isis wants to make into one continuous threat. one continuous state. this was a threat that you weren't dealing with back in 2000 -- >> we were dealing with it in a national form. it was inside of iraq in the form of al qaeda in iraq. and we certainly had difficulties with al qaeda in iraq. particularly you'll remember they took control of fallujah during that time and we had a big battle of fallujah back

because of what happened. what's been happening in syria as i mentioned. >> for folks who are less familiar. what's happened is -- becoming more active in the so-called sunni triangle of northern iraq opposed to the government in baghdad. and they took a foothold. you may recall earlier this year and last year, back in fallujah again and then ramadi, which is in the western part of the country, which is a sunni predominantly sunni area of the country, and now most recently

you've seen this rather spectacular attacks starting with mosul. which was always a troublesome -- >> [ inaudible ] -- chas been charged with his role in the attacks on u.s. fast tl is in benghazi, libya, on september 11th, 2012. no u.s. personnel or civilians were injured in this operation which was carried out in close coordination with law enforcement personnel. the united states has taken khatallah to a secure location outside libya. he will be brought to the united states to stand trial on a court of law. secretary hagel's proud of everyone who meticulously planned and executed this operation. they took great personal risk to fulfill our pledge that the united states will do whatever it takes to ensure justice comes

to those who warm american citizens. it is also an important reminder to the american people, as well as to our partners and our adversaries alike, that the u.s. military works every single day to be ready to carry out the orders of the commander in chief and to defense this nation. just a quick note on scheduling, as you may know, secretary hagel will testify on the budget before the senate appropriations committee subcommittee on defense tomorrow. and on thursday he will host the german minister of defense for her first visit to the pentagon since taking office earlier this year. with that i'll take your questions. >> john, can you say whether he will be coming back here to d.c. area for trial? is that the plan? and, he was living out in the open in libya for some time. i mean he's interviewed by reporters, press, last year. can you address why this took so long, and whether or not there was any, either notification, or

coordination with the libyans at all. anyone? >> okay. there's a lot there. on where he's coming back to stand trial i'd refer you to the justice department. i just -- i can't speak to that. what i can tell you is that certainly the -- we have long maintained on the consultations with libya, we've long made it clear that we were going to hold accountable the perpetrators of benghazi. this is -- should come as no surprise to anyone. least of all the libyan government. and i can tell you that they were notified. they were notified about this capture operation. on the -- i'm sorry your other one was, oh, about living in --

well, look, terrorists go to great lengths to evade capture. and, it can be -- it can be a complicated process. trying to get at them. and you don't ever want to execute a mission like this, a complicated mission like this, that you know, without -- without having the proper information and resources all in place. and so, what matters is not that -- not that it -- it -- that it took a matter of time to get him but that we got him. and i can't speak for his living habits. but let's just say for argument's sake he was living in plain sight. he's not anymore. >> for clarification the libyans were notified prior to the -- >> i'm not going to get into the -- i'm not going to get into

the specifics of diplomatic discussions. i can tell you the libyan government was notified. justin? >> admiral, on the raid itself, were any shots fired? were any combatants killed? how long were they on the ground doing this raid? and where exactly did it take place? >> as i said in the outset, there were no casualties, civilian or otherwise. as a result of this. i'm not going to get into the details of how the operation was actually executed. i'm sorry you had another one. >> how long were they on the ground? how long did it take to get this whole thing done? >> well, again, i'm not going to get into specifics on the actual execution of the operation. i can tell you that the capture took place near benghazi. >> where is he being held now? and will the u.s. military transport him back to the u.s. for his eventual trial? >> he is in a secure location

outside of libya. that's as far -- that's as much detail as i'm going to offer on that. and he's in u.s. custody. he is in u.s. custody and a secure location outside libya. and that's as far as i'm going to go. and i -- i don't have visibility into the precise you know transportation arrangements. the point is, that he's going to be brought back here to the united states to stand trial. >> who specifically was the u.s. military force that went in to get him? what was the service? >> not going to identify specific units. >> has he been read his rights? >> i'm -- he -- he's in u.s. custody in a secure location. i'm not going to get into -- i'm not -- i'm not going to get into the -- those kinds of details and again that -- that's a question better put to the justice department. not to the military. go ahead. >> why can't you get into those details? if he's charged in federal

court. >> mm-hmm. >> and you said he's coming back here. why are you -- why the -- why can't the government say who's holding him, where he's being held, and whether his rights have been read? >> there's a -- this isn't just about successful capture. this is about a legal process. and i think it's important to preserve the integrity of that process. and on the -- on the operational details as you know we don't routinely talk about many of the operations we conduct for good reason. >> but the legal process in the united states if someone is arrested, the government has to say where they're being held, you know, who arrested them, under what conditions. why is this different? >> you're perfectly willing to consult the justice department for -- for questions about the legal process. i'm not lawyer. what i'm telling you is speaking for the military. we're not going to get into the details of either the operation, or his location. >> is he under interrogation now u.s. military interrogation?

>> i'm not going to speak to the legal process here. >> what were the details of the capture? was he captured -- when he was captured was it a -- was he taken into custody without any violence? i mean i'm not asking for details. i'm asking -- >> those are details. >> characterize the nature of the capture. >> look, i mean successful. obviously successful. and i'm just not going to get -- i'm not going to get into -- into a tic toc here. i just don't think that that's -- that's appropriate right now. the important thing is, and i think the important thing for everybody to remember is, he's no longer on the streets. and he will be held accountable. he will be tried in a court of law here in the united states. i think that's the most important thing to remember. and you know, not every little tic toc detail about how it came to be. joe? >> do you think the capture of abu khatallah could lead to the

arrest of other leaders among the sharia in libya? >> as i think i said we made no secret of the fact that -- that we're going to continue to pursue those who do americans harm, including those who were involved in the attacks in benghazi. but, counterterrorism is a ongoing mission of the united states military all over the world. so, it shouldn't surprise anybody that we're going to continue to pursue these guys. >> after his capture has he taken any extra security measures to secure the embassy in tripoli? >> i would refer you to the state department to talk about security at their embassies. typically we don't talk about specific force protection measures. we do what we need to do to protect our people, and part of being able to -- part of being able to do that is to not openly talk about force protection measures and to be able to change them from time to time. i certainly wouldn't comment for that.

>> admiral, on iraq, there's been some reports that isis controls some air defense systems, including potentially american-made stinger missiles. as this department prepares options that you've talked about for the president on iraq potentially can you confirm that and can you talk at all about what their anti-air system position might be right now? >> this is -- you're talking about the isil? yeah. i can't confirm, as i said yesterday, i can't confirm specifics about what owe equipment or systems they possess. clearly we know that as they have moved, and taken over places, and some bases, that they have captured some equipment. we don't have a perfect invent other of that. the iraqi government is investigating all that. i would remind you then that this is their property, not ours. but we don't have a perfect visibility and on stingers i

have seen no firm indications that they're in possession of that particular system. >> yesterday you announced that there was going to be some flight support going in to iraq. i'm wonder iing is that going t be at baghdad international. is that in addition to service members at the embassy compound? is there also going to be a contingent or small footprint -- >> you say announced flights? >> flight support. >> flight support. well, look, i mean you saw the president advised notified congress under the war powers act that a number of up to approximately 275. so i can break that down a little bit for you. we talked about this over the weekend. there was some static security personnel that were that were sent to augment security in baghdad particularly at the embassy. and it's a -- it's a mix but it's of forces, but it's roughly

about 160 or so. that are there, providing what we would call static security. to assist there. and there is another 100 or so that will be forward stationed that are forward stationed outside iraq. to be ready in case there's a need for them. and one of the things that this group does, and so proficient at is airport management and security, that kind of thing. but they are outside iraq. they're available if needed. outside iraq right now. >> do those include contingency response airmen to help set

up -- >> i'm not going to detail the each of the every unit. i've gone about as far on the detail that i intend to go. there's about 100 that are outside iraq. part of their mission is to, to, to provide airport management services and support. >> they're available to go in to iraq or available for a larger mission? >> i think without getting into hypotheticals, they're available for a wide range of missions inside their skill set. not all of those missions have to be inside iraq. nancy? go ahead. >> you're not going to answer it. >> 875, they're included in the 175 which is -- >> i'm not -- i'm not -- we -- we typically don't talk about hypothetical future operations. they're there, they they are prepared and trained and ready should they be needed. to go inside iraq.

they aren't right now. and i'm i just you know i don't know how i can better answer a mission or a request that has that hasn't happened. >> you were making it sound before like they were going to support from outside of iraq. that's all i was trying to clear up. the president said 275 in the war powers act. there's 100 or i don't know how many more the number changes every three hours it seems like. last night it was 179 you're saying it's closer to 160. >> if the war powers -- you said up to. up to. it didn't say absolute ceiling. so that's one thing. and number two, and if i was unclear, i'll state it again. they are there outside of iraq. they are not in the country but they are ready if they're needed to be called on. and because of that, because they had to be forward deployed, and to be prepared, it required notification. did that get any closer?

