extremely complex relationship. and it's an asymmetrical relationship. what do i mean by asymmetrical? in 1993 russia's economy and china's were about the same size. china's economy is now four times larger than that of russia, and the disparity is growing. as a result, until recently russia including putin would be very reluctant to commit russian resources over a long-term period to the growth of china. now, some other factors have come into play now, but that underlying suspicion on the part of russia about the potential threat to russian interests of an increasingly strong and prosperous china is always an

underpinning of russian views of their relationship with china. having said that, though, it's very important to understand how strong the impulse is between the two countries to improve their relationship. neither of them like a world dominated by a sole superpower. so that strategic factor, despite the fact that until recently both of them had more important relationships with the united states than with each other. and i think you could still say that in the case of china. but recent developments in u.s.-russian relations have altered that particular balance. but the underlying fact is they don't like a superpower-dominated world and it was reflected in the fact that ten years ago they finally settled their remaining border

dispute through a border agreement that involved the transfer of some islands in the amor river from russia to china and the division of an island. so here were two big strong counsel resolving a territorial dispute through the transfer of territo territory. that's something that both governments ought to bear in mind and particularly china in terms of looking at how territorial disputes are affecting their bilateral relations. so the trend in russian-chinese relations has been toward improving them, and i think it's fair to say that they are the both they have been in post-world war ii history, including the period of communist cooperation, because it's a different type of relationship now. now, having said that, i've mentioned that russia was reluctant to commit its resources to the development of china. that has changed.

it was changing over time. and i think the ukrainian developments have greatly strengthened that desire on the part of russia. in the case of china and looking at the energy picture, which is what we were supposed to be talking about today, until the mid '90s chinas energy strategy was based on self-sufficiency. but beginning around 1993, china had to move to a different energy strategy because it was becoming increasingly reliant on imported energy. so now the fundamental driver of china's energy policy is diversity of supply. and in large measure because of the ukrainian crisis the importance to russia of the diversity of demand has become much more important. a large portion of their gas exports has been to europe. and now there's a question in

russian minds of how reliable that demand is going to be. and the second factor is the chinese demand is growing rapidly and european demand is growing very slowly and may decrease because europe is now looking at diversifying their sources of energy because they don't like the implications of being too dependent on russia as the source for their natural gas supply. so these are the considerations that came together in this meeting that produced this agreement. now, the agreement on its surface looks like a very important one. the supply of 38 million cubic meters of gas annually by russia to china beginning in 2018. that's a big deal by any measure. but we have to be careful. dr. brzezinski correctly pointed out, we don't know the details.

key factor is price. what we do know is that china compromised a long-standing position by agreeing to a base formula for price that is related to oil price. this is the way that russian supply of gas to europe is priced. high oil prices mean you pay higher price for the natural gas. but china has always resisted that type of a formula and it's one of the reasons why for ten years the two countries were not able to reach agreement on this particular deal. now they've reached agreement and it seems that they have agreed to a oil price-related formula but we don't know the details. and it's very likely that russia was in a weaker position than china was in working out the final details of the agreement. but we'll have to wait until we learn more about the actual pricing arrangements. now, the second thing to

remember is let's not blow this deal out of proportion. the deal provides for 38 million cubic meters of gas per year. it doesn't begin until 2018. and it will take a while to ramp up to that level of supply. china's current consumption of natural gas is running at somewhere between 70 billion cubic meters a year and 100 billion cubic meters of gas a year. so this deal represents maybe 25% or less of china's current consumption. but by the time the gas comes on stream it will be a much smaller percentage. why? because china has set the goal by 2020 of having an annual consumption of natural gas that is in the 200 billion cubic meters of gas per year or 220.

so 38 billion viewed in that context is a much smaller percentage of china's overall natural gas consumption. now, there's a reason why china is trying to increase its consumption of natural gas so rapidly, and anyone who has traveled to chinese cities knows why. coal-fired pollution is decimating the air quality in china. and therefore, they have a major urgent need to diversify away from coal burning and to utilize more clean natural gas. and so that is the trend which is under way. and russia is part of that picture. but dr. brzezinski referred to the turkmenistan deal. the turkmenistan deal is for a shorter period of time but provides for $40 billion -- 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year at its maximum level.

and there's a possibility that will rise to 70 billion cubic meters per year. so once again -- and australia is becoming an important potential supplier of lng to china. and somewhere around 2020 it's possible the u.s. fracced gas will become available for export to asia, and that will also affect the considerations. so if you look at this particular deal in the context of this broader picture, you realize that it's an important arrangement but it's by no means one that ties the two countries together in a highly dependent relationship over a long period of time in the sense that one country could exert influence over the other by diddling with the supply of gas as russia has done with the ukraine.