>> you said earlier that libya had been notified but tripoli's hold on eastern labor yeah is tenuous at best. can you give us details on who in the libyan government was notified? also i'd like to know how much the general as far as operations in eastern libya had an effect if any on this operation and finally if you go back to the question about the that he was able to move freely in libya for two years, were there any previous attempts to try to capture him, if you could give us any more as to why it took more than two years to go after someone who was operating openly in benghazi? >> let me see if i can remember them. i won't talk about the details of diplomatic discussions. i'm not going to talk about the specifics of the operation, so on your second question about heftar i'm tim ply not going to go there. now on your third one, i mean, you know, there's -- the presumption in the question is

that, is that, you know, he was going to mcdonald's fob milk shakes every friday night and we could have just picked him up in a taxi cab. i mean these, these people deliberately try to evade capture and, and putting yourself in a position where you can properly i.d., and move against them takes a lot of planning. and i don't think anybody's going to apologize for the effort over such a long period of time that eventually led to his capture. i mean, again, let's not miss the major point here. is he's captured. he's not on the streets of benghazi. >> simply whether you've tried once before. >> i don't have -- i don't have any information on that. frankly i don't know how it's relevant to the fact that we got him today. >> the second question can you

just say whether libyan forces at all were involved? >> unilateral united states mission. i'll come to you. >> on that point i know you can't get into the details of the operation but can you give us at least a sense of timing, was it night time, everynight? what time on sunday. and why would it take you know i know that there is some operational security issues getting him out of the country but why two days to announce that this operation -- >> the operation took place over the course of the weekend. the actual physical capture was sunday afternoon our time. i'm sorry your other one was? why did it take two days. well, look, as i said, to i think it was craig, this isn't just military operation. this was very much an interagency effort.

and there is a legal component to this. a judicial component to this. and we have to respect the integrity of that process. and so, it just that process required taking a little bit of time before we could talk about it. plus, we had to be -- we had to also make sure that that those involved that their security and safety was looked after, as well. >> you said a couple of times judicial component. prevented you the military from acknowledging this, and it prevents you from talking about it in detail. can you tell us specifically what that judicial component is, what is it in the law that prevents you -- >> i didn't say -- i didn't mean to convey that there was some legal prohibition. was i said was there's a process. there's a judicial process, i'm not an expert on it.

i mean i'm -- but -- >> -- prevents you from speaking about this? >> we're speaking about it now. >> you declined several times to offer details on the basis of the judicial process and judicial component. >> and -- and also good ground on operational security. >> it's over now though so what -- >> there are lots of operations that are concluded that we don't ever talk about. >> you have referenced judicial component and judicial process. i'm simply asking what is the judicial process or component -- >> there's an integrity to the process by way an individual is taken to trial. we're going to respect that process. as part of that process we're going to protect certain information. and part of that information that we're going to protect is the details of this operation. >> what legally is the basis -- what -- what have they told you why you can't talk about it legally? >> i will refer you to the department of justice for that answer. yeah? >> in his recent statement

attorney general has said -- he said that we have conducted a thorough unrelenting investigation across continents. and now once they have conducted the investigation, why are we still holding back on -- we are talking as if we are just pick them up without any investigation. >> i'm not sure i understand your question. >> my question is that -- >> you want more information? >> -- statement and that they have i'm quoting him. an unrelenting investigation across continents, and so if the investigation by department of justice has been done, why are we not getting more details about this person? >> well -- it's a justice department investigation, so, i'd refer you to them to speak to them. our role -- now wait a second now. our role was participating in this operation, which we did. which we did successfully. without anybody getting hurt. and a real bad guy is no longer

walking around. benghazi. and i think we just need to focus on that. and i don't -- and i'm i'm simply not going to get into the operational details at this time. i'm just not going to do it. and it doesn't -- it doesn't matter if this justice department investigation is complete or not. that's not for me to speak to. >> are you continuing your like we will have more arrests in the coming days, weeks? >> i'm not going to -- i'm not going to get ahead of -- of -- of operations that haven't happened yet. i said at the outset where we're we've never lost a focus on those that wish us harm. we've never lost a focus on the perpetrators of benghazi. we've never lost our focus on counterterrorism. not in the past 13 years. >> you said the capture operation itself is unilateral but did any libyan force or militia play any role in facilitating it, whether it had to do with information coming out of libya, and on iraq, on do any of the options you're preparing for the president get

complicated or foreclosed upon by the length of time it's taken to make a decision. >> no to your second question. and, no to your first question. it was a unilateral military operation. that was the easiest two i've had all day. >> going back to iraq have any additional transport or strike aircraft been moved into the region to give the president more flexibility and more options? >> not that i'm aware of. >> joe? >> we have seen today a military report saying that despite the u.s. has the capability to strike iraq in few hours, as of now, the u.s. military doesn't know what exactly what are the targets to strike. do you agree with that? or if not, do you -- could you confirm that the u.s. military knows exactly what who where to strike -- >> the question presumes that the president's already made a decision to conduct air strikes and he hasn't. so, look, i've said it before, our job is to provide options,

viable, credible options to the president of the united states, the commander in chief, he makes those decisions, and, and whatever decisions he makes and by the way you know we're also all assuming that that military options are the only options available to him and that's not the case either. but should the president decide to use the military tool in whatever way that he decides to do it we'll execute smartly and efficiently. i'm not going to go beyond that. let's pick somebody else. >> let's say the president does choose to use the military tool. >> oh, good negotiation hypothetical. i love it. >> -- break the momentum of isis what quantifies as a successful operation at this point in time. if it's not you know, if you can't disperse some of the violence going on what's the backup plan? >> well you just jumped two or three steps there, didn't you? look, i -- the where we are right now in the process is that

the national security team continues to meet and to discuss and to review options available to the commander in chief. not all of those options are military. some of them are. the president hasn't made final decisions right now. and we have to preserve that space. for him to do that. so while it's an interesting hypothetical exercise and the questions you pose, you know, again, interesting questions, but i we're not we're not at that stage where we can answer those. our our job house far has been to provide him viable options, we're doing that, done that, discussions are ongoing and then when there's something to announce i'm sure the president will do that. tony? >> well -- you saying well isis or isil is about 30 miles outside of baghdad right now and yet you're still mulling

options. question of this, does this building now feel that the iraqi security forces have stiffened their resistance and they're breaking the momentum on the isis momentum on their own? or do the people you consult with, are they concerned that this group is going to penetrate baghdad fairly soon? >> we're watching events unfold, we're watching it as closely as we can. you are right that there are elements of isil not very far from baghdad. we also have reason to believe, certainly indications, that the iraqi security forces are stiffening their resistance and their defense. and are coalescing, particularly in and around baghdad, and that's encouraging. and so i mean i it's hard for me to to to speak for the intent of isil. but it does appear as if, as if

those iraqi security forces, and shia militia members that are assisting are stiffening their their defense of baghdad and the surrounding area. >> just giving the white house and the national security effort some breathing room to consider options more? >> i think -- i think i would just say that, that, that, that everybody on the national security team understands the -- the sense of urgency there in iraq and the seriousness of the threat, and and they're having the discussions in that context. you know, understanding fully that, you know, this is a very serious threat. and it's and it's and it's i know where you're going i mean this this this isn't about breathing space. it's about making measured deliberate decisions that that make the most sense. and it's a complicated issue. everybody understands the seriousness of the threat. everybody believe me everybody has noticed the speed with which

isil has moved inside iraq. but that doesn't mean that you -- you rush to a decision. and again, that's -- that that's space belongs to the commander in chief not to the pentagon. our job is to give him options. >> you're seeing some resistance the iraqi forces are fighting back. this is not like the last night of the alamo where baghdad's going to fall. you're seeing some stiffening resistance. >> i said that. we're seeing indications certainly that, that, that iraqi security forces in and around baghdad are stiffening themselves, they're -- they're being assisted by shia militia members. and it certainly appears as if they have the will to defend the capital. >> one question on the raid. was it a conventional force or special operations force that went in and did it? >> i'm not going to get into the details. >> why can't you do that? -- if the pentagon would be more transparent about counterterrorism operations. this is one example.

>> i have to tell you i you know i don't think you're going to find a federal agency that is more transparent and open than the military than the pentagon. i know you don't like that, and i know you don't agree with it. but i can tell you it's true. i mean we're as transparent as we can be. but, but part of our job is to defend the united states and the american people and sometimes that means not talking about what we're doing and how we're doing it. >> special forces -- special operations forces are conventional. i mean as opposed to saying delta force, i don't know where they're getting that, not asking you to acknowledge that. were they special mission units or conventional military? >> i'm not going to talk about the specifics of the operation or the units involved. eric? >> when you talked about the, the militia, the shia militia playing a role can you quantify that in some way in terms are we talking about scores, hundreds of fighters, and are these militia that are have been in iraq or are they some of the militia that have been recalled -- >> i don't -- i don't have perfect visibility on these guys i mean we just have indications

that they are that they are engaging, and i would be loathe to put a number on it eric i mean this isn't it's not like we get nose counts of these guys. but clearly we have indications that they are -- that they are -- that they are finding common cause with the iraqi security forces in this regard. but again i, i wouldn't be able to speak with any specificity about that. >> -- general is directing any of these militias and what role is he is playing with the qods force? >> i have nothing on that. i have nothing on that. richard? >> [ inaudible ] under war powers the president set up to 275. >> yeah. >> the 100 special operators are they included in that 275 or are they in addition to? >> i did not say they were special operators. and, i guess -- let me try -- let me try -- no i mean -- i mean i clearly i have not done a

good job of explaining this so let me try it again. over the weekend, we flowed into iraq, and it took -- you know, it -- it took the weekend to get everybody in. but roughly, about 160 troops. these are security assistance troops. mixed services. and i'm not going to break it down by service or by unit. to provide security assistance to the embassy and associated facilities. as they, the embassy, re-evaluated security there, and as they, the embassy, relocated mostly within side iraq some personnel. we did not transfer those personnel. we did not ferry those personnel. these troops were sent to provide additional security assistance because of their job

they had to be armed. because they were armed, there was a requirement to notify congress. in addition to that 160 or so, there is another 100 troops that have been staged outside of iraq. they can conduct lots of different missions. one of them is airport management but another one is security. they are there as a contingency force. they are there to be ready if they're needed to go inside iraq if required. that doesn't mean that they will. but because they, too, are armed to defend themselves, they were included in the war powers notification to congress. bringing the total to of about 270, the document said up to approximately 275. so that's the math. that did that do a better job of it? that better? >> your statement yesterday said 170, today you're saying 170. >> 160, 100, 260, 270, it's

about 160, to 170, okay. i mean i don't have the exact nose count. but it is in keeping with the notification that went to congress. not going to talk about their specific location outside iraq. how many isil did you estimate are operating in iraq? >> i've said it before, we don't have a perfect number. but i think it's in the thousands. it's in the thousands. it is pretty broad. >> 5,000 -- >> it's in the thousands. yeah. >> do you have a request to army presence in kuwait. you have a brigade there. an aviation brigade. is there any conversation using them as part of the options you're contemplating for iraq. >> army routinely deploys as you know a rotational brigade in and out of kuwait.

that rotational presence continues. they're available for a range of contingencies across central command region. they're there. >> potentially evacuation assistance? they're available for a range of missions, louie. and there's been no request about the state department to conduct evacuations. and i would remind you that you know even when you know when the state department does decide to do evacuations wherever it is in the world they turn immediately and first to the military power to help us with that. >> the humanitarian crisis in iraq, and is doing u.s. to provide some relief to the displaced people? >> i'm not going to get ahead of decisions the president hasn't made. again we're watching the situation in iraq very, very

closely. military has provided options to the president to consider, we need to let that process go. >> about half million is moving in the kurdish area. do you have any assessment of the -- impact -- >> i do not. i do not. no. >> beyond president obama's rule about putting troops on the ground in iraq for combat roles but under the osci, operation are there any limits to what the u.s. military could do in iraq? >> the osci mission, office of security cooperation. the key being cooperation, that's a small group, they've been less than 200, have been in iraq since the end of the combat mission in 2011. they continue to be there. their job is to help train advise and assist the iraqi security forces. that's a job that we believe is still relevant, and they're still doing that. >> are there any limits to what they can do in iraq --

>> well, they have -- they have a clearly defined role, which is to help train advise and assist that's what they do. and that's the scope of their mission. that's the scope of their mission. the president was very clear. he's not considering a new combat mission for american troops inside iraq. that's been very clear. yes. >> on that benghazi, the pub members of congress, of course, set up a special committee to look into the whole affair. in one of their main criticisms, you know, forever, has been that the perpetrators of this, the original attack, were still walking around, this touches on lida's question on nancy's question we're still walking around benghazi, libya, out in the open, now that khatallah has been captured do you think this should take or would you hope that this should take some of the steam out of their investigation, the special committee work, and so forth. >> that he's been captured that it would take steam out of the -- >> one of their main criticisms has been that the perps have not

were not brought to justice that they were wand iring around out in the open, where everybody could see them they were talking with reporters. >> i think look i -- i -- i'm not going to get into political debate here. the message that this sends is pretty strong. as i said at the outset to the american people, to our friends and partners, but also to our adversaries that we we take these threats seriously, and we're going to hold you we're going to hold you accountable and i think the capture over the weekend and i'd like us not to forget that the larger issue here the successful capture of this individual sends that signal in the strongest possible sense. i mean if you need a tangible demonstration of our commitment, ask abu khatallah. yeah. [ inaudible ] >> is he in military custody then? >> pakistan admiral you're been pressing pakistan for so long to wroot out the safe havens now that operation has begun how

would you rate success in terms of u.s. haves? >> i think the operation as you said just began and i'm we're not going to certainly rush to judgment here on how it proceeds. i think it's a testament to the degree to which pakistan and the united states and afghanistan have a shared threat and a shared challenge to deal with. and we obviously hope that that the operation that the pakistani military is conducting is successful because it does you know it does represent a common enemy. and again i i said it before it it's worth reminding i mean that we recognize that the pakistani military has taken casualties in this fight for many years. this isn't the first time that they've conducted operations there. and, the recent attacks in karachi at the airport i think are a very stark reminder of how the threat affects the pakistani people. so again we wish them well and you know, we're we look forward to seeing them succeed.

>> [ inaudible ] >> you'd have to talk to the pakistani military about their intent and objectives. i'll take one more. >> -- on ensuring that the militants who might be fleeing from pakistan into afghanistan -- >> there is daily constant communication between the isaf forces under general dunford and pakistani counterparts on various levels and i won't -- i won't get into details about the specifics, on this particular operation. but communication with the pakistani military continues. and must continue. phil this will be my last one. >> the pakistani army -- here in washington has he asked for any help in the operation or in dealing the aftermath of the operations? >> not that i'm aware of. >> admiral the army has identified the officer that's going to look into sergeant bergdahl's disappearance a couple of years ago and we got as part of that announcement that he will talk with sergeant

bergdahl. what's his reintegration process is finished and he's prepared to be debriefed and have those discussions. do you know if that is when that investigation is going to begin or is he going to start now and then get to bergdahl at some point down the line once he's ready to talk? >> i'd really point you to the army on that. i don't want to speak for their investigative process but as you rightly said they did name an officer to do this. and i think they made clear that they want him to be as thorough as he needs to be and take as long as he needs to take to get it done. obviously a key part of that will be talking to sergeant bergdahl at the appropriate time. i mean let's not again let's not get ahead of ourselves here. he's just now in phase three of reintegration he's got a long road ahead of him and i think secretary hagel has made it clear our first priority is his health and well-being. the investigative process we'll get to at the appropriate time. thanks everybody, appreciate it.

a reminder if you missed any of this pentagon briefing, it's available in our video library to watch at c-span.org. a number of questions at the briefing today about iraq, news this afternoon that president obama has summoned house and senate leaders to the white house to discuss the situation in that country. senate republican leader mitch mcconnell telling reporters today that he, majority leader reed, house speaker boehner and house minority leader pelosi have been invited to the white house tomorrow by president obama. that coming as reports out of iraq today that an explosion in baghdad's shiite sadr city district has killed ten people. also quite a few questions about the news today regarding the captured libyan militant suspected of carrying out the attacks in benghazi in 2012. the associated press writing that the president says the man suspected of killing americans in benghazi will face the full

weight of the american justice system. his capture marks the first apprehension of an alleged perpetrator in the 2012 attack that killed u.s. ambassador chris stevens and three other americans. and reaction coming in from capitol hill today. in today's to today's news rather on benghazi. the chair of the house foreign affairs committee ed royce saying i am encouraged that ahmed abu khatallah has been captured. this is overdue considering that this individual has made himself available to multiple media outlets in the 19 months since the deaths of four americans. and house speaker john boehner saying it is obviously good news that this terrorist is now in american custody. and i expect the administration to give our military professionals time to properly gather any useful intelligence he has. elsewhere on capitol hill today, a senate committee held a hearing looking at false advertising of weight loss products.

well-known cardiothoracic surgeon and television host dr. mehmet oz was among the witnesses. he was questioned this morning about the use of flowery language in advertising by committee chair claire mccaskill. here's a bit of that exchange. >> now, here's three statements you made on your show. you may think magic is make believe but this little bean has scientists saying they found the magic weight loss cure for every body type. it's green coffee extract. quote, i've got the number one miracle in a bottle to burn your fat. it's raspberry ketone. quote, garcia campbogia it may be the simple solution you've been looking for to bust your body fat for good. i don't get why you need to stay this stuff because you know it's not true. so why, when you have this amazing megaphone, and this amazing ability to communicate, why would you cheapen your show by saying things like that?