china is not prepared to put itself subject to that type of leveraging, and i don't think that russia has gained that potential in this particular agreement. so within that context i think we should not assume that the rivalry factors in the sino-russian relationship have been eliminated. they're very important in central asia, for example. where the chinese supply of consumer goods has essentially driven russian goods out of the market but that russia still has knows historic relationships with the central asians. now, here's an interesting point, and i'll close on this point. we've just had this conference that putin attended called the conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in asia, or cica, if you will. at that conference president xi

jinping gave a very important speech in which he essentially addressed a major security proposal. he's talking about a collective security arrangement for asia. and there was some language in that speech that seems to be targeted against the united states. but if you look at other language, you realize this particular organization has 26 members plus some observers. and of those 26 members 19 are not in east asia. they're basically relevant to central asia. not to east asia. and president xi emphasized that no country should dominate the security of a region and all countries have a right to their security independence from other countries. was that really targeted at the united states? or was that targeted at russian security ambitions in asia? i lean toward the latter

interpretation because of the locus of where he made the speech. that doesn't mean that there were not elements that were aimed at the united states, but it suggests the complexity of the sino-russian relationship. we should be very careful to do our homework before we jump to premature conclusions. >> thank you. prime minister redden, you certainly travel to beijing a lot and have embarked upon this very ambitious project up at harvard to help think about these issues. so i wonder if maybe you would frame a little bit about how this is all seen through beijing's eyes and how you think that sets the strategic framework going forward. >> good. thanks very much. it's -- i take very much stape roy's comments about complexity. and there is -- develop complex developments into a snappy phrase which causes us to reach

false strategic conclusions. that's the first caveat which we should all apply to a serious study of international relations and strategic affairs. second point therefore which arises in my mind is when we look at both the content and the symbolism of the recent summit between vladimir putin and president xi jinping in shanghai, what does it actually mean as opposed to what everyone theorizes it as meaning? and in the grand sweep of china-russia or sino-soviet relations as it used to be, does it mean a lot? and in the -- within that frame are we looking at a dramatic event which fundamentally turns the dial in the arrangements which henry kissinger and richard nixon and mao and cho

enlai reached effectively in the 1970s, which was a strategic accommodation between washington and beijing based on a common strategic neuralgia toward the then soviet union. that was of genuine global strategic significance and the subsequent unfolding of what then became modernizing china as well. have we reached a new point at which that fundamental axis has now changed? i think personally that the shanghai meeting represents the culmination of forces which have been at work for quite some time in the china-russia relationship and the china-u.s. relationship. which begin fundamentally to alter the premises of the 1972 strategic concord. the second point i would seek to go to is how then our analysis

to one side is this reality viewed from beijing. and then finally, though i am no russophile and no russia expert and no sovietologist by training, based on recent travels to moscow i'd hazard my arm on how some of these realities are viewed from moscow as well. on the china view of reality i think it's always important to go back to the fundamental principles of what are china's abiding national interests and how it currently perceives those through the standing committee of the poll-it boo plit politbu. the first point if you were standing around the committee of the politburo at present whether it's articulated or not it's certainly assumed that the number one interest of the standing committee of the politburo is to preserve the communist party in power. it is not something that we

should simply smile about and pass on from because when you look at the current dynamics of russian politics and the russian leadership there is no critique coming from moscow, nor has there been for a long, long time. in terms of the viability, the credibility of a one-party state. and so in terms of regime fundamentals, to state the obvious, but we should restate it, you do not have a rolling critique of the fundamental nature of chinese political power under the communist system coming from moscow. and that is of some genuine comfort to china. given that the volume of critique it obtains from the rest of the world and sustaining its current political and politico-economic model. number two, from the chinese national interest point of view, is this. the maintenance of political sovereignty and territorial

integrity. well, there's nothing remarkable about that. that's the same discussions we have around any cabinet table in any capital in the world. but applying specifically to the russian question, this is of i believe profound significance. number one, the fact that in that period post-'89 starting with that epoch-making meeting between gorbachev and deng in the middle of 1999 which began the settlement process of the soviet chinese, then russian-chinese border, that has provided the fundamental long-term security from a chinese perspective about the vast expanse of 4,300 kilometers of the land border across the north. any student of chinese history will tell you that the highest levels of chinese strategic concern have always existed in terms of what comes rolling across your frontiers from the north. from the former and later hang

dynasties right through until the manchu invasions of the 17th century. and if you include japan within the wider north or frankly into the 20th century as well. the strategic significance of effectively settling the russian-chinese border, which occurred in a process beginning in that meeting in '89 and concluding with the amoa river negotiations and agreements most recently, is of profound strategic significance because the core point is this. china no longer regards russia as a threat. and this is a deep, deep question which has been resolved from a long period in history. therefore, when we look at china's territorial integrity and territorial claims, the focus is no longer on this vast

trert roo terrestrial border but on india in one direction and its maritime disputes and borders on the other with japan and southeast asia. the third national interest of china and where russia again fits into this is of course the paramount importance attached to the transformation of the chinese economic growth moltdel. the number one, number two, number three priorities of this leadership is how do you transform the model which has served komina's economic modernization from 1978 to 2012, 13 into a new model which is essentially based on domestic private consumption replacing public investment as the primary drivers of economic growth. secondly, priority also attached to the growth in the services industries as opposed to traditional labor-intensive and energy-intensive manufacturing. and number three, with a greater role for private firms in

relation to state-run enterprises into the future. this is where the bulk of this government's, this leadership in china's energies are currently focused. and therefore, where does russia fit into that? the underpinnings of the old growth model and the new growth model, and where the state's contribution has been particularly important, lies in long-term energy security and food security. and across the energy security, security of raw materials supply and food security questions, china sees in russia a potential long-term huge strategic partner. yet to be fully articulated, yet to be fully expressed, but of direct and fundamental significance to the continuation of this transforming process of china's path to economic modernity. number four is this. that within the framework of these other three sets of interests china, however, in the period since dish think we could

probably point it to october, november last year or maybe september, october last year. in a major national conference on diplomatic work articulated a new approach to its diplomacy, at least in east asia and certainly with its neighboring states.