>> well, if i could disagree about whether they work or not. and i'll move on to the issue of the words that i used. and just with regard to whether they work or not, take green coffee extract as an example. i'm not going to argue that it would pass fda muster if it was a pharmaceutical drug seeking approval. but, among the natural products that are out there, this is a product that has several clinical trials. there was one large one, a very good quality one that was done the year that we talked about this in 2012, listen i -- >> i want to know about that clinical trial. because the only one i know was 16 people in india that was paid for by the company that was in fact at the point in time you initially talked about this being a miracle, the only study that was out there was the one with 16 people in india, that was written up by somebody who was being paid by the company that was producing it. >> well this paper argued that there was no one paying for it. but i have the four papers, five papers actually plus basic

science papers on it as well. but senator mccaskill. we can spend a lot of time arguing the merits of whether bean coffee extract is worth trying or not worth trying. many of the things we argue you do with regard to your diet is likewise criticizable. a low fat diet, low carb diet. i spnt a good part of my career recommending that folks have a low fat diet we've come full circle in that argument now and no locker recommend that many of us who practice medicine because we realized it waejt working for ourn patients so it is remarkably complex as you know to figure out what works for most people even on a dietary program. even in the practice of medicine we evolve by looking at new ideas, challenge orthodoxsy and evolving them. when i hold these are the five papers these are clinical papers and we could argue about the quality of them very justifiably. i can pick apart papers that showed no benefit, as well. but, at the end of the day, if i have clinical subjects, real people, having undergone trials, and in this case i actually gave it to members of my audience it wasn't a formal trial.

it was just -- >> which wouldn't pass -- the trial you did with your audience you would not say that would ever pass scientific muster. >> i would never publish the paper. it wasn't done under the appropriate guidance. that wasn't the purpose. the purpose was to get a thumb nail sketch. is this worth talking to people about or not? again i don't think this ought to be a referendum on the use of alternative medical therapies because if that's the case i've been criticized for having folks come on my show talking about the power of prayer. now again, as a practitioner i can't prove that prayer helps people survive an illness. >> it's hard to buy prayer. >> that's the difference. >> prayer is free. >> yes, prayer is free. that's a very good point. thankfully prayer is free. and so -- but i see in the hospital when folks are feeling discomfort in their life and a lot of it is emotional when they have people praying for them it lightens their burden. so my show was about hope. i wanted and as you very kindly stated we've engaged millions of people in programs including programs we did with the cdc, to get folks to realize that there

are different ways that they could rethink their future. that their best years aren't behind them they're in front of them they actually can lose weight so if i can just, get across the big message that i actually do personally believe in the items that i talk about on the show. i passionately study them. i recognize that oftentimes they don't have the scientific muster to present as fact, but nevertheless i would give my audience the advice i give my family all the time and i've given my family these products specifically the ones you've mentioned that i'm comfortable with that part. where i do think i've made it more difficult for the fdc is in an intent to engage viewers you use flowery language, i use long that was very passionate, but it ended up not being helpful but incendiary and provided fodder for unscrupulous advertisers. and so that clip that you play, which is over two years old, and i've done hundreds of segments since then, we have specifically restricted our use of words, we

i literally not speaking about things i would otherwise talk about. there's a product i've never talked about in the show that i feel very strongly about because i know what will happen. i will say something very, in fact we did a show with syrup which you did not bring up. south american root that had a big study published on it. i think a very high quality study where they showed not only did it help people lose weight but more importantly helped their health. it was done in women who were diabetic, was not funded by industry. and we talked about it and i used as careful language as i could. and still, there were internet scam ads picking one or two supportive words. of course i support them i wouldn't be talking about it otherwise. it still ended up out there. >> listen, i'm -- i'm surprised that you are defending -- i mean i've tried to really do a lot of research in preparation for this trial and the scientific community is almost monolithic against you in terms of the efficacy of the three products that you call miracles.

and when you call a product a miracle, and it's something you can buy, and it's something that gives people false hope, i just don't understand why you need to go there. you've got so much you do on your show that makes it different, and controversial enough that you get lots of views. i understand you're in a business of getting viewers. but i really implore you to look at the seven -- and i would ask you to look at the seven list that the ftc put out on the gut chuck. the seven -- it's very simple. causes weight loss of two pounds or more a week for a month without dieting or exercise. causes substantial weight loss no matter how much you eat. causes permanent weight loss like you said, looking for it to bust your body fat for good. if you just look at those seven, and if you spend time on your show, telling people that this is the seven things you should know, that there isn't magic in a bottle. that there isn't a magic pill, that there isn't some kind of

magic root or berry or raspberry ketone that's going to all of a sudden make it not matter that you're not moving and eating a lot of sugar and carbohydrates. i mean i >> senator mccaskill, i know the seven. i say those things on my show all the time. >> why would you say something is a miracle in a bottle? >> my job, i feel on the show, is to be a cheerleader for the audience. when they don't think they have hope, when they don't think they can make it happen, i want to look and i do look everywhere, including alternative healing traditions for any evidence that might be supportive to them. you pick on green coffee bean extract. with the amount of information i have on that, i still am comfortable telling folks if you can buy a reputable version, i say this all the time. . i don't sell it and this is not for long-term use. it's one pound a week over the duration of different trials that have been done. that happened to be the same amount of weight lost by the 100 or so folks on the show who came on.

half of them got a placebo. we got fake pills, gave it to half the people, real pills to the other half. it's sort of the same thumbnail. i'm looking at the rough idea. if you can lose a pound of week more than you would have lost doing the things you do already. you can't sprinkle it on kielbasa and expect it to work. but if that trial data is your life and get a few pounds off, it jump starts you and gives you confidence to keep going and following the things we talk about every single day and the seven items and i think it makes sense. >> that was a portion of today's hearing. we'll show you the whole thing later today beginning at 5:00 p.m. herein here on c-span3. tomorrow general mottoers ceo mary barra testifies before a house committee about gm's internal investigation related to the company's ignition switch recall. in april miss barra declined to answer many of the questions posed by lawmakers during hearings saying she wanted to wait for findings of that internal investigation. that report released earlier this month cleared miss barra

and executive team of any wrongdoing but criticized the bureaucracy in which senior managers shirked responsibility and lower level engineers either concealed or overlooked vital information. you can see that hearing wednesday live at 10:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span3 and throughout the hearing we are interested on your thoughts on miss barra's testimony. weigh in on our facebook page or at twitter. >> so the idea of 250 and 250 is instead of trying to sell the entire history of st. louis as a time line or like era by era, we would absolutely miss vitally important things, so instead of trying to do that and failing, we decided what if we just gave snapshots of st. louis history that would give people a glimpse of all the diverse things that

happened here and use their imaginations to fill in the rest. so we chose 50 people, 50 places, 50 moments, 50 images and 50 octobers and tried to choose the most diverse selection we possibly could. we're standing in the 50 object subject of the 250 and 250 exhibit right now and this is what most people would call the real history. this is where the object is right in front of you. brewing is such a huge part of st. louis's history. it's an amazing story with lots of different breweries and, of course, the most famous became anheuser busch with the largest in the world. and in the era of anheuser busch talking about millions of barrels produced each year, so much beer, this is from an era when things were a little bit simpler and fun to show people this object and kind of gauge their response. in the days before they had cans or bottle caps, they put corks in the top of the bottles and

somebody had to sit on this you can see it's got foot pedals on the bottom. that's where the operator pushes down with the feet for force to get the cork in the bottle and three different holes for three different sized bottles. >> this week, the history and literary life of st. louis, the gateway to the west, on c-span2's book tv and c-span3's american history tv. stephen pifer said sanctions did not have an impact on russia's actions in ukraine and spoke in washington on monday on news that russia cut off the gas supply. zbigniew brzezinski said it will be a bourd. jane harman gives introductory remarks. >> good morning. i'm jane harman, president and

ceo of the wilson center and as i always say, a recovering politician. it is not a 12-step program. but i'm very happy and fortunate to be in this role. i do want to recognize u.s. ambassador to egypt robert bekroft. i think he is here. welcome, sir. and to underscore the title of today's event, which is, "mutual security on hold? russia, the west and european security architecture." this conversation could not come at a more important time with the events in ukraine looming large on the global agenda. i was thinking about it earlier, and i suppose one piece of good news about the assault of the isis extremist organization in iraq is that russia is distracted. what is russia distracted by?

ukraine. and the disintegrating relations with europe, its disintegrating relations with europe and the u.s. a downing of a military transport plane in east ukraine on saturday created outrage in kiev. the russian embassy there was substantially damaged by an angry mob. fortunately, the event was diffused by the foreign minister of ukraine, although comments he made there has obviously gone viral. at any rate, no one really believes that russia isn't meddling and fomenting instability and makes it much harder for the recently elected president to stand up a effen t effective, transparent and corruption free, let's try that, government for the first time in ukraine's history. i observed the election on the

national democratic institutendi delegation led by madeleine albright. we had a chance right before it to meet with the candidates and porosh enko said the right things and my personal wish he's able to be successful. today's event is really although ukraine will be a focus, to celebrate the role of the munich security conference and other organizations like the osce and the wilson center paying close attention to russia and other major security challenges. bill son center invested in these issues for 40 years. they founded the cannon institute in 1974. it's the center's oldest program. and our global europe program led by christians of traman on today's panel or moderating it, the home of the newest

distinguished scholar. we have 1,400 scholar alumni worldwide and 100 of them on the ground right now in ukraine. i met several of them and 3 of them work in a small office we still have in kiev. so, who better to keynote our program than someone who knows a lot about this region, ambassadors br 1kezinski. we worked together. i didn't work for him but he was the big shot. i was the small shot. in the carter white house. in another century. when somehow the problems seemed a little easier other than hostages in iran and a few other things. but zbig continued to think carefully about the strategic challenges in the world and and has in my view written some of the most important books that

give the rest of us tools to think about those. during his tenure in the carter bhous, he managed the normalization of relations with china, the signing, brokering of camp david accords, the encourage of disdents in eastern europe and the fallout from the 1971 iranian revolution, although that didn't resolve until after president -- immediately after president carter left office. he's currently the senior research professor at johns hopkins but i actually think he's the second most important member of his family. after mika. after zbig's talk, former u.s. ambassador to ukraine steve pifer will make some comments. steve and i testified together a few weeks ago before the senate foreign relations committee which is focused intently on what strategies could be successful in ukraine. but before any of that happens, let me introduce wilson scholar,

ambassador wolf gang ischinger to talk about the munich security conference's most recent anniversary volume. wolfgong chaired the conference since 2008 following a very successful career in germany's foreign service where he was a deputy foreign minister, ambassador to the u.s. during the 9/11 period and then ambassador to the uk. the book that he produced which was released at this past february's conference includes chapters written by various folks. i was honored to write the chapter on non luger and last year to be involved in a celebration of senator sam nun for his enormous contributions in the area of nuclear security. the conference each february is the security event in the world. our congress sends a major delegation there and i think i'm up to year 14 attending it.

one last thing about wolfgang before i introduce him, among his other extraordinary accomplishments, he is, of course, a grandfather. but he's also a father of a 9-year-old. and so i've been waiting, wolfgang, to wish you happy father's day. please welcome ambassador wolfgang ischinger. [ applause ] >> thank you so much, jane. and thank you, zbig and steve and of course christian, for allowing us to have this session here this morning. both jane harman and zbig brzezinski were of course participating again once again after many sessions at the munich security conference earlier this year, and i remember that you, zbig, participated in a session on

ukraine at a moment when many of us were still considering ukraine a problem of ukrainians. and, of course, now it's become a problem of not only european but global dimensions and we'll talk more about that. so thank you for allowing me just to make a few brief remarks. i want to sort of present to you this book. there are outside in the hall a few copies of it. and there's also a sheet where -- if you want a copy, you can order a copy from a u.s. distribution company. it's actually -- if i may say very modestly, a really good book. i know of very few other collections of essays that offer such a comprehensive overview of

foreign policy and global affairs. we have in this book contributions from -- and i'll just give you a few names. from igor ivanov, chuck hagel, john kerry, helmut schmidt, bill cohen, senator mccain, sam nunn, joe nye, jim hoagland, jim stavridis, nato secretary general rasmussen. but also, you know, non-americans like klaus naumann. carl bildt. of course, most importantly, jane harman. so buy the book. it's worth reading it. there are really some -- some real gems in the book. and i'm -- i am proud that we --

we worked on it for almost a year to come up with something on the anniversary of munich. for those of you who have not had a chance to be in munich, let me just make one comment about the munich security conference. it is at its core a transatlantic event. there are not many events around the world annually where you will find up to ten active u.s. senators and a number of members of the house in one place for two days all together. that's a rare thing to see. i've checked with many of my american diplomatic colleagues, and it's something that doesn't happen very often. so there's strong participation, not only by all u.s. administrations since the 1960s, but by the congress, by those in

the congress who lead on foreign policy, is a huge asset for the conference. the conference was founded by ewald von kleist who for those of you who don't know who he was, he was until he passed away last year, the last surviving member of the group of people who tried to assassinate adolph hitler in 1944. and he had a -- quite a story to tell about how he escaped death and how, unfortunately, the attempt in 1944 failed. just one or two words about our topic before i hand over to our keynote speaker, dr. brzezinski. i had this opportunity to spend a few weeks in ukraine on behalf of the osce chairman in office during the month of may leading

up to the presidential elections in ukraine. i have to tell you that i did not meet many separatists. and i tried very hard. i went all over the country. and i found that there was huge dissatisfaction, enormous dissatisfaction, by many citizens with the conduct on their own government over the last decade or so because of corruption, because of lack of unity. either there was somebody from the east running the country from an eastern point of view, or there was somebody from the west running the country from a western point of view, et cetera. but i did not encounter a great deal of support for the idea that ukraine should be carved up. neither, by the way, did i find a lot of fascism or anti-semitism. which is something that russian propaganda has tended to suggest over the last period. so we need to be careful that we don't let ourselves be driven into the wrong direction.

second point, my view, and i expect that dr. brzezinski and ambassador pifer will hopefully correct me if i'm wrong, my view is that russian action on ukraine has not been an action motivated by strength and strategic sense, but more out of weakness and, in a way, almost out of a sense of panic that certain things were sort of drifting apart, that russia thought was important for them. my russian friend, dmitri trenin, who represents the carnegie endowment in moscow has recently said russia has three options now. unfortunately, the only good option is the least likely one. he said the first option the russians have is

self-improvement, self-reliance, more democracy. that's not very likely. the second option is that russia will tend to rely more and more on military options. certainly not a big war, but fomenting unrest, continue to foment unrest in ukraine and maybe in other crisis spots in europe and beyond. and the third option for russia, as dimitri put it, is for russia to leave the west and to go more to china, which they've already tried in a certain way. but that would be tantamount to russia surrendering to china. and would also not be such a good option. so my -- i tend to agree with dimitri. russia has a problem. and has created a problem by the very behavior which we have seen.

finally, let me say that transatlantic coordination on how to deal with the ukraine, on the sanctions issue and beyond, has actually been relatively good. we have stayed together. on the day i left kiev, i asked the prime minister of ukraine, what, if he had one wish, what would it be from the west? and he said to me, and i think i'm authorized to quote him, he said, ambassador ischinger, there's one thing you need to do. make sure that everybody understands that what we need is western cohesion. don't allow yourselves to be falling apart once again within europe and between europe and the united states. we've actually been quite good at it. but it's not been easy. and one of the reasons why it's not easy, if you look at certain elements of the german and european public, is the loss of

trust created by the, quote/unquote, snowden, nsa affair. that is a handicap currently. and i keep saying it while i'm here in this country. you shouldn't think that it will simply blow over. it is a -- it continues to be a serious handicapping factor for european governments trying to work with the united states in handling these types of emergencies. last point, you might think looking at ukraine that this ambitious title, "toward mutual security," was maybe an illusion. i believe, and i'm interested in hearing what our speakers will have to say, i believe that even if this is now a vision that is more remote than we thought two or three years ago it would be, it's still an appropriate vision

for a future where europe is not going to be as divided as it is currently between the west and russia. but where we will have a europe whole and free. including with a security architecture that works and with a kind of relationship of mutual trust that would help us to renew relations with russia in months and years to come hopefully. with this, i stop and hand over to our keynote speaker, dr. brzezinski. [ applause ] >> president harman -- that sounds pretty good, doesn't it? distinguished panelists, it's a pleasure to be here.

let me try to discuss the implications for the european security architecture of what wolfgang ischinger just addressed. namely the problem of the relationship of russia to the west and ukraine. what we are seeing in ukraine in my judgment is not a peak but a symptom of a more basic problem. namely, the gradual but steady emergence in russia over the last six or seven years of a quasi mystical chauvinism. putin has taken the lead in this. and it has a great deal of content that is significant for the totality of russia's relations with the world and the west in particular. recently, the russian international affairs council,

an institution in moscow composed of very reputable and significant scholars, not dissidents, but independent thinkers, and these do exist these days in moscow, has come up with a report on russia's national identity transformation and new foreign policy doctrine. and it reports in some detail on the process of creating a wholly new conceptual framework for defining russia's relationship with the world. a relationship that the russians feel is needed because of the collapse of the soviet union and the partial disintegration of the long-established russian empire. it's a longish report, but it's worth reading for those who are interested in international affairs.

it deals particularly with several key concepts. that this new view of the world contains. a view of the world created by the need of russians around putin and putin himself have felt for a more comprehensive interpretation of what is the nature of russia's position in the world and its relationship with the world and the west in particular. it's in this context that the ukrainian issue then becomes significant. and the key concepts are that this report written by a group of people of some prominence in moscow involves four basic concepts. that of, and i quote, a divided people. secondly, the theme of, quote, protecting compatriots abroad, end quote. then more broadly, the russian world. russkiy mir, in russian. and the importance of

acknowledging and sustaining, embracing and promoting, quote, the great russian civilization. i mention this because i think it will be an error to think that crimea and ukraine are just the products of a sudden outrage. they are to some extent in terms of timing. it would have been much smarter for russia to have what has been happening happen about ten years from now when russia would be stronger, economically more solid. but it happened. and these concepts are important. a divided people is the point of departure for the chauvinistic claim that russia's sovereignty embraces all russians. wherever they are. and that has, for anyone familiar with european history, some ominously familiar sounds.

prior to world war ii. it leads, of course, to the concept of protecting compatriots abroad. and that has special meaning for those countries which do have russian ethnic nationals living in their society and who border on russia. the divided people and the protecting of compatriots abroad then raises the question of the russian world. and the notion here is of an organic, integral unity between all russians irrespective of their territorial location. and there's that territorial location can be altered favorably in reuniting the russian people. think of the baltic states. last but not least, the conviction that russia is not part of the western

civilization. is also not a part of china. it is not part of the muslim world. russia itself is a great civilization. a world civilization. which emphasizes a set of principles, some of which are not unfamiliar to our own society, such as, for example, strong commitment to a particular religion, but much stronger than in the west where religion is part of a more complex social arrangement. the notion that the great russian civilization stands for certain basic values, not only religious, but in terms of interpersonal relationships, to some extent. for example, condemning some of the changes in the relationship between the sexes and within the sexes that are now taking place in the world. in effect, russia protects the integrity of certain basic beliefs that have characterized

christianity, but in the russian view, christianity is now betraying or permitting to slip away. so this is a comprehensive outlook. and an ambitious outlook. and an outlook which justifies, then, the conclusion that russia is a world power. and nothing has hurt putin lately. in some of the international dialogue with the west than the words of president obama which credited russia with being a significant regional power. he didn't have to say more in order to score a point that hurt. that is, therefore, an important point of departure for dealing with the ukraine issue. the ukraine issue is not a sudden peak, but a symptom, as i have said, of a basic problem. the emergence of the policies packaged within the larger

philosophical framework, which i've described. what can we, therefore, expect? if ukraine, in fact, is its manifestation, that problem will be difficult to resolve. and i think it will take time to resolve. but, of course, resolution of it need not be a unilateral solution if the west has a stake in it. and the stake has to be, then, crystallized into meaningful policy. the ukraine problem may fade if it is contained. and especially if the russian increasingly cosmopolitan middle class which is surfacing, but not dominant currently, becomes politically more important, perhaps repelled by its sense of vulnerability and disappointment

in putin, and at some point assumes a more significant political role when putin has passed from the stage. but when? there's no way of predicting it. it could be soon. it could be a long time. but also a great deal will depend on whether what ukraine has become as a symptom, becomes a success or a failure from putin's point of view. so in brief, the stakes are significant. in the most immediate sense, the stake involves, of course, the issue that the use of force in crimea and the ongoing and sustained effort to destabilize parts of ukraine pose as a threat to the post-world war ii notions of international arrangements, and particularly, the exclusion of the use of force in resolving territorial issues. that has been a cardinal assumption of the european order after world war ii. and russia has been part of it, including through the treaties that it has signed.

but it now is challenging that. that is a significant threat. in a broad sense and an immediate threat. psychologically, at least, but potentially, in view of crimea, militarily. to the baltic states. to georgia. to moldova. and more vaguely indirectly, but perhaps potentially more successful than the others, belarus because belarus does not have any external protection. the others that i have mentioned do in varying degrees. it follows from what i'm saying that the ukrainian problem is a challenge that the west, by which i mean the united states and europe and the nato particularly, must address on three levels. we have to effectively deter the

temptation facing the russian leadership regarding the use of force. we have to deter the use of force, more simply put. we have to secondly obtain determination of russia's deliberate efforts at the progressive or continuing destabilization of parts of ukraine. it's very hard to judge how ambitious these goals are. but it is not an accident that in that one single portion in which the russians actually predominate, one single portion of ukraine in which they actually predominate, the use of force has been sophisticated. the participants in the effort have been well armed. even tanks. certainly effective anti-aircraft weaponry. all of that is something that

even disagreeable -- disaffected citizens of a country to which they feel they do not belong would be storing somewhere in their attic or in their basement. these are weapons provided, in effect, for the purpose of shaping formations capable of sustaining serious military engagements. it is a form of interstate aggression. you can't call it anything else. how would we feel if all of a sudden, let's say, the drug-oriented gangs in the united states were armed from abroad, from our southern neighbor, by equipment which would permit violence on that scale on a continuing basis? so this is a serious challenge. so that is the second objective. and the third objective is to promote and then discuss with the russians a formula for an eventual compromise, assuming that in the first instance the use of force openly and on a

large scale is deterred and the effort destabilized is abandoned. that means, in turn, the following. and i will be quite blunt regarding my own views on the subject. ukraine has to be supported if it is to resist. if ukraine doesn't resist, if its internalist order persist in its capacity to organize national defense doesn't transpire, then the ukraine problem will be resolved unilaterally, but probably with consequential effects that will be destabilizing in regards to the vulnerable states and to the totality of the east-west relationship. for the forces of chauvinism, the forces of a new sort of world self-definition will

become more strident. and they do represent the most negative aspects of contemporary russian society. a kind of thirst for nationalism, for self-fulfillment, gratification of the exercise of power. something which is not pervasive in the new middle class, which is the longer range alternative. but which is a certain notch on top of political influence. if ukraine has to be supported so that it does resist, the ukrainians have to know the west is prepared to help them resist. and there's no reason to be secretive about it. it would be much better to be open about it and to say to the ukrainians and to those who may threaten ukraine that if you resist, if you ukrainians resist, you will have weapons. and we'll provide some of those

weapons in advance of the very act of invasion. because in the absence of that, the temptation to invade and to preempt may become overwhelming. but what kind of weapons is important. and in my view, they should be weapons designed particularly to permit the ukrainians to engage in effective urban warfare of resistance. there's no point trying to arm the ukrainians to take on the russian army in the open field. thousands of tanks, an army well organized for some purposes, overwhelming force. but there is a history to be learned from urban resistance. in world war ii, and most recently in grazny, chechnya, which persisted for three months in house to house fighting. some moving examples from world war ii which i do not need to reiterate.

the point is, if the effort to invade was to be successful politically, it would have to incorporate taking the major cities. if the major cities, say kharkiv, say kiev, were to resist and street fighting became a necessity, it will be prolonged. and costly. and the fact of the matter is, and this is where the timing of this whole crisis is important, russia is not yet ready to undertake that kind of an effort. it will be too costly in blood, paralyzingly costly in finances. and would take a long time and create more and more international pressure. so i feel that we should make it clear to the ukrainians that if you are determined to resist, as they say they are and seemingly they are trying to do so, though not very effectively, we'll provide them with anti-tank

weapons, hand held anti-tank weapons, hand held rockets, weapons capable for use in urban short range fighting. this is not an arming of ukraine for some invasion of russia. you don't invade a country as large as russia with defensive weaponry. but if you have defensive weaponry and you have access to it and you know it's arriving, you're more likely to resist. and hence that acts as a deterrence. and that in turn can permit them or effective operations to terminate some of the violence that is being sponsored on the borders between ukraine and russia. that, i think, would help in any case to contain the risk and the temptation to resolve this issue by form of arms. on the russian side, in the context of a mood of great ecstasy over the crimeaen success which was quick and decisive and which encountered no resistance, the temptation to seek its repetition can be quite strong and appealing to a political leader who desperately

needs a major success. but at the same time, we have to engage in some exploration of possible arrangements for compromise outcome, especially if it becomes clear to the russians and to mr. putin that either destabilizing ukraine or taking it by force poses great risks and may not be attainable. that has to be accompanied, therefore, by an effort to engage in a dialogue. what should be the formula for such a possible compromise? i think it's relatively simple, in fact. ukraine can proceed with its process, publicly endorsed by an overwhelming majority of ukrainian people, of becoming part of europe. but it's a long process. the turks have been promised that outcome. and they have been engaging in that process. already for 60 years. in other words, it's not done very quickly. therefore, the danger to russia is not imminent and the negative consequences are not so

destructive. but at the same time, clarity that ukraine will not be a member of nato. i think that is important for a variety of geopolitical reasons. if you look at the map, it's important from a psychological, strategic point of view. and ukraine will not be a member of nato. but by the same token, russia has to understand that ukraine will not be member of some mythical eurasian union that president putin is trying to promote on the basis of this new doctrine of a special position for russia in the world and special claims outside of russia, vis-a-vis some of its fellow natives. ukraine will not be a member of the eurasian union, but ukraine can have a separate trade agreement with russia. particularly taking into account the mutual benefits of the fact that certain forms of exchange

and trade are mutually beneficial. agricultural products, for example, from ukraine to russia. industrial products that russia needs and are being produced in ukraine. not many people realize that some of russia's best rockets, most of the engines for russian civil aviation, and some of the rockets used by the united states are produced in ukraine. it's a profitable and successful industrial enterprise. and that, therefore, should be continued under an arrangement whereby ukraine and russia have a special treaty. i think something like this might actually at some point become appealing. and it should be surfaced, but it should be surfaced in the context of an open, not covert, but an open action designed to convince the russians that any use of force will have negative, but enduring, consequences for russia itself.

not involving a threat to russia's security, but involving rising costs of the assertion of russia's power at the cost of ukrainian independence. in my view, in that context, nato should also act somewhat more assertively in reducing the insecurity of those nato countries that border on russia and happen to have on the average about 25% of its population constituted of russian nationals. i speak specifically of estonia and latvia. america has committed its presence there. i would think it would be very productive if, in addition to america, some leading european states, notably germany, france and great britain, deployed some symbolic forces in these three countries. so that they're there, too, and not just americans. on a regular basis. on a regular basis. so that this would reaffirm the

fact that nato stands, in the context of this problem, together. in international politics, symbolism is as important as decisiveness. and symbolism can avert the necessity for extreme measures. given the current consequences of the very massive expansion of nato in the last several decades to 28 members, it might be also appropriate in the light of the ongoing experience that we are in the process of assimilating to take another look at the structure of nato itself. and i have in mind particularly a review of the historical paradox involved, and it's not much mentioned and it is not much mentioned but potentially very important article 5. article 5 is the article which provides for the procedure that the alliance follows in

undertaking a military response to an aggression directed at it in general or at one or two or more of its members. you doubtless recall that article 5 has a provision that decisions to engage in hostilities by the alliance have to be unanimous. which, in other words, means that a single country has a veto. it was the united states that insisted on this provision when nato was first formed. it insisted on it in order to obtain popular support from it in the american congress from the isolationist portions of the american body politic. which feared that an alliance of this sort would violate american tradition of no foreign entanglements. the argument was this gives

america what it needs to avoid a foreign entanglement. unfortunately today, with 28 members, a varying degree of capacity for participating in military action, and unfortunately of some varying degree of genuine political commitment to some of the security assumptions of the alliance, the situation has become reversed. it is some of the new allies that may be tempted in some circumstances to invoke article 5. would be persuaded to join. or defacto, taken out of the alliance. but i think it would be wiser to review this provision in a more patient atmosphere, in spite of the circumstances that prevail

today. one possible solution might be simply the adoption of note of the provision that there will be no veto right in the alliance for sustained, enduring, underperformers of jointly agreed commitments. some members of nato don't meet their commitments even by some remote approximation. they just do not. and hence, their membership in nato is a free ride altogether. why should a member that doesn't meet nato commitments practically in total then have the right to veto the members, the other members right to engage in collective self defense? it is an anomaly and potential source of gridlock and confusion. as this crisis is gradually resolved, i hope nato will take another look at it and will also

look at the issue of additional new members in nato, more critically. it doesn't follow that the country in whose security nato has an interest has to be in nato. nato can have an interest in the security without having it in nato and have a variety of understandings regarding how it might respond. there is some talk of new members in the eu. and perhaps, some of these will seek nato membership and the recent years some countries obtained nato membership and being territorially remote from the possible conflicts on the east/west dividing line. i think more discretion here may be actually beneficial and some reflection on this subject might, in fact, enhance nato credibility and create some pressure on those members who wish to be active members in nato to do more to meet the commitments they have formally undertaken.

finally, and looking much fourth i aide hrks i think one way or another, with or without a solution, crimea is going to become a serious economic burden for russia. there is no way that the kind of economic activity in which crimea has been able to engage and quite profitably named as a major source of tourism and visits and international liners on a large scale coming into its ports and foreign tourists engaging in trade, collection of souvenirs and so forth can be sustained, as long as the international community doesn't formally recognize the incorporation of crimea into russia. it means that the exploration of the underwater resources within crimea's territorial confines of the sea cannot be undertaken by international companies because

they'll be subject to suits from a variety of interested parties. in brief, russia faces the prospect of the necessity of subsidizing on a significant scale economic activity in crimea to the benefit of its citizens. prices, consumer prices, have already risen threefold since the incorporation of crimea into russia. this situation creates a potentially serious liability for russia, which already is in a relatively weak economic position. beyond that, there is the potential reality, which i think will take on the enduring fact as ukraine succeeds, that russia in the process has created the enduring reality of hostility to russia on the basis of some 40 million people.

unlike others, ukraine has not been under russia historically and certainly, there is no comparison between its attitude traditionally that is russia and that of the poles next door. the poles have repeatedly fought for their independence against the russia and have strong feelings and enduring feelings on this subject. an myty to russia is new but it's becomer very intense and the entire new generation of ukrainians born in freedom and national sovereignty reflected the strongest. ukraine, therefore, will evolve not an enduring problem for russia in that respect, but the permanent loss of a huge swath of territory, the greatest loss of territory, suffered by russia in the course of its imperial expansion. this may, in turn, eventually begin to work against this new mythology regarding russia's place and role in the world with which i started my presentation.

it may be refuted by realities. and this is why i am increasingly hopeful for that the new emerging russian middle class realizing that the kind of mythology that putin has adopted and which a significant portion of the less educated, more chauvinistic russians have absorbed and embraced is a road to nowhere. that the real place of russia as an important country is in europe, as a major european country, and they'll be reminded of that imperative every time they look to the east and ask themselves, what does that mean for the future of russia? thank you. [ applause ] >> thank you so much, dr. brzezinski, for these brilliant remarks, very clearly laying out your views on russian motivations and western actions.

we now have the privilege to have comments by ambassador stephen pifer. the drikts to be ocht brookings arms control and nonproliferation commission. served for 25 years in the state department including as ambassador to ukraine from 1998 to 2000. ambassador pifer. thank you to the woodrow wilson center for inviting me here. it's awfully hard to follow dr. brzezinski when he covers such a broad bit of history, of current history and does it in such comprehensive and such terrific terms. some of my comments will be mainly underscoring points that he made. i would agree completely that the thing the west needs to do is support ukraine. it seems to me that the best rebuke to the kremlin's policy of the last six months would be if three to four years from now ukraine is looking each day more and more like poland, a normal

democratic rule of law european country. i think the west can do things to help make that happen in terms of economic support, advice on things like energy diversification, which is going to be a real issue today with gazprom's decision to reduce gas flows to ukraine. i would second his point about provision of military assistance to ukraine. certainly, nonlethal assistance makes sense. but light anti-armor weapons and manned portable air systems make sense in terms of making sure the russian military, which i believe is not eager to go into eastern ukraine. i think they worry precisely about the urban fighting dr. brzezinski described. they are not eager for that. we ought to be providing weapons to the ukrainian military to, in fact, affect that calculation. particularly, in the case of manned portable air defense systems, there is almost sort of an obligation for nato which over the last ten years has been running programs to destroy stocks of ukrainian manned pads.

a second direction is the point of assuring nato countries, particularly those in central europe, who today are much more nervous about russia, russian policies and russian actions than they were six months ago. the u.s. military has deployed four companies, 150 troops each to countries. i think that's a good response. the pentagon says it is persistent and will last up to a year. i think having ground forces like that which do not have heavy equipment, do not have significant offense capability but are a tangible signal that america's commitment is important. i would agree it would be useful to have them joined by european forces. for example, a german company paired with the american company lithuania and a dutch township paired with an american company in estonia to make clear to russia that the commitment is a nato commitment. it's not just an american commitment.

and again, i think it can be done in a way that would not be provokttive very much like the berlin bre gad and its british and french counterparts 30 years, vastly outnumbered by soviet and east german forces and still manage to keep west berlin free by their presence. the third area i think the west needs to work on and perhaps needs to work more on is the question of sanctions of russia. the goal of sanctions should be to change russian policy. there's evidence now that suggests that the sanctions to date are relatively modest have had an economic impact on russia. for example, russian companies in 2013 were able to sell foreign currency bonds worth about $830 million. january and february they sold those bonds for about $6 billion. since march they sold zero. i think the sanctions are successful in their economic impact. but they have failed in their

primary political purpose which is to affect a change of policy in the kremlin. i worry that the west has not handled the sanctions process well. the last day on which the united states and the european union announced sanctions together at the end of april, the russian stock market gained 1.5%. i would suggest that is not a positive signal for the effect of those sanctions. may 2nd, president obama and chancellor merkel said if russia interfered with the may 25 presidential collections, there would be substantial sanctions. they can not participate in the election because of activities by armed separatists supported by moscow. we have not seen any punishment for that. in the g-7 when they met in normandy said there would be additional sanctions over the course of the next month if russia stopped being part of the problem. but again, i think we have seen continued problems including the introduction of heavy weapons on the part of the separatist

tanks, missile launchers as evidenced by the shootdown of the ukrainian aleutian 76 on friday. so i think the west needs to be tougher in terms of imposing costs if we are going to try to encourage the russians to shift their policy. the last point i think is it does seem to me if the russians are prepared to be a part of the solution, you can see the elements of a compromise. the government in kiev talked about decentralization of power and political authority, which makes sense. governors in the region should be elected, not appointed by the president. they've talked about some status for russian language which addresses some of the concerns expressed by those in the east. there is talk of early parliamentary elections which would be a good step. it would revalidate the democratic legitimacy of the ukrainian parliament in the way

the may 25 election gave the president a new democratic mandate. as dr. brzezinski suggests, you can see the elements how ukraine orients itself in terms of foreign policy, drawing closer to the european union, but not pursuing nato. i would try to craft language that said -- not ask ukraine to say no how, no way, never, but you can make clear to the russians that nato is not on the agenda for the foreseeable future. the most important reason ukraine would want to pursue that is not a foreign policy reason. that would be usually controversial within ukraine. president poroshenko is trying to find a way to mend internal divisions. he does not need the controversy that nato would provoke with eastern ukraine. it's not going to be addressed early on. my own analytical judgment is it's very hard to see a scenario in which ukraine is able to regain sovereignty over crimea

but that does not mean the west should accept it and the west should continue a policy of nonrecognition until such time, if and when the ukrainians decide to do something otherwise. but that can be an issue that you perhaps put down the road. the other pieces here might put together a basis for a compromise that would help mend the divisions within ukraine and i think could be an acceptable way forward, but i think the big question here is at the end of the day srks that still acceptable to russia? i'm not sure the russians are happy with just ukraine saying no nato. i think russians are still unhappy with the idea ukraine wants to draw, and this is not just the president but the parliament and the ukrainian people a that they want to draw closer to the european union. when you look at the association agreement and what that agreement does and if, and it's a big if, if the ukrainians were to implement it, but if ukraine implements the eu association

agreement, it is out of moscow's political orbit. i think that still remains a sticking point for the russians. >> thank you very much, ambassador pifer. i think we want to quickly get to your questions and quickly g questions and comments, but get ready. before we do that, i would like to give ambassador issuing an opportunity to respond. >> very little to add for the brilliant presentation, and steve, thanks for your comments. just a few brief points i would like to add from my point of view. first, in a way, and i mean this only half cynical, we can tail thank you, vladimir putin for reminding us that there is a good reason for having nato. nato was in the process of getting off the radar screen a little bit of major -- of the major european and transatlantic

debate. now it's back on the radar screen, and that's good. second, president putin by doing what he did reminded european there's an overwhelmingly good reason to trying to get our act together to speak with one voice for the eu to be a political actor that can exercise a significant role, as it should, representing 500 million people. third, i think these events are in the process are already reenergizing the debate did how best european countries, including my own can unburden itself from two great a dependency on energy imports from russia. that's all pretty good.

the second point, when you discuss delivery of extension of support, including weaponry to ukrainance, the one problem i believe we would run into is the ukrainian military is in terrible shape that is not the fault of staff. they've understaff and under equipped, and it will not be easy to make something of the sorry state of the military to work efficiently as a military body. next point, deploying nato forces to eastern nato countries like poland or the three baltic

states, we will at the wilson center -- in fact i could make an advertisement. in a couple days, the new german defense minister -- and i'm sure somebody is going to ask her that question, whether germany should or could join those who have already taken some steps the one word of caution i would add is that we should think twice before we violate the promise we made in the context of the nato/russia founding act almost 20 years ago when we said that we would not permanently deploy major combat troops in the new -- among the new nato members. now, i think this can be handled. major combat groups is something that is -- can be interpreted, but sending for -- sending a

smaller force, sending a few airplanes, is probably not a major combat force. i think even symbolic acts would be helpful in the sense as dr. brzezinski has suggested. finally, one point that has not been mentioned i believe merits broadband mentioned. president putin has not only un -- has not only challenged the european security architecture as dr. brzezinski described it, he has also presented a challenge to the very idea of europe integration, to the idea of europe. is it not amazing that not only the post-communist leaders of west european parties, including the linka in my own country, is

traveling to moscow to conduct discussions with russian leadership. that's normal, but it is very surprising, certainly to me and i'm sure to many in my country, that many other right-wing leaders in europe have discovered that vladimir putin is their hero, the hero of something that rejects overcoming the nation state, that looks for nationalistic leadership. there is a strange -- these are strange bedfellows, the european right wing and president putin. and in my view, this is a rather fundamental challenge to the very concept of europe. i'll stop here. thank you very much. >> thank you so much. let's go to your question and answers. if you could please wait for the microphone, it's coming right there. we'll start with president

harmon. >> thank you all. i remember you talking in the cabinet meetings of the carter white house, and i think it was your warm-up act of the this was just magnificent. thank you very much for coming here. my question is about an organization that got very little mention, but wolfgang recently spent a lot of time connected to it. that is the osce secretary-general was here about a month ago, and it was at the roundtables in ukraine that wolfgang chaired that are credited, to some extent, with really encouraging ukrainians to participate in the election. it is true, as am bar to pifer said that some in the eastern part of ukraine couldn't participate, but the turnout was above 60%, better than our elections. my question is could the osce, a security organization which includes russia, but which operates by consensus, play a

bigger role in negotiating an outcome here that would be satisfactory both to the west and to russia and benefit ukraine? >> thank you. >> i suppose it should, but probably at this change, on the subrosa -- in other words, the discussions were informal, bakley not open to the press and conducted in private. right now we're not at the stage at which it is likely they could lead to something positive, but certainly the doors should be open to that. so i think it's desirable. could i make just two comments on what was said earlier? very briefly on the arms. the arms are -- the ones i'm talking about are dutch urban warfare, they cannot be use offensively against russia, so

there's no reason to say these provocative to russia. it doesn't require a lot of mill their sophistication. if the military is, as you say, as they rightly are, civilians could participate in it. i can regale you with stories on how they were surprised, and certainly in world war ii there were stories of urban warfare that endured, so it's easy to convey don't an easy walk in. it will be painful, costly, prolonged. one more aspect that pertains to what you asked, jane, right now the russians are really in a phase in which they are trying to mobilize global support of western reactionaries. that's what you referred to. the interesting thing about the western reactionaries is that they like the kevin of what the

russians describe as the reduction global civilization. that is to say, errant modernist modernistic, it's socially reactionary. it's kind of drawn inward, but very self-righteous. this is what makes the new western right-wingers all of a sudden the equivalent of the old western left wingers who loved communism. so we're seeing a flip around here, but my guess inned change in character, particularly the change of character in the middle class in the big cities will spell the doom of that once two things happen. putin is not successful milit y militarily asserting himself, and two at some point one way or another is no longer the central player. >> thank you very much. >> i just might -- i think it remains to be seen whether osc could play a role. i think it depends on how the

russians approach this. certainly if you did have a settlement. it would seem the monitors could be hugely important. that whatever accord is worked out would hold. >> if i may, one brief word on that. we had on the 17th of april a meeting in geneva between john kerry, sergei lavrov, the european union and the ukrainian gov. so far that was unfortunately only a one-time event. in my view it is highly desirable that a second geneva, geneva 2, as we've continued to call it, should take place, and osce i think is a good organization to support and help implement the kinds of decisions that were leadership